This paper offers a personal report on the author's investigations concerning the Lvov-Warsaw School. The author outlines the origin of his interests in Twardowski's school and his reasons for deciding to write a comprehensive monograph about this group of philosophers. The last part of the paper mentions other people working on the same topic and focuses on problems related to the popularization of Polish philosophy.
What is meant by “philosophy after Auschwitz”? How do we categorize thinkers into this discipline? Such categorization poses no problem where Jewish or German philosophers and theologians are concerned. In Poland, this type of thinking is commonly considered as virtually absent. Prof. Józef Tischner observed: “Heidegger says: ‘Man in his being was focused on his own being.’ Sartre says: ‘Hell is other people.’ Levi-Strauss says: ‘Hell is ourselves.’ Another structuralist says: ‘The end of the human being.’ And we have Kolbe.” The observation sounds ambiguous. On the one hand, it indicates the superiority of action, or “practical philosophy,” over purely speculative thinking, and it brings out philosophers’ ethical responsibility for theories they formulate. On the other hand, it suggests that Auschwitz as an event and a symbol may not have been thought out thoroughly enough. In this article, I seek to answer the question why the event of Auschwitz has had a different impact on Jewish and German religious thought than on thought in Poland, I discuss the ways the event comes to the surface, and I give an outline of Polish religious thinking “after Auschwitz.”
The questions of death and suicide have been discussed in philosophy and religion since the antiquity. In the polish philosophy these topics were analyzed by Henryk Elzenberg. His pessimistic point of view was determined by poetry of Leonte de Lisle. Elzenberg took inspirations also from Buddhist thought and existential philosophy. According to Elzenberg, the death is liberation from the body prison. He accepted individual suicide. Suicide is a kind of a social watchman, last institution where suffering man can find his support.
The paper attempts to reconstruct Joseph Tischner (1931–2000) views about relation between grace and human freedom. The issue has been taken with reference to broad philosophical and theological context, which was important in Tischner’s thought (especially phenomenology and philosophy of dialogue). Besides, the paper pointed out to prospective problems in Tischner’s concept of grace and freedom, which can be inspiring in philosophy and theology.
PL
W artykule podjęto próbę rekonstrukcji poglądów Józefa Tischnera dotyczących zagadnienia relacji między łaską a wolnością człowieka. Omówiony został także filozoficzno-teologiczny kontekst, w ramach którego kształtowały się poglądy krakowskiego myśliciela. Wskazano również na najbardziej perspektywiczne wątki w Tischnerowskiej koncepcji łaski i wolności, które mogą okazać się inspirujące zarówno w obrębie dyscyplin filozoficznych, jak i teologicznych.
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