Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 5

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  phenomenal consciousness
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote

Mají zvířata vědomí?

100%
Hříbek T.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2016
|
vol. 64
|
issue 1
3-22
EN
The study analyses the arguments of contemporary philosophers of mind concerning the subject of animal consciousness. The first part reminds the reader of the Cartesian starting point of the contemporary discussion and points to the concept of phenomenal consciousness as the main point of contention concerning the instantiation of consciousness in non-human animals. The second part of the study analyses various forms of representationalism which make up the mainstream of contemporary debate. In the third part the philosophy of mind of Daniel Dennett is discussed, together with its implications for the question of animal consciousness. In contrast with critics who treat Dennett’s theory as the result of conceptual confusions, the author argues that we should look upon the theory as the rejection of the assumptions of the mainstream and an attempt to think anew the question of consciousness, including animal consciousness.
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Świadomość fenomenalna a problem intencjonalności. O intencjonalności fenomenalnej

100%
Gładziejewski P.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2011
|
issue 16
5 - 25
EN
The article concerns the problem of how to understand the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality or mental content – an issue that, until recently, has been neglected by many analytic philosophers of mind. I distinguish two ways of theoretically establishing the phenomenal-intentional relation: reductive one, which I equate with so called phenomenal externalism and non-reductive one, which is based on the idea that there is a kind of intentionality – i.e. phenomenal intentionality – that is phenomenally constituted. I argue for the second of these options. Following the work of philosophers such as G. Graham, T. Horgan, U. Kriegel, J. Tienson and B. Loar, I try to show that (1) phenomenal intentionality actually exists, (2) that content of phenomenally intentional states is narrow and (3) that both previous theses are compatible with moderate externalism about mental content.
3
Content available remote

Świadomość fenomenalna a problem intencjonalności. O intencjonalności fenomenalnej

100%
Gładziejewski P.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2011
|
issue 16
5-25
EN
The article concerns the problem of how to understand the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality or mental content – an issue that, until recently, has been neglected by many analytic philosophers of mind. I distinguish two ways of theoretically establishing the phenomenal-intentional relation: reductive one, which I equate with so called phenomenal externalism and non-reductive one, which is based on the idea that there is a kind of intentionality – i.e. phenomenal intentionality – that is phenomenally constituted. I argue for the second of these options. Following the work of philosophers such as G. Graham, T. Horgan, U. Kriegel, J. Tienson and B. Loar, I try to show that (1) phenomenal intentionality actually exists, (2) that content of phenomenally intentional states is narrow and (3) that both previous theses are compatible with moderate externalism about mental content.
4
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

The Conscious Semiotic Mind

84%
Konderak P.
Studia Semiotyczne
|
2017
|
vol. 31
|
issue 1
67–89
EN
The paper discusses possible roles of consciousness in a semiotic (meaning-making) activity of a cognitive agent. The discussion, we claim, is based on two related approaches to consciousness: on Chalmers’ theory of phenomenal and psychological consciousness and on Damasio’s neural theory, which draws a distinction between core and extended consciousness. Two stages of cognitive-semiotic processing are discussed: the moment of perception of a sign as a meaningful entity and the metasemiotic processes understood as the human capacity to reflect on signs and their usage, analyse and control processes of recognition, interpretation of signs and to detect and correct errors in semiotic activity. In the case of the first stage, it is argued that signs as meaningful entities have a distincly experiential character. The feeling of meaningfulness is a result of phenomenal consciousness, in particular a result of the so-called valuation features of phenomenal experience. I claim that this aspect of cognitive-semiotic activity is possible owing to a special neural mechanism called a semiotic marker. It is argued that semiotic systems have to be able to use signs as signs, i.e. they should display some metacognitive capacities, in particular an ability to analyse semiosis at a metalevel. It is argued that such metasemiosis is dependent on psychological consciousness (in Chalmers’ terms: awareness) and is realized at the neural level in the form of extended consciousness. The paper is based on a particular understanding of cognitive semiotics as a discipline involving analyses of cognitive processes as semiotic processes, i.e. processes requiring usage of signs.
5
Content available remote

Podstawowe rodzaje świadomości we współczesnej filozofii naturalistycznej

67%
Dąbrowski A.
Diametros
|
2013
|
issue 36
27-46
PL
Dotychczasowe poszukiwania adekwatnej teorii świadomości rzuciły światło na jej złożoną naturę i pozwoliły wyodrębnić kilka różnych jej odmian (aspektów lub poziomów). Ambitne i nieredukcyjne podejścia zainteresowane są przede wszystkim rozróżnieniem na świadomość dostępu i świadomość fenomenalną. Wydaje się jednak, że dla pełnego zrozumienia świadomości ważne są również inne pojęcia świadomości. Celem artykułu jest prezentacja następujących rodzajów świadomości: (1) świadomość nieprzechodnia, (2) świadomość przechodnia, (3) samoświadomość, (4) świadomość fenomenalna, (5) świadomość funkcjonalna (dostępu), (6) mentalne stany (a) zachodzące i (b) ukryte. Rzeczone odmiany świadomości uzupełnione zostały krótką prezentacją nieświadomych stanów mentalnych.
EN
Research to date into the theory of consciousness has shed light on its nature and allowed us to isolate several different kinds of consciousness. Ambitious and non-reductive approaches to consciousness are primarily interested in the distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. It appears that for a full understanding of the notion, other types of consciousness may also be important. The purpose of this article is minimalistic: to present in a concise manner the following kinds of consciousness: (1) intransitive consciousness, (2) transitive consciousness, (3) self-consciousness, (4) phenomenal consciousness, (5) functional consciousness (access-consciousness), (6) mental (a) occurrent states, and (b) standing (dormant) states, and non-consciousness.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.