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Postprawda w dyskursie publicznym w kontekście logiki klasycznej i logiki rozmytej

100%

Lakomy M.

Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia de Cultura

2019

issue 11(1) "Postprawda. Nowe narracje i praktyki społeczne w epoce sfingowanych informacji i gatunków hybrydycznych"

5-14

W pracy zaprezentowano dwa nurty dyskusji na temat postprawdy. Pierwszy konserwatywno-krytyczny, zasadzający się na konieczności odrzucenia tego pojęcia jako nienaukowego i szkodliwego. W tym kontekście uznano bowiem, iż termin ten jest sprzeczny z dorobkiem filozofii, logiki klasycznej i nauki społecznej Kościoła katolickiego. Drugi z kolei nurt–liberalno-kontraktualistyczny – poszukuje uzasadnienia dla zjawiska postprawdy w logice nieklasycznej, trójwartościowej i rozmytej.

The work presents two trends of discussion on post-truth. The first is conservatively critical, based on the necessity of rejecting this concept as unscientific and harmful. In this context, it was recognized that this term contradicts the achievements of philosophy, classical logic and the social teaching of the Catholic Church. The second in the current – liberal – countercurrent – seeks to justify the phenomenon of post-truth in non-classical, trivalent and fuzzy logic.

CZYM JEST PLURALIZM LOGICZNY? (STANOWISKO J.C. BEALLA I GREGA RESTALLA)

80%

Czernecka-Rej B.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

2013

vol. 61

issue 1

5-22

C. Beall and Greg Restall are advocates of a comprehensive pluralist approach to logic, which they call Logical Pluralism (LP). According to LP, there is not one correct logic, but many equally acceptable logical systems. The authors share Tarski’s conviction and follow the mainstream in thinking about logic as the discipline that investigates the notion of logical consequence. LP is the pluralism about logical consequence – a pluralist maintains that there is more than one relation of logical consequence. According to LP, classical, intuitionistic and relevant logics are not rivals, but they all are equally correct, they all count as genuine logics. The purpose of this paper is to present some remarks concerning J.C. Beall’s and Greg Restall’s exposition of LP. At the beginning, the definition of the relation of logical consequence, which is central to their proposal, is shown. According to Beall and Restall, argument is valid if, and only if, in every case when the premisses are true, then the conclusion is, too. They argue that by considering different types of cases the logical pluralist obtains different logics. The paper — apart from presenting LP — also gives a critical discussion of this approach. It seems, that the thesis of LP is far from being clear. It is even unclear what exactly LP is and where is stops. It is unclear what “equally good”, “equally correct”, “equally true” mean. It is not clear, how to explain, in scope of logic, that the system of logic, is a model of real logical connections.

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1 Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia de Cultura

1 Roczniki Filozoficzne

1 2019

1 2013

1 Czernecka-Rej B.

1 Lakomy M.

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Postprawda w dyskursie publicznym w kontekście logiki klasycznej i logiki rozmytej

CZYM JEST PLURALIZM LOGICZNY? (STANOWISKO J.C. BEALLA I GREGA RESTALLA)