In the proposed draft position the author claims that the challenged provisions of the Act of 13 October 1998 on Social Insurance, insofar as it takes no account of the situation in which the day of death of the decedent was considered to be the date when the court decision declaring the person (for whom social security contributions were collected) dead was made, do not conform with the Constitution. In her opinion, in order to achieve compliance of the above-mentioned Act with the Constitution it would be sufficient to take into account – as a precondition – the suspension of the limitation period due to the death of the decedent. The author notes that in would be at risk of irrationality for the Constitutional Tribunal to adjudicate on both examined provisions, as it is difficult to consider the issue of suspension of the limitation period in relation to the claim for undue contributions when the limitation period has not yet started.
The limitation period plays a crucial role in any legal system. It is commonly used in the fields of criminal and civil law. As for the administrative law, the regulation was introduced partially and in an inconsistent way. The Polish Constitutional Court pointed out, that one cannot claim its right or even expectative for setting up the limitation period in the field of administrative law. Nonetheless, once introduced in the legal system, the limitation period has to fulfill the require- ments resulting from the Constitution. As for the energy law, the limitation period was introduced in 2015 by providing the reference to the provisions of Tax Code. However, the reference to the provisions of Tax Code concerning the limitation period were partially removed just one year later. The reform of Administrative Procedure Code introducing inter alia the rules for the limitation period of impos- ing and executing administrative penalties, was supposed to provide the general provisions applicable to all persons and legal entities. Nevertheless, due to the inconsistent regulations contained in multiple legal acts, such as the Energy Act, the usage of limitation period still casts doubt.
The text will present arguments raised by the supporters of two different positions regarding the manner of taking into account the expiry of the limitation period, namely those that are supposed to speak in favor of taking this circumstance by the courts ex officio, and those which prevail to take it into account only in the event of raising the plea of limitation by the one against whom the claim is due. Against this background, a polemical analysis will be made with these arguments, including inquiries about interests of which entities or social groups are implemented and protected for each of these solutions. It will be shown that some of the arguments put forward actually emphasize that the institution of limitation is to serve not so much as a party involved in a given claim (creditors or debtors), but rather institutions of the judiciary. It will also be shown that the solution currently in force in Polish civil law, within which the taking into account of the fact that a given claim is time-barred is possible only if the one against whom the claim is entitled raises the relevant claim of limitation, in fact prefers only the more affluent and better educated social strata, deepening the social exclusion of those who, due to, for example, worse property status, do not have the necessary knowledge, nor can afford to take advantage of legal aid. The latter, in effect, often do not plead the expiration of limitation period, because they do not know that they are entitled to it (in general, or are unable to assess when the claim became due, at which point the limitation period began or has ended). Polish civil law is a good example here for considering, firstly, that in the 20th century the regulations concerning the limitation of claims were changed several times, and each time a discussion on how to consider the expiry of the limitation period came to life (which provides rich argumentation with which one can confront) and also because historical and political entanglements play a significant role here. Namely, the text will show that the main resistance against taking into account the expiration of limitation period ex officio (which is a solution that protects the poorer people who can not afford legal assistance) is due to the fact that this solution, which was in force in the original version of the current Polish Civil Code, was modeled on the solutions of Soviet law. This means that after the political change in Poland in 1989, it was automatically attempted to eliminate it, and replace it with a solution used in European countries, where only if the one against whom the claim is entitled raises the relevant claim of limitation, even without any reflection on the substantive legitimacy of such a change and without analyzing the practical social effects of a solution, within which the expiry of the limitation period only is taking into account on when relevant plea is raised, not ex officio. Immersion of considerations in the realities of Polish law will also allow to show interests that have recently clashed on the occasion of the regulation of electronic writ-of-payment proceedings. In this example, it will be shown that despite the legislator making certain facade measures to protect the interests of people with less legal awareness and poorer, who can not afford to get help from a lawyer, in fact, many gates have been left, which question the reality of striving for such protection, because they allow to sue for the claim after the expiration of the limitation period in this proceeding. In this context, the latest change in Polish civil law in this area was also discussed, that is, the Act of April 13, 2018. On the basis of this Act, there has been a return to taking into account the expiration of the limitation period ex officio, but only if the entrepreneur sue the consumer. In the remaining scope, a solution was left within which the expiry of the limitation period is taking into account only when relevant plea is raised.
The article addresses the issue of interrupting the running of the limitation period through the initiation of mediation. First, this issue is analysed in the context of other circumstances provided for in the Civil Code, which may interrupt the running of the limitation period but frequently provoke controversy. These examples are used to demonstrate that interpretative difficulties arise in respect of the initiation of mediation proceedings as well, as an event interrupting the running of the limitation period. Such difficulties are primarily due to the fact that while Article 1836 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) states that mediation proceedings are initiated from the moment one of the parties serves the mediator with a petition to conduct mediation proceedings, there is no regulation addressing the matter of formal defects in the petition; legal scholars take diametrically opposing positions in respect of whether it is possible to remedy these defects and initiate the mediation process, and whether the running of the limitation period can thereby be interrupted. In addition, Article 1836 § 2 CCP is another source of uncertainty as it provides for a range of circumstances in which the proper serving of the petition does not lead to the initiation of mediation proceedings. The article subjects these regulations to thorough analysis, with particular attention paid to the impact of these situations on interruption of the limitation period on claims (including assessment of the justifiability of such legal solutions and with reference to the views of scholars, as well as de lege ferenda remarks). Mention is also made of issues associated with the limitation period in cases where the court directs the parties to engage in mediation.
PL
Artykuł dotyczy kwestii przerwania biegu przedawnienia roszczeń przez wszczęcie mediacji. W artykule poddano analizie ten przypadek, przedstawiając go najpierw w kontekście pozostałych przewidzianych w Kodeksie cywilnym przyczyn przerwania biegu przedawnienia, które budzą liczne kontrowersje, i na tym tle pokazano, że wątpliwości interpretacyjne powstają także w odniesieniu do tej przyczyny przerwania biegu przedawnienia, zwłaszcza jeśli chodzi o mediację inicjowaną przez stronę. Wynikają one przede wszystkim z tego, że choć zgodnie z art. 1836 § 1 k.p.c. wszczęcie mediacji następuje z chwilą doręczenia przez stronę mediatorowi wniosku o przeprowadzenie mediacji (z dołączonym dowodem doręczenia jego odpisu drugiej stronie), to jednak nie uregulowano prawnie sytuacji, gdy wniosek taki zawierał będzie braki formalne (a poglądy doktryny co do tego, czy możliwe jest ich uzupełnienie i wszczęcie wówczas mediacji, a co za tym idzie – przerwanie biegu przedawnienia, są diametralnie zróżnicowane). Ponadto źródłem wspomnianych wątpliwości jest też art. 1836 § 2 k.p.c., w którym ustawodawca przewidział cały szereg przypadków, w jakich pomimo prawidłowego doręczenia wspomnianego wyżej wniosku nie będzie dochodzić do wszczęcia mediacji. W artykule poddano je dokładnej analizie, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem wpływu takich sytuacji na przerwanie biegu przedawnienia roszczeń (w tym oceniając zasadność tych rozwiązań prawnych oraz odnosząc się do poglądów doktryny i zgłaszając uwagi de lege ferenda). Podniesiono także kwestie wiążące się z przedawnieniem w przypadku, w którym to sąd kieruje strony do mediacji.
Artykuł poświęcony jest analizie zagadnień intertemporalnych związanych z wejściem w życie z dnia 10 czerwca 2014 r. o zmianie ustawy o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów oraz k.p.c. Sformułowano w nim propozycję wykładni przepisów dotyczących aspektów prawa międzyczasowego odnoszących się do poszczególnych znowelizowanych instytucji ustawy o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Regulacja intertemporalna ustawy nowelizującej została zestawiona z dotychczasowymi unormowaniami w tym zakresie w poprzednich ustawach antymonopolowych oraz ustawach nowelizujących.
EN
This paper deals with the temporal aspects resulting from the Act of 10th June 2014 amending the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection and the Code of Civil Procedure (“Amending Act”), which influence the interpretation and application of various legal institutions of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection.
Commentary analysed abovementioned judgement of Supreme Administrative Court which deals with a problem of the effectiveness of delivering to the taxpayer information on the suspension of the limitation period for tax payment as a result of initiation criminal proceedings in connection with the suspicion of committing a crime or a penal fiscal offence. The authors are critical of the arguments used by the court in justifying the judgment.
PL
W glosie przeanalizowano uchwałę Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego, która dotyczy problematyki skuteczności doręczenia podatnikowi informacji o zawieszeniu biegu przedawnienia zobowiązania podatkowego na skutek wszczęcia postępowania karnego w związku z podejrzeniem popełnienia przestępstwa lub wykroczenia skarbowego, w sytuacji gdy popełnienie przestępstwa lub wykroczenia wiąże się z niewykonaniem tego zobowiązania. Autorzy krytycznie odnoszą się do argumentacji użytej przez sąd w uzasadnieniu uchwały.
Limitation periods represent a legal safeguard for a person who has once broken the law in order not to be put at risk of sanctions and other legal liabilities for an indefinite amount of time. By contrast, public interest can sometimes require that a person who has committed a serious breach of law cannot benefit from limitation periods and that it is necessary to declare that the law had indeed been infringed and that legal liability shall be expected irrespective of the passage of time. This article aims to answer the question whether limitation periods for sanctions attached to competition restricting practices by Slovak competition law also limit the powers of its competition authority to declare the illegality of illicit behaviour or to prohibit it. Although this question can arise, and has done so already, as a defence in antitrust proceedings, as well as the fact that an answer to this question can potentially, as well as actually, affect rights of undertakings which have broken competition rules, Slovak jurisprudence cannot be seen as explicit in answering this question.
FR
Les délais de prescription représentent une garantie juridique pour éviter que celui qui a violé la loi soit pour toujours exposé à la contrainte d’une sanction ou d’un autre type de responsabilté juridique. Toutefois, dans certains cas, il est dans l’intérêt public que la personne qui a gravement enfreint la loi ne puisse pas bénéficier du délai de prescription et qu’il soit possible de constater la violation du droit et d’engager la responsabilité juridique. Le présent article essaie de répondre à la question fondamentale, celle de savoir si les délais de prescription prévus, dans le droit slovaque actuel, pour infliger des sanctions pour accords limitant la concurrence ou pour abus de position dominante sont, également, en situation de limiter la compétence de l’autorité slovaque de la concurrence de constater l’illégalité d’une démarche d’une entreprise ou sa compétence d’interdire une telle démarche. Même si cette question peut être posée, ou a déjà été posée, en défense contre les démarches anti-cartel et la réponse à la question peut, potentiellement mais aussi réellement, avoir une influence sur les droits de l’entreprise qui a violé les règles de concurrence, la jurisprudence slovaque donne une réponse claire à cette question.
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.