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The Politics of Regression: The Idea of the Nation State in the Thought of Ernst Cassirer and Aurel Kolnai

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Gniazdowski A.
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
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2018
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vol. 2
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issue 3(5)
27–41
EN
The aim of this paper is to compare the approaches of Ernst Cassirer and Aurel Kolnai on the idea of the nation state in its most radical form, which consists of identifying national sovereignty with an unrestricted right of the nation to political, external, and internal self-determination. What the comparison attempted here focuses on, is the criticism on the conditions for the possibility of specific German nationalism, presented by Cassirer in his Myth of the State and by Kolnai in his War Against the West. According to the main thesis of this paper, insofar as both Cassirer and Kolnai recognized the role played in politics by emotions and considered political phenomena as being constituted by not only rational or at least calculable mechanisms, but also affective factors, like beliefs, religion, and myth, they tended to consider nationalism in terms of the politics of “regression,” understood, psychoanalytically, as a reversion of mental life, in some respects, to a former, or less developed, psychological state, characteristic of not only individual mental disorders, but also social psychosis. It will be argued, that Cassirer and Kolnai, not unlike the representatives of the Frankfurt School, considered the contemporary preponderance of mythical thought in political philosophy to be an expression of the dialectic, which consisted in “relapsing” of the Enlightenment into mythology. As a main motive for the comparison of their political philosophies, an assumption will be presented in the paper, that, while taking into account the contemporary tendency to oppose national sovereignty to the sovereignty of international law, the approach to the idea of nation state, as presented by Cassirer and Kolnai, seems to be by no means out of date.
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Marburska filozofia krytyczna wobec psychologizmu

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Parszutowicz P.
IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych
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2011
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vol. 23
44-52
EN
The article discusses the position taken by the neokantian Marburg School against the epistemological claim of psychologism, which localized the ultimate source of knowledge and its proof of validity in psychological realm. Marburg School opposed strongly against psychologism to such an extent that 'antypsychologism' itself became one of the most prominent features of the 'Marburg School doctrine'. Antypsychologism served both as a negative point of reference for the transcendental method developed and practiced by the Marburg School, and as an exemplary determinant which distinguished that specific tradition from other neokantian schools. According to Cohen's, Natorp's and Cassirer's critique, psychologism conceived the whole problem of cognition in a very limited sense and reduced all the cognitive acts to the acts of consciousness; psychologism deemed it is necessary that all the cognitive acts have to be conscious, therefore treated consciousness as a necessary condition of all cognitive operations. Exponents of the Marburg School, most notably Ernst Cassirer, did not seek to get rid of psychology at any cost from the edifice of scientific knowledge, but simply to put is in its right place and to separate 'science of the contents' from the 'science of the forms' of knowledge. The latter was supposed to become a fundamental subject of interest for the critique of epistemology developed by the Marburg School as a strictly philosophical science. Its task was to deduce from any systematically developed domain of knowledge its logical structure and to show constitutive for the object of the given science pure cognitive functions, which are independent from the psycho-physiological constitution of the subject of cognition.
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Spór o metodę w filozofii przełomu XIX i XX wieku

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Noras A. J.
Folia Philosophica
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2011
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vol. 29
111-151
EN
The starting point of the analysis provided in this paper is a discussion of how philosophical method is understood by Leonard Nelson who draws upon the lines of Jakob Friedrich Fries. From this perspective Nelson points out two ways of argumentation, two methods or standpoints: metaphysical and anthropological, objective-one and subjective-one, critical and genetic, epistemological and psychological or transcendental and psychological. These distinctions find their justification in concepts by philosophers with which Nelson polimicizes defending Fries’ standpoint: Kuno Fischer, Paul Natorp, Wilhelm Windelband, Carl Stumpf and Max Scheler. On the ground of analysis of their conceptions Nelson argues that admittedly they follow Kant, yet Kant — unlike Fries — has not included the psychological aspect of cognition.
DE
Der Ausgangspunkt für diese Erwägungen ist die philosophische Methode von Leonard Nelson, der in seiner Philosophie an Jakob Friedrich Fries anknüpft. Aus dieser Perspektive bestätigt er das Vorhandensein von zwei Hauptmethoden der Argumentation. Es sind: metaphysische und anthropologische, objektive und subjektive, kritische und genetische, erkenntnistheoretische und psychologische oder transzendentale und psychologische Methoden. Solche Unterscheidungen haben ihre Berechtigung in der Lehre von den Philosophen, gegen welche Nelson, den Standpunkt von Fries verteidigend, polemisiert. Zu diesen Denkern gehören: Kuno Fischer, Paul Natorp, Wilhelm Windelband, Carl Stumpf und Max Scheler. Nelson analysiert ihre Lehren angesichts der genannten Methoden und kommt zur Überzeugung, dass sie zwar in die Fußtapfen von Kant treten, doch im Gegensatz zu Fries die psychologische Seite der Erkenntnis nicht in Rücksicht nehmen.
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Kilka uwag na temat rosyjskiego neokantyzmu

71%
Biełow W. N.
Kultura i Wartości
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2013
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issue 7
DE
Der Artikel setzt sich zum Ziel, den russischen Neukantianismus zu analysieren und seine Eigen-tümlichkeit zu erfassen. Sie entstammt der kulturellen und historischer Eigenart der russischen Philoso-phie. Die Stufen und das Eigentümliche des russischen Neukantianismus werden am Beispiel der Entwür-fe von A. I. WWedenskij, B.V. Jakowenko und V. E. Sesemann untersucht.  
EN
The article is devoted to the analysis of the development of neokantianism in Russia. In particular, the paper attempts to pinpoint the originality of Russian neokantianism, which - as the present author posits and contextualises – stems from the cultural and historical peculiarities of the formation of the Russian philosophical thought. The stages and specific character of the development of Russian neokantianism are discussed on the basis of the philosophical ideas and intellectual concepts of A. I. Vvedenskij, B. V. Jakovenko, and V. E. Sesemann.
PL
Celem artykułu jest analiza rosyjskiego neokantyzmu, zmierzająca do uchwycenia jego oryginalności. Bierze się ona z kulturowej i historycznej specyfiki rosyjskiej myśli filozoficznej. Etapy i swoistość rosyjskiego neokantyzmu są analizowane na przykładzie koncepcji A. I. Wwiedienskiego, B. W.. Jakowenki oraz W.. E. Sezemana.
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