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1

Granice wyjaśnienia naukowego, część II

100%

Gorazda M.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

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2013

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issue 52

53-106

PL

The second part of the text is intended to deal with the anti-naturalistic argument of F.A. Hayek. To present it comprehensively, however, his theory of mind has to be outlined first. According to Hayek, the way in which we perceive the world is entirely grounded in the biological construction of our neural order and thus, from this perspective, he seems to be a naturalist. He excludes any non-natural properties of our cognition like e.g. transcendental free will. However, a closer look at the functioning of our biological apparatus of perception divulges certain inherent and internal restrictions. First of all, we notice that the neural order (biological construction of neurons) is in fact a very complex apparatus of classification and discrimination of sensory impulses. Impulses may come from reality which is outer to the neural order as well as from the inside. The apparatus of classification and discrimination of sensory impulses is not stable, but permanently dynamic. An unstoppable attack of sensations and relevant responses of the system creates new classification rules (neural connections) and demolishes those which have been inactive for a longer time. A system of those rules, existing in a particular time unit, forms a model of reality which imperfectly corresponds to the existing, transcendent reality. The final argument for anti-naturalism which is elucidated in the text is Hayek’s idea of what is explanation and where lie its limits. This idea can be reduced to the following quotation: “…any apparatus of classification must possess a structure of a higher degree of complexity that is possessed by an object which it classifies.” In other words: if our cognitive system is an “apparatus of classification”, and if an explanation means modeling, and if a complete explanation requires the explanation of the apparatus itself, then a complete explanation is not possible at all, as the apparatus, which has a certain level of complexity, cannot upgrade this level in order to explain itself. Hayek’s reasoning is generally approved yet it is emphasized, however, that it rests on very strong assumptions which are identified and named at the end of the text.

2

Teoria wielości rzeczywistości Leona Chwistka. Rys krytyczny

86%

Bożek H.

ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal

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2014

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vol. 4

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issue 2

405-424

EN

The purpose of this paper is to offer a logico‑philosophical critical overview of the theory of multiple realities (TWR). The paper is divided into three sections. In the first section I present a brief history of the development of some ideas, which combined together form the conceptual framework of the theory in question, whose main thesis is that there is more than one reality. In the second part I present (and try to address) some interpretations of TWR, which can be described as: ontological; epistemological; esthetical; logical ad mixed interpretations. When doing so, a special emphasis is laid on the presentation of an explication of TWR based on theory of models, an explication authored by Teresa Kostyrko. This explication rests on a conditional recognition of the particular ‘realities’ of Chwistek’s theory as proper models (i.e. those, which fulfill the condition of the identity of meaning of theory’s fundamental notions) of the theories of reality, with the provision that such models are indeed constructible. In the last section of my paper I propose a preliminary appraisal of the TWR as well as a way to reengineer this theory in order to avoid some of its difficulties. By appealing to Kostyrko’s idea on one hand and the spirit Quinean ontological relativism on the other, I wish to argue as follows: (1) ‘reality’ is the name of the set comprising all meanings of the term ‘reality’; (2) under particular conditions these meanings can be arranged in a theory, which posseses a proper model (scientific discourse, some forms of the common talk); (3) model proper designate by definition classes of objects, which we regard as existent on the grounds of a given theory. The above set of theses forms the core of a concept, which I propose to call the ‘manifold reality’ in order to differentiate it from TWR, the development of which theory it is, as well as its modification towards a new kind of ontology.

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Analiza krytyczna podstaw teorii wielości rzeczywistości Leona Chwistka

72%

Bednarz G.

Estetyka i Krytyka

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2017

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issue 1(44)

25-38

EN

The aim of the article is to present a few criticisms of the foundations of Leon Chwistek’s philosophy. Completeness postulate, imposed on all correct philosophical systems by Chwistek, and which is supposed to be in conflict with conventionalism, is criticised. Correctness of some Chwistek’s axioms is called into question. Axioms for six intermediate realities are given. I argue in favour of model theory interpretation of manifold reality.

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Granice wyjaśnienia naukowego, część II

Teoria wielości rzeczywistości Leona Chwistka. Rys krytyczny

Analiza krytyczna podstaw teorii wielości rzeczywistości Leona Chwistka