Well-being is becoming an increasingly popular issue in economics. The aim of the article is to present the concept of well-being and the methods of its measurement and to examine the statistical significance between the results obtained by specific indicators. The article was written based on the meta-analysis of the books and scientific papers on the subject, as well as well-being and welfare measurement reports. The study shows that there is a very wide range of theories and concepts related to well-being which are sometimes exceptive. The most important conclusion from the study is that the correlation between welfare and well-being represented respectively by GDP and HDI is very strong, while the correlation between welfare and life satisfaction as well as well-being and subjective well-being are negligible.
The purpose of the paper is to challenge one of the most important assumptions of the neo-positivists, namely the unity of science. The idea that all of the sciences, both natural and social, should have the same structure and should deploy similar methods is, after Grobler, called naturalism. I try to argue for anti-naturalism. An interesting example seems to be economics. It does not, however, demonstrate the success, similar to that achieved by natural sciences. Certain naturalistic explanations for this lack of success are reviewed and criticized in the paper. Firstly, complexity: at the beginning of this naturalistic argument, one encounters the problem of definition. Up to nine different notions of complexity are proposed and only a few of them are practically quantitative. Secondly, mathematics: in the natural sciences we explore mathematical theories in order to capture the regularities in the investigated phenomena and to include them in the corresponding equations. However, even if we do not have a perfectly corresponding mathematical model, regularities themselves can be observed. Wherever we do not have a good theory expressed in terms of exact mathematical equations, we should at least be able to judge the existence or non-existence of certain regularities on the basis of linear (statistical) or non-linear methods. Those methods, some of them extremely sophisticated, are being extensively applied in economics and in econometrics (the so called quantitative methods). The results are disappointing. The anti-naturalistic argumentation of Grobler is dealt with separately. Grobler names three anti-naturalistic arguments: complexity (as mentioned above), the free will of humans (which the author did not find interesting enough) and, finally, the reasoning which is called, ”inherent two-way interdependence”. Grobler maintains that we are able to work out a meta-theory which shall include both predictions and the possible impact of those predictions on the theory’s object. This proposal is rejected in the paper.
The purpose of the paper is to analyse the issue of a test method in economics. It calls for the necessity of adopting a methodological approach that will be flexible and cognitively inspiring, which is a prerequisite to establishing the foundations for economics, its development and effectiveness in clarifying social and economic phenomena. Currently believed to be a complex (both theoretical and empirical), and inductive-deductive science, economics fails to possess binding methodological arrangements. Therefore, when looking for good solutions, scholars propose universal pluralism, which lets them expand the research apparatus within defined, yet not tightly logical structures.
During the last two decades, the literature in management studies has shown a signifi cant increase in interest in the theory of business models, and there has been wide-ranging discussion about the definitions of those models. These studies and discussions have provoked questions about the scientifi c nature of business models. The question is analysed here by using the methodology of the Scientific Research Tradition (ScRT) proposed by Larry Laudan. The result confirmed that the theory of business models that is created and defined based on management sciences falls under the scope of ScRT.
PL
W ostatnich dwóch dekadach odnotowano w literaturze dotyczącej zarządzania znaczący wzrost zainteresowania teorią modeli biznesowych, jak również szeroko zakrojonej dyskusji na temat definicji modelu biznesowego. Te badania i dyskusje budziły wątpliwości dotyczące naukowego charakteru modeli biznesowych. Kwestia naukowych podstaw modeli biznesowych została w tym artykule poddana analizie i ocenie, z wykorzystaniem Metodologii Tradycji Badań Naukowych (MTBN) zaproponowanej przez Larrego Laudana. Uzyskany tą drogą rezultat potwierdził, że teoria modeli biznesowych, która jest tworzona w oparciu o fundamenty naukowe zarządzania mieści się w zakresie MTBN.
Over the years, researchers have been reflecting on the role of time in human life. The economy also views it as a unique and limited resource. However, money is defined as a tool that facilitates transactions. This work is an attempt to supplement economic thought in terms of comparing time and money. By analyzing the literature in the context of defining the concept of money and own analysis of pluralistic types of transactions, the deductive inference was made. The aim of the study is an attempt to prove that the object of economic exchange carried out with the use of money is human life in the form of time involved in obtaining a commodity. On the basis of such logical considerations, it was indicated that time is a concept much wider than money because time is the currency in transactions.
PL
Na przestrzeni lat badacze zastanawiają się nad rolą czasu w życiu człowieka. Również ekonomia postrzega go jako wyjątkowy i ograniczony zasób. Pieniądz z kolei jest definiowany jako narzędzie ułatwiające transakcje. Niniejsza praca jest próbą uzupełnienia myśli ekonomicznej w zakresie porównania czasu i pieniądza. Poprzez analizę literatury w kontekście zdefiniowania pojęcia pieniądza oraz analizę własną pluralistycznych rodzajów transakcji, przeprowadzone zostało wnioskowanie dedukcyjne. Celem pracy jest próba udowodnienia tego, że przedmiotem wymiany ekonomicznej dokonywanej za pośrednictwem pieniądza jest życie ludzkie w postaci czasu zaangażowanego do uzyskania wymienialnego dobra. Na podstawie tak przeprowadzonego rozważania logicznego zostało wskazane, że czas jest pojęciem o wiele szerszym niż pieniądz, ale to właśnie czas jest walutą w transakcjach.
This paper explores the ways Prof. A. Malawski understood the various kinds of interplay between economics, mathematics, and philosophy. In particular, it addresses the issue of the mathematicity of the economy and what it means for economics to be a mathematical science. Next, it focuses on the nature of economic laws. It concludes by claiming that the interpretative key to Prof. Malawski’s research lies in his deep humility.
PL
W artykule podjęto rozważania na temat sposobu rozumienia przez prof. A. Malawskiego związków pomiędzy ekonomią, matematyką i filozofią. W szczególności analizie poddano kwestię matematyczności gospodarki, a także tego, jak należy rozumieć ekonomię traktowaną jako naukę matematyczną. Podjęto także problematykę natury praw ekonomicznych. Artykuł kończy się stwierdzeniem, że kluczem interpretacyjnym do badań prof. A. Malawskiego jest jego wyjątkowa pokora.
Neuroscience is a fascinating discipline – its dynamic progress has led to the emergence of new interdisciplinary research programmes with great potential. One of these research areas is neuroeconomics. As will be shown in this article, this discipline, which is diffi cult to clearly characterize and defi ne, is faced with many problems. Th is paper argues that social scientists should be interested in the problems and tendencies in social neuroscience for several reasons. Neuroeconomics, and other disciplines inspired by neuroscience, will compete with their parent disciplines in many fi elds of interest. On one hand it will be necessary for scientists to defi ne and defend the irreplaceable roles of their disciplines, but also critically evaluate the potential of new approaches on the other. In the context of this discussion, which reopens questions about the scientifi c status of economics and its roles, this paper introduces the main problems related to neuroeconomics. Th is paper concludes that these problems represent a wide domain for social scientists and methodologists of science.
CS
Neurověda je fascinující disciplínou – její dynamický rozvoj podněcuje vznik nových interdisciplinárních výzkumných programů s velkým potenciálem. Jednou takovou oblastí je i neuroekonomie. Jak se ukáže v článku, tato disciplína, kterou je obtížné jednoznačně vymezit a určit její defi nici, se potýká se spoustou problémů. Článek y jj fi argumentuje, že by se společenští vědci měli těmito problémy a tendencemi v sociální neurovědě zabývat, a to hned z několika důvodů. Neuroekonomie, a také další neurovědou inspirované disciplíny, budou svým mateřským oborům konkurovat v mnoha oblastech, přičemž bude nezbytné, aby vědci byli schopni na jedné straně defi novat a obhájit nezastupitelné role svých disciplín, na straně druhé kriticky vyhodnocovat potenciál nových přístupů. V kontextu této diskuze, která znovu otevírá otázky ohledně vědeckého statusu ekonomie a jejích rolí, článek vymezuje základní problémy, s nimiž se neuroekonomie potýká. Práce dospívá k závěru, že tyto problémy představují široké pole působnosti pro společenské vědce a metodology vědy.
The goal of the article is to substantiate that despite the criticism the paradigm in economics will not change because of the axiomatic assumptions of value-free economics. How these assumptions work is demonstrated on the example of Gary Becker’s economic approach which is analyzed from the perspective of scientific research programme (Lakatos). The author indicates hard core of economic approach (maximization of utility, instrumental rationality) and the protective belt which makes hard core immune from any criticism. This immunity leads economists to believe that they are objective scientists and, consequently, it results in epistemological hubris. Due to its tautological nature (and other problems), economic approach is considered to be a degenerative programme. This conclusion is extended on value-free economics. In spite of these problems, many economists still believe in positive economics and they dismiss normative approaches. It has a negative influence on people (well-being, choices over time). The conclusion of the article is that thanks to axiomatic assumptions economists do not have objective and ironclad methodology and they should accept normative values in their research.
This paper endeavours to interpret laws of economics as statements that are only valid under “normal” conditions. It starts out by referring to various problems in understanding scientific laws, including those governing economics, in ceteris paribus terms. Next, the author tries to demonstrate that difficulties in completing antecedents of these laws, i.e., specifying all factors that are either absent or constant, should result in a “normality” approach to ceteris paribus laws. In such an approach, instead of claiming that “ceteris paribus, if A, then B,” we would be stating that “ceteris rectis, if A, then B,” with ceteris rectis implying that “the nature of A is to produce B.” However, the clause would have to be placed in the context of the more encompassing definition where ceteris rectis originally means simply “other things being right.” Such reflections, deeply rooted in the general philosophy of science, are illustrated by various examples taken from economics, including statements on the relationship between the cost of money and investments, as well as some insights into the law of demand. The paper concludes by asserting that economic laws not only carry implicit or explicit ceteris paribus clauses, but also consist of the ceteris rectis clause. This appears to rule out the possibility of formulating universal laws of economics.
PL
Celem artykułu jest interpretacja praw ekonomicznych jako stwierdzeń odnoszących się do warunków normalnych. Punktem wyjścia tekstu jest przedstawienie problemów związanych z rozumieniem praw naukowych, w tym ekonomicznych, w kategoriach ceteris paribus. Następnie analiza biegnie w kierunku wykazania, że trudności m.in. związane z dopełnieniem praw ceteris paribus, a więc wyspecyfikowaniem w ich poprzednikach wszelkich czynników nieobecnych i niezmiennych, powinny prowadzić do przyjęcia ich normalnościowej interpretacji, w ramach której zamiast twierdzić „ceteris paribus, jeśli A, to B” stwierdza się „ceteris rectis, jeśli A, to B”, i gdzie ceteris rectis rozumie się jako „w naturze A jest powodowanie B”. Taka interpretacja zawiera się w znaczeniowo szerszym rozumieniu tej klauzuli jako „przy innych warunkach w porządku”. Tego typu rozważania, silnie osadzone w filozofii nauki, są w tekście ilustrowane przykładami zaczerpniętymi z ekonomii m.in. dotyczącymi relacji między ceną pieniądza a aktywnością inwestycyjną przedsiębiorstw, czy zmiennymi obecnymi w prawie popytu. Konkluzją artykułu jest stwierdzenie, że prawa ekonomiczne nie tylko zawierają implicite bądź explicite klauzulę ceteris paribus, ale również, iż obecny w nich jest zwykle warunek ceteris rectis. Takie rozumienie praw ekonomicznych kwestionuje możliwość sformułowania w ramach teorii ekonomii uniwersalnych praw naukowych.
Social constructivists use to say that economists cannot study objective reality, absolute truth does not exist, and economic knowledge is being constructed, not discovered and it depends on temporary culture. Realists notice and admit social conditions which may affect economic theories and unrealistic assumptions of models, but they claim that these models describe the real world, at least to some extent. The notions of truth and reality are crucial in both of these concepts. In this papar they are analysed based on Hilary Putnam theory developed by Adam Grobler.