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Sobre el carácter heterogéneo de las connotaciones

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EN
Our objective with this study is to present the specific nature of semantic connotations understood as such characteristics of lexical items which evoke affective, emotional, evaluative or cultural associations in the users of any language. We would like to present a few of the many classifications and propose our own typology. This procedure will permit us to demonstrate that these hidden meanings are in many cases individual, but some of them can be disseminated and decoded in the same way by large groups of speakers. Furthermore, we would like to stress that these connotative attributes have highly complex structures and it is difficult to establish a fixed framework in which we could encompass them.
Human Affairs
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2007
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vol. 17
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issue 1
22-32
EN
Normative pragmatists about linguistic meaning such as Sellars and Brandom have to explain how norms can be implicit in practices described in purely naturalistic terms. The explanation of implicit norms usually offered in the literature commits pragmatists to equate actions with naturalistic events. Since this is an unacceptable consequence, I propose an alternative explanation of implicit norms that avoids this identification. To do so, one has to treat the normative-intentional concepts such as "norm", "action", "sanction", "belief", "desire" as a holistic system, in the sense that one has to apply all of them to a given naturalistic practice simultaneously. This result might be taken to imply that the pragmatist strategy of explaining the content of assertions and beliefs in terms of norm-governed use is misguided because it presupposes that one can account for the concept "norm" independently of the concept "belief". I argue that this consequence does not follow.
EN
The paper traces how disappointment with the notion of linguistic meaning has led to a shift towards the new, technical term of “narrow content”. In the first part of the paper I analyze the ways “narrow content” is understood in the literature. I show two important distinctions which have to be applied to the term in order to avoid confusion – the difference between context and functional theories of narrow content, and the difference between mental and linguistic narrow content. I argue that the most controversial combination of both distinctions is the idea of functional linguistic narrow content. In the second part of the paper I show that, contrary to the initial impression, this controversial, cut back notion of narrow content sheds some much needed light on several key semantic phenomena which we might otherwise be unable to explain – and because of this can be seen as a rightful descendant of the notion of meaning.
EN
The article introduces theories of epistemic justification to the problems of under-standing in communication. Two dominant approaches in contemporary epistemolo-gy—foundationalism and coherentism—are applied in intercultural discourse. Since the intended meaning of utterances in communication is reached through inference, beliefs about the intended meaning are justified with respect to the evidence of communicative behaviour and context. Tracing the difficulties of intercultural dialogue, the article ar-gues that the coherentist method of justification is more useful than foundationalist one. Coherentism is consistent with the open-mindedness and unprejudiced reasoning, both of which are crucial parts of intercultural competency.
EN
The author first reconstructs standpoints adopted by the scholars from the Poznan-Szczecin schoolof legal theory regarding the linguistic meaning of a legal norm. This reconstruction allows certaindilemmas related to the adoption of analytic philosophy in the theory of law to be visualized. Inthe next section of the article, attention is paid to the influence of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s philosophyon the understanding of linguistic meaning within the School. The problem of linguistic meaning may be explained by the definition of equivalence, the core of which is a set of directivesof a specific language. Finally, the author comments on the theses of Robert B. Brandom’s analyticpragmatism and the application of the latter to legal theory of Maciej Dybowski. Analytic pragmatismextends semantic research through an attempt to understand practice-related conditions.
PL
Autor rekonstruuje stanowiska przyjmowane w ramach tzw. poznańsko-szczecińskiej szkoły teorii prawa (Szkoła) dotyczące znaczenia językowego normy prawnej. Pozwala to na unaocznienie pewnych dylematów związanych z przyjmowaniem założeń filozofii analitycznej w teorii prawa. Następnie zwrócono uwagę na wpływ filozofii Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza na pojmowanie znaczenia językowego w Szkole. Problem znaczenia językowego może zostać wyjaśniony przy użyciu definicji równoznaczności, której rdzeń stanowi zbiór dyrektyw danego języka. W ostatniej części tekstu omówione zostały natomiast tezy pragmatyzmu analitycznego Roberta B. Brandoma i sposób jego aplikacji do teorii prawa przez Macieja Dybowskiego. Pragmatyzm analityczny poszerza badania semantyczne o próbę zrozumienia uwarunkowań praktycznych.
EN
The review article refers to the book by Mark Johnson of 2007 which has been translated by Jarosław Płuciennik. The book is worth noting as it analyses the basic notion of the theory of cognitive linguistics – i.e. embodied meaning.
PL
Artykuł recenzyjny dotyczy pracy Marka Johnsona z 2007 roku, którą przetłumaczył Jarosław Płuciennik. Książka jest godna zainteresowania, rozpatruje bowiem podstawowe pojęcie w teorii lingwistyki kognitywnej, mianowicie znaczenie ucieleśnione.
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