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EN
In general terms, the more economic approach to the application of EU merger law implies increased reliance on theoretical concepts from industrial economics and quantitative methods of analysis, firstly in the case of investigations and, secondly, when formulating legislation and defining the criteria that are to be set. In other words, a tendencyof the more economic approach to EU merger control is to base the evaluation of each specific case on an assessment of its anti- and pro-competitive effects (effects-based approach), rather than on the form of the intrinsic nature of a particular practice (formbased approach). In this article, the author presents the development of the more economic approach to the application of EU merger control and analyses the implications of this new trend which is present in the European Commission’s practice.
EN
For the last fifteen years, competition policy in the European Union has been dominated by the ‘more economic approach’, or rather the ‘effects-based approach’, as it has recently been called. A similar trend can be observed in Polish competition law. Its mechanisms have been implemented into normative acts and the National Competition Authority seems to have, at least partially, adopted such approach also. On the other hand, some important issues related to the application of the more economic approach seem to have been overlooked by the Polish debate on this subject. These include questions such as: (i) whether such approach was present in Polish competition law even before the formal economisation of EU competition law; (ii) to what extent should the more economic approach be advocated and what are its limitations; (iii) how economic evidences should be assessed and whether neoclassical economics is enough. These issues will be analysed in the light of the decisions of the UOKiK President and the judgments of the Polish courts. The resulting conclusions will help provide answers to questions on the use of the more economic approach which have so far been avoided in Poland. The final aim of this paper is to assess the stage of the application of the more economic approach to Polish competition law and to assess its future perspectives.
FR
Pour les quinze dernières années, la politique de la concurrence dans l'Union européenne a été dominée par l'approche plus économique ou d'une approche fondée plutôt sur les effets, comme elle a été récemment appelée. La même tendance peut être observée dans la loi polonaise sur la concurrence. Ses mécanismes ont été mis en œuvre dans les actes normatifs autant que le président d’Office pour la protection de la concurrence et des consommateurs (OPCC) semble avoir au moins partiellement adopter cette approche. D'autre part, certains sujets importants liés à l'application de l'approche plus économique pour le droit de la concurrence semblent être omis dans le débat polonais sur ce sujet. Il s'agit notamment des points suivants: (i) la question de savoir si cette approche était présente dans la loi polonaise sur la concurrence avant même son institutionnalisation par la Commission européenne; (ii) dans quelle mesure devons-nous opter pour l'approche plus économique et quelles sont ses limites; (iii) la façon dont nous devrions évaluer les preuves économiques et si l'économie néoclassique est suffisante. Ces questions seront analysées à la lumière des décisions du Président d’OPCC et les jugements des tribunaux antimonopole. Les conclusions de l'analyse de la jurisprudence serviront à fournir les réponses aux questions omises sur l'approche plus économique en Pologne. L'objectif final de cette étude est d'évaluer le stade de l'application de l'approche plus économique à la loi polonaise sur la concurrence et d'évaluer ses perspectives d'avenir.
EN
Antitrust is an interdisciplinary science that draws from political economy. Since the beginning of the XXI exacerbated by national legislation and European tendencies to economize antitrust law. Historically, the first was the principle of "formal approach" to the analysis of antitrust law. However, the shortcomings of this method gave rise to the need to find other solutions. From this arose the need for an approach to an even greater extent, aking into account the use of economic regulations and multidimensional study of the effects of market behavior. The article presents the regulations concerning abuse of dominance and mergers and evidence allowed economization of these institutions in the polish law and examples of their application in relation to energy companies.
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2017
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vol. 6
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issue 5
28-45
PL
Niniejszy artykuł został poświęcony problematyce udzielania rabatów przez przedsiębiorstwa dominujące w świetle unijnego prawa konkurencji. Zagadnienie przedstawiono w świetle bardziej ekonomicznego podejścia (more economic approach) oraz w oparciu o wydane w latach 2011–2015 orzeczenia Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej – Tomra (2011), Intel (2014) oraz Post Danmark II (2015) oraz uwzględnia opublikowaną w październiku 2016 r. opinię Rzecznika Generalnego Nilsa Wahla.
EN
This article is dedicated to the problematic issue of rebate schemes applied by dominant undertakings under EU competition law. The said problem is presented in the light of the more economic approach, and in accordance with ECJ judgements published between 2011-2015: Tomra (2011), Intel (2014) and Post Danmark II (2015). Moreover, the article includes an analysis of the Opinion of the Advocate General Nils Wahls to the Intel Case, issued in October 2016.
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