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Proporcjonalizm: pokusa utylitaryzmu z teologii moralnej

100%
Plich R.
Forum Teologiczne
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2011
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vol. 12
73-86
EN
During the post-Conciliar renewal of Catholic moral theology, some theologians worked out a method of moral reasoning called ‘proportionalism’. According to this method, an acting person is obliged to choose the option likely to yield the best proportion between pre-moral good and evil. Proportionalism seems attractive, but it contains some serious flaws. Although its adherents insist that proportionalism is distinct from utilitarianism because of its theory of the good, the two methods share a consequentialist approach from which proportionalists were never able to separate their system. In other words, proportionalists borrowed from utilitarians the principle of utility and tried to combine it with a certain understanding of the objective good. This effort proved fruitless because there is no single universal standard against which one can measure basic human goods in their specific existential realizations. Although proportionalists reject traditional Catholic teaching on intrinsically evil acts, they claim that their understanding of so-called ‘proportionate reason’ is rooted in tradition. Yet a traditional condition of proportionate reason, which is one of the elements of the principle of double effect, requires not that the good effect outweigh the evil one, but that a person aiming for an intended good end should choose a good means that causes as little non-intended evil as possible. Proportionalism was rejected by Pope John Paul II in his encyclical letter Veritatis splendor, 74-75.
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Grounds and preparations for the main thesis of "Veritatis Splendor"

84%
Finnis J.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2015
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vol. 51
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issue 2
7-26
EN
Having set out in some detail the central teaching of the encyclical “Veritatis Splendor” – on exceptional moral norms – this paper outlines some of the preparatory work done by the International Theological Commission in a document which, though adopted with virtual unanimity by the Commission, remains unpublished because it so closely preceded the encyclical. In a third section, the paper recalls relevant teachings of Vatican II and of the Holy See that the ITC document recalled in support of its thesis. The fourth section of the paper offers some further reflections on the encyclical, its foundations and its significance.
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The splendor of truth and intrinsically immoral acts I: A philosophical defense of the rejection of proportionalism and consequentialism in "Veritatis Splendor"

84%
Seifert J.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2015
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vol. 51
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issue 2
27-67
EN
The present article is the first part of a paper that was delivered, in an abbreviated form, as keynote address, December 16, at the Conference “Ethics of Moral Absolutes Twenty years after 'Veritatis Splendor', Warsaw 16th–17th December 2013. Containing the word truth in its name, the Encyclical insists that human freedom is based on the foundation of truth. Therefore, even though the judgment of conscience represents the highest subjective norm for moral actions, our first obligation is that our conscience itself conform to the truth and base itself on its knowledge. Even in the case in which an erring conscience obliges or frees us to commit what we deem to be good or permitted, this is only true in virtue of the sincerity and authenticity of a person searching the truth as foundation of the voice of conscience. In other words, conscience receives its extraordinary ultimate subjective moral authority only – even if it is based on error – from the truth which it always must intend as ground of its verdict. In the following, I will try to show by purely philosophical reflections that these fundamental tenets of "Veritatis Splendor" are not merely based on the Holy Scripture and Church teaching, but can also be shown to be true by philosophical reason.
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The splendour of truth and intrinsically immoral acts II: A philosophical defense of the rejection of proportionalism and consequentialism in "Veritatis Splendor"

84%
Seifert J.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2015
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vol. 51
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issue 3
7-37
EN
The basic message of "Veritatis Splendor" is neither a legalism nor a mere set of ethical absolutes, not even a specifically and exclusively Christian ethic. Rather, the “absoluteness” of the moral calls and the obligatory unconditional rejection of acts that are in themselves evil, lives in the heart of morality as such and especially of Christian morality. How can one understand otherwise the words, where the absolute God reveals himself as the final addressee of any inner-worldly action when he says: “you have done unto me what you have done to the least of my brothers,” and: “what you not have done to the least of my brothers, that you have not done unto me”? What words might reveal more deeply the inner unity between the fundamental option and the specific interpersonal action, as well as the absolute character of the moral Act that is directed to fellow human beings? What words could insist more on the glory of human dignity, but also on the splendour of truth, and the holiness of God that radiate from these words? Perhaps this is the deepest sense of the word of Saint Gregory of Nyssa: "gloria Dei vivens homo est" – "The glory of God is the living human person."
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A Tale of Two Women. Reflections on Two Types of Morality , One Hundred Years after the Birth of St. John Paul II

67%
Kampowski S. M.
Studia Nauk Teologicznych PAN
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2020
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issue 15
213-232
PL
W setną rocznicę urodzin św. Jana Pawła II niniejszy artykuł podejmuje temat jego spuścizny w teologii moralnej, badając trwałą aktualność encykliki Veritatis Splendor z 1993 roku. W przeciwieństwie do tego, co niektórzy autorzy nazywają nową moralnością, encyklika ta podtrzymuje klasyczne pojęcie moralności jako sfery, w której mamy do czynienia  z absolutem, do tego stopnia, że można nawet być wezwanym  do złożenia męczeńskiej ofiary z własnego życia. Jako postać moralności klasycznej, esej przedstawia Antygonę, która ryzykowała życie, by uczcić ciało zmarłego brata. Inną kobietą która służy jako postać nowej moralności jest Pani Bergmeier, chwalona przez zwolenników tego podejścia za to, że popełniła cudzołóstwo by móc zjednoczyć się z rodziną. Analizując różnice między tymi dwoma postaciami, artykuł przypomina klasyczne rozróżnienie między wyborem a intencją oraz argumentuje, że nowa moralność zapomniała o momencie wyboru, zaliczając go całkowicie do intencji. W swoim nauczaniu na temat moralnego przedmiotu czynu i czynów z natury złych Veritatis Splendor broni podstawowego doświadczenia moralnego – tego, że mamy wybór i że nasze wybory mają znaczenie.
DE
Anlässlich des hundertsten Jahrestages der Geburt von Johannes Pauls II. denken wir über sein Vermächtnis in der Moraltheologie nach, indem wir die bleibende Gültigkeit der Enzyklika Veritatis splendor von 1993 untersuchen. Im Gegensatz zu dem, was einige Autoren die neue Moral nennen, hält dieses päpstliche Dokument an der klassischen Vorstellung von Moral als einer Sphäre fest, in der wir dem Absoluten begegnen, bis zu dem Punkt, an dem man sogar dazu aufgerufen werden kann, sein Leben im Martyrium hinzugeben. Als eine Figur der klassischen Moral stellt der Aufsatz Antigone vor, die ihr Leben riskierte, um die Leiche ihres toten Bruders zu ehren. Eine weitere Frau dient als Figur einer neuen Moral: Frau Bergmeier, die von den Befürwortern dieses Ansatzes dafür gelobt wird, dass sie Ehebruch begangen hat, um mit ihrer Familie wieder vereint zu werden. Der Artikel analysiert die Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Beziehungen und erinnert an die klassische Unterscheidung zwischen Wahl und Absicht. Es wird argumentiert, dass die neue Moral den Moment der Entscheidung vergessen hat, da sie die Absicht in den Vordergrund stellt. In seiner Lehre über das moralische Handlungsobjekt und die in sich bösen Taten verteidigt der Papst in Veritatis splendor die grundlegende moralische Erfahrung, dass wir eine Wahl haben, und dass unsere Entscheidungen von Bedeutung sind.
EN
On the centenary of the birth of St. John Paul II, this article reflects on his legacy for moral theology by examining the enduring relevance of his 1993 Encyclical Veritatis Splendor. Against what some authors call the new morality, this papal document holds up the classical notion of morality as a realm in which we encounter the absolute, to the point that one may even be called upon  to lay down one’s life in martyrdom. As a figure of classical morality, the essay presents Antigone, who risked her life to honor her dead brother’s body. A different woman serves as a figure of the new morality: Mrs. Bergmeier, who is praised by some of the proponents of this approach for having committed “sacrificial” adultery in order to be reunited with her family. Examining the differences between these two accounts, the paper recalls the classical distinction between choice and intention. It is argued that the new morality has forgotten about the moment of choice, subsuming it entirely under the intention. In its teaching on the moral object and intrinsically evil acts, Veritatis Splendor defends the basic moral experience that we have a choice and that our choices matter.
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Natural law, biological knowledge, and the claims of evolutionary ethics

67%
Liptay J.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2015
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vol. 51
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issue 2
69-83
EN
This paper investigates the claim that developments in biological sciences require us to abandon the account of moral norms advanced by natural law theory and to embrace some version of evolutionary ethics. A brief sketch of a contemporary statement of evolutionary ethics is followed by a consideration of the two fundamental ways in which it opposes the natural law account. Both of these objections are shown to misfire: first, positing a sceptical position fails to attend to what is implicitly affirmed in the critique of ethical objectivity, and, second, the criticism of natural law’s account of marital sexual acts proceeds by way of misunderstanding. While the natural law account of moral norms is not undermined, evolutionary ethics itself is found to be untenable.
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