What has happened in the late and concluding stages of postmodern culture is that concrete ideas of a good life have been reduced to pseudo-concrete ideals. With the aid of simulacra, the experience of everyday life is turning into a show, into narcissistic emptiness and single bodily pleasures.
Magdalena Płotka, known for numerous publications regarding the philosophical thought of the medieval ages, this time analyses the matter of pleasure in the texts of Aquinas. The book is an extensive study of this topic and the Author herself attempts to show the referred matter in an organised way, with a coherent language, quoting a various bibliography of the subject (for the most part in English-language). The discussed book consists of: the introduction, particular chapters which are seven in numbers, the ending and practical appendices such as the index of abbreviations, bibliography and the index of names. The first chapter titled Przyjemność i jej postacie (Pleasure and Its Shapes), contains the preliminary statements which are further developed in details in the following chapters. At first, the Latin terms which are employed by Aquinas when he speaks of pleasure are enumerated. In the second chapter Magdalena Płotka analyses the topic of pleasure as feeling. Above all she speaks of feelings of the appetitive faculty and then she turns to the comparative study of pleasure and joy. The purpose of this comparison is to answer the question whether we may classify them – pleasure and joy – as feelings. Next, the third chapter, titled: Formalno-materialna struktura przyjemności (Formal-material structure of pleasure) is dedicated to a comparative study between pleasure spiritual and corporeal. In the fourth chapter we find issues regarding the reason and purpose (aim) of pleasure. The fifth chapter offers study on the moral context of pleasure. In this chapter there are included such topics as eutrapelia and sexual pleasure. In the sixth chapter the Author speaks of issues regarding the aesthetic dimension of pleasure. It poses a question whether beauty can be a source of pleasure and in what way. The last, seventh chapter, concerns the topic of pleasure which is the participation of the saved. Thereby the entire domain of responses of human appetitive faculty has been explained, encompassing also the whole human compositum including human condition after death.
The concept of the society of consumption says that in this type of society everything is “for sale” if there is a consumer for this. That means that one can sell not only products and services but people, ideas and values as well. On the other hand, people face many global risks. Confronted by risks, they have become equal regardless of their origins, education or financial status. Anxiety about future and awareness of fragility of a human life causes people to be more likely to indulge themselves with different pleasures. They want to “have fun before they die”. The media, advertisements and medicine offer a variety of products and services that are to make one`s life better and to bring more pleasure and happiness to them. Contemporary hedonism is, after all, different in the sense that it does not avoid pain and suffering. People are willing to suffer in the name of the future pleasure. Will this race to satisfy whims and desires end someday? Will the fast defeat the carnival? Is there a place for reflection and altruism? These are some questions that this paper examines.
The article analyses two kinds of theft for pleasure: shoplifting and joyriding. Both are connected with stealing which is not aimed at getting money or fulfilment of real-life needs. The origin of both can be found in orientation, especially of young people, towards risky behavior, excitement and achieving status as well as visibility in the peer group. Shoplifting is more typical of women, who steal items like cosmetics or underwear for personal use. During joyriding, young men from lower classes want to express their masculinity. They steal cars to ride without any specific aim and ultimately destroy the vehicles. These phenomena are considered against the background of changes in contemporary culture and especially the content disseminated by mass media.
In EE H 2 Aristotle presents a typology of friendship starting from the puzzle whether the good or the pleasure is the object of love. But after indicating the reasons for loving and identifying three types of friendships he raises three important questions (1237a19–21): (1) whether there is any friendship without pleasure; (2) how the hedonical friendship differs from the ethically friendship; (3) on which of the two things the loving depends: do we love somebody because he is good, even if he is not pleasant, at any rate not for his pleasantness? The present article attempts to give answers to questions 1–3 and show that despite the coincidence of good and pleasure and the important role of pleasure in the hedonical and ethical friendship the typology does not lose its validity.
PL
In EE H 2 Aristotle presents a typology of friendship starting from the puzzle whether the good or the pleasure is the object of love. But after indicating the reasons for loving and identifying three types of friendships he raises three important questions (1237a19–21): (1) whether there is any friendship without pleasure; (2) how the hedonical friendship differs from the ethically friendship; (3) on which of the two things the loving depends: do we love somebody because he is good, even if he is not pleasant, at any rate not for his pleasantness? The present article attempts to give answers to questions 1–3 and show that despite the coincidence of good and pleasure and the important role of pleasure in the hedonical and ethical friendship the typology does not lose its validity
This paper deals with critical analysis of western hedonism in the light of Indian theory of peace. Indian Philosophers have made ‘peace’ the goal of worldly human life, which is keeping equidistance from pleasure and pain. Attachment is the reason behind the presence of these two ‘sovereign masters’ of Human life. External thing or any other human being is not capable of indulging us either of them; it is the worldly attachment which brings Pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain always come together. Western Hedonists could not go to the root of pleasure or pain in life. Their observation was mere empirical. Indian thinkers, except those of Carvaka school, have given a particular philosophy which is Peace oriented and which finds worldly pleasures or pains temporary and mostly ‘man-made’.
The subject of this paper is the archaeologically created past, seen as a reservoir of pleasure. The topic is discussed in comparison with changes of the contemporary man’s approach to the past. The organising motif of my reflections is the category of pleasure and different ways of pursuing it by people, mainly by means of broadly understood play. I propose here two theses, namely: (1) in the contemporary world the past, being a point of reference for archaeological investigation, may constitute a source of pleasure or inspiration to search for pleasure; (2) the ways of presenting the past to a certain degree have been subjugated by the rules that have been reserved for the domains of entertainment and consumption. This paper will relate to: (1) the pleasure of exploring of the past; (2) the pleasure of re-enacting and performing the past, and (3) the pleasure of playing with the past during archaeological fêtes.
The aim of the paper is to discuss Polish sex positivity movement and its relationship to queer theory. This is done on the basis of a case study, i.e. the analysis of the book Warsztaty intymnosci [The Workshops of Intimacy] by Agnieszka Szezynska. The author of the article presents selected aspects of this publication, focusing on the typical features of sex positivity approach (in so doing, she refers to other Polish and English sources which represent or study this topic). Apart from that, the scholar shows conceptual overlaps between Szezynska’s perspective and queer theory. In conclusion, the author discusses the functioning and possible outcomes of this alliance in the Polish context.
The series of lessons related to Lalka by B. Prus (1890) and the film Jobs by J.M. Stern (2013) showed that the film can deepen the understanding of the characters, as well as the mechanisms of the world presented in the literature and film watched by the students. The juxtaposition of Wokulski and Jobs in the students’ mind underlined the nobility of the first one and market mechanism of contemporary corporation of Jobs. The resulting cognitive amalgam revealed the timeliness of the novel: the rapacity of economic processes, social divisions and the human need for love.
PL
Z lekcji wiążących tematycznie Lalkę B. Prusa (1890) i film Jobs J.M. Sterna (2013) wynikło, że film może pogłębić rozumienie bohaterów, a także mechanizmów świata przedstawionego w lekturze, filmie i otaczającego uczniów. Zestawienie w przestrzeniach mentalnych uczniów Wokulskiego i Jobsa podkreśliło szlachetność pierwszego i rynkowe mechanizmy współczesnych korporacji. Powstały z zestawienia amalgamat kognitywny ujawnił aktualność powieści: drapieżność procesów ekonomicznych, podziały społeczne i ludzką potrzebę miłości.
This paper ponders on the aftermath effects of beauty, the ugly, and the hypotheses on how to get rid of the ugly. Due to the impossibility of addressing the effects of something that is entirely unknown, the author first attempts, in lieu of a definition of beauty, to examine the three classical conditions for beauty, which will otherwise be respected as in some sense a mystery. Secondly, he turns to the effects of beauty by analogy to the six effects of love as elucidated by Thomas Aquinas; in addition, he adds three other effects of beauty found in classical Greek thought: catharsis, epiphany, and pleasure. Thirdly, he reviews, by way of contrast, the corresponding effects of the ugly; and then he proposes how the ugly can be “redeemed” by beauty.
Rozpatrując estetykę gastronomii, można skupić się na co najmniej trzech odrębnych, choć powiązanych nawzajem elementach. Pierwszym są złożone procesy, doświadczenia i względy (cele i kryteria) przygotowywania pożywienia, do których zaliczyć można dbałość o sposób podawania jedzenia na talerzu i stole. Drugim elementem są obiekty spożywcze, jako takie, rozważane pod kątem swych własności — nie tylko w sensie właściwości odbieranych przez różne narządy zmysłów, lecz także w sensie szerszych społecznych i symbolicznych znaczeń pokarmów, a wśród nich ich wartości odżywczych. Trzecim elementem są rozmaite procesy składające się na konsumpcję pożywienia. Ten trzeci wymiar gastronomii dotyczący spożywania jedzenia można rozumieć jako sztukę jedzenia w bardziej specyficznym sensie (węższym od ogólnego pojęcia sztuki gastronomicznej). To na sztuce jedzenia właśnie skupia się mój artykuł. Co odróżnia zwykły akt jedzenia od sztuki jedzenia? Jakie cechy musi mieć podmiot praktykujący jedzenie jako wyrafinowaną sztukę i jakim wartościom służy sztuka jedzenia? Jakie elementy przynależą do sztuki jedzenia i w jakie sposoby sztuka ta angażuje somatyczny podmiot, wymagając somatycznych umiejętności i wrażliwości? Jak do lepszego zrozumienia sztuki jedzenia może przyczynić się somaestetyka? W moim artykule staram się odpowiedzieć na te pytania.
EN
In considering the aesthetics of gastronomy, one can focus on at least three distinct, though related, elements. First, the complex processes, experiences, and considerations (aims and criteria) in preparing food, which can include also the preparations for the presentation of food on the plate and table; second, the food objects themselves in terms or their qualities — not only the qualities they present to our various senses but also in terms of their larger social and symbolic meanings which can also include meanings related to nutritional qualities; and third, the various processes involved in the consumption of the food. This third dimension of gastronomy, which concerns the ingestion of food, can be construed as the art of eating in the narrower, more specific sense (rather than its general sense of gastronomical art), and it is the focus of my paper. What distinguishes the mere act of eating from an art of eating? What qualities are demanded of the subject who practices eating as a refined art and what values does the art of eating serve? What are the different elements of the art of eating, and what are the different ways in such art engages the somatic subject and requires somatic skill and sensitivity? How can somaesthetics contribute to a better understanding of the art of eating? My paper addresses these questions.
The article aims to examine how fitness centres fall in line with the reflexive project of the self and active policy of choice. Such a perspective makes the gym a contradictory category involved in a number of individualand social processes connected with freedom and discipline, control and pleasure or work and leisure.Drawing on qualitative research I wanted to see how the interviewees used the term fitness, how it related to their everyday life, what sort of commitments and responsibility it elicited and the implications arising thereof, and to explore the ambivalence based on a complex interplay of tension and release in fitness.Through the empirical discussion, I show that the reflective attitude is rarely a matter of choice, but rathera result of pressure or social-cultural obligations. Self-discipline as an element of fitness gives the illusion of being causative in the sense that it is strongly entangled with expert knowledge systems.
This article concerns the pleasure of the blessed, i.e. the pleasure (sensual and bodily) that a blessed person will experience in the visio beatifica state. Although by its very nature this problem is a theological issue arising directly from Christian eschatology, this article focuses on the underlying philosophical problems raised by Thomas Aquinas’s research. The article includes three sections. The first concerns Thomas Aquinas’s general discussion of the bodily pleasure contained in beatitudo. In particular, I will examine Aquinas’s argument that bodily pleasure is a necessary part of beatitudo and is immanent in ultimate happiness. In the second part of the article, I will look at Thomas’s understanding of the status of the resurrected body. Lastly, in the third part I will specify the individual bodily pleasures that the saved person will probably experience.
PL
Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy przyjemności osób zbawionych, czyli przyjemności (zmysłowych i cielesnych), jakich zbawiony będzie doświadczał w stanie visio beatifica. Choć ze swej natury problem ten jest zagadnieniem teologicznym, wynikającym bezpośrednio z eschatologii chrześcijańskiej, to jednak w niniejszym artykule skupiono się na podstawowych problemach filozoficznych, jakie pojawiły się w badaniach Tomasza z Akwinu. Artykuł obejmuje trzy części. Pierwsza dotyczy ogólnej dyskusji Tomasza z Akwinu na temat przyjemności cielesnej w beatitudo. W szczególności zbadam argument Akwinaty, że przyjemność cielesna jest koniecznym elementem beatitudo i jest immanentna w szczęściu ostatecznym. W drugiej części artykułu przyjrzę się rozumieniu przez Tomasza statusu zmartwychwstałego ciała. Wreszcie w części trzeciej przedstawię poszczególne przyjemności cielesne, których prawdopodobnie doświadczy zbawiony człowiek.
The integral concept of pleasure seeks the answer to the question what various experiences of pleasure have in common. While contemporary philosophy partially capitulates before responding to this question, the integral and unifying concept of pleasure, ancient philosophers eagerly took up this thread and tried to elaborate on the essence of experience or the state of pleasure so as to be able to indicate its essential and inalienable element in various experiences. The aim of the paper is to present the three greatest concepts of pleasure in ancient philosophy: Platonic, Aristotelian and Epicurean. Although at the root of all three concepts is the same question and the same research problem to be solved (i.e. “what is pleasure in its essence”), the answers to this question were quite different. For Plato, pleasure is some kind of change in the soul or body (kinesis), he emphasized the nature of pleasure as a process. Aristotle, in turn, recognized pleasure not as a process, but as an activity, more precisely as a quality built on activity. The views of both philosophers can be considered “metaphysical”, i.e. they sought to answer the question about pleasure in terms of the nature and structure of this experience. Many scholars of ancient thought find inspiration for these concepts in ancient medical thought, especially the doctors of Hippocrates and Polybus of Kos. Similar influences are noted in the case of Epicurus’s concept of pleasure: although we would consider his concept as ethical rather than metaphysical, the relationship between Epicurean philosophy of pleasure and medicine is twofold. On the one hand, like Aristotle and Plato, he was influenced by the medical thought regarding the explanation of the nature of pleasure and pain, on the other hand, the influence of epicureanism, e.g. on medieval Arabic medical thought.
Gilbert Ryle and Fred Feldman regard pleasure as, respectively, a disposition anda propositional attitude. I consider whether their accounts can seriously threaten the traditional understanding of pleasure in terms of feeling or sensation. I argue that their reluctance to treat pleasure as a mental state results from misunderstanding the difference between sensation and feeling. These concepts relate to different psychological phenomena and should not be used interchangeably. Understanding the difference between them makes it possible to defend the concept of pleasure in terms of feeling, though not sensation.
PL
Gilberta Ryle oraz Fred Feldman definiowali przyjemność jako, odpowiednio, dyspozycję i nastawienie sądzeniowe. Zastanowię się, czy ich koncepcje mogą poważnie zagrażać tradycyjnemu pojmowaniu przyjemności w kategoriach uczucia albo doznania. Skłaniać się będę ku tezie, że niechęć Ryle’a i Feldmana do traktowania przyjemności jako pewnego rodzaju stanu umysłu wynika z niezrozumienia różnicy między doznaniem a uczuciem. Pojęcia te odnoszą się do różnych zjawisk psychicznych i nie powinny być używane wymiennie. Ukazanie i zrozumienie różnicy między nimi pozwoli mi bronić pojmowania przyjemności w kategoriach uczucia, choć nie doznania.
The author considers the phenomenon of honor by examining Aristotle’s description of it and its role in ethical and political life. His study of honor leads him to two related phenomena, anger and belittlement or contempt; examining them helps him define honor more precisely. With his examination of honor the author shows how densely interwoven Aristotle’s ethical theory is; he illuminates such diverse things as the human good, political life and friendship, virtue, vice, incontinence, flattery, wealth and pleasure; he shows how the metaphysical principles of dunamis and energeia are at work in human affairs; he treats the passion of anger as well as the moral attitude of contempt that provokes it, and he situates both within the study of rhetoric.
The author considers the problem of beauty. He identifies beauty as an analogically understood property of reality, of human products (including art), and of the human mode of conduct, and as that which, in the tradition of Western culture, is expressed under the form of harmony, perfection, or splendor, which as beheld and for beholding arouses complacency or pleasure. The article discusses the following topics: classical theories of beauty, beauty in the metaphysical conception, beauty in aesthetics, the separation of beauty from reality, and the problem of ugliness.
This paper considers and withstands the ideology of a “good death” (euthanasia). I consider some ontological statements about life and death and also some ethical motivations. In that light I show that legalization of the euthanasia is morally problematical.
This critical note is devoted to Stacy Alaimo's "Exposed. Environmental Politics and Pleasures in Posthuman Times" published in 2016 by University of Minnesota Press. It summarises the chapters included in Alaimo's book, reconstructs their key concepts, and presents the problems they aim to tackle.
PL
Niniejsza nota krytyczna poświęconą książce Stacy Alaimo pt. "Exposed. Environmental Politics & Pleasures in Posthuman Times" opublikowanej w 2016 roku przez University of Minnesota Press. Nota prezentuje streszczenia esejów składających się na pracę Alaimo, rekonstruuje ich kluczowe zagadnienia oraz opisuje problemy z jakimi się one mierzą.
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