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EN
The purpose of the article is to discuss the importance of mutual trust between EU Member states, which is key to the process of European integration. Without mutual trust it would be impossible to create an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), which in this aspect applies to both the legal systems and the justice systems of the Member States. Mutual trust allows to assume that the legal system of each Member State guarantees the same level of protection of individuals and that law enforcement bodies carry out their tasks equally effectively. However, the level of mutual trust is not constant - one can observe its slow and systematic growth, but its level may as well decrease, which has recently occurred in the case of relations between Poland and other Member States. This condition has an adverse effect on the functioning of the AFSJ and causes the occurrence of many practical problems, which are presented in the article. The legal order was determined based on the formal-dogmatic method and presented using the descriptive method. The case study method was used when presenting CJEU rulings.
EN
The paper concerns the principle of mutual trust and its interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union as well as two other important European courts: the European Court of Human Rights and the German Constitutional Court. The paper presents the important change of direction in interpretation of the principle of mutual trust by the CJEU. Initially, the belief in the existence of mutual trust between member states was firm. Over time, however, it has turned out that even in the EU – which follows from a number of judgments of the ECtHR – violations of human rights sometimes happen. This dramatically undermines trust in foreign judicial systems. This led the CJEU to the conclusion that the principle of mutual trust is rebuttable and that in some circumstances limitations to the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust can be made. This conclusion can be treated as an answer in the specific ‘judicial dialogue’ of the CJEU with the ECtHR and the German Constitutional Court – the two latter courts seemed to notice earlier that mutual trust between member states cannot be blind and unconditional.
EN
During the two years of the COVID-19 pandemics, countries have introduced various forms of certificates, approving either partial or full vaccination of the bearer of such certificate against COVID-19. While such certificates were originally intended to serve primarily for domestic purposes, various regimes of recognition of these certificates by other countries have gradually emerged during the second year of pandemics. This article understands the COVID-19 pandemics as a unique laboratory, where various regimes of recognition have emerged. It analyses major trends which arose with respect of mutual recognition of vaccination certificates. The main research question of this article is whether any key lessons can be learned from these developments for the general theory of mutual recognition in public law. In broader terms, this article also aims to deal with major challenges that the emergence of various regimes of recognition have implied for the scholarship of public law.
EN
The paper discusses the problem of the ne bis in idem principle stipulated in the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 54 of the CISA makes the application of the principle ne bis in idem subject to the condition of execution of the penalty. An analogous condition is not provided for in the Charter. These differences caused doubts regardingthe application of the ne bis in idem principle and were subject of the question for preliminary ruling in the Spasic case (C-129/14 PPU). The paper contains a critical review of the reasoning of the Court of Justice of the European Union in this judgment. In addition, the article also contains an analysis of the CJEU’s decision in Case C-398/12 M. in which the CJEU has analysed the meaning of “final disposal” of the judgment in the context of the ne bis in idem principle. Based on the above judgments, the article presents arguments indicating that the reasoning of the CJEU on the conditions for the application of the ne bis in idem principle in judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU is not consistent.
EN
The main thesis of this article is, that social capital significantly increases the competitiveness and innovation. Bourdieu defined social capital as the sum of the actual and potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of relationships, based on mutual dependence and recognition. In my terms, social capital consists of two parts: the same social relations that enable individual access to the resources of the people you are connected, and the quantity and quality of those resources. Individuals and organizations with high social capital gain competitive advantage through rapid fl ow of knowledge. With regard to the public good role of social capital lies primarily in its servitude, lies in the fact that it allows to combine and more efficient use of other types of capital. As a result of social capital can offset the adverse economic events, to help better cope with crises and to compensate for market failure. Social capital not only plays an important role in the economic sphere but also in the social life of ordinary people, enhancing their welfare and prevent loneliness.
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Tři tváře vzájemné důvěry v unijním právu

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EN
The EU concept of mutual trust is of hybrid nature. It mixes the notion of trust as a factual phenomenon with a legal principle whose effects differ from the understanding of trust in the social sciences. However, the exact nature of mutual trust in EU law remains unclear. The article builds on its hybrid character and points out that this concept has in fact three different faces: 1) presumption of mutual trust, 2) mutual trust as an objective to be pursued, 3) the legal principle of mutual trust, which consists in the presumption of compliance with EU law by all the Member States. Using an analysis of the theoretical justification behind this concept, the article first highlights the different motivations of the EU legislation and the Court of Justice for using mutual trust and their different perception of it. The article then considers the link between different faces of mutual trust and their legal relevance. It argues that the individual faces of mutual trust should not be mixed and confused. While it is desirable to pursue a genuine state of trust between Member States, from a legal point of view, the presumption of compliance with EU law is the key principle. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to use directly this legal presumption (instead of general ‘mutual trust’) while dealing with matters of law.
CS
Unijní koncepce vzájemné důvěry má hybridní charakter. Mísí v sobě pojetí důvěry jako faktické kategorie s právní zásadou, jejíž účinky se od běžného chápání důvěry ve společenských vědách liší. Přesná povaha vzájemné důvěry v unijním právu nicméně zůstává nevyjasněná. Článek vychází z jejího hybridního charakteru a poukazuje na to, že tato unijní koncepce má ve skutečnosti tři různé tváře: 1) vzájemná důvěra jakožto předpoklad panujícího stavu, 2) vzájemná důvěra jako cíl, jehož má být dosaženo, 3) právní zásada vzájemné důvěry spočívající v presumpci dodržení unijního práva všemi členskými státy. S využitím analýzy teoretického zdůvodnění této koncepce článek nejprve poukazuje na rozdílnou motivaci unijní legislativy a Soudního dvora k využití vzájemné důvěry a její odlišné chápání. Následně se článek zamýšlí nad propojením a právní relevancí jednotlivých tváří koncepce. Předložen je argument, že jednotlivé tváře vzájemné důvěry není vhodné směšovat. Ačkoli je žádoucí usilovat o dosažení skutečného stavu vzájemné důvěry mezi členskými státy, z právního hlediska je klíčová presumpce dodržení unijního práva (třetí tvář koncepce). Spíše než se „vzájemnou důvěrou“ by proto bylo v právní rovině vhodnější pracovat přímo s touto domněnkou.
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