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EN
The article presents a dispute over unclear philosophical reasoning (in works, statements). This issue was started by Kazimierz Twardowski, and developed by philosophers both engaged in polemics with him: Joachim Metallman, Roman Ingarden, as well as defending his theses, David Einhorn. Many years later Twardowski’s student, Tadeusz Czeżowski, referred to this issue, as well. In his article Kazimierz Twardowski considered the problem of understanding philosophical works with regard to a method and style of their authors. This raised important methodological and metaphilosophical issues, which were essential foundations of philosophical attitude and the way of practicing philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School. He was wondering whether an unclear reasoning can be always unequivocally and definitely disqualified with regard to science. He rejected the view that the more difficult philosophical issues the author raises, the more intricate style of his reasoning can be. He argued, that the main reason of unclear philosophical style is vague and unclear way of thinking. In this regard, he postulated that it is not worth to try to understand the works written in an intricate and unclear way. Philosophers engaged in polemics with him considered his position as too radical, and pointed out the existence of causes and factors which may only lead to an apparent vagueness of philosophical reasoning. They postulated that one should consider the cause of a vague statement in the first place, and only then, on this basis, consider whether the work is worth the attemps to understand it. On the other hand, Einhorn, defending Twardowski’s theses, tried to show absurdity of their positions, while Czeżowski claimed that objection of vagueness should be applied with caution and upon consideration. He also marked, that there are cases in which objection of vagueness should not put responsibility on the author alone, but it obliges the recipient (reader, debater) to overcome difficulties standing in the way of agreement. Just like Ingarden and Metallman, he showed causes of apparent vagueness, and cases in which, despite vagueness of reasoning, it was worth entering philosophical discussion. The dispute over objection of vagueness is a part of a considerably broader philosophical discourse of the 20th century, regarding not only the way of practicing philosophy, but also the question how to convey its content in the most valuable cognitive manner.
EN
The article presents a dispute over unclear philosophical reasoning (in works, statements). This issue was started by Kazimierz Twardowski, and developed by philosophers both engaged in polemics with him: Joachim Metallman, Roman Ingarden, as well as defending his theses, David Einhorn. Many years later Twardowski’s student, Tadeusz Czeżowski, referred to this issue, as well. In his article Kazimierz Twardowski considered the problem of understanding philosophical works with regard to a method and style of their authors. This raised important methodological and metaphilosophical issues, which were essential foundations of philosophical attitude and the way of practicing philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School. He was wondering whether an unclear reasoning can be always unequivocally and definitely disqualified with regard to science. He rejected the view that the more difficult philosophical issues the author raises, the more intricate style of his reasoning can be. He argued, that the main reason of unclear philosophical style is vague and unclear way of thinking. In this regard, he postulated that it is not worth to try to understand the works written in an intricate and unclear way. Philosophers engaged in polemics with him considered his position as too radical, and pointed out the existence of causes and factors which may only lead to an apparent vagueness of philosophical reasoning. They postulated that one should consider the cause of a vague statement in the first place, and only then, on this basis, consider whether the work is worth the attemps to understand it. On the other hand, Einhorn, defending Twardowski’s theses, tried to show absurdity of their positions, while Czeżowski claimed that objection of vagueness should be applied with caution and upon consideration. He also marked, that there are cases in which objection of vagueness should not put responsibility on the author alone, but it obliges the recipient (reader, debater) to overcome difficulties standing in the way of agreement. Just like Ingarden and Metallman, he showed causes of apparent vagueness, and cases in which, despite vagueness of reasoning, it was worth entering philosophical discussion. The dispute over objection of vagueness is a part of a considerably broader philosophical discourse of the 20th century, regarding not only the way of practicing philosophy, but also the question how to convey its content in the most valuable cognitive manner.
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Metafilozofia Władimira Erna

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EN
Vladimir Ern is often seen as a philosopher that focused mainly on defining the characteristic featuresof Russian philosophy. When his philosophical works are interpreted in such a way, the biggeststress is being put on the fact that he formulated a certain idea of national philosophy, which wasthen transformed by him into a kind of national ideology during the World War I. The article triesto show, that Ern should be treated first of all as an author who considered metaphilosophical issues(and that this fact distinguishes him from the majority of the philosophers of Russian religiousphilosophicalrenaissance, who were mainly interested in solving the metaphysical issues). He focusedon metaphilosophy because he was convinced, that philosophy is a field of the battle between twonotions of the essence of philosophical knowledge which exclude one another. Seen as such, hisphilosophy should be interpreted as an attempt to find a proper way in philosophy and to rejectthe wrong way. The authentic way, which gives a correct answer to the question concerning theessence of philosophical knowledge, was seen by him in Christian Platonism. He tried to show, thatin the works of Plato can be found a certain theory of the spiritual development of man, whichis at the same time a genuine epistemology that shows the way of true philosophical knowledge.
EN
Philosophy of philosophy, also called metaphilosophy, is a very interesting field of human intellectual activity. It shows not only what philosophy and its goals are, but it teaches philosophers a lot about themselves. John Henry Newman (1801–1890) in his work described the nature and role of philosophy as „organized, and therefore living knowledge”. He attached great importance to tell his listeners and readers what should characterize true philosopher as well.It is worth to knowing, what the idea of philosophy and the philosopher described and promoted by Newman (who was called – with good reason – the „Plato of Oxford” and „English Socrates”) was, and how philosophy can be a way of maturing our humanity and be a method to transform the world. This article provides an introduction and outline of this issue.
EN
Having a better understanding of what worldviews are and how they function may be able to contribute to the resolution of conflicts which arise when people from differ-ent cultures holding different worldviews interact with each other. This paper begins by examining the nature of worldviews and how they might be approached from the perspective of intercultural philosophy. The paper then turns to meta-philosophical questions regarding the disciplinary boundaries, goals, and methods of intercultural philosophy with respect to worldviews. Attention is given to the possibility of adopting a constructivist, dialectical approach to cross-cultural dialogue on worldviews.
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Philosophy and Mediation. A Manifesto

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Ethics in Progress
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2019
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vol. 10
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issue 1
67-82
EN
The current condition of philosophy as a discipline is quite problematic, in particular if we consider its relationship to other human sciences and to other disciplines in general. The philosophical debate appears fragmented, and philosophy itself has lost any specific role in the present scientific landscape. This situation determines a sort of “identity crisis”, whose main consequence is the coexistence of antinomical views about philosophy in the contemporary scientific and public discourse. Starting from this context, the paper aims at providing a description of philosophy as “theory of mediation”. This description does not want to be ‘original’, but rather tries to emphasize an element that is always been rooted in the very essence of philosophy, but that has also often been neglected. Philosophy has always pointed out the necessity to think the in-between of things, their relation and the passage from one to another, rather than just offering a taxonomy or a factual description of the world. In order to prove this point, the paper offers an analysis of some classical texts, in particular of some fragments by Heraclitus and of a passage taken from Hegel’s early writings. A view that rethinks philosophy as “mediology” allows a rehabilitation of philosophy as a specific discipline and as a systematic enterprise, at the same time providing a new framework for the understanding of the relationship between philosophy and other sciences.
EN
The answer to the question of child’s philosophizing requires the prior decisions on fundamental issues in areas such as metaphilosophy, epistemology, psychology and pedagogy. The position in the dispute over a child’s philosophy is usually the consequence of adopting a certain attitude towards issues related to understanding the nature of philosophy itself, what childhood is, how human cognitive competences develop, and what the education is and what it should be. Supporters of child’s philosophizing probably have different definition of the philosophy, they also have another vision of child’s cognitive development than philosophers who are skeptical towards philosophy practiced by children. In this paper I will attempt to order the arguments of supporters and skeptics of child’s philosophizing, stressing the importance of various authors’ positions on issues which are substantial for the problem of child’s philosophizing. A special role in this dispute plays criticism of Piaget’s theory of development of cognitive competences. According to critics of Piaget, he is focused on constructing a model of development and does not notice the phenomenon of child’s philosophizing. Children are in the wrong at any stage of development. But their mental constructions are essentially brilliant philosophical problematizing of the world.
EN
The theme of this paper is Leszek Nowak’s reconstruction and systematization of metaphilosophy of the negativistic unitarian metaphysics described in Being and Thought in four volumes, published in the years 1998, 2004, 2007, 2019. The goal of the article is to contribute to the discussion on the status of metaphilosophy. Metaphilosophy is understood here as a separate dimension of every philosophical conception determining, on the one hand, how we understand the realm of objects (what we postulate), on the other hand, how we choose methods for the construction of theories and ways to legitimize them. The author tries to show that Nowak’s metaphilosophy assumed in negativistic unitarian metaphysics meets exactly this definition of metaphilosophy.
EN
Metaphilosophy as a research discipline is concerned with the overall metatheoretical reflection of philosophy on its own subject matter, assumptions, methodology, and goals guiding this form of human intellectual activity. The aim of this article is to present a cross-sectional analysis of the main stages in the historical development of this discipline, and offer a general characterization of the current state of research. The means to achieving this goal of study is a confrontation between two partly competitive and partly complementary paradigmatic approaches to metaphilosophical reflection which currently determine a relatively wide range of interests in this theoretically promising and heuristically fertile field of philosophical analysis.
EN
The main purpose of the paper is to characterize the metaphilosophical paradigm of today’s philosophy.The author argues that contemporary philosophical thought is thoroughly – and in a complexsense – metaphilosophical in nature. Namely, it takes the form of philosophy’s reflection on itselfpracticed after its end, but still from within philosophy. Understood in this way, metaphilosophyunifies the formal-spatial and temporal meanings of the prefix “meta-” as well as the two correspondingspecific paradigms of metaphilosophy: philosophy of philosophy and post-philosophy. In orderto substantiate this hypothesis, (1) the Hegelian historical-philosophical position, which marks thefinal moment of classical philosophy, is first presented, and on its basis the situation of contemporarythought, which is determined by the problem of the future of philosophy, is outlined. (2) Then the“early” and “late” philosophy of Martin Heidegger, which belongs to the metaphilosophical epochof post-classical philosophy, is discussed. (3) This ultimately allows the author not only to drawconclusions about the condition of philosophy today, but also to outline an original context fora potentially fruitful confrontation between these two authors, which is the second aim of the paper.
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EN
There are many pragmatisms, and it is a litle misleading to present this variegated trend of thought as if it were a monolithic doctrine. The founding fathers, too, were all but unanimous. Peirce was not in agreement with James on many issues. Dewey, in turn, did not like various aspects of both Peirce's and James' philosophy, while C.I. Lewis' views on logic were quite diefrent from those held by Dewey. It should not be surprising, then, to find the same amount of disagreement in contemporary neo-pragmatism, where Rescher and Rorty, who both define themselves pragmatists, display diefrent opinions on most subjects. I shall draw some comparisons between the ideas of these two thinkers. As a maetr of fact there are many pragmatisms, so that it is a litle misleading to present this variegated trend of thought as if it were a monolithic doctrine. The founding fathers, too, were all but unanimous. Peirce was not in agreement with James on many issues. Dewey, in turn, did not like various aspects of both Peirce's and James' philosophy, while C.I. Lewis' views on logic were quite diefrent from those held by Dewey. It should not be surprising, then, to find the same amount of disagreement in today neopragmatism, where Rescher and Rorty, who both define themselves pragmatists, display diefrent opinions on most subjects. In the present section we shall draw some sketchy comparisons between the ideas of these two thinkers. Rescher views the contrast between himself and Rorty as a continuation of the struggle between an objective pragmatism (or “pragmatism of the right”) which includes the triad Peirce-Lewis-Rescher, and a subjective one (or “pragmatism of the left”) 1 which comprises James, the early and middle Dewey, and Rorty. The later Dewey assumes, in this picture, a middle-of-the-road position. While Rorty must certainly be praised for both overcoming the linguistic turn and making pragmatism popular again in American philosophy following several decades of relative forgetfulness, Rescher argues that the Rortyan interpretation of pragmatism is too partial. In particular, by taking Rorty too seriously one is led to believe that pragmatism implies relativism. 1 Marsonet, Michele. “Diefrent pragmatist reactions to analytic philosophy.” New Perspectives on Pragmatism and Analytic Philosophy, edited by Rosa M. Calcaterra, Studies in Pragmatism and Values, 2011, 101-107
PL
Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg’s philosophia fundamentalis: Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802–1872) is an author who connects two periods. On the one hand, he attended the lectures of one of the first followers of Immanuel Kant - Karl Leonhard Reinhold, he knew personally and was influenced by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. On the other hand, Trendelenburg has educated a very large group of important figures within the German philosophy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (e.g., Wilhelm Dilthey, Franz Brentano and Hermann Cohen). His main work, Logische Untersuchungen (Logical investigations), was to see its release in three editions during his life. In the second edition Trendelenburg adds an introductory chapter, entitled Logik und Metaphysik als grundlegende Wissenschaft [Logic and metaphysics as a basic science]. It presents the idea of philosophy as a science and, like a lens, focuses on the most influential metaphilosophical solutions of the second half of the nineteenth century. The article in its first part presents the academic biography of Trendelenburg, while in the second it discusses the most important meta‑philosophical problems raised in Logische Untersuchungen.
EN
This paper is a critical analysis of the conditions under which a decent world order is possible, an order in which the different peoples of the world can thrive under the conditions of peace, cooperation, freedom, justice, and prosperity. This analysis is done from the standpoint of Janusz Kuczynski’s philosophy of universalism as a metaphilosophy. More than any other in the contemporary period, this philosophy has advanced a focused, systematic, and comprehensive analysis of these conditions on the basis of a universal vision of nature, human nature, and the meaning of human life and destiny. The paper is composed of three parts. The first part is devoted to a short overview of activism in the history of philosophy. The second part is devoted to an analysis of the main elements of universalism as a metaphilosophy, especially the theoretical conditions of establishing a decent world order. The third part is devoted to a discussion of the practical steps that should be taken to establish a decent world order.
Human Affairs
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2011
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vol. 21
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issue 2
140-156
EN
This paper explicates and defends Morton White’s holistic pragmatism, the view that descriptive and normative statements form a “seamless web” which must be tested as a “unified whole”. This position, originally formulated as a methodological and epistemic principle, can be extended into a more general philosophy of culture, as White himself has shown in his book, A Philosophy of Culture (2002). On the basis of holistic pragmatism, the paper also offers a pragmatist conception of metaphilosophy and defends the need for interdisciplinary inquiry.
EN
In this essay, I defend philosophical wandering not only as an approach to doing philosophy, but also as an important force to incite critical reflection in cultural life. I argue that philosophical wanderers have an embodied, errant praxis, supporting wisdom whenever they engage with others. For these philosophers reflection is not given in a series of systematic assertions, nor through phenomenological description, nor analytic dissection. Rather, reflective life is the force that enhances the performative element of philosophy as an exercise in being obnoxious (as a Socratic gadfly) to bring people within a culture to particular kinds of critical awareness and action. I conclude by suggesting that this mode of philosophy has a correlate mode of truth, “incited reflectivism,” different from coherentism, foundationalism, warranted assertibility, and other theories that have been previously defended as the standard for “truth.”
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EN
Although reflection on the nature of philosophy has constituted an integral part of this discipline from its beginnings, the term „metaphilosophy” referring to such a reflection only made its first appearance in the middle of the twentieth century. In the course of discussions concerning the book by C.J. Ducasse about the subject-matter and method of philosophy, the term was introduced in the United States by C.G. Hempel and M. Lazerowitz, and in Poland by M. Choynowski. Subsequently, two different metaphilosophical programs, which disseminated this category, were put forward by Lazerowitz and J. Kalinowski. They had dissimilar objectives and assumptions, though for both of them a crucial problem was the diversity of philosophical conceptions and persistent disagreements in philosophy.
EN
The article is a comparative study of selected elements of three philosophical positions which arose on the theoretical underpinning of the concept of transcendental idealism: Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Theory of Knowledge, Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, and Marek J. Siemek’s transcendental philosophy. The primary aims of the study are to examine the epistemological assumptions underlying the three positions, and then critically reconstruct and bring into focus their metaphilosophical component. The article seeks to corroborate the titular thesis that transcendentalism as an epistemological position provides the concepts discussed here with a theoretical framework for a radically conceived interpretation of metaphilosophical discourse.
EN
This paper presents Michael Heller’s notion of “philosophy in science” and re-introduces Michael Heller’s classical text that first presented this concept of philosophy entitled How is “philosophy in science” possible?. The paper discusses the historical context of Heller’s idea as it emerged from the discussions and works of the Krakow philosophical scene and discusses the basic tenants of this philosophy, its analytic character, the role of intellectual tradition in the development of this philosophy, and the critical role played by an interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy, science, and theology. Despite the idea of philosophy in science having emerged about 40 years ago, this concept still inspires and fuels innovative research. The notion of “philosophy in science” lies at the foundations of the philosophy published in two journals: Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) and Philosophy in Science.
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EN
The Michael Heller’s article entitled “How is philosophy in science possible?” was originally published in Polish in 1986 (see Heller, 1986) and then translated into English by Bartosz Brożek and Aeddan Shaw and published in 2011 in the collection of essays entitled Philosophy in Science. Methods and Applications (Heller, 2011). This seminal paper has founded further growth of the ‘philosophy in science’ and become the reference point in the methodological discussions, especially in Poland. On the 40th anniversary of Philosophical Problems in Science we wanted to make this paper freely available to the international public by reprinting its English version. In this issue it is followed by two additional articles-commentaries (by Paweł Polak and Kamil Trombik).
EN
The purpose of this paper is to ponder upon the future of the humanities from a metaphilosophical perspective inspired by G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy of the history of philosophy. The need for this reflection follows from the crisis that the humanities are facing today due to global changes in higher education, caused by the domination of the capitalist economy and the dramatic development of technology. The author assumes that the essence of the humanities is determined by the formation of self-understanding (Bildung) and proposes to consider this issue from a broader historical point of view and apart from the institutional context of human sciences, namely in the light of the history of philosophy, understood according to the Hegelian approach as the development of selfknowledge. The paper extensively discusses Hegel’s philosophy of the history of philosophy, as well as subsequent metaphilosophical positions inspired by Hegel’s thought (especially that of August Cieszkowski and Martin Heidegger). As a result, the question about the future of the humanities is transformed into a postulate of reflection on the primacy of technoscientific thinking in the modern world. In line with the Hegelian view of knowledge development – attributing autoperformative function to self-cognition – this kind of reflection is a potential remedy for the crisis currently diagnosed in the humanities.
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