This article is devoted to the analysis and interpretation of the sense of touch in the early novel The Virtuous by Eliza Orzeszkowa. Touch is used in emotional or intentional tones, and in its character is the force of interaction: positive or negative. In the novel The Virtuous, touch in a physiognomical context was particularly important, which added diagnostic information about the nature of the literary hero. Due to the satirical content of the work, there was definitely more badness in tangibility that distinguished the small-town elite. Among the many categories of touch are “touch for show”, hidden touch, honourable touch, metaphorically-meta-physical touch, and empathic touch.
For Cvetaeva the eyes were always the expression of a man’s soul. It was through the eyes that she would first estimate the personality of people that she met in the course of her life. In her opinion, the eyes reflected the most important features of an individual. That is why wanting to fully express an opinion about someone, including protagonists of her works, she would use a metaphor in describing their look. The eyes were the driving force for Cvetaeva and dark eyes, especially hazel, stimulated her artistic imagination. Having hazelnut eyes equalled for her belonging to a spiritually rich and intelligent nation. The article contains an interpretation of works in which the description of eyes plays a significant role.
Artykuł ma na celu zakwestionowanie sensowności tych interpretacji Panien z Awinionu, które poszukają jego znaczenia odwołując się do stanu umysłu Picassa w okresie, w którym obraz powstawał i traktują to dzieło jako wyraz zmagania się artysty z osobistymi demonami. Oferowana tu interpretacja obu wersji obrazu wskazuje, że był on odpowiedzią na Le Bonheur de vivre Matisse’a i zarazem jego krytyką. Co więcej, odwołanie się do teorii Lacana pozwala autorowi nie tylko objaśnić pozorne niekonsekwencje Panien z Awinionu, lecz także pokazać, że ostateczna wersja tego dzieła jest metaobrazem, który ukazuje proces powstawania reprezentacji.
EN
The paper argues against interpretations of Les Demoiselles that look for its meaning in Picasso’s state of mind and treat it as the expression of a struggle with his personal demons. Rather, it interprets both versions of the painting as a response and contrast to Matisse’s Le Bonheur de vivre, which is proposed as the main intertext of Les Demoiselles. Moreover, an excursus into Lacanian theory allows the author not only to explain the supposed inconsistencies of Les Demoiselles, but also to propose that in its final version it is a meta-painting which analyses the way representation comes into being.
The article concerns ethical aspects of the creative activity – art and craft – persons with disability. Based on the metaphysical concept of disability the Author argue that it doesn’t affect constitutive characteristics of the human person. Therefore personal acts – inter alia creating – of persons with disability have the same moral value as acts of persons that have not this impairment. Hence these acts can be evaluate as good or evil and as perfective or degrading their subject. And this moral value has the fundamental meaning in the work of educators and first of all for persons with disabilities.
In Being and Nothingness Sartre develops a phenomenology of the ‘lived body’ that aims both to acknowledge the necessity that consciousness be embodied, and to accommodate the central phenomenological consequences of this embodiment, without compromising the radical freedom of the for-itself. Aim of this paper is exploration of the question of the relation between two different subjects in J.P. Sartre’s phenomenology. The relation between me and the other is based on a constant conflict, according to Sartre it has not cognitive but existential character. I would explore one of the basic concepts of Sartre theory, namely “le regard”, (the look). Looking at someone, meeting one’s eyes is always a kind of astonishement, shocking in its radicality. Can I know the Other without degrading or objectifying him? Can the Other know me? Can I look at the Other without the risk of reducing him/her to être-en-soi? I would show that the experience of desire (especially sexual one) and affection is bound up with the clash of interpersonal perspectives involved in our transactions with the Other as well as with the question of freedom. In the case of infatuation, in Sartre’s view, it is considered as an invitation to bad faith. Sartre offers a rethinking and critique of basic philosophical positions concerning the concept of perception presented by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. He holds that desire and distance inform the concept of “life”. Levinas identified a similar structure in Descartes’s notion of the infinite. By mentioning Lacan and Merleau Ponty conceptions I would try to elaborate and extend the formal structure of desire and distance by drawing on motifs as yet unexplored in the French phenomenological tradition, especially the notions of “lived-body” which is prominent in the later Husserl but also appear in non-phenomenological thinkers such as Bergson.
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