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Na ratunek teologii – Philipa Claytona koncepcja emergentnego umysłu

100%
Maziarka T.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2014
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issue 54
155-259
PL
New worldview that arose from a number of important findings of science, including the Darwinian theory of evolution as well as the Big Bang theory, calls for a redefinition of the human place in the world of nature. Human mind, with its characteristic self-consciousness, is facing a difficult problem of understanding of his own nature as well as clarifying its relationship with the realm of the physical world. According to Philip Clayton, the correct answer to the question of the relation of mind to body (mind-body problem) is given by the concept of emergentism. While taking his arguments from modern science and philosophy, Clayton claims that the mind – causally active mental properties – is a valuable result of the evolution that has occurred through the emergence, and its special feature, i.e. rationality, sheds new light on attempts of the ultimate understanding of reality.
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Review: "Osoba — fikcja czy rzeczywistość? Tożsamość i jedność ja w świetle badań neurologicznych" [Persons: Fiction or Reality? The Identity and Unity of the “Self” in the Light of Neurological Research], by Józef Bremer

100%
Lechniak M.
Forum Philosophicum
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2014
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vol. 19
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issue 2
255–259
EN
The article reviews the book "Osoba — fikcja czy rzeczywistość? Tożsamość i jedność ja w świetle badań neurologicznych" [Persons: Fiction or Reality? The Identity and Unity of the “Self” in the Light of Neurological Research], by Józef Bremer.
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The Daniel Dennett’s New Mind: Darwin, Turing but no Bach

100%
Krzanowski R.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2018
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issue 64
209-213
EN
Book review: Daniel C. Dennett, From Bacteria to Bach and Back. The evolution of mind, Penguin Random House, UK 2017, pp. 467.
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Review: "Osoba -- fikcja czy rzeczywistość? Tożsamość i jedność ja w świetle badań neurologicznych," by Józef Bremer

100%
Ługowska D.
Forum Philosophicum
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2008
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vol. 13
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issue 2
386-389
EN
The article reviews the book Osoba – fikcja czy rzeczywistość? Tożsamość i jedność ja w świetle badań neurologicznych [A Person: Fiction or Reality? Identity and Oneness of the I in View of Neurologic Research], by Józef Bremer.
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Program Erica Kandela a materializm nieredukcjonistyczny

100%
Janik B.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2012
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issue 51
76-95
PL
In this article I analyze Eric Kandel’s intellectual frameworks for psychiatry from the perspective of non-reductionist materialism. I briefly present Kandel’s program and its main features and then, after introducing various types of non-reductionist materialism, I focus on incorporation the philosophical view into a purely scientific program. The main goal of this paper is to show that a philosophical component is necessary for holistic approaches to the philosophy of mind.
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Folk Psychology and Law: the Case of Eliminativism

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Jakubiec M., Janik B.
Semina Scientiarum
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2017
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vol. 16
EN
The aim of this paper is very modest. First, we want to assess how differentstrategies of naturalization might deal with the need of using folk psychologyin legal domain. Second, we want to check whether folk psychology is indeedindispensable in the legal domain. Third, we want to describe possible problemswith one strategy of naturalization, i.e. radical naturalization with classicalelimination. Our conclusion will be that despite various attempts, every projectof naturalization of law will have to resolve the tension between law and folkpsychology and such resolution would not be achieved by simple reduction orelimination of folk psychology. A variety of non-standard solutions might be inplace to resolve this tension. We will only outline those strategies here.
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A Subaltern Pain: The Problem of Violence in Philosophy’s Pain Discourse

88%
Harfouch J.
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
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2019
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vol. 3
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issue 3(9)
127-144
EN
The scientific and philosophical approach to pain must be supplemented by a hermeneutics studying how racism has complicated the communication of pain. Such an investigation reveals that not only are non-white people seen as credibly speaking their pain, but also pain “science” is one of the ways races have historically been constructed. I illustrate this through a study of Frantz Fanon’s clinical writings, along with eighteenth- and nineteenth-century slave-owners’ medical manuals and related documents. I suggest that, with this history, what philosophers understand as the problem of pain is best framed as the problem of colonial violence.
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Consciousness, Culture, and the Brain

88%
Bartra R.
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
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2018
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vol. 2
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issue 2(4)
100–114
EN
Human consciousness is a phenomenon that occurs not only in the brain but also in an external network, a symbolic system. This symbolic system is defined as an exocerebrum. The exocerebrum is a system of artificial cultural prostheses that substitute functions the brain cannot carry out through exclusively biological means. The exocerebrum is a symbolic system that substitutes the cerebral circuits that are incapable by themselves of completing functions that are characteristic of human mental behavior. The brain is not capable of processing symbols without the help of an external system essentially made up of speech, symbols, the non-discursive forms of communication (such as music, dance, and painting), and the exterior artificial memories (from writing to the Internet). We are in the presence of a continual spectrum, one in which there is no need to draw a dividing line between the brain and the exocerebrum, between the neuronal circuits and the cultural prostheses.
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Granice wyjaśnienia naukowego, część II

88%
Gorazda M.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2013
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issue 52
53-106
PL
The second part of the text is intended to deal with the anti-naturalistic argument of F.A. Hayek. To present it comprehensively, however, his theory of mind has to be outlined first. According to Hayek, the way in which we perceive the world is entirely grounded in the biological construction of our neural order and thus, from this perspective, he seems to be a naturalist. He excludes any non-natural properties of our cognition like e.g. transcendental free will. However, a closer look at the functioning of our biological apparatus of perception divulges certain inherent and internal restrictions. First of all, we notice that the neural order (biological construction of neurons) is in fact a very complex apparatus of classification and discrimination of sensory impulses. Impulses may come from reality which is outer to the neural order as well as from the inside. The apparatus of classification and discrimination of sensory impulses is not stable, but permanently dynamic. An unstoppable attack of sensations and relevant responses of the system creates new classification rules (neural connections) and demolishes those which have been inactive for a longer time. A system of those rules, existing in a particular time unit, forms a model of reality which imperfectly corresponds to the existing, transcendent reality. The final argument for anti-naturalism which is elucidated in the text is Hayek’s idea of what is explanation and where lie its limits. This idea can be reduced to the following quotation: “…any apparatus of classification must possess a structure of a higher degree of complexity that is possessed by an object which it classifies.” In other words: if our cognitive system is an “apparatus of classification”, and if an explanation means modeling, and if a complete explanation requires the explanation of the apparatus itself, then a complete explanation is not possible at all, as the apparatus, which has a certain level of complexity, cannot upgrade this level in order to explain itself. Hayek’s reasoning is generally approved yet it is emphasized, however, that it rests on very strong assumptions which are identified and named at the end of the text.
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Would we know (and shold we think that we would know) all about the mind if we knew all about the brain? The debate about reductionism and reductivism in philosophy of mind

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Paprzycka K.
Nauka
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2008
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issue 2
EN
The paper distinguishes the debate between reductionism and antireductionism (centered around the question whether sciences such as psychology are in principle reducible to neurosciences and eventually to physics) from a debate between reductivism and antireductivism (centered around the practical question whether we should prefer neuroscientific theories over psychological theories). The first part of the paper surveys various arguments for and against reductionism and ends with a plea for agnosticism. The second part of the paper contains an argument that even if reductionism is true, we should all be antireductivists.
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Kognitivní revoluce, behaviorismus a magická teorie mysli

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Franek J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2014
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vol. 62
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issue 3
403-416
EN
The article reacts to a critical evaluation of the cognitive revolution which Jaroslav Peregrin has presented (The Cognitive Counterrevolution?, Filosofie dnes, 4, 2012, No. 1, pp. 19-35). According to Peregrin the cognitive revolution has thrown open a Pandora’s box of naive mentalistic theories and variations on Cartesian dualism (“magical theories of the mind”), which “do not belong to science, nor even to sensible philosophy”. Although I agree with the rejection of magical theories of the mind, I attempt to show that the cognitive turn in the 50’s and 60’s of the last century is susceptible of a quite different interpretation, according to which cognitive science, as a result of its basic assumptions and methodology, does not imply or propagate any kind of Cartesian dualism, rather it explicitly denies the possibility of such an account of the relation between mind and body.
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Úvod do aristotelsko-scholastické filosofie mysli

75%
Sousedík S.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2018
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vol. 66
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issue 1
11-36
EN
The article is not a historical piece, but rather aims to contribute to contemporary discussion of its theme. The author draws freely on, above all, Thomist elements and he attempts, on their basis, to formulate a starting point for a theory of mind that would be acceptable today. For this reason documentary support in the form of citations of the historical sources is kept to a minimum. In order for the question to meet the interests of the contemporary reader appeal is made to several contemporary analyti­cally-orientated authors (mainly T. Nagel and J. R. Searle), who in their treatment of certain points of detail, defend positions similar to the author’s own. The account is divided into three parts. In the first (1), the author discusses consciousness in general, in the second (2) he concerns himself with simple (that is, without focusing on the object) conscious states, in the third part (3) he discusses states focusing on an object, that is, on intentional states. This part is further divided into two sub-sections: in the first (3.1) the author points to the materiality of sensory intention, in the second (3.2) the author attempts to show that the intentional objects of reason (which the author takes to be abstract objects) by their very immateriality point to the immateriality of intentions themselves (that is, the corresponding cognitive act), as well as the immateriality of their bearer. In this way the bases for further reflections on the human soul are clarified, although the author does not concern himself with these further reflections in this article.
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Jak uniesprzecznić sprzeczność umysłu?

75%
Grygiel W.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2010
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issue 47
70-88
PL
The common sense conviction that rationality is based on the classical logic requires major revision since the essential assumption of many standpoints in the cognitive science, concerning the non-contradictory character of mind, seems to be no longer tenable. Firstly, the non-algorithmic models of mind proposed by John Lucas and Roger Penrose are presented. In the context of these models, the importance of the Gödel incompleteness theorems for the philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence is debated. Secondly, several specific difficulties in applying the ‘Gödelian arguments’ in the modeling of mind are pointed out. As the main thesis of the article, it is stipulated that mind operates according to a wrong algorithm that is functionally equivalent to a contradictory formal system. The examples of the contradictory contents of mental states, evidenced in the phenomenon of self-deception and the mediaeval double truth theory in science, are discussed. Some consequences of the model of an inconsistent mind, based on the revision of the classical logic, are surveyed.
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Umysł: system sprzeczny, ale nie trywialny

75%
Hohol M.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2010
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issue 47
89-108
PL
In this article, the model of an inconsistent mind according to suggestions of Hilary Putnam and Alan Turing is presented from the perspective of the cognitive sciences and the evolutionary psychology. An attempt to reconcile the two versions of the modular model of mind by Jerry Fodor and Steven Pinker is undertaken followed by the discussion of the problem of evolutionary origin of mind. Next, the problem of the central module (interface) is considered which is supposed to integrate the individual and specialized modules of mind. The main thesis of this article states that the ‘global’ inconsistency of mind may result from the inconsistencies among ‘local’ computational modules of mind. Mind may be modeled as an inconsistent formal system which remains non-trivial. Consequently, it seems rational to postulate that the operation of mind is not based on the classical Aristotelian logic and is better described the systems of a paraconsistent logic. Best examples of such logical systems include the discussive logic by Stanisław Jaśkowski, the logic of formal inconsistency (LFI) by Newton da Costa and the many-valued logic by Jan Łukasiewicz and Graham Priest.
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Czy potrzebna nam teoria fundamentalna? Refleksje na temat teorii świadomości Davida Chalmersa

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Hohol M.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2011
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issue 49
3-45
PL
The article presents a survey of the fundamental theory of consciousness according to David Chalmers. In order to examine these issues the following actions are taken. In the first part, the philosophical and cognitive-scientific views of David Chalmers are summarized in detail. Particular attention is paid to the following issues: the distinction between the easy and hard problem of consciousness, the nature of qualia, supervenience, as well as the arguments against the reductive accounts of consciousness. The elements of the structure of Chalmers’ fundamental theory: e.g., the principle of structural coherence, the principle of organizational invariance and the principle of double aspects of information are presented. Also, the problems of the relationship between mind and quantum mechanics are analyzed. In the second part, Chalmers’ theory of consciousness is challenged and criticized in three areas: cognitive science, philosophy of science and philosophy of physics. In the summary, the reply to the question in the title of the article is suggested.
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Przeciw dualizmowi psycho-fizycznemu. Analiza i porównanie stanowisk Johna Searle'a i George'a Lakoffa

63%
Milewski D.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2014
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issue 56
57-92
PL
This paper discusses John Searle’s biological naturalism and George Lakoff’s embodied mind hypothesis. These theories are presented as examples of a certain part of the philosophy of mind that breaks with the tradition launched by Descartes. In both cases, the break from this tradition is indicated to be a radical one as the theories argue not only against Cartesian dualism - the basic philosophical categories utilized by Descartes are being questioned. This attempt of departure from distinctions that seem to form a great part of the contemporary philosophy of mind may stand for a chance to provide a new perspective for some old philosophical problems.
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Rozważania o filozofii umysłu na podstawie Dialogów Stanisława Lema

63%
Owczarek K.
Filozofia i nauka. Studia filozoficzne i interdyscyplinarne
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2018
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vol. 6
181-195
PL
W dotychczasowej recepcji Dialogów Stanisława Lema przyjmuje się, że cała moc argumentacyjna skoncentrowana jest na dialogu ostatnim, w którym pisarz — używając terminologii z zakresu cybernetyki — poddaje krytyce ustrój centralnie sterowany. Autorka podejmuje polemikę z przyjętą opinią i wskazuje na inne zadanie, które postawił przed sobą Lem: czy możliwe jest, a jeśli tak, to pod jakimi warunkami, przeszczepienie ludzkiej świadomości na elektromózg? Tym tropem podąża autorka w niniejszym artykule, analizując warunki konieczne i wystarczające do przeprowadzenia transferu świadomości na nośnik niebiologiczny. Przedstawia też stanowisko Lema w odniesieniu do teorii tożsamości osobowej, koncepcji świadomości czy roli, jaką przypisuje on technologii.
EN
The aim of this article is to present Lem’s philosophy of mind. The author bases it on Dialogues — the first Lem’s philosophical essays published in 1957. It is emphasized that at that time Lem was influenced by cybernetics. I present connections between cybernetics and Lem's theory. He considered such issues as: consciousness, machine consciousness, personal identity. What is more, he investigated if immortality was available to human. I reconstruct his conception of mind and its anthropological and ontological consequences.
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Sprawozdanie ze szkoły letniej „The Copenhagen Summer School in Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind”, Kopenhaga, 13-17.08.2018 r.

63%
Fedyk O.
Folia Philosophica
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2019
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vol. 41
87-95
PL
Abstract: In this work, the author reports on the ninth edition of the Summer School of Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, which took place in Copenhagen on 13-17 August, 2018. At the beginning of the report, the context, character, goals of the meeting and the number of participants are presented. Next, the order of the day is presented, the detailed structure of the lecture and workshop parts. The author then makes a brief summary of 5 lectures and 10 papers presented each day.  Zusammenfassung:  In diesem Artikel berichtet der Autor über die neunte Auflage der Sommerschule für Phänomenologie und Philosophie des Geistes, die am 13.-17. August 2018 in Kopenhagen stattfand. Zu Beginn des Berichts werden der Kontext, Charakter, Ziele des Treffens und die Anzahl der Teilnehmer vorgestellt. Als nächstes wird die Reihenfolge des Tages als auch die detaillierte Struktur des Vortrags und des Seminarteils präsentiert. Der Autor macht dann eine kurze Zusammenfassung der fünf Vorträge und 10 Präsentationen, die sind in Rahmen der Sommerschule vorgestellt worden.
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Contextual Emergence and Its Applications in Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science

63%
POCZOBUT R.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2018
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vol. 66
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issue 3
123-146
EN
The purpose of the article is to analyze the concept of contextual emergence as well as its selected applications in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In the first section the author presents the general assumptions of the emergentist model of reality. He stresses that the concept of emergence can be applied to the description of various levels of organization of nature: one of these levels is that of mental-cognitive processes, analyzed within the fields of philosophy of mind and cog­nitive science. In the subsequent sections, he introduces the definitions of con­textual emergence and systemic causation and he points to their selected applications to mental-cognitive systems. In the concluding part, he presents the ideas of Gerald Edelman and Michael Gazzaniga on the role of con­textual explanations as well as the concepts of emergence in the philosophy of biology and cog­nitive neuroscience. He also indicates the possibility of incor­porating the concept of contextual emer­gence into active externalism and the extended cognition theory.
PL
Celem artykułu jest analiza pojęcia emergencji kontekstowej oraz jego wybranych zasto­so­wań w filozofii umysłu i kognitywistyce. W pierwszej sekcji autor przedstawia ogólne założenia emer­gentystycznego obrazu rzeczywistości. Zwraca uwagę, że pojęcie emergencji ma zasto­so­wanie do opisu różnych poziomów rzeczywistości — jednym z nich jest poziom systemów umysłowo-‑poznawczych badany w filozofii umysłu i kognitywistyce. W kolejnych sekcjach wpro­wadza de­fi­nicje emergencji kontekstowej oraz przyczynowości systemowej oraz wskazuje na zastosowania tych pojęć w odniesieniu do systemów umysłowo-poznawczych. W końcowej części artykułu, w na­wią­zaniu do prac Geralda Edelmana i Michaela Gazzanigi, omawia rolę wyjaśniania kon­tek­stowego w biologii i neurokognitywistyce. Wskazuje również na możliwość wykorzystania poję­cia emer­gencji kontekstowej w analizie eksternalizmu aktywnego oraz teorii rozszerzonego po­znania.
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Fizykalistyczny panpsychizm

63%
STRAWSON G., Jarocki J.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2018
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vol. 66
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issue 1
181-205
PL
W najogólniejszym sformułowaniu panpsychizm to pogląd, który głosi, że wszystko jest umysłem lub świadomością. Mimo że stanowisko to ma długą tradycję i staje się coraz popularniejsze we współczesnej debacie, wciąż ma ono wielu przeciwników. Celem tego artykułu jest dowiedzenie, że panpsychizm stanowi najlepsze metafizyczne wyjaśnienie natury tego, co stanowi ostateczne tworzywo rzeczywistości. Jest to zarazem odmiana fizykalizmu, zgodnie z którą doświadczenie (doświadczeniowość) jest budulcem wszystkich konkretnie istniejących przedmiotów.
EN
Rougly speaking, panpsychism is the view, that everything is mind or have consciousness. Although the view has a long and venerable tradition, and becomes more and more popular in the contemporary debate, it still has many opponents. The aim of this article is to prove that panpsychism is the best metaphysical account of the nature of the ultimate stuff of reality. At the same time, it is a kind of physicalism, according to which experience (experientiality) is the fundamental stuff of all concrete objects.
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