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1

Václav Havel, Simone Weil and our desire for totalitarianism

100%

Fredriksson A.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2022

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vol. 70

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issue Special_issue_1

83-104

EN

Given our troubled history in the 20th century, how is it that nationalism and populism have come to raise their heads again in Europe over the past 20 years? What have we lost? What is it about our liberal, democratic political structures that creates the current atmosphere of mistrust, xenophobia and shortsightedness? How has this development come about, and what is driving it? How should we understand this desire for authoritarianism? In this paper, I will address these questions through a reading of two essays that can be considered to have been written as warning signs regarding a very common tendency within social psychology that entails a development of communities towards authoritarian structures. Simone Weil’s essay “Human Personality”, written in 1943 during her wartime exile in London, and Václav Havel’s “The Power of the Powerless”, written in 1978 during his house arrest in Czechoslovakia, both address the potential relapse of Europe into authoritarianism. Neither of these essays should be read as developed theories within political philosophy. They are notes from a dire predicament of crisis, on both a personal and a macro-political level, that investigate the relationship between the subject and society in order to understand the dynamics of totalitarianism. Their strength lies exactly in that they address a present unfolding situation that the authors perceive to have potentially unbearable consequences. This tone of urgency, their way of addressing us from a positionality void of any real power or privilege, and their bold demands for envisioning change beyond given political ideologies, make these essays into unique backdrops for thinking about our current political questions. Both Weil and Havel advocate an open society that permits the subject to cultivate a form of life beyond collective ideology. Both essays address the sensibilities of the subject that do not appeal to identity, common ideology or collectivity in order to thrive. The aim of this paper is to outline this redefinition of the relation between the individual and society in Weil and Havel, as a remedy for our desire for authoritarianism.

2

Why Can´t We Regard Robots As People?

86%

Schmiljun A.

Ethics in Progress

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2018

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vol. 9

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issue 1

44-61

EN

With the development of autonomous robots, one day probably capable of speaking, thinking and learning, self-reflecting, sharing emotions, in fact, with the raise of robots becoming artificial moral agents (AMAs) robot scientists like Abney, Veruggio and Petersen are already optimistic that sooner or later we need to call those robots “people” or rather “Artificial People” (AP). The paper rejects this forecast, due to its argument based on three metaphysical conflicting assumptions. Firstly, it is the idea that it is possible to precisely define persons and apply the definition to robots or use it to differentiate human beings from robots. Further, the argument of APs favors a position of non-reductive physicalism (second assumption) and materialism (third assumption), finally producing weird convictions about future robotics. Therefore, I will suggest to follow Christine Korsgaard’s defence of animals as ends in themselves with moral standing. I will show that her argument can be transmitted to robots, too, at least to robots which are capable of pursuing their own good (even if they are not rational). Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant delivers an option that allows us to leave out complicated metaphysical notions like “person” or “subject” in the debate, without denying robots’ status as agents.

3

Introduction

86%

Bardziński F., Dutka J.

Ethics in Progress

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2015

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vol. 6

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issue 2

7-10

EN

Introduction

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In defence of the rationality of ethics. "Veritatis Splendor" and a robust conception of moral agency

58%

Cebula A.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

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2015

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vol. 51

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issue 2

115-126

EN

The central metaethical contention of "Veritatis Splendor" is that an indispensable element of any plausible conception of moral agency must always be a specific notion of a moral act – an act executed by a moral agent. In my paper I focus on the way in which the interpretation of a moral act as a specific enterprise fully identifiable and determined by its clearly outlined aim (the object of an act) informs the concept of moral agency – human faculty of deliberating upon and performing moral acts. In view of the pledge made by the encyclical’s author not to “impose upon the faithful any particular theological system, still less a philosophical one” I try to demonstrate that the dependence (or perhaps interdependence) in question is of the most basic nature and can thus be construed as a key condition for a genuinely rational character of any ethical theory.

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Definition of death as a challenge for humanity in the 21st century

58%

Kalajtzidis J.

Wschodni Rocznik Humanistyczny

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2019

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vol. XVI (2019)

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issue 1: Filozofia: Lwów-Preszów-Rzeszów

19-26

EN

The presented paper focuses on the issue of definition of death as a challenge for the humanity in the 21st century. As the methodological scope of the paper the theory of ethics of social consequences is used. Ethics of social consequences works with categories which might make the issue we are dealing with in this pa-per much clearer. At the beginning of the paper, the issue of death is briefly sum-marized. Afterwards paper continue with the introduction of moral values, which are closely connected to the studied issue. Study concentrates on the values of humanity and human dignity. At the end the issue of moral agency is introduced and used as a helpful aid to resolve the identified problems.

PL

Prezentowany artykuł koncentruje się na kwestii definicji śmierci jako wyzwania dla ludzkości w XXI wieku. Jako zakres metodologiczny artykułu wykorzystana jest teoria etyki konsekwencji społecznych. Etyka społecznych konsekwencji współdziała z kategoriami, które mogą sprawić, że problem, z którym mamy do czynienia w tym artykule, jest znacznie jaśniejszy. Na początku artykułu została krótko przedstawiona kwestia śmierci. Następnie Autor kontynuuje wprowadza-nie wartości moralnych, które są ściśle związane z badanym zagadnieniem. Studia koncentrują się na wartościach człowieczeństwa i godności ludzkiej. Na koniec zostaje wprowadzona kwestia moralnej woli i wykorzystywana jako użyteczna pomoc w rozwiązywaniu zidentyfikowanych problemów.

RU

Статья посвящена проблеме определения смерти как вызова человечеству в 21 веке. В качестве методологического объема работы используется теория этики социальных последствий. Этика социальных последствий работает с категориями, которые могут прояснить проблему, с которой мы имеем дело в этой статье. В начале статьи кратко изложена проблема смерти. После это-го Автор вводит моральные ценности, тесно связанные с изучаемой пробле-мой. Исследование концентрируется на ценностях человечества и человече-ского достоинства. В конце вводится проблема морального агентства и ис-пользуется в качестве полезной помощи для решения выявленных проблем.

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2 Ethics in Progress

1 Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

1 Studia Philosophiae Christianae

1 Wschodni Rocznik Humanistyczny

1 2022

1 2019

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2 2015

1 Bardziński F.

1 Cebula A.

1 Dutka J.

1 Fredriksson A.

1 Kalajtzidis J.

1 Schmiljun A.

Václav Havel, Simone Weil and our desire for totalitarianism

Why Can´t We Regard Robots As People?

Introduction

In defence of the rationality of ethics. "Veritatis Splendor" and a robust conception of moral agency

Definition of death as a challenge for humanity in the 21st century