Search results

1

Was Verdanken wir Descartes in der Gegenwärtigen Debatte über das Leib-Seele-Problem?

100%

Rynkiewicz K.

|

2009

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vol. 14

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issue 2

369-380

DE

Ziel des Aufsatzes ist es, einige relevante Sachverhalte aus der Philosophie Descartes' hervorzuheben, welche die Entwicklung der (gegenwärtigen) Leib-Seele-Problem-Debatte maßgeblich geprägt haben. Aus der Sicht gegenwärtiger philosophischer Debatte wird die Fundierung des ontologischen Dualismus Descartes' aufgewiesen, um schließlich diesen Standpunkt einer kritischen Würdigung zu unterziehen—mit dem Blick auf eine Zukunftsperspektive. Das methodische Verfahren nimmt Rücksicht sowohl auf den Bereich a priori als auch den a posteriori.

2

Ne sutor ultra crepidam. Kazimierz Twardowski o filozofii i nauce

80%

Brożek A.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

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2010

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issue 46

3-31

PL

Kazimierz Twardowski is the father of the modern Polish analytical philosophy. One of the most important stamp of this philosophical style is referring - in philosophical investigations - to achievements and methods of natural sciences. The article analyses this plot in Kazimierz Twardowski's philosophical works. It contains, in particular, a reconstruction of Twardowski's views concerning the classification of sciences, the methodological status of philosophy and psychology and the mind-body problem. Some not commonly known facts concerning the sources of Twardowski's interests in philosophy and science are mentioned.

3

Some Remarks on Aristotle’s Concept of form and Its Possible Interpretation in the Light of Contemporary Thought

70%

Facca D.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2015

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issue 4

37-50

EN

The reflection on form (eidos, morphe) is situated at the core of Aristotle’s philoso-phy. Not only it was the bone of contention with Plato and other academic philosophers, who maintained the separateness and immutability of forms, but mature Aristotle’s theory of form provided him with an adequate theoretical equipment for all fields of scientific inquiry, so the concept of form proved to be all-pervasive (transcendental). This issue is examined in the paper. The article also deals with some issues characteris-tic of the contemporary (postmodern) debate, such as the question of sense and intellec-tual cognition, the problem of identity, the mind-body problem. Finally, the parallel topic of matter is addressed by showing that Aristotle’s conception still proves incisive in contrasting several theories, lending itself—more or less implicitly—to the Neopla-tonic conception.

4

The Dialogical concept of consciousness in L.S. Vygotsky and G.H. Mead and its relevance for contemporary discussions on consciousness

70%

Koczanowicz L.

Polish Psychological Bulletin

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2011

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vol. 42

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issue 2

65-70

EN

In my paper I show the relevance of cultural-activity theory for solving the puzzles of the concept of consciousness which encounter contemporary philosophy. I reconstruct the main categories of cultural-activity theory as developed by M.M. Bakhtin, L.S. Vygotsky, G.H. Mead, and J. Dewey. For the concept of consciousness the most important thing is that the phenomenon of human consciousness is consider to be an effect of intersection of language, social relations, and activity. Therefore consciousness cannot be reduced to merely sensual experience but it has to be treated as a complex process in which experience is converted into language expressions which in turn are used for establishing interpersonal relationships. Consciousness thus can be accounted for by its reference to objectivity of social relationships rather than to the world of physical or biological phenomena.

5

Idea emergencji – zarys ogólny

61%

Maziarka T.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

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2013

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issue 52

131-177

PL

This article has an introductory character and systematizes the topic. It introduces the idea of emergence which is currently enjoying something of a renaissance and aims to bring order to the terminology associated with this idea. The article concerns the very beginning of the formation of emergentism and its intuitive understanding. It also presents the main concepts of representative authors of emergentism (S. Alexander, CL Morgan, Ch. D. Broad) as well as the numerous characteristics of emergence (synchronic and diachronic emergence, weak and strong emergence). The article concludes with a systematization of meanings and contexts in which the concept of emergence occurs.

6

Angel in “the Cartesian theatre” – Aquinas and the mind-body problem

61%

Stępień T.

Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne

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2018

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vol. 31

|

issue 3

66-79

EN

One of the solutions of the mind-body problem, which returns to the philosophical discussion on consciousness is the “soul hyphotesis”. Existence of the soul can clear the “explanatory gap”, but it brings yet another problems in explanation of how consciousness works. The magiority of those issues exist because of very specific understanding of the mind-body relations in Cartesian way as two separated substances. Some of the schoars propose to overlap the Cartesian approach by returning to the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas. This article shows that in the writings of Aquinas we can find exact analogy of the Cartesian view of the body-soul relations in the description of how immaterial angel assums the body. For Aquinas angel exist and acts in assumed human body in the very same way as Descartes describes the soul acting in human body, and angel’s mode of perception is similar to what is usually called as “the Cartesian theatre”. For Aquinas angel in assumed body cannot perfom any human action, it only pretends to perform it, because it operates bodily organs as the form, which is not united with this specific body. St Thomas explanation of the relation of body and soul in human being relies on the claim of unity of body and soul, which together are one substance. Such approach was even called biological, because of the stress on the role which body plays in human actions. Therefore Aquinas proposition could be perceived the way of overcoming the dualism and removing some of the dilemas which are linked with “soul hypothesis” understood in traditional way.

7

Dennett’s Account of Mind versus Kim’s Supervenience Argument

61%

Marczuk Z. J.

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2011

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vol. 16

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issue 2

1-15

EN

This paper challenges Daniel Dennett’s attempt to reconcile the performance of mind and brain within a physicalist framework with Jaegwon Kim’s argument that a coherent physicalist framework entails the epiphenomenalism of mental events. Dennett offers a materialist explanation of consciousness and argues that his model of mind does not imply reductive physicalism. I argue that Dennett’s explanation of mind clashes with Jaegwon Kim’s mind-body supervenience argument. Kim contends that non-reductive physicalism either voids the causal powers of mental properties, or it violates physicalist framework. I conclude that Dennett’s account of mind does not escape or overcome Kim’s mind/body supervenience problem. If Kim’s argument does not prove Dennett’s explanation of mind to be either a form of reductive materialism, or a logically inconsistent view, it is due to the ambiguity of concepts involved in Dennett’s theory.

8

Superweniencja psychofizyczna

57%

Kurek Ł.

Semina Scientiarum

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2011

|

vol. 10

EN

The aim of this article is two-fold. First, a critical presentation of the concept of supervenience is carried out. In this context, three basic types of supervenience are presented: weak, strong, and global. It is argued that the most useful types of supervenience are its strong, and global versions. Second, a broader analysis of the usefulness of supervenience is undertaken. It is argued that it is a very „flexible” concept, which allows for a variety of different solutions to the philosophical issue of the mind. However, the aforementioned flexibility can be limited by additional philosophical assumptions. Moreover, supervenience allows to augment traditional philosophical investigations concerning the mind with results of empirical findings of such sciences as psychology, or neuroscience. In this context it is argued that supervenience is a „third way” in the philosophical study of the mind.

9

Rogera Sperry’ego teoria świadomości

51%

Bremer J.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

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2017

|

issue 63

133-166

PL

Roger W. Sperry (1913–1994) received the Nobel Prize for Physiology in 1981 for his outstanding scientific achievements in connection with the study of people with severed brain commissures. Sperry linked the results of his research to philosophical considerations pertaining to the conscious mind of human beings and its place in the natural sciences. He was interested in the philosophical question of whether or not the severing of the cerebral hemispheres constituted a violation of the unity of consciousness. Sperry’s explanatory account of mind-body (mind-brain) interaction forms part of a broadly construed theory of emergent interactionism – one that also purports to guarantee the unity of consciousness. In this article, I first present an intellectual profile of Sperry, outlining the evolution of his philosophical-scientific analyses. I then outline the emergence and flourishing of theories of emergence, along with the elements essentially associated with them. Using this as a basis, I go on to consider Sperry’s account of emergent interaction more closely, focusing on his understanding of downward causation. In conclusion, I show how his theory corresponds to a version of emergent interactionism, and seek to address some criticisms leveled against it. I also aim to establish how far this theory can be said to answer the question of the conscious character of mental states.

10

Przeciw dualizmowi psycho-fizycznemu. Analiza i porównanie stanowisk Johna Searle'a i George'a Lakoffa

51%

Milewski D.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

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2014

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issue 56

57-92

PL

This paper discusses John Searle’s biological naturalism and George Lakoff’s embodied mind hypothesis. These theories are presented as examples of a certain part of the philosophy of mind that breaks with the tradition launched by Descartes. In both cases, the break from this tradition is indicated to be a radical one as the theories argue not only against Cartesian dualism - the basic philosophical categories utilized by Descartes are being questioned. This attempt of departure from distinctions that seem to form a great part of the contemporary philosophy of mind may stand for a chance to provide a new perspective for some old philosophical problems.

11

Relacja między duszą a ciałem w ujęciu Mieczysława A. Krąpca

51%

Pedryc A.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

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2011

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vol. 47

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issue 2

175-193

EN

The problem of the relationship between soul and body is one of the most often discussed questions in philosophy. If we take into account contemporary philosophical anthropology, Krąpiec's conception, inspired by Aristotle and Aquinas' thought, is quite unique. Krąpiec says that man is a psycho-physical unity. The starting point of his considerations is human fact given in experience. We know, from our experience, that we perform various acts, the sum of which does not add up to the "I". All the “my” acts are performed by the independently existing subject "I". On the basis of analysis of the structure of higher mental acts, like thinking and wanting, we can say that the reason that justifies them is the spiritual factor, known in philosophical tradition as the soul. Krąpiec does not accept the soul as a principle at his point of departure; rather it is the reason making our experience non-contradictory. After proving the existence of the soul, we determine its relation to the body. The soul and the body are in full unity, substantial and essential. Man is a single being, but a complex one. Unity is possible because a man has one single existence. The soul, possessing its own act of existence, shares it with the body. Krąpiec, wanting to know the essence of man, remarks that the body is an important factor, because it is a necessary reason for the existence of the soul and it determines, at least to some extent, all human activities. Man is a psycho-physical being and each of his activities is both bodily and spiritual in some aspect. We experience the unity of soul and body, on the one hand, but on the other, we perform activities that require the acceptance of soul and body as the principles constituting the human being.

PL

Problem relacji między duszą a ciałem jest jednym z zagadnień najczęściej dyskutowanych w filozofii. Prezentowana koncepcja Krąpca, inspirowana myślą Arystotelesa i św. Tomasza z Akwinu, jest dosyć oryginalna na tle współczesnej antropologii filozoficznej. Krąpiec stwierdza, że człowiek jest psychofizyczną jednością. Punktem wyjścia w rozważaniach jest fakt ludzki dany w doświadczeniu. Na podstawie doświadczenia wiemy, że spełniamy różnorodne akty, których suma nie stanowi „ja”. Wszelkie akty „moje” są wykonywane przez samodzielnie istniejący podmiot – „ja”. Na podstawie analizy struktury wyższych aktów psychicznych, takich jak myślenie i chcenie można stwierdzić, że racją dla nich jest czynnik duchowy, który w tradycji filozoficznej nazywany jest duszą. A więc Krąpiec nie przyjmuje duszy jako zasady w punkcie wyjścia, ale jest ona racją uniesprzeczniającą nasze doświadczenie. Po wykazaniu istnienia duszy określamy jej relację z ciałem. Dusza i ciało są w pełnym zjednoczeniu, które jest jednością substancjalną, istotową. Człowiek to jeden byt, ale złożony. Jedność jest możliwa, ponieważ człowiek ma jedno istnienie. Dusza posiadająca własny akt istnienia udziela go ciału. Krąpiec chcąc poznać istotę człowieka zauważa, że ważnym czynnikiem jest ciało, które jest racją konieczną dla zaistnienia duszy oraz jest współczynnikiem wszelkiego ludzkiego działania. Człowiek to byt psychofizyczny i każda jego czynność w jakimś aspekcie nosi znamiona cielesności i duchowości. Z jednej strony doświadczamy jedności istnienia, ale z drugiej wykonujemy czynności, które domagają się przyjęcia duszy i ciała jako zasad konstytuujących człowieka.

12

Filozoficzne konsekwencje przyjęcia paradygmatu ewolucyjnego w badaniach nad umysłem

51%

Stępnik A.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

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2012

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vol. 48

|

issue 1

105-127

EN

The aim of the article is to consider the philosophical consequences of the evolutionary paradigm in mind examination and to examine some methodological problems connected with evolutionary explanations. The article consists of four parts. The theory of evolution and contemporary controversies related to it are outlined in the first part. The second concerns the evolutionary paradigm applied to mind examination, especially from the methodological perspective. The third is entirely dedicated to an analysis of the philosophical consequences of the evolutionary paradigm, and the last is a summary. The result is the recognition of the evolutionary paradigm as an interesting perspective, which doesn’t demand far-reaching ontological assumptions, which allows for the rejection of some views concerning the mind-body problem. But the evolutionary paradigm cannot be the only universal paradigm, and some of the evolutionary explanations are nothing more than hypotheses or speculations.

PL

Celem artykułu jest rozważenie filozoficznych konsekwencji, jakie niesie za sobą przyjęcie paradygmatu ewolucyjnego w badaniach nad umysłem, a także zbadanie metodologicznych trudności związanych z generowaniem wyjaśnień ewolucyjnych. Artykuł składa się z czterech części. W pierwszej zarysowana zostaje teoria ewolucji i współczesne kontrowersje wokół niej, w szczególności wokół jej statusu. W drugiej omawia się paradygmat ewolucyjny w badaniach nad umysłem, a także pewne aspekty metodologiczne z nim związane. Trzecia poświęcona jest analizie filozoficznych konsekwencji przyjęcia paradygmatu ewolucyjnego, a czwarta stanowi próbę oceny jego głównych wad i zalet, z odniesieniem do przyszłości badań nad umysłem i dociekań z zakresu filozofii umysłu. Rezultatem jest stwierdzenie, że paradygmat ewolucyjny stanowi interesującą perspektywę badawczą, nie nakładającą zbytnich zobowiązań ontologicznych i pozwalającą na odrzucenie niektórych stanowisk odnoszących się do problemu psychofizycznego. Jednakże ze względu na trudności metodologiczne nie może być to paradygmat jedyny i uniwersalny, a do wielu wyjaśnień ewolucyjnych należy podchodzić z odpowiednią rezerwą.

13

Bertranda Russella koncepcja monizmu neutralnego

51%

Jarocki J.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2016

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vol. 33

69-88

EN

The metaphysical view of Bertrand Russell, called neutral monism, is not widely known today, although its impact on the contemporary debate over mind-body problem is clearly visible. The aim of this paper is to answer the question: what was Russell’s neutral monism? Firstly, I present the views of Russell’s predecessors – Ernst Mach and William James. Then, I discuss Russell’s own thought which can be divided into three phases. The initial phase is the rejection of neutral monism (mainly because of Russell’s commitments to epistemology). The second phase – I call it the first neutral monism – appears in The Analysis of Mind, where he proposes a deflationary theory of the object and the subject. The last, third phase – called the second neutral monism, initiated in 1927 in The Analysis of Matter and An Outline of Philosophy – introduces the notions of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Finally, I suggest that the agnostic metaphysics of Russell is too reductive for a dualist and too mysterious for a materialist. However, it might be also true that Russell’s view is more epistemological than metaphysical, and the frames of (misleading) Cartesian dictionary of mind/matter may be too narrow for neutral monism to be pertinently interpreted.

14

Problem mind-body w świetle Tomaszowej koncepcji hylemorfizmu

51%

Zembrzuski M.

Rocznik Tomistyczny

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2018

|

vol. 7

159-176

EN

The aim of this paper is to approach the mind- body problem in the context of philosophy of Aquinas, especially in the context of his understanding of hylomorphism. Disproportion between the issues of the philosophy of mind and Thomas's position are not to the extend which would unable us to see at the variety of questions from his perspective discussed nowadays by philosophers. On the contrary, Thomas' stance might be an attractive solution with regard to positions already fixed (established)- materialism and dualism. What follows in this paper are four issues: the problem of causative interaction between soul and body, the question of cognition of other senses, the issue of personal identity, and at least, the issue of qualia. All these questions, contemporary discussed, find their answers in Aquinas' explanation which points out the most proper understanding of human being, which is defining a human being as a person.

15

DWA OBRAZY ŚWIATA: MANIFESTUJĄCY SIĘ I NAUKOWY

51%

Bremer J.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2012

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vol. 60

|

issue 1

27-49

EN

The article below consists of two parts. In the longer first one, we present the salient features of Sellars’ conception of the manifest and scientific images of the world, and seek to determine the ways in which these two elements may be said to be related to one another. On the basis of this, we then point out one of the sources of the contemporary mind-body problem. In the shorter second part, we outline a variety of philosophical and neuroscientific proposals for resolving the issue of the relationship between our everyday intuitive understanding of what the mental states of a person amount to and their brain states as described in strictly scientific terms.

PL

Niniejszy artykuł składa się z dwóch części. W pierwszej, dłuższej charakteryzujemy W. Sellarsa rozumienie manifestującego się i naukowego obrazu świata (manifest and scientific image) oraz określimy typy zachodzących pomiędzy nimi zależności. Na przykładzie tej charakterystyki wskażemy na jedno ze źródeł współczesnego problemu umysł - ciało. W drugiej części, krótszej omówimy kilka typowych - filozoficznych i neuronaukowych - propozycji rozwiązań kwestii zależności pomiędzy potocznie rozumianymi stanami mentalnymi osoby a naukowo opisywanymi stanami jej mózgu.

16

Problem relacji umysł-ciało w emergentyzmie Samuela Alexandra

51%

Fornal M.

Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris

|

2018

|

vol. 43

|

issue 4

71-93

EN

Among contemporary philosophers of mind prevails a view that the representatives of Classical Emergentism such as Samuel Alexander sought to create a comprehensive metaphysical system which frequently allowed existence of non-physical elements or forces. Such view, classified British Emergentism as a position contrary to commonly accepted thesis of the Completeness of Physics, contributes to discrediting it in mind-body problem debates. The main aim of this paper is to present Samuel Alexander’s metaphysics of mind and analyze its present interpretations. The primary thesis is the claim, that solution of the mind-body problem proposed by Alexander is applicable on the ground of contemporary considerations within the framework of so called Non-reductive Physicalism.

PL

Wśród współczesnych filozofów umysłu dominuje przekonanie, że klasyczny emergentyzm dążył do utworzenia całościowego systemu metafizycznego niejednokrotnie dopuszczając istnienie nie fizycznych czynników czy sił. To przekonanie, klasyfikujące brytyjski emergentyzm, jako stanowisko stojące w sprzeczności z powszechnie przyjmowaną współcześnie tezą o domknięciu przyczynowym świata fizycznego, przyczynia się do całkowitej jego dyskredytacji we współczesnych debatach nad problemem umysł-ciało. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zaprezentowanie metafizyki umysłu Samuela Alexandra, jednego z czołowych przedstawicieli wymienionego wyżej stanowiska filozoficznego oraz analiza jego współczesnych interpretacji. Główną tezą pracy jest twierdzenie, że zaproponowane przez Alexandra rozwiązanie problemu umysł-ciało, można z powodzeniem przenieść na grunt współczesnych rozważań w ramach tak zwanego nieredukcyjnego fizykalizmu.

17

Hylemorficzna jedność radości: ujęcie Awicenny i św. Tomasza z Akwinu

41%

Płotka M.

Rocznik Tomistyczny

|

2019

|

vol. 8

61-72

EN

The aim of the paper is to deal with the problem of emotion in the context of medieval discussion on mind-body problem. The paper focuses particularly on joy and pleasure (delectatio, gaudium) as an example of intersection of mental and corporeal emotional phenomena in Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas. Both Aquinas’s treatise of the passions of the soul in the Summa Theologiae and parallel works and Avicenna’s philosophical and medical works reflect the problem of the way in which the unity of the person, soul and body, is experienced and displayed in emotion. Firstly, it has to be said that although an ‘emotion’ (passio) can be considered as an unified state of mind, neither Thomas nor Avicenna considered ‘emotion’ in this way. Rather, they recognized ‘emotion’ as a set of components, of bodily involvement, intentionality, objectivity, behavioral suggestions, even a sense of ecstasy, etc. Both Avicenna and Aquinas consider joy as a conglomerate of corporeal and mental elements. Avicenna argues, that emotions of the soul, such as joy, pain, fear and anger, are also called the emotions of the spirit, since they are accompanied by cardiac and spiritual changes, as he says in De medicinis cordialibu. Analogically, Aquinas distinguishes in STH Prima Secundae formal and material aspect of emotion: the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate (STH, I-II, q. 44, a. 1, co.:) So, a central issue of my paper is the question how they could think the various mental and physiological features of emotion of joy together. Although they both refer to Aristotle’s psychology, their answers seem to differ significantly. The difference is about the specific role of estimation in the plane of sensual and intellectual cognition. For Thomas estimation is definitely sensual cognitive power; however Avicenna argues that estimation takes part in the intellectual evaluation of the objects intended. Also, there is a different account of intellectual emotion. Whereas Thomas says that emotion is a result of cognition and inasmuch there are sensual and intellectual cognition, there are accordingly sensual and intellectual emotions (passions and affection), Avicenna introduces the power of estimation which is affective evaluation for both sensual and intellectual cognition. So, one could say that Thomas elaborates two theories of emotion (theory of affection is not compatible with the theory of passions), whereas Avicenna develops an unitary theory of emotion.

Refine search results

Was Verdanken wir Descartes in der Gegenwärtigen Debatte über das Leib-Seele-Problem?

Ne sutor ultra crepidam. Kazimierz Twardowski o filozofii i nauce

Some Remarks on Aristotle’s Concept of form and Its Possible Interpretation in the Light of Contemporary Thought

The Dialogical concept of consciousness in L.S. Vygotsky and G.H. Mead and its relevance for contemporary discussions on consciousness

Idea emergencji – zarys ogólny

Angel in “the Cartesian theatre” – Aquinas and the mind-body problem

Dennett’s Account of Mind versus Kim’s Supervenience Argument

Superweniencja psychofizyczna

Rogera Sperry’ego teoria świadomości

Przeciw dualizmowi psycho-fizycznemu. Analiza i porównanie stanowisk Johna Searle'a i George'a Lakoffa

Relacja między duszą a ciałem w ujęciu Mieczysława A. Krąpca

Filozoficzne konsekwencje przyjęcia paradygmatu ewolucyjnego w badaniach nad umysłem

Bertranda Russella koncepcja monizmu neutralnego

Problem mind-body w świetle Tomaszowej koncepcji hylemorfizmu

DWA OBRAZY ŚWIATA: MANIFESTUJĄCY SIĘ I NAUKOWY

Problem relacji umysł-ciało w emergentyzmie Samuela Alexandra

Hylemorficzna jedność radości: ujęcie Awicenny i św. Tomasza z Akwinu