The article examines Półtawski’s reading of Patočka’s concept of asubjective phenomenology as presented in § 24 of the 1973 book Świat, spostrzeżenie, świadomość [The World, Perception, Consciousness]. The author discusses the main points of Patočka’s philosophy, especially his views on Husserl. For Patočka, phenomenology consists in a systematic analysis of whatever presents itself in experience. The method which problematizes the manifestation of phenomena is epoché. But the theory of transcendental reduction reduces phenomena to mere subjective appearances. For this reason, phenomenology should be pursued as an “a-subjective” project. Półtawski claims that Patočka is right in criticizing Husserl for falling into Cartesianism, but that he fails in defining the “phenomenal sphere” as the main subject matter of phenomenology. Półtawski holds that Patočka in fact continues the dogmatic motif of Husserl’ phenomenology and, moreover, that he reduces phenomena to their subjective being. The author analyzes Półtawski’s reading and claims that it has some limitations, including a misinterpretation of Patočka’s epoché, or the emphasis put on metaphysical claims of phenomenology.
The article analyzes Rozmyślania sandomierskie (Sandomierz Meditations) by Kasper Drużbicki, a 17th century Jesuit. The text, which was probably read out during a monastic retreat, borders on homiletics and mystical writing. The author of the present article interprets it through the prism of strongly marked elements of Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition and tries to reconstruct the spiritual, philosophical and linguistic phenomena occurring at the interface of the physical and metaphysical spheres, among others the way symbols function, the shaping of the semantics of words, instability of the category of time, mutual permeation and complementation of the fields of esthetics and anesthetics. There are numerous references to philosophical writings and contemporary contexts within the theory of literature but their purpose is not so much to bring out factographical or historical dependencies or the existence of conscious intertextual references but rather to provide a detailed and multifaceted depiction of the main themes of Drużbicki’s work also in an attempt to elicit on these grounds certain general regularities in the history of human thought and religion.
Главной целью статьи является представление акта восприятия в его сознательном аспекте. Этот сознательный аспект является, согласно автору, обязательной исходной точкой для дальнейших анализов перцепционных процессов (в том числе несознательных процессов). Представляя сознательный аспект восприятия, автор доопределил понятие «сознание» с помощью таких категории как качественный доступ, ограниченное число модальности, преднамеренность, содержательность (концептуальность). В описании акта восприятия автор отличил феноменальную и оценочную перцепцию. Феноменальная перцепция как основная является связанной с феноменальной изменчивостью, которая привела (и ведет к скептицизму). Аргументируя феноменальность (преднамеренное существование) характера сознательного поля, автор указал каким способом, благодаря активации эмоциональной системы, можно получить достоверность акта восприятия (и, следовательно, также, переступить скептицизм).
EN
The main purpose of this paper was to present a conscious aspect of a perceptual act. This aspect is a necessary base for further investigations of perceptual processes (including those that act below the conscious level). Before presenting the conscious aspect of perceptual act the author defined the notion of “conscious” with a help of such categories as qualitative access, limited number of cognitive faculties, intentionality, and content. In describing act of perception he differentiates between phenomenological and evaluative kinds of perception. The first one seems to be basic but results in scepticism due to phenomenological variability. Arguing for phenomenal nature of conscious field the author shows how, thanks to activation of emotional system is possible to achieve the reliability of perceptual act (and yet to weaken scepticism).
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