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The article discusses the problem of justification of protection of human beings’ individual rights within the solidaristic framework. Solidarists refuted the concepts of existence of innate human rights, which made the foundation for protection of a certain range of freedom of the individual, acknowledging it to be pure metaphysics that bore no relation to the reality. Only the rules that regulated interpersonal relations, existing solely and exclusively within social life, could be referred to as law. Therefore there did not exist the category of innate rights – connected with the very essence of humanity and anterior to human community. According to Solidarists, the justification of protection of a certain range of human beings’ individual freedom in their relations with others was an objective social progress, visible in the transition from mechanical into organic solidarity. The basis of protection of the individual’s rights was to be the social conviction, of the objective character, about the necessity of guaranteeing each man a certain scope of protection in order for him to perform his social function.
XX
The article aims at showing the issue of the relation between the state and the legal order in the neo-Kantian philosopher Rudolf Stammler's philosophy of law. Stammler's thesis about the identity of the state and the legal order is accepted as the point of departure of the discussion. Analysis of the phenomenon of positive law as the logical condition for presenting the concept of the state finally leads to the conclusion that Stammler's position cannot be maintained, as it means „limiting the conceptual definition of the being of the state” to only one function, that is the function with the legislative character, consisting in creating and realizing legal norms. Finally it is said that Stammler „leaves out of his reasoning the fact that the state must not be understood as a being with the legal structure only, as, of its essence, it also has the political structure, existing largely outside the jurisdiction of legal norms”.
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