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O postawach fizyków wobec filozofii

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PL
Celem artykułu jest analiza postaw fizyków wobec filozofii na przykładach stanowisk wybitnych teoretyków. Można wyróżnić postawy profilozoficzne (Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, von Weizsäcker, Penrose, Rovelli) oraz antyfilozoficzne (Weinberg, Hawking, Feynman). Analizie poddano argumenty fizyków za filozofią lub przeciw niej z uwzględnieniem kierunków filozoficznych, do których omawiani fizycy się odnoszą. Okazuje się, że najbardziej krytycznie odnoszą się fizycy do wszelkich koncepcji filozoficznych dopatrujących się czynników apriorycznych w ludzkim poznaniu, natomiast ci, którzy dostrzegają pozytywne znaczenie filozofii dla nauki, najczęściej nawiązują do tradycji pitagorejsko-platońskiej jako właściwej podstawy rozumienia fizyki współczesnej.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2012
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vol. 60
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issue 4
283-296
EN
In the article the views of Archbishop Józef Życiński on the relationship between nature and mathematics are outlined. Życiński states that formal structures create the basic level of nature. This enables him to explain the effectiveness of mathematics in the scientific research of the material world. He therefore accepts Platonism and the thesis of mathematicity of nature. In the article some of the difficulties of this concept are pointed out.
PL
W artykule zostały naszkicowane poglądy ks. abpa Józefa Życińskiego na temat relacji między przyrodą a matematyką. Życiński stwierdza, że podstawowy poziom rzeczywistości przyrodniczej tworzą struktury formalne. To pozwala mu wyjaśnić skuteczność matematyki w badaniach świata materialnego. Przyjmuje zatem platonizm i tezę o matematyczności przyrody. W artykule wskazano na niektóre trudności takiej koncepcji.
PL
Sama etyka to normy rozumiane jako kryteria doboru działań chroniących osoby. Gogacz przekonuje, że etyka realistyczna poszukuje tych kryteriów - za Arystotelesem i św. Tomaszem - w człowieku. Rezultatem tych poszukiwań jest wskazanie trzech najważniejszych kryteriów postępowania moralnego: mądrości, sumienia i kontemplacji. Po pierwsze, ludzka mądrość jako podstawowe kryterium dobrego postępowania. Mądrość pomaga rozpoznać najwyższe dobro i umożliwia ludziom wybór właściwego kierunku działania. Po drugie, prawidłowo ukształtowane sumienie jest kolejnym kryterium moralnego postępowania. Gogacz zwraca uwagę, że moralne postępowanie wymaga regularnej ludzkiej refleksji, przemyślenia tego, co należy zrobić. A zatem, po trzecie, kontemplacja jest ostatnim kryterium moralnego postępowania. Rozważania te otwierają najważniejszą książkę Mieczysława Gogacza, w której przedstawił on swoją oryginalną propozycję teorii etycznej, tj. Wprowadzenie do etyki chronienia osób. W niniejszym artykule spróbuję zrekonstruować tę propozycję i wskazać jej najważniejsze tezy, koncepcje i postulaty. Przebieg wywodu będzie zgodny z kolejnością omawiania problemów etycznych w tej książce. Część pierwsza tego artykułu rozpoczyna się krótkim omówieniem zagadnień metodologicznym: wyjaśnimy czym jest etyka, jakie racje stoją za uzależnieniem etyki od antropologii, by następnie przywołać tezę Gogacza, że badania etyczne muszą być poprzedzone badaniami z zakresu metafizyki człowieka. Następnie w części pierwszej przedstawimy najważniejsze tezy etyki chronienia osób. Skupimy się na relacjach osobowych. Zostaną również sformułowane trzy zasady etyki. Druga część (Anthropological problems) dotyczy uszczegółowienia zagadnień z filozofii człowieka, aby móc w kolejnej ostatniej części (Ethical problems) przyjrzeć się bliżej szczegółowym propozycjom problemów etycznych.
EN
The key postulate of Mieczysław Gogacz’s ethics of protecting persons is to develop an attitude that always stands on the side of persons and defends the persons. In order to be able to implement this postulate, Gogacz points out that it is necessary to recognize in advance who a person (i.e. the subject of ethics) is. In his account, ethics of protecting persons is an ethical proposition built on metaphysics, on certain metaphysical assumptions. The ethics itself is constituted by norms understood as criteria for selecting actions that protect persons. He indicated three the most important criteria for moral conduct: wisdom, conscience and contemplation. Firstly, human wisdom as the basic criterion of good conduct. Wisdom helps to recognize the ultimate good and enables people to choose the right courses of actions. Secondly, a righteous conscience is another criterion for moral conduct. Gogacz point out that moral conduct requires a regular human reflection, consideration of what is to be done. Thus, thirdly, a contemplation is the last criterion for moral conduct. In this paper, I will attempt to reconstruct this proposal and point its most important theses, concepts and postulates. The course of the argument will correspond to the order of discussing ethical problems in Gogacz's book. The first part of this article begins with a brief discussion on methodological issues: we will explain what ethics is, what are the reasons for the dependence of ethics on anthropology, and then we will recall Gogacz's thesis that ethical research must be preceded by research in metaphysics of a human being. Then, we will present the most important theses of the ethics of protecting persons. Precisely, we will focus on personal relationships. Three rules of ethics will also be formulated. The second part (Anthropological problems) deals with some detailed problems on metaphysics of a human being (i.e. body, soul, conception, birth, death, suffering, etc.) in order to be able to take a closer look at the detailed propositions of ethical problems in the next last part (Ethical problems).
EN
1. For many people, the contemporary culture seems to be something different from modernity, it is something resembling a special period of “post-”. At the same time, different trends are present in current culture. Some reach the genesis of nearly two and a half thousand years back, others have about half a century. Perhaps also breaks some modern belief that in every culture, “newer” means “better”. 2. Representatives of the philosophical and theological trend of “Radical Orthodoxy” noticed in this the approach of postmodernism to the pre-modern tradition. Therefore, we can say that we live and operate in a “post-world”, without leading currents of thought. On the other hand, is the current culture very different from the others when you look at it from the perspective of centuries? 3. For many philosophers, it is still important to reach to the great traditional approaches to the problem of truth. These are above all three concepts related to three great philosophical syntheses created by Plato, Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. This is also evident among the basic contemporary trends critical of the classics and philosophical tradition. 4. M. Heidegger created a certain idea of being reduced to the time determinant. For the supporters of his views, it became the overcoming of Aquinas’s theory. The German thinker also formulated a specific interpretation of Plato's views on truth. He contrasted it with Thomas's concept, especially with the definition of truth as the adequacy of thing to intellect. 5. T. Bartoś – Polish author of the new attempt to read the essence of the concept – believes, in turn, that the statements of the Angelic Doctor can be found close to the characteristics of post-modernity. He points to a certain incoherence and fragmentary nature of the problem, anthropocentrism and pragmatism of the approach, and a rejection of the unity of truth. It seems, however, that there is a lot of exaggeration in this interpretation. De facto, we are dealing here with radical criticism of Thomism as a trend that develops the views of Saint Thomas Aquinas, because none of the known Thomists do not even come close in their deliberations to the view that T. Bartoś formulated. 6. Finally, a group of philosophers using in the method of reflection the achievements of contemporary logic, representatives of analytic philosophy, generally seems to be aimed at getting rid of the term “truth” from his vocabulary. The idea of reaching their assumptions of logical positivism is difficult to discuss with his followers because of the difference in approach to the practice of philosophy itself between the “analysts” and “non-analysts”. The classic concept of philosophy, under which situates itself Platonism, Aristotelianism and Thomism, is different from the concept of linguistic or neo-positivist, which locates to analytic philosophy. 7. The classical approach to truth, especially the definition developed in the final shape in the Middle Ages, indicating the adequacy of things and the intellect as the essence of truth, therefore meets with criticism from various directions. This does not mean that they should go into oblivion, that they have been replaced by newer and better concepts, or simply refuted. The proclamation of the slogans such as “The End of the Era ...”, “The End of Truth ...” sounds propaganda. 8. The classical approach to the problem of truth has lost nothing in its argumentation. In fact, the current forms of criticism do not rely on any discussion, but on the rejection of the principles on which it is based. Heidegger proclaimed his vision of being and truth, supporting it with a hermeneutic analysis of ancient works. He claimed that this vision is contained in the properly read outlooks of ancient Greek thinkers. The current of philosophy practiced with the use of modern logic tools considers reality only in so far as it can be translated into a “language fact”. This is the analysis of language and not reality. The proposal to read the theory of truth contained in the works of Aquinas, submitted by T. Bartoś to be a projection of some interpretative grid on the expression Thomas's interpretation, wherein the radically differs from the recognized positions. 9. It seems that in the whirlwind of ideologies present in philosophy, science and culture in general, it remains to preserve the classical approach to the problem of truth and develop them according to their essential elements. Compilation with principles that are not appropriate to them will not result in the presentation of their authentic content. They are permanent achievements of culture, philosophically justified. Recourse to reality, confrontation with it, makes the classic approaches open in terms of development. None of them provides a closed system also adopted a priori or received by the conversion performed according to a specified number of regulations. The development of the classical approaches to the problem of truth is theoretically interesting for the whole field of philosophy and as such should be supported.
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Bóg i uniwersalia

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EN
The first two parts of the article discuss the motivations leading to acceptance of the existence of universals, as well as their types. Four main positions in the so-called the dispute about universals are presented: conceptual realism (Platonism), moderate conceptual realism, i.e. the Aristotelian solution, conceptualism and nominalism (in various versions). Further parts of the article present a critique of nominalist, Aristotelian and conceptual solutions. Against this background, the author argues in favor of theistic conceptual realism, showing how to interpret the relationship between human semantic consciousness and universals existing in God’s mind. In this context, issues related to the concepts of cosmic and biological evolution and the concept of creation are taken into account.
PL
W pierwszych dwóch częściach artykułu przedstawione są motywacje prowadzące do akceptacji istnienia uniwersaliów, jak również ich rodzaje. Dalej zostają wyróżnione cztery zasadnicze stanowiska w tzw. sporze o uniwersalia: realizm pojęciowy (platonizm), umiarkowany realizm pojęciowy, czyli rozwiązanie arystotelesowskie, konceptualizm i nominalizm (w różnych wersjach). W dalszych częściach artykułu przedstawiona jest krytyka rozwiązań nominalistycznych, arystotelesowskich i konceptualistycznych. Na tym tle autor argumentuje na rzecz teistycznego realizmu pojęciowego, ukazując, w jaki sposób należy zinterpretować relację pomiędzy ludzką świadomością semantyczną a uniwersaliami istniejącymi w umyśle Boga. W tym kontekście zostają wzięte pod uwagę zagadnienia dotyczące pojęć ewolucji kosmicznej i biologicznej oraz pojęcia stworzenia świata.
Vox Patrum
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2016
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vol. 66
327-351
EN
De scientia politica was written in the form of a Platonist dialogue and constituted a political and philosophical theory of a state and its ruling king or emperor. The writing was created in the 6th century A.D., during the reign of Justinian I. The information about its existence had been known from a short note in Photios Library, long before its parts were found and published in 1827. The author – excellently educated and continuing the Platonist and Neo-Platonist tradition – preferred to remain anonymous, despite some at­tempts of identification. The work is highly intellectual, addressed to educated readers, capable of understanding sophisticated literary references and allusions. The author’s effort to give it a scholarly character is clearly visible. Book IV was devoted to military affairs, whereas Book V – to imperial power, where the author discussed the problem of its origin, limitations, principles of choosing a ruler and ruler’s obligations. While expressing the principles which a 6th century ruler (i.e. already a Christian ruler) should obey, the author makes references to the Greek and Roman writers – Homer, Plato and Neo-Platonists, Cicero, Seneca, Titus Liv­ius and others. The Persian model was not alien to him either and it is not always clear if he took from the pagan or the Christian heritage. Frequent references to the predecessors’ thought do not mean that the author of De Scientia politica uncritically took over all of their views. He rather selected from the antique heritage what he thought to be current and at the same time he tried to adjust his work to the reality of a 6th century world. The work, albeit pre­served only in fragments is, according to P. N. Bell: „the only surviving example of a Neo-Platonic political theory outside the Arab world”.
EN
The metaphor of the sun, in which Plato (Republic 509b) compares the idea of the Good to the sun that dwells above the earth yet affects the phenomena occurring on it, was an inspiration for both heretical and orthodox theology in the first Christian centuries. The Gnostics, Clement of Alexandria and Origen all believed that God, like the Platonic idea of the Good, is radically transcendent in relation to the world, but at the same time is the cause of everything that exists in it. Unlike Plato, who believed that the idea of the Good is knowable and can be the subject of science, the Christian theologians of the first centuries believed that God was like a blinding light. This means that God, according to them, though intelligible, is unknowable in His essence. Therefore, God cannot be the subject of science. Another modification of the Platonic metaphor was the introduction of the element of sunlight, to which the philosopher from Athens did not refer. For the Gnostics, the rays of the sun were “eons” – spiritual beings that existed in the space between the first principle of all things and the material world. For Clement and Origen, the light that comes from the sun was the Son – the power and wisdom of God. In contrast to the Gnostics, who believed in the progressive degradation of the spiritual world through successive emanations, the Alexandrian Fathers believed that the Son possessed all the knowledge of God and therefore revealed to man the true God. Yet the revelation of God by the Son, and even the grace that assists human beings in the process of learning about God, do not give man complete knowledge of the essence of God. Thus the Gnostics, Clement and Origen, despite some doctrinal differences, all accepted the concept of the radical transcendence of God on the ontological and epistemological levels.
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Darwin i naturalizm

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PL
Darwinowską teorię ewolucji zwykle postrzega się jako zgodną z wymogami naturalizmu metodologicznego, jak jednak można pogodzić to z faktem, że w O powstawaniu gatunków Darwin wielokrotnie mówił o Bogu? Odpowiedź na to pytanie łączę z objaśnieniem znaczenia naturalizmu metodologicznego. Przy okazji zastanawiam się, czy twierdzenia dotyczące istot nadnaturalnych są kiedykolwiek testowalne i czy uprawianie nauki byłoby niemożliwe, gdyby porzucono naturalizm metodologiczny. Inne pytanie dotyczy tego, czy teoria Darwina oraz jej współczesne następczynie są niezgodne z izolowanymi aktami boskiej interwencji, a kolejne brzmi: jeśli liczby rozumiane są na sposób platoński (jako istniejące poza czasem i przestrzenią), to czy tym samym współczesna zmatematyzowana teoria ewolucji sprzeniewierza się naturalizmowi metodologicznemu?
EN
Darwin’s theory of evolution is usually thought to conform to the requirements of methodological naturalism, but how can this be reconciled with the fact that Darwin talks about God more than a few times in the Origin of Species? Answering this question involves clarifying what methodological naturalism means. In the process, I consider whether propositions about supernatural beings are ever empirically testable and whether science would come to a halt if methodological naturalism were abandoned. Another question is whether Darwin’s theory and its modern successors are incompatible with isolated acts of divine intervention. And if numbers are understood Platonistically (as existing outside of space and time), does the modern mathematical theory of evolution thereby violate methodological naturalism?
PL
Nowoczesny racjonalizm, w skrócie: neoracjonalizm, jest prądem, w którym mieszczą się m.in. Frege, Russell, Church, Bernays, Gödel (najwyraziściej), Quine, Putnam, Kreisel, Chaitin. Przypisuje on istnienie abstraktom, a umysłowi zdolność ich poznawania w sposób intuicyjny. W przypadku obiektów matematycznych, jak uzyskiwane w wyniku abstrakcji zbiory, liczby, algorytmy etc., mówimy o intuicji matematycznej; na niej koncentruje się artykuł. Nazwa „nowoczesny” uwydatnia różnicę w stosunku do racjonalizmu klasycznego z XVII w. Polega to na poniechaniu tezy o doskonałej wiarogodności intuicji matematycznej. Neoracjonalizm opowiada się w kwestii intuicji za fallibilizmem oraz stopniowaniem wiarogodności: tym wyższy jej stopień, im mocniej jest ugruntowana we wrodzonym wyposażeniu biologicznym (co oznacza natywizm w stylu Chomsky’ego) i w doświadczeniu zmysłowym. Ze względu na fallibilizm, pewne zbliżenie do empiryzmu i odniesienie do biologii, mylące jest nazywanie tego prądu „platonizmem”, stąd propozycja nazwy „neoracjonalizm”.
EN
Modern rationalism, abbr. neorationalism, is a philosophical orientation to include Frege, Russell, Church, Bernays, Gödel (most distinctly), Quine, Putnam, Kreisel, Chaitin, etc. It claims the existence of abstract entities as classes, numbers, algorithms etc., and mind’s ability to intuitively learn about them. When meaning mathematical entities, we speak of mathematical intuition, being in focus of this paper. The adjective “modern” highlights the difference in relation to the classical rationalism of the 17-th century. The modern one denies the mathematical intuition to possess a perfect reliability, and sees it as a gradable faculty which does not enjoy an assured infallibility. The degree of reliability depends on how close is intuition to an inborn biological equipment (what means nativism in Chomsky’s style), and to sensory experiences. What is called neorationalism in this paper happens to be called mathematical platonism by other authors. However, on account of fallibilism, a certain tilt toward empiricism, and a significant reference to biology, “Platonism” (as lacking these traits) proves to be less fitting term than is “neorationalism”.
Vox Patrum
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2016
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vol. 65
631-651
EN
The original Latin catalogue of heresies, produced by Saint Philastrius of Brescia in the second half of IVth century, encompasses several observations re­garding the source of early Christian heterodox movements. These views are dis­persed and interwoven into the analysis of particular heresies, and as such do not constitute an integral and standalone teaching on the nature of unorthodoxy and its genesis. The present work attempts at enucleating this standpoint and summari­sing it in a comprehensive and complementary manner. Regarding the issue of the foundation of heresy, Philastrius proposed his own point of view based on the following threefold argumentation: the theological (Satan is the father of all the world’s heterodoxy – comprehended as a lapse form God’s truth), the moral (heresies rise due to one’s pride), and historical and cul­tural (errors in early Christian doctrine derive from the Judaic sects or else from the counterfactual views of the ancient Greek philosophers). Philastrius’ perspective refers back to an extensive and modestly younger work Panarion by Epiphanius of Salamis, in which the topic of Jewish-deriving deviations from the doctrine was treated even more at length. The Bishop of Brescia’s index has been the inspiration for the later catalogues of unorthodoxy by St. Augustine (narrow in the topic of Judaic origins of heretical movements and rather focused on influences from the ancient philosophical schools) and Isidore of Seville (intermingling both sources of early heretical movements – i.e. Judaic and Greek – withholding the determination which of them has in fact more influ­enced the uprising of heterodoxy and the doctrine itself).
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Popper : dogmatyzm : dialektyka

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PL
W artykule udowadniam tezę, że Popper - mimo programowych haseł swego krytyczne­ go racjonalizmu - jest dogmatykiem, że ma np. dogmatyczno-negatywne podejście do dialekty- ki. Choć krytykuje dialektykę sam jest dialekty- kiem. Widać to w Popperowskiej filozofii ma­ tematyki. Również jego falsyfikacjonizm jest stanowiskiem dogmatycznym. Powołuję się przy tym na Feyerabenda, Kuhana i Lakatosa.
EN
In this article I justify the thesis that K. R.Popper - in spite of the policy statement of his critical rationalism - is a dogmatist, e.g. his approach to the dialectics is dogmatically negative. Although he criticises the dialectic, he is a dialectician himself. It is evident in his phi­ losophy of mathematics. His falsificationism is a dogmatic attitude, too. In the argumentation, I refer to Feyerabend, Kuhn, and Lakatos.
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