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Studia Semiotyczne
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2017
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vol. 31
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issue 2
77–112
EN
What is the scope of a semantic theory consistent with the theoretical assumptions adopted by the generative program? In this paper I will show that the linguistic theory generically known as generative grammar is an extremely coherent Scientific Research Program and within this descriptive framework it’s possible to characterize the main features of an I-semantics. First, will be presented the hardcore of the generative program, its heuristics and Chomsky’s criticism towards formal semantics. Second, I will compare two approaches: the denotational approach by Larson and Segal and the intensional approach by Paul Pietroski. I argue in favor of Pietroski’s approach, because it is more coherent with the core assumptions of the generative program. The main argument is that syntax, in the context of the generative program is explanatory and, in this very context, semantics is not. Therefore, in order to account for the explanatory role of syntax in the generative program it is necessary to review certain foundational assumptions commonly accepted in formal semantics.
EN
The aim of this paper is to provide a classification of linguistic programmes. Referring to the philosophical concept of research programmes, the author proposes a number of original solutions. The content of the article focuses on issues related to the problems of the linguistic study and the methods of solving them. The author attempts to prove that the concept of programmes by I. Lakatos explains the development of linguistic research better than the concept of paradigms proposed by Th. Kuhn.
EN
We see, in linguistics, the predominance of Greco‑Latin tradition on language studies. The scientists, prisoners to the tradition, cannot see the language from other perspectives. Using two examples in the morphology of the attitude of the linguists (the distinction inflection/derivation and the word classes), we intend to characterize two processes in linguistic research that has prevented the development of morphological studies: the naturalization of grammar and its use as “protocol sentence”.
EN
Despite conceiving epistemological principles as the most important element in a science and strongly defending the indissolubility between the linguistic and philosophical dimensions of theorization, Eugenio Coseriu expressed a great number of his epistemological convictions only as mere comments scattered across different writings. For this reason, it is not always easy to realize which aspects of his linguistic thinking, which argumentation procedures and which key categorizations and concepts in his linguistic theorization originated from issues of a philosophical nature – especially as far as philosophy of linguistics is specifically concerned. In this respect, the present paper aims to identify the philosophical-scientific foundations underlying ―Logicismo y antilogicismo en la gramática‖ (―Logicism and Antilogicism in Grammar‖). In doing so, I intend to show that this work is not a mere linguistic study, but an essential approach to unravel the epistemological principles around which the whole philosophical-scientific edifice of Coserian linguistic theory is structured.
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EN
Following the linguistic turn in analytical philosophy, concern for language underlies some of the most important strands of philosophical practice, making issues of mind, language and discourse virtually inseparable elements of scientific inquiry. Just as philosophy looks to language and linguistics to endorse different ontological and epistemological postulates, linguistics looks to philosophy in addressing its key questions of meaning, function and use. In this paper I argue that pragmatics and discourse analysis are areas where the relation between language, linguistics and philosophy is particularly salient. Crucially, philosophy, its conceptions and frameworks, should never be viewed as ‘external’ to discourse. Rather, discourse and discourse study involving pragmatic tools are, in themselves, areas of intense philosophical practice. Results of this practice are relevant and of interest to not only language philosophers, but also to those exploring ontological and epistemological matters of general philosophy.
EN
Othering is the construction and identification of the self or in-group and the other or out-group in mutual, unequal opposition by attributing relative inferiority and/or radical alienness to the other/out-group. Othering can be “crude” or “sophisticated”, the defining difference being that in the latter case othering depends on the interpretation of the other/out-group in terms that are applicable only to the self/in-group but that are unconsciously assumed to be universal. The Mass Noun Thesis, the idea that all nouns in certain languages are grammatically and folk-ontologically similar to mass nouns in English, is an example of such sophisticated othering. According to this Thesis, (a) count nouns refer to discrete objects and mass nouns to stuffs; (b) the other’s language has only mass nouns and thus no count nouns; and therefore, (c) the other’s folk-ontology is an ontology of mass stuffs only. There is much evidence, however, that folk-ontology is independent from language. This paper argues that the Mass Noun Thesis is a case of sophisticated othering rooted in a conflation of grammatical and ontological conceptions of mass and count nouns that is applicable to the language of the interpreter/self but not to the languages of the relevant others, and that othering in this case is driven by a need to create some radically alien other to support a scientific or philosophical theory.
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