The aim of the study is to demonstrate the paradoxicality determining human life. The natural aspiration of the subject is to strive to achieve order, enabling a reasonably satisfying and passably predictable life, guaranteeing the essential sense of security both on an individual and on a social dimension. The ancient writers and thinkers saw the origins of differentiation, and thereby of the impossibility of achieving coherence and order, in the external reality. Views of thinkers of the 19th and 20th centuries show not only a demand for diversity to be taken into consideration, but also reveal their picture of culture as something highly heterogeneous that cannot be reduced to just a single, preferred vision. Multitude of models and values creates the potential for dialogue, which is irregular and spontaneous.
The author of the article helps to understand the relation patient-doctor in the light of axiological psychiatry developed by Antoni Kępiński. Kępiński was not a typical doctor who, with great dedication and reverence, fulfilled his duties towards patients. First of all, he paid special attention to uniqueness and specificity of the level of contact between a doctor and a patient and pointed out its matey character. The article also introduces the sources of axiological psychiatry developed by Kępiński, which should be found in the philosophy of dialogue. In the light of works of Kraków psychiatrist one can notice that his philosophical anthropology was saturated with the influence of dialogue thought. According to Kępiński only a specific kind of emotional relationship based on empathy and trust could be the key to complete knowledge of the man fighting with mental illnesses.
This article tries to explain the meaning of „I” and „Thou” as categories essential for Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue. I consider these categories in a context of human’s origin and interpersonal existence. Buber’s statement of ‘dialogity’ as a specific quality of human existence has, first of all, descriptive status, and then – indirectly and secondarily – prescriptive one. I take special notice of a transcendent position of Thou towards I and distance between them. I also take under consideration „nominal” matter of I and Thou, which decides on one’s individuality and their ability to listen and answer. The result of I and Thou meeting is recognizing in I a fellow-man towards Thou. Being I and being Thou can be identified only if they are able to cross immanent cultural sphere. This is because addressing I by Thou had its beginning in transcendentalism of divine Thou and can not be interpreted in immanent context of culture as autonomous cultural area.
The other (alter), through the lens of Levinas`s criticism of the same (neutrum), is always a unique other who stands up to any generalisation and homogenisation. According to a heteronomous schedule of ethics by E. Levinas, “face of the other”, presence of their personal Thou in the sphere of life of a moral subject, precedes own being of this subject by their calling for an answer. Uniqueness of interpersonal relationship and appeal of the exterior Thou challenges human to exclusivity and to infinite self-abandonment in favour of the other (challenges to love). This ethical horizon is not possible to be ever reached and closed, it is impossible in fact, too difficult to be accepted as a norm of everyday life, mainly life in a community, society, state. Presence of “the third” (the political) in the sphere of morality is posed as a theoretical problem: What kind of ethics should be designed in a society of many “others” where Thou is inevitably turned to He/She, included in socio-political structures and relationships of justice? Is it possible to talk about some continuum between the relationship to the other and the relationship to a community? The final part of the paper seeks to answer these questions and pedagogical implications of demands of love in moral education are pointed out.
Throughout history ethical and philosophical thought has been shaping various concepts of freedom. Global transitions and significant changes within economic, sociopolitical and cultural structures have raised new questions on postmodern human condition and the sphere of axiology. The paper presents selected aspects of freedom in the context of globalization according to the works of Emmanuel Lévinas and Zygmunt Bauman. A postulated concept of freedom is defined in relation to criteria such as dialogue, encounter, inter-subjectivity and responsibility, that are the foundations for tradition of the philosophy of dialogue. The article aims at highlighting social challenges and chances, in terms of the fast-changing world, and outlines the importance of discussing the problem of freedom in dialogical approach in the 21st century.
Leśmian’s poems, those that can be treated as parables with the thirdperson narrator and a given plot and those written with the lyrical I and straightforward narrative, include a dominant and premeditated anthropological conception. Leśmian is intrigued by the relation between an individual and other people. The relation is conducive, or even essential, in the spiritual survival of the individual, and is often described as a “salvation”. The relevant issues can be interpreted within the language of the philosophy of dialogue, including the philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas, though the latter cannot be obviously treated in terms of decisive influence. The space where the ethical dimension of the interpersonal relations is revealed is namely love towards the closest pesons, it is followed by the encounter with other people, and finally the encounter with radical otherness, with what is, beyond the very experience of humanity, different - with a suffering animal. In Leśmian’s poetical output, in which the ontological and epistemological dimensions are so important, it is rather the ethical dimension that becomes prominent. This dimension, often neglected by researches of the poet’s rich and versified output, quite unexpectedly seems to come down to some absolutely fundamental ethical imperatives: to love and keep in mind that one should not hurt or kill with words or deeds.
This article takes into consideration the problem which occurs between the relations of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and the philosophy of dialogue, analyzing basic problems of Gadamerian philosophy – the problem of language, tradition or the truth in terms of the presence of the same intuitions, which were part of Ebner’s, Levinas’, or Rosenzweig’s (the principles of dialogical and the criticism of the idea of unity). It presents an outline of Gadamerian ‘philosophy of dialogue’ and peculiarly features the conditions and basic assumptions, which make interpersonal communication possible.
Barbara Skarga (1919–2009) was one of the most important Polish Philosophers of 20th century. She was an expert in classical and contemporary French (e.g. Comte, Bergson, Lévinas) and German Philosophy (e.g. Kant, Hegel, Heidegger). In this paper I present some important biographical facts (participation in organized resistance in Vilnius, interments in Gulags) as well Skarga’s philosophical, mostly sociopolitical and ethical, ideas. I called its philosophical concept “philosophy of difference”.
The essay has three parts. The opening part describes symmetric and asymmetric concepts of a dialogue. The middle section deals with paschal aspects of theology, and the closing one examines paschal dialogics based on the indicated dialogical and theological content. Explanations are drawned from the classical philosophy of dialogue as interpreted in the contemporary philosophical and theological dialogics. The author investigates the soteriological content of Fr Wacław Hryniewicz’s book Outlines of Paschal Theology. The symmetric concept of a dialogue stresses equality of the partners, connected with an innermost experience of ‘I’. The asymmetric concept of a dialogue draws attention to the inequality of the partners resulting from axiological circumstances of their personal lives. Hryniewicz’s paschal theology is centered around the Passion of Jesus Christ seen as the historical events on the one hand, but on the other being relevant in all times and places. The purpose of those events, defined as the Passover, is the salvation of the man and all the universe. The paschal anthropology is focused on the paschal event taking place inside man. It accentuates the relational and ecstatic aspects of the human being, situated at the bases of the salvific dialogue. The elements of the philosophy of dialogue, from which the paschal theology draws its explanations, are two concepts of dialogue: symmetric and asymmetric. Their complementary nature was proved through theological implementation of both dialogical contents. Thanks to this the paschal anthropology revealed the tendency of the philosophical dialogics for self-development within theology.
The author of the essay attempts to identify the kind of philosophical anthropology that theology needs today. Because of the complexity of the human being and its transcendence there is – within the boundaries of the anthropological philosophy – a need for a continuous search for the answers to the questions about man. In his analysis of the problem the author concludes that the task of the anthropological philosophy should be reflection on the man’s ontological structure and his auto transcendence. Since Christian anthropology should be primarily concerned with the principal characteristics of the human being, it means a return to the metaphysics; the metaphysics which is not only the very core of the Christian philosophy, but also and foremost the widest and ultimate – on the mind’s level – knowing of truth. Among the tasks of the philosopher undertaking a reflection on man is a multifaceted clarification of the phenomenon of morality. The anthropological philosophy, apart from its metaphysical core, must be enhanced by a personalistic trait – phenomenological, existential and dialogical. The essential moments of the human existence, like evil and suffering, hope and despair, freedom and law, or its agapetical dimension, should all find their place in the reflection of that philosophy. There is a need to build such anthropological reflection which would be based on the paradigm of vocation and responsibility. Anthropology should also contain a sapiential trait as its mode of the search for the ultimate and comprehensive sense of human life, and correspond with the Word of God.
This principal aim of deliberations in this paper was to verify the hypothesis that Karl Rahner’s anthropology operates on premises which dovetail with fundamental ideas originating with medieval Jewish mystics. In order to argue the hypothesis, the author relies on comparative methodology to discuss essential anthropological concepts advanced by K. Rahner and M. Buber.
The idea of dialogue in philosophical and theological anthropology emphasizes the dignity proper to each human being as a person, and also the human social nature. In the 20th century many humanists rediscovered the idea of interpersonal dialogue. In the philosophical thought this idea is present in the works of Jewish thinkers: Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig and Emmanuel Levinas. But the notion of dialogue can also be useful in Chrisitian theological language.The article looks at the notion of dialogue in the definition of the relationship between God and human beings from the perspective of Christian Personalism. A “dialogically oriented theology” shows the relationship between God and man as a dialogue based on divine grace. The dignity of every human person is rooted in the vocation to dialogue with the persons of the Holy Trinity. This dialogue with God defines human beings in their relation to the world. The dialogue goes far beyond everyday life and finds its fulfillment in eternal dialogue with God and with the community of the redeemed.
This comparative essay about two kinds of interpersonal-centric humanism is dedicated to the memory of professor Janusz Kuczynski and his conception of dialogical universalism as a metaphilosophy, and shows Immanuel Kant’s thought as a ceaseless source of inspiration for all anti-conservatives and universalists. Kant’s philosophy gave man an unforgettable sense of freedom, because it not only posed the imperative of building a pan-human community of all rational beings, but also revealed the above-natural sense of the human species’ imposition of purposefulness upon itself, and the realisation of this purposefulness in the form of a republican federation of free states dedicated to co-creating eternal peace. Kantian ethics did not reach beyond the obligations people had towards one another, hence it was functionally anthropological and uninfluenced by religion, which re-situated philosophy with regard to scientific cognition and religious experience, giving rise to a metaphysics of anthropological responsibility for the condition of the spiritual freedom this ethic propounded. Kant revealed the existence of a metaphysical difference in the sphere of being—between the determinism of nature and the moral kingdom of freedom—without direct reference to the transcendental source of these two essentially different worlds. Kant was the first to set morality rooted in the autonomy and unanimous will of all rational beings—or true humanity—against legal and religious legalism. Kant laid weight on the processual character of man’s self-education to social life through the sense of commitment to self-improvement for the benefit of the solidary co-existence of all rational beings that he developed in himself as a rational being. Thus created freedom is founded on the selflesness of goodness and represents a new quality of being that only manifests itself and evolves in community, interpersonalcentrically. It is a universalistic approach capable of gradually neutralising the human inclination towards radical evil. My attempt to compare these two interpersonalcentric humanism conceptions aims to add some substance to this very delicate element in Kuczynski’s universalism as a metaphilosophy construct.
The process of cognition usually ends with an attempt to name and understand the searched/encountered phenomenon. The essence of sacrum is not observable simply because as „we do not have direct access to the quantum world via our senses”, but it does exist. Remembering the words of L. Wittgenstein which state that „the borders of the language (the only language I understand) constitute the borders of my world”, one ought to take one of the ways leading to our subject of cognition. A direct arising in the sphere of sacrum can be both a mental and emotional anticipation of the essence of subject we are heading to, and whose spatial frame is determined by architectonic objects. In its sensory meaning sacrum materializes itself often in a form of sacred chapels, paintings, sculptures, fragments of buildings, landscape etc. In the following article an attempt to select one of the ways that can lead to more complete contact and understanding of a sacred, materialized phenomenon which is referred to as sacrum. One, however, ought to bear in mind that the attempt at reaching the essence of such a place is a difficult task because just like „watching a wild brook does not concern the flow, the sound or reflexes of this particular brook but the general concept of a brook: unbridled push of unformed matter”, the understanding and sensing of sacrum escapes a clear codification.
PL
Proces poznania kończy się zazwyczaj próbą nazwania i zrozumienia poszukiwanego/napotkanego zjawiska. Istota sacrum nie jest obserwowalna, tak jak „Nie mamy przecież bezpośredniego dostępu za pomocą zmysłów do świata kwantowego” , a jednak on istnieje. Mając w pamięci słowa L. Wittgensteina, że „ granice języka (jedynego języka, jaki rozumiem) oznaczają granice mego świata”, należy przejść jedną z dróg prowadzących do naszego przedmiotu poznania. Bezpośrednie zaistnienie w sferze sacrum może być mentalno-emocjonalną antycypacją istoty przedmiotu dążenia, którego oprawą przestrzenną są niejednokrotnie obiekty architektoniczne. W sensie zmysłowym sacrum materializuje się często w formie: uświęconych kaplic, obrazów, rzeźb, fragmentów budowli, krajobrazu itp. W niniejszym artykule podjęto próbę wskazania jednej z dróg, która może doprowadzić do pełniejszego obcowania i zrozumienia uświęconego, zmaterializowanego zjawiska, któremu często nadaje się imię sacrum. Należy jednak pamiętać, że próba dotarcia do istoty takiego miejsca jest działaniem trudnym, gdyż tak jak „ogląd dzikiego potoku nie dotyczy spływania, szumu i blasków tego indywidualnego potoku, ale ogólnej idei potoku: nieposkromionego parcia naprzód bezforemnej materii” , tak i zrozumienie i odczucie sacrum umyka klarownej kodyfikacji.
„Pogranicze” to słowo-klucz współczesnej humanistyki. Rozumiane szeroko (biorąc pod uwagę zarówno jego aspekt geograficzny, kulturowy jak i interpersonalny) dotyczy wielu paradygmatów współczesnej nauki. W niniejszym szkicu kategorię pogranicza powiążemy z myślą filozoficzną Michaiła Bachtina, Tzvetana Todorova, Martina Bubera i Emmanuela Levinasa. Pogranicze to spotkanie „ja” z innym (tym „ja” lub innym może być jednostka, grupa, kultura), nieuniknione i stanowiące o sensie życia, oparte na niewspółobecności (Bachtin, Todorov), odpowiedzialności (Buber, Levinas), pełnym oddaniu, obustronnym wzbogaceniu światopoglądowym (kulturowym), sprawiedliwości, próbie przezwyciężania różnic, rozbieżności w kwestiach fundamentalnych.
EN
,,Borderland” is a keyword, contemporary humanities buzzword, widely understood (regarding the geographical, cultural and interpersonal aspect) concerns of many paradigms of contemporary science. In this essay, the borderland is connected with the philosophical thought of Mikhail Bachtin, Tzvetan Todorov, Martin Buber, Emmanuel Levinas. The borderland is the meeting the „I” with the other (the „I” or the other can be individual, group or culture), the inevitable and forming the meaning of life, based on noncoexistence (Bakhtin, Todorov), the responsibility (Buber, Levinas), the complete devotion, mutual enrichment of worldview (cultural), the justice, the efford to overcome of differences, discrepancies in fundamental issue.
The article focuses on the role of intersubjectivity in the philosophy of Karl Jaspers, concentrating above all on the third chapter of Philosophy, Vol. II in which Jaspers gives his most detailed exposition of the various forms of communication. At the same time, a detailed analysis of the basic modes of communication – which correspond to the different levels of the human self – facilitates our understanding the origin of the inadequacies and failures that occur in communication when it has not risen to the level of existential communication. Special attention is given to existential communication and its importance in the process of becoming oneself. The author argues that, especially in those passages that highlight the serious metaphysical consequences that follow from failures in communication, Jaspers is developing an implicit polemic with Martin Heidegger (in whose analyzes of authentic Dasein intersubjectivity played no role). In the conclusion, the author points out the connection between existential communication and the boundary situation of struggle.
CS
Článek je věnován roli intersubjektivity ve filosofii Karla Jasperse. Autor se zaměřuje především na 3. kapitolu z Philosophie II, kde Jaspers podává nejpodrobnější výklad různých podob komunikace. Detailní rozbor základních způsobů komunikace, jež odpovídají různým úrovním lidského Já, zároveň umožňuje objasnit původ nedostatečnosti a selhávání, k nimž dochází v komunikaci, pokud se nepozvedla na úroveň existenciální komunikace. Zvláštní pozornost je věnována právě existenciální komunikaci a jejímu významu v procesu stávání se sebou. Autor zastává tezi, že zejména v pasážích osvětlujících závažné metafyzické důsledky, jež plynou ze selhávání v komunikaci, Jaspers rozvíjí implicitní polemiku s Martinem Heideggerem, v jehož analýzách autentického pobytu intersubjektivita nehraje žádnou roli. V závěru pak autor poukazuje na souvislosti mezi existenciální komunikací a mezní situací boje.
Filozofia subiektywności dotarła w XX wieku do granic swoich możliwości. Jako odpowiedź na jej ograniczenia rozmaici filozofowie podjęli próby nowego rodzaju myślenia. Takie próby to m.in. myśl dialogiczna, która pierwszy wyraz znalazła w pismach takich filozofów, jak Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber czy Eberhard Grisebach. Innym przykładem jest postulat powrotu do pytania o bycie Martina Heideggera. W niniejszym artykule staram się pokazać, że obie próby mają ze sobą wiele wspólnego, choć ich przedstawiciele odnosili się do siebie nawzajem raczej krytycznie, o ile w ogóle to czynili. Okazuje się jednak, że myśl Martina Bubera oraz Martina Heideggera ujmują człowieka jako byt dynamiczny, który staje w obliczu nachodzącego go wezwana. Dlatego też analizuję najpierw koncepcję Martina Heideggera z okresu Bycia i czasu, następnie przedstawiam myślenie Martina Bubera, głównie w oparciu o jego traktat Ja i Ty. Na koniec dokonuję zestawienia i porównania wątków wspólnych obu filozofom, jak również zaznaczam różnice, które dzielą obie próby przekroczenia filozofii podmiotowości.
EN
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the philosophy of subjectivity reached its limits. Various attempts at new thinking appeared as a reaction to these limits. Such attempts involve, among others, the philosophy of dialogue, which was represented in the works of Franz Rosen- zweig, Martin Buber and Eberhard Grisebach. Another approach includes Martin Heidegger’s demand for returning to the question of Being. In this article, I intend to present that both attempts are similar in many ways, although their representatives tended to be critical of one another. However, the approaches of Martin Buber as well as Martin Heidegger prove to understand a man as a dynamic being who faces the calling. Firstly, I would like to analyse the thought of Martin Heidegger as presented in Being and time , then I will describe the thought of Martin Buber mainly based on his treaty I and Thou . Finally, I compare the similarities and differences in the thinking of both philosophers
Philosophy should seriously take into account the presence of computers. Computer enthusiasts point towards a new Pythagoreanism, a far reaching generalization of logical or mathematical views of the world. Most of us try to retain a belief in the permanence of human superiority over robots. To justify this superiority, Gödel’s theorem has been invoked, but it can be demonstrated that this is not sufficient. Other attempts are based on the scope and fullness of our perception and feelings. Yet the fact is that more and more can be computer simulated. In order to secure human superiority over robots, reference to the realm of human relations and attitudes seems more promising. Insights provided by philosophy of dialogue can help. They suggest an ultimate extension of the Turing test. In addition, it seems that in order to justify the belief in human superiority one must rely on the individual experiences that indicate a realm that is not merely subjective. It makes sense to call it religious.
After the publication of Jaques Derrida’s book, L’animal que donc je suis, anti-speciesism has been looking for a theoretical foundation for its ethical content. In my opinion, the defect of all these philosophical perspectives is that they still reduce animals to objects of human philosophy. Here, I develop a new framework in which animals are considered as subjects of their own philosophy. In analogy to the concept of ethnophilosophy, the concept of speciophilosophy is here introduced (§ 1, §3). The different ways of thinking between humans and other animals are outlined, by explaining the difference between verbal reasoning and thinking through images (§ 2). Human philosophies are shown to be anthropocentric ideologies, related to carnivorism (§4, § 8). Subsequently, animal speciophilosophies are discussed (§6) and a dialogical symphilosophein (§ 5) among all living beings is proposed to be the extension of the so-called philosophy of dialogue. Finally, it is shown how this perspective was present in the original Christian ethics (§7, §9, § 10).
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