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EN
Metaphor, as is known, has been considered an expression of the creative approach of a subject to language and thinking. Metaphor enables the subject of cognition and action to establish meaning – the subject exercises semiosis not only by referring to the former convention and the situational context, but also by transforming it due to the distinct act of turning the metaphor into an instrument of expression. The innovative character of metaphor allows one to consider it in the context of performative theory, whereas its receptive, evocative character requires interpretation from the recipient. In both cases, metaphor in acts of communication, opens their participants towards specific expressions – performative expression in the case of individual semantic innovation, and receptive expression in the case of the interpretation of former metaphors. The specific example of silence, considered as a kind of metaphor within the frameworks of the performative theory, is the subject-matter of the paper. The basic question of the paper, referring to John L. Austin’s speech act theory and to his followers, is related to the source of the aforementioned metaphorization – to what degree is it an intention of language users, and to what degree is it a language convention which allows one to combine words and establish new associations metaphorically? In his pragmatic concept of meaning, Austin stresses the role of the context of an utterance – the situational context may also enable the establishment of metaphor as a figure of speech that dynamizes and moves our thinking.
EN
The theory of rational lawgiver entails an assumption of normativeness of legal text. The assumption can be expressed in two propositions: (1) articulated parts of legal text are normative, and (2) other parts of legal text (i.e. preambles, titles of acts, parts, chapters etc.) are not normative. Closer examination of Polish legal text shows that propositions (1)–(2) are not necessarily always true. The authors propose several defi nitions and use the enriched vocabulary to express theoretical possibility and to show real cases of non-normative fragments of articulated parts of legal texts and normative fragments of other parts of legal text. The types of normativeness are defi ned: the broadest, broad, and strict. The notion of normativeness is tightly connected with notions of redundancy and superfl uity of legal texts. The distinctions which were made in the article can be used — as the authors hint in the conclusion remarks — to expand contemporary theories of legal interpretation, and to improve the quality of lawmaking process in Poland.
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