The paper looks at the influence of the so-called net tax on household income disparities in Poland. The net tax is understood as the difference between personal income tax (PIT) and social security benefits. This theoretical category makes it possible to identify the total redistributive impact of public transfers and PIT, Aksman says. A Central Statistical Office (GUS) study of household budgets in 2004-2007 was the source of data for the empirical research made by the author. She conducted a statistical and econometric analysis using two definitions of the redistributive effect of net tax based on the Gini coefficient as a measure of income disparities. The research shows that disparities increased in the analyzed period in the case of both original incomes and net household incomes. Original incomes increased by 5.50%, while net household incomes grew 9.29%, Aksman says. She adds that net income disparities were markedly smaller than original income disparities due to the redistributive effect of the net tax. The average net tax rate for original income was positive, showing that households received less in the form of social security benefits than they paid in the form of PIT. This means they were net contributors in this area, Aksman concludes.
Tax competition is defined as the use of tax policy that will allow to maintain or increase the attractiveness of a particular territory for business location. Tax competition is used especially by the relatively under-developed countries, as foreign capital inflow gives them the possibility to implement modern technology, new management methods or to increase exports. One of the effects of tax competition is the formation of tax havens, countries or territories using preferential tax rates in order to gain capital from abroad. Comparative analysis of the income tax rates in the EU countries and certain tax havens shows that despite the progressive reduction of the rates of these taxes in the EU, the phenomenon of tax competition is still very strong, and the position of tax havens as countries with relatively low or very low taxes seems to be unthreatened. Conducted empirical studies, however, show that tax competition does not significantly affect the volume of foreign direct investment, and the amount of the nominal rate of corporate income tax is not critical to the decision of potential investors. Favorable investment climate is not determined only by the properties of the tax system, but it also depends on other factors. Therefore relatively highly developed countries should increase their efforts to intensify competition for capital through the use of factors other than low taxes, for example political stability, relatively low labor costs, transparent and unambiguous legislation supporting the development of business, simple procedures to enable start a business and promoting the development of entrepreneurship, good cooperation with local and central authorities, the development of road infrastructure and telecommunications / internet, highly skilled workforce and quality of land for investment.
The aim of the paper is to perform an empirical analysis of the compatibility of the Polish personal income tax (PIT) function with the equal absolute sacrifice principle, which is a major principle of a fair division of tax burden. Throughout the empirical analysis, the author uses analytical methods proposed by Fisher (1927) and Young (1990). The Fisher method is based on calculating the variation in individual sacrifice according to an assumed utility function of income. The Young method is based on selecting the isoelastic utility function of income, which makes all taxpayers sacrifice most equally. Subsequently, a new tax function is determined, which guarantees equal absolute sacrifice according to the selected utility function of income, and compared with the actual tax function. The empirical analysis carried out by the author shows that the Polish personal income tax (PIT) function in 1999-2008 provided a good fit with the equal absolute sacrifice principle, while the sacrifice of most taxpayers was equalized according to reasonable utility functions. However, the author identified three groups of taxpayers whose sacrifice was significantly lower than required by the equal absolute sacrifice principle as well as described the time variation in the compatibility of the Polish tax function with the equal absolute sacrifice principle and in the progressivity of this function.
PL
Celem artykułu jest empiryczna analiza zgodności taryfy podatku dochodowego od osób fizycznych (PIT) w Polsce z zasadą równych ofiar absolutnych, tj. jedną z podstawowych zasad sprawiedliwego podziału obciążeń podatkowych. Do realizacji tego celu zastosowano metody analizy zaproponowane przez Fishera [1927] i Younga [1990]. Metoda Fishera polega na określeniu zmienności ofiar ponoszonych przez podatników zgodnie z pewną, założoną na potrzeby analizy, postacią funkcji użyteczności dochodu. Metoda Younga polega na wyznaczeniu tej spośród izoelastycznych funkcji użyteczności dochodu, która w największym możliwym stopniu zrównuje ofiary ponoszone przez podatników; następnie wyznacza się taryfę podatku, która zrównuje ofiary wszystkich podatników względem otrzymanej funkcji użyteczności dochodu, i porównuje tę taryfę z faktyczną taryfą opodatkowania. Według przeprowadzonej analizy taryfa podatku dochodowego od osób fizycznych (PIT) w Polsce w latach 1999-2008 była dość dobrze dopasowana do wymogów zasady równych ofiar absolutnych a ofiary większości podatników były zrównywane względem sensownych empirycznie funkcji użyteczności. Niemniej, wyróżniono trzy grupy podatników, których obciążenia podatkowe były niższe niż postulowane na gruncie zasady równych ofiar absolutnych, a także opisano zmienność w czasie zgodności taryfy opodatkowania w Polsce z zasadą równych ofiar absolutnych oraz progresywności tej taryfy.
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