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Otázka tzv. logického determinismu v antice a v moderní logice

100%

Šebela K.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

2010

vol. 58

issue 4

589-603

The article deals with the reflections on determinism which appeared in the context of ancient and modern logic beginning with Aristotle’s famous Argument of the Sea Battle in the ninth chapter of his On Interpretation. The canonical interpretation of this passage is put forward according to which the unlimited validity of the Principle of Bivalence seems to imply determinism, which in turn constitutes a reason for limiting the validity of that principle while preserving the Principle of Excluded Middle. Several strategies are shown which have been used by various thinkers when coming to terms with this argument, and the argument is ultimately put into the wider context of Aristotle’s philosophy. As a reaction to the aforementioned argument the article then discusses the so-called Master Argument which originates in the Megaric school. Its reconstruction is undertaken, presenting it as an attack on Aristotle’s conception of modality, and certain objections are raised which disqualify the argument in its given form. The Stoics accepted the Argument of the Sea Battle, with its deterministic consequences, and they thus became unequivocal proponents of the unlimited validity of the Principle of Bivalence, something which showed itself in, for example, the Stoic conception of negation. The Principle of Bivalence became, with the Stoics, the foundation for the causal argument for determinism. It seems that the Epicureans, in their polemical exchanges with the Stoics, failed to consider this assumption. In the reflections of Jan Lukasiewicz on the subject of determinism, one can detect a link with the ancient problematic. Lukasiewicz, however, makes the causal argument the premise of a modified Argument of the Sea Battle and, because of a reluctance to accept determinism, infers that the Principle of Bivalence must be limited, which, in the form that he states it, leads to the rise of many-valued logic.

Między determinizmem a prawdopodobieństwem – analiza poglądów Jana Łukasiewicza

51%

Pruski P.

ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal

2014

vol. 4

issue 2

315-324

In the contemporary philosophical debate about probability, one of the main problems concerns the relation between objective probability and determinism. Is it possible for objective probability and determinism to co‑exist? This is one of the questions this dispute tries to answer. The scope of discussion is conducted between advocates of a positive answer (compatibilist) and co‑existence opponents (incompatibilist). In the early twentieth century, many logicians also developed topics regarding probability and determinism. One of them was the outstanding Polish logician and philosopher — Jan Łukasiewicz. The general purpose of this paper is to analyse and implement Łukasiewicz’s views regarding determinism and probability in the contemporary field of this problem. I will try to show the relation between his interpretations of these concepts and in consequence his attempt to confront them. As a result of the above analysis, I present some different positions (located in the fields of logic and semantics) in the contemporary discourse about the relation between objective probability and determinism. Moreover, I will present Łukasiewicz’s views about this relation and the consequence of these solutions in the field of logic. Słowa kluczowe: objective probability; logical determinism; philosophical interpretations of probability

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1 Šebela K.

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Otázka tzv. logického determinismu v antice a v moderní logice

Między determinizmem a prawdopodobieństwem – analiza poglądów Jana Łukasiewicza