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EN
This paper aims: 1. To discuss Romano Guardini’s method of philosophical and religious studies and its achievements, i.e. presenting the Christian eidos as finding its fullest expression in Jesus as our Lord. 2. To compare Guardini’s method with medieval philosophy as taught by Thomas Aquinas and others. Citing G. van Rieta, the paper attempts to show that Thomism should be continued today, drawing on contemporary philosophy, the phenomenological method in particular. This is a reliable way to see what Christianity is in itself, in its specific religious character.
PL
Celem artykułu jest wyjaśnienie, na czym miałaby polegać, postulowana przez Schelera, współpraca filozofii z naukami szczegółowymi. Rozważania dotyczące poszczególnych rodzajów poznania prowadzą go do wniosku, że ani fakty nauk szczegółowych, ani też ich metody nie mogą być bezpośrednio wykorzystywane przez filozofię. Te pierwsze muszą zostać „oczyszczone” z obciążających je założeń i wszelkiego rodzaju „wtrętów”. Te drugie mogą pełnić rolę co najwyżej pomocniczą, gdyż główny ciężar odpowiedzialności za poznanie filozoficzne spoczywa na metodzie fenomenologicznej. Składają się na nią kolejno przeprowadzane redukcje (transcendentalna, psychologiczna, ejdetyczna), mające otworzyć nas na przestrzeń czystych możliwości. Metodologiczne postulaty Schelera nie zawsze są przez niego konsekwentnie wcielane w życie. W praktyce często odwołuje się on do faktów nauk szczegółowych i dokonuje indukcyjnych uogólnień, dotyczących problemów natury filozoficznej. Precyzyjnie przeprowadzone, wolne od założeń i nakierowane na istotę rzeczy doświadczenie fenomenologiczne nie jest zatem jedynym źródłem głoszonych przez niego tez.
EN
The aim of the article is to clarify the nature of the cooperation between philosophy and specialised sciences proposed by Scheler. Reflections on types of cognition lead to the conclusion that neither the facts nor the methods of specialised sciences can be directly used by philosophy. The former must be ‘cleared’ of the assumptions that burden them and of all kinds of ‘insertions’. The latter may perform an auxiliary role at best, as the main burden of responsibility for philosophical cognition rests on the phenomenological method. It consists of successively conducted reductions (transcendental, psychological, eidetic), which are to open us to the space of pure possibility. Scheler’s himself does not always consistently implement his methodological postulates. In practice, he often refers to the facts of specialised sciences and makes inductive generalisations concerning problems of a philosophical nature. A phenomenological experience which is precisely executed, free of assumptions, and essence-oriented is, therefore, not the only source of the theses he supports.
PL
Celem artykułu jest pogłębiona analiza jakości podstawowego aktu fenomenologicznego poznania. Zestawiając ze sobą argumenty Jana Patočki i Paula Ricoeura, autor dochodzi do wniosku, że ani negacja (jak twierdzi Patočka), ani afirmacja (jak sądzi Ricoeur), lecz wyprzedzające oba te akty zapytywanie jest podstawowym doświadczeniem fenomenologicznym. Z tej perspektywy „rzecz myślenia” nie jest ani niebytem (nicością), ani byciem, lecz pytajnością. Filozoficzne akty afirmacji i negacji, których korelatami są byt i niebyt, są odpowiedziami na źródłowe doświadczenie pytajności. Wytrzymanie w nim nie tylko kwestionuje prymat sądu w filozofii, lecz także hegemonię pisma jako jedynego środka wyrazu myślenia filozoficznego.
EN
Fashion in philosophy is often a camouflage for spiritual misery. The analysis of what is considered to be fashionable allows us to demystify this camouflage. I conduct this analysis in three stages. In the first stage, I determine phraseological contexts in which the word “fashion” and the related words occur, its synonyms and antonyms of it, and its polisemy. The second stage consists in constructing the contextual definition of a word “fashion”. The aim of the third stage is to formulate 13 theses on fashion; these theses are mostly not strictly general; they use quantifiers of the form “usually” or “often”. Next – in two stages – I deal with philosophical fashion. The first stage of the analysis of philosophical fashion consists in indicating the types of objects of these fashion. In the second stage, I illustrate these types in the possibly most various way. The evaluation of philosophical fashion is the third stage. I do not disavow philosophical fashions as such, but I recommend the attitude of sound reason, moderation and caution to them.
EN
The present paper aims at showing that the phenomenological method is a crucial methodological element of every research that is based on the interpretation of utterances or texts based on experiences, like religious studies. Following the neophenomenological school, the notion of “phenomenon” is understood in a radically relative way: “A phenomenon for a person at a given point of time is a state of affairs for which this person cannot — in spite of trying to vary the presuppositions she makes as much as possible — withdraw the belief that it is a fact” (Schmitz, 2003: 1). Starting from this notion, phenomenology may fruitfully criticise two common strategies: reduction and construction. The first one tries to reduce experiences to allegedly more fundamental processes like electrical impulses in neural nets. Here the phenomenologist must object that in doing so without preceding phenomenological analysis the reductionist will lose large parts of potentially important information. As to the second strategy, constructions — in the sense of presuppositions, ready-made concepts etc. — are present in all texts that are meant to express an experience. In order to describe the underlying experience more adequately, the phenomenological researcher has to remove as many constructions as possible. In this way she does not only produce a description that is ”closer” to the experience (though she can never hope to fully grasp it), but she also paves the way for comparison and dialogue across religions and cultures.
EN
The paper is a short summary of a critique of Heidegger, which I formulated at greater length in The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology for the Godforsaken (Catholic University of America Press, 2006), and Heidegger: A (Very) Critical Introduction (Eerdmans, 2008). The critique is motivated by ethical and theological concerns and interrogates Heidegger’s key methodological distinction between ontological investigations and ontic discussions. I argue that this distinction allows Heidegger to re-populate the ethico-theological horizon with presuppositions that remain unexamined and, under the terms of the distinction, unexaminable. These presuppositions set the stage for Heidegger’s politics in the 30s and his theological impact on Catholic and Protestant theology in the latter half of the 20th century. In conclusion I argue that ontology must never be divorced from the ethico-theological concerns which are endemic to it.
EN
The present article explains the concept of the research method, what such a method is in the general meaning, then it presents those research methods that are most frequently used in writing master’s and doctoral dissertations in ethnology of religion that undertake issues connected with folk religiousness. In dissertations such methods, among others, are used, as the method of ethnographic field research, the method of analysis and critique of writings, the comparative method and the theological method. Most attention was devoted to the ethnographic method, because ethnology is not included in the curriculum of theological studies. Due to the complexity of the subject of research, that is of religion, it requires a multi-faceted approach, so that its essence as well as the rites and rituals that are performed in it can be properly understood.
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2019
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vol. 8
|
issue 3
621-643
EN
In his paper, “The Concept of Value in the Ethical Thought of Cardinal Karol Wojtyła,” Tadeusz Ślipko argues that the thought of Karol Wojtyła was not faithful to the truth. This paper attempts (1) to bring into question the validity of Tadeusz Ślipko’s claim and (2) to show that Wojtyła can be embraced not only as an ambassador of the truth, but that such an acceptance allows us to embrace the truth itself. The paper consists of three parts. After (1) framing the stage with a more developed showcase of Wojtyła’s view of value within the bounds of morality as seen from antiquity, it (2) summarizes Ślipko’s objections and reservations and, then, (3) expands on Wojtyła’s stance in relation to the objections and offers relevant solutions.
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