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EN
The study submitted herein, which was conducted on the basis of investigation of source materials undertaken in Czech and foreign archives as well as study of Czech, Yugoslav and foreign literature, attempts to map the situation of the political opposition in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) between 1929 and 1931. This is the period spanning between the proclamation of a dictatorship by King Alexander Karađorđević in January 1929 and the issuing of the octroi constitution in September 1931. At the same time, the study attempts to inform readers about Czechoslovakia’s stance — as a significant Yugoslav ally — toward the local political opposition.
EN
Rock is a kind of popular music, which is destined to the young and is played by the young, and intended for mass media publishing. It's a characteristic phenomenon for youth culture of the second half of 20th century. With the help of developing new technology, rock gained global popularity also in Poland, especially in 1980's, which is called the ‘boom of Polish rock music’. That unexpected growth of rock popularity was caused by cultural, social and economic factors. A very special role was played by the circulations of culture. In Poland of 1980's, we had three circulations: the first one (official culture), the second one (political opposition) and the third one (alternative culture). Famous rock bands, which composed in the West, earned a lot of money by promoting their singles, playing concerts and selling albums, so they could not only live comfortably, but also record better albums in good studios, with the best instruments. In Poland, the bands which played in Polish People's Republic didn't have such an opportunity – their popularity depended on the government, and the salaries were given according to the results of the exam of theoretical knowledge and general musical skills. The media tried to break the monopoly of the government (e.g. Program 3 of Polish Radio or ‘Non Stop’ magazine). The third circulation, equated especially with punk culture, developed in underground and on independent stages. It was characterized by raising issues which were ‘banned’ in the official culture. It was manifested in the message of the words of songs, but also in magazines created by fans or musicians (fanzin). A very interesting phenomenon were also music festivals, which, despite the political situation, gave a lot of freedom to musicians and the audience. This publication is a compilation of information collected by other researchers and also an extract of the BA thesis of the author of this text.
EN
The study aims to identify of the specific models of cooperation between government and opposition in Czechoslovakia in transition period. In the article the prerequisites of confrontational relationships and their projection on the level of political competition and the formation of new political institutions in terms of democratization are determined. Was proved that the character of the relationship between government and opposition in Czechoslovakia was largely determined by degree of democratization of the regime and the opposition force, it`s goals and strategies. In the late 80th under pressure of the opposition, parties have moved from confrontation to cooperation, what reflected on co-option of the opposition members to the government. However, at the coalition government in fact was no division on pro-government and opposition forces, which made adaptation of opposition to the new socio-political conditions more complicated. A fundamental difference between the relationship of government and opposition in West European countries and Czechoslovakia was noted. In West European countries, the relationship found expression in both legal and political norms. They were characterized by the fact that they are in mutual consent of the parties to act before all in the public interest without going beyond existing law. In Czechoslovakia the main opponents of the ruling forces were communists who had radically different understanding of the main goals of social development. As for the anti-communist opposition, which operated until 1989, its isolation and the virtual disappearance were observed. The elections did not lead to authority post-communist forces, as it were observed in Poland and Hungary. The weakness of the opposition until 1989 gave her little chances at a new political conditions. It was weakened by internal divisions. Against the background of a weak opposition increased level of competition between pro-government parties. This, to some extent, contributed the establishment of new informal rules of electing of the president and prime minister of the federal government. After the first free parliamentary elections, relations between the government and the opposition have changed to a more confrontational with minimal consensus. In Czechoslovakia, in contradistinction to Poland and Hungary, there was no opposition repositioning, i.e. its transformation from outsider of changes of political order to an active participant in the parliament. Post-opposition forces remained weak and separated political entities. In 1991-1992 clear division between progovernment and opposition forces cannot be traced. Blurred boundaries between political opponents were intensified duality of political regime, that combines the features of the previous and democratic, centrifugal tendencies, regionalization of political parties. The competition took the form of real competition within the ruling group, formally differentiated by geographic criteria into two political parties. All this weakens the inter-party competition at the level of «government-parliamentary opposition» at the national level and put the problems of democratization to the second plan, giving priority to processes of formation of independent states of Czech Republic and Slovakia.
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Ewolucja opozycji politycznej na Ukrainie

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EN
The article presents the evolution of the political opposition in Ukraine. The author provides the legal basis for the formation and activities of the political opposition and their evolution, as well as the factors facilitating functioning of the political opposition – a form of government and electoral system. We consider four stages evolution of the political opposition. The parliamentary and nonparliamentary forms of opposition are also discussed.
EN
In March 2018, another presidential election took place in the Russian Federation. For the fourth time Vladimir Putin won the election by a large majority of votes. Alexei Navalny – an oppositioncandidate who had been preparing his election campaign since the end of 2016 – was not allowed to stand in the election. Regardless of his elimination from the election, Navalny remained an active member of Russian political life before and after the election; he carried out a boycott of the election, and organized post-election protests. Without a doubt, despite the ban on running in the election, Navalny was one of the main figures in the electoral process. Thus, the aim of this article is a detailed analysis of Navalny’s preparations for the campaign – the authors focused not only on the candidate’s opposition activity, but also on his unique measures and methods of running a campaign (Internet, social media, crowdfunding). The article examines the campaign preparations, as well as the reasons for the rejection of Navalny’s registration as an election candidate, social support index, relationships with other candidates and the change of strategy after the Central Election Commission’s decision. The analysis is based on Russian law, Central Election Commission’s decisions, opinion poll results and information from the Russian and international media.
EN
The phenomenon of opposition is the easiest to notice and most frequently analysed at the national, parliamentary-government level. However, it is also to be met at lower levels of power, for example in local, regional authorities. Among those we can distin-guish communes, not least because of the monocratic executive body, elected in a direct way. The article analyzes the current institutional and legal solutions as well as the actual ones, which have a significant impact on the development and institutionalization of the opposition at the lowest level of regional authorities. The analysis confirmed the accepted thesis, according to which the existing constitutional arrangements for the municipalities in Poland are not conducive to the formation of the opposition in local authorities and their adverse impact is reinforced by the specific conditions of local governments.
EN
The main purpose of the article was to analyze the evolution of parliamentary behavior of Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) in the years 2001–2013. The present paper explains the development of identity of both parties since the election of 2005. The analysis takes into account creating bond with the voters, as well as selected models and rules governing the behavior of politicians. The data presented show that up until 2010 Polish government opposition was of consensual type, i.e. the opposition agreed with the governing party in many cases. At the turn of sixth and seventh term of office was substituted with “hard” opposition, who consistently voted against proposed bills of the coalition. However, it needs to be stressed that a clear dissonance in legislative behavior is correlated with the previously long term of stability of coalition governments, as well as with the increase in coherence of parliamentary clubs. This may be an indicator of the forming of a permanent model of parliamentary rivalry and of an increase in stability of the political system.
EN
The following contribution sketches in the political developments in Yugoslavia after the issuing of the octroyed constitution in September 1931, mainly based upon thorough research into sources in Czech and foreign archives and analysis of period publications. It particularly focuses on the activity of the Yugoslav opposition and on the position adopted by Czechoslovakia – as one of Yugoslavia’s key foreign policy allies, as well as a country with which many representatives of the Yugoslav opposition movement had close relations. Another aim is to capture the transformations that took place in Czechoslovakia in public opinion, in the press, and in some of the political parties’ stances on the political situation in Yugoslavia, as contrasted with the official position of Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy formulated and represented by Minister Edvard Beneš.
PL
Antanas Smetona was the father of Lithuania’s independence, a journalist, lawyer, politician, but also Lithuania’s dictator. He is considered an architect of the country’s authoritarian and fascist regime and at the same time was a fugitive who fled the country at a decisive moment. Due to the lack of scientific publications in Polish scientific discourse, my aim is to present oppositional actions of Lithuania’s first president (during the years 1920–1926) as well as to explore new aspects of his political thought/ideology.
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Opozice v meziválečné KSČ v letech 1925-1929

75%
EN
The submitted study looks at the previously little investigated issue of opposition groups and trends within the interwar KSČ. Marxist historiography often tended to provide simplified explanations for these groups, whom they termed “liquidators”. The study is limited in time to the period between 1925 and 1929, when Bolshevisation was completed at the party’s Fifth Congress and those with different opinions were expelled. On the basis of documents in archives and periodicals, the crisis, and the opinions of opponents and their critics are monitored chronologically. The opposition groups were not united. They did not come together, at least partially, until 1929. The report notes that opponents were neither career-driven nor opportunists, as they were termed by KSČ leaders, but rather people who were opposed to the principles of Bolshevisation.
PL
Artykuł stanowi przedstawienie koncepcji współczesnego polskiego obozu narodowego, reprezentowanego przez Ligę Polskich Rodzin i Ruch Narodowy, dotyczących postulowanej roli opozycji politycznej w systemie politycznym Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Oba ugrupowania stały na stanowisku, że należy wzmocnić opozycję, nadając jej nowe uprawnienia i kompetencje, co pozwoliłoby zwiększyć pluralizm i różnorodność ideologiczną oraz przeciwstawić się dominacji kilku wielkich ugrupowań politycznych.
EN
This article presents the ideas of the contemporary Polish national camp, represented by the League of Polish Families and the National Movement, concerning the postulated role of the political opposition in the political system of the Republic of Poland. Both parties have taken the view that the opposition should be strengthened by granting it new powers and competences, which would allow for an increase in pluralism and ideological diversity, as well as to oppose the domination of a few large political parties.
EN
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the Communist Party and Komsomol policy concerning informal youth associations in Soviet Ukraine. The author paid considerable attention to the factors that caused the emergence of informal associations’ phenomenon. It is shown that if up to the first half of the 1980s state structures preferred repressive methods of influence on informal youth associations, then from the mid-1980s onwards the policy of party-state leadership changed using the principle of cooperation according to a differentiated approach to associations. This led to a decrease in destructive activities of certain associations and overcoming tensions between the informal youth and public structures. However, in general, the authorities failed to establish constructive cooperation with informal youth associations. Informal organizations became politicized, opposition informal associations formed and consolidated in the second half of 1988. Their authority among the youth was growing amid the decay of official youth structures.
Dzieje Najnowsze
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2022
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vol. 54
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issue 2
109-129
EN
The political system of ‘People’s Poland’ complies with a definition of a ‘monocentric system’ proposed by Stanisław Ossowski. The rulers deprived the citizens of their subjectivity, controlled them, and destroyed the values significant to them. In response to that, some young people established underground organisations striving to change the political regime and preserve their freedom. The article verifies the hypothesis: the youth undergrounds organisations were a form of political opposition in the monocentric system.
PL
Ustrój „Polski Ludowej” mieścił się w zaproponowanej przez Stanisława Ossowskiego definicji „systemu monocentrycznego”. Rządzący odebrali obywatelom podmiotowość, poddali ich kontroli i niszczyli istotne dla nich wartości. W odpowiedzi część młodzieży powołała tajne organizacje, dążąc do zmiany reżimu i ochrony własnej wolności. Celem artykułu jest weryfikacja hipotezy: podziemne związki młodzieżowe stanowiły formę opozycji politycznej w systemie monocentrycznym
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2022
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vol. 20
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issue 2
122-141
EN
The aim of this article was to analyze the condition of legal (direct) institutionalization of political opposition in contemporary states, as well as to specify and organize solutions that are used in this process. The elaboration hypothesized that current conditio of knowledge on this subject is out of date, and legal institutionalization, including its constitutionalization, becomes more and more common phenomenon. To solve the research problem and verify the hypothesis, the content analysis and comparative methods are used during research. The source base were normative acts, monographs and collective studies as well as scientific articles. The result of the analysis showed that the direct institutionalization of the political opposition is more and more frequent phenomenon, concerning also states with rich democratic traditions.
PL
Celem niniejszego artykułu było przeanalizowanie stanu prawnej (bezpośredniej) instytucjonalizacji opozycji politycznej we współczesnych państwach, a także wyszczególnienie i uporządkowanie rozwiązań, jakie stosowane są w tym procesie. W opracowaniu postawiono hipotezę, że obecny stan wiedzy na ten temat jest nieaktualny, a prawna instytucjonalizacja, w tym jej konstytucjonalizacja, staje się zjawiskiem coraz powszechniejszym. W celu rozwiązania problemu badawczego i zweryfikowania hipotezy w trakcie badań skorzystano z metody analizy treści i metody porównawczej. Bazę źródłową stanowiły akty normatywne, monografie i opracowania zbiorowe oraz artykuły naukowe. Wynik analizy pokazał, że bezpośrednia instytucjonalizacja opozycji politycznej jest zjawiskiem coraz częstszym, obejmującym również państwa o bogatych tradycjach demokratycznych.
EN
The article analyzes the electoral campaign for the United Opposition “Fatherland”, which was the main rival of the ruling party – the Party of Regions. The United Opposition could not present a new quality in the election campaign, it has demonstrated its concept of development of the state, the society. The opposition acted as the governing party distributing promises and creating a “black and white” picture of reality.
PL
W artykule przeprowadzono analizę kampanii wyborczej Zjednoczonej Opozycji „O Ojczyznę”, która była głównym rywalem partii rządzącej – Partii Regionów. Zjednoczona Opozycja nie potrafiła zaprezentować nowej jakości w kampanii wyborczej, nie zademonstrowała własnej koncepcji rozwoju państwa, społeczeństwa. Opozycja zachowywała się podobnie jak partia rządząca, rozdając obietnice i kreując „czarno-biały” obraz rzeczywistości.
RU
Исследование посвящено системному анализу существующих моделей политической оппозиции. Отдельный акцент сделан на методологическом разделении опытов политической оппозиции в странах Европы и Украины. Сформулирован вывод, что в Украине, как и в других странах постсоветского пространства, политическая оппозиция не может быть проанализирована при помощи существующих теоретических подходов, т.к. она также является формой политического поведения с целью реализовать популизм, который ускоряет её приход во власть. Также политическая оппозиция в Украине может быть формой политического протеста, целью которого является радикализация общества. При этом, опыт функционирования политической оппозиции в Республике Польша во многом отличен от украинского, но формализация оппозиционной деятельности также имеет ряд фундаментальных проблем – очень часто правительство формирует не партия, выигравшая выборы, а коалиция оппозиционных партий (т.н. проблема «правительств меньшинства»).
EN
Research is devoted to the system analysis of existing models of political opposition. The separate emphasis is placed on methodological division of experiences of political opposition in the countries of Europe and Ukraine. The conclusion is formulated that in Ukraine, as well as in other countries of the former Soviet Union, the political opposition cannot be analyzed by means of existing theoretical approaches since it also is a form of political behavior with the purpose to realize populism, which accelerates its arrival to the power. In addition, political opposition in Ukraine can be a form of a political protest which purpose society radicalization is. Thus, experience of functioning of political opposition in the Republic of Poland is in many respects other than Ukrainian, but formalization of oppositional activity also has a number of fundamental problems – very often the government is formed not by the party which has won elections, and the coalition of opposition parties (so-called. problem of "minority governments").
PL
Wybory prezydenckie na Białorusi w 2015 roku posiadały niedemokratyczny charakter. Ponownie na prezydenta wybrano Aleksandra Łukaszenkę. Opozycja polityczna nie potrafiła wypracować spójnej strategii wyborczej. Nie powiodły się również próby konsolidacji środowisk demokratycznych oraz wystawienia wspólnego kandydata. Wybory prezydenckie przebiegały pod pełną kontrolą reżimu i według wcześniej sprawdzonego schematu. W odróżnieniu od poprzednich wyborów prezydenckich w 2010 roku, reżim nie zdecydował się na masowe represje powyborcze. Spokojny przebieg wyborów prezydenckich w 2015 roku ułatwił Białorusi podjęcie dialogu politycznego ze strukturami zachodnimi (UE, RE, OBWE).
EN
Presidential elections in Belarus in 2015 did not follow democratic standards. Once again Aleksandr Lukashenko was elected a president. The political opposition was not able to develop a consistent election strategy. Attempts to consolidate the democratic circles and put forward one candidate also failed. The presidential elections were fully controlled by the regime and went according to the previously proved scheme. Contrary to the previous presidential elections in 2010, the regime did not decide to launch a campaign of mass post-election repressions. The quiet presidentialelections in 2015 facilitated for Belarus an initiation of a political dialogue with Western structures (EU, EC and OSCE).
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Underground na severní Moravě v letech 1970-1989

63%
EN
This paper discusses the phenomenon of the North Moravian underground in years 1970–1989. It focuses primarily on the “other” culture, alternative culture, parallel culture, in which music bands were considered as “defective” bands and people with long hair or people involved in unofficial art were considered as “defective” youth. During my research I encountered a different meaning of the term “underground” in Northern Moravia, to the meaning associated with the term in Prague, where the society was more politicised.
EN
Political science literature distinguishes two forms of institutionalization of the opposition – political (indirect) institutionalization and legal (direct) institutionalization. The first is based on the assumption that the opposition i san integral part of the Political system, which results from the basic constitutional rules, a catalog of civil rights or electoral law, while the second relies on placing a phrase reffering to “opposition” in a specific legal act: resolution, law or constitution. This article focuses just on the second form of institutionalization of the opposition, or more precisely, on its constitutionalization. The aim of the author of the study was to examine the scale of this phenomenon in the political systems of European states, as well as to present the context in which constitution-makers refer to the “opposition” in the content of the constitution, and what are the differences in this scope. The analysis embranced the constitutions of all European states, therefore the research kept comprehensive character. Among the used methods were: the method of content analysis and the comparative method, and the source base – apart from the constitutions – included: monographs, collective studies, scientific articles and other legal acts. Research has shown that the constitutionalization of political opposition is a rare phenomenon in Europe, encompassing only a few states. Those who decided to do it, differ the methods and solutions used for this purpose.
PL
W literaturze politologicznej wyróżnia się dwie formy instytucjonalizacji opozycji – instytucjonalizację polityczną (pośrednią) i instytucjonalizację prawnoustrojową (bezpośrednią). Pierwsza opiera się na założeniu, że opozycja stanowi nieodłączny element systemu politycznego, co wynika z podstawowych zasad konstytucyjnych, katalogu praw obywatelskich czy przepisów prawa wyborczego, natomiast druga polega na zamieszczeniu sformułowania nawiązującego do „opozycji” w konkretnym akcie prawnym: uchwale, ustawie bądź konstytucji. Niniejszy artykuł koncentruje się właśnie na tej drugiej formie instytucjonalizacji opozycji, a ściślej mówiąc, na jej konstytucjonalizacji. Celem autora opracowania było bowiem zbadanie skali tego zjawiska w systemach politycznych państw europejskich, jak również przedstawienie kontekstu, w jakim ustrojodawcy nawiązują w treści konstytucji do „opozycji”, i jakie występują różnice w tym zakresie. Analiza objęła konstytucje wszystkich europejskich państw, w związku z czym badania zachowały charakter całościowy. Wśród wykorzystanych metod znalazły się: metoda analizy treści i metoda porównawcza, a na bazę źródłową – oprócz konstytucji – złożyły się: monografie, opracowania zbiorowe, artykuły naukowe oraz inne akty prawne. Badania wykazały, że konstytucjonalizacja opozycji politycznej jest w Europie zjawiskiem rzadkim, obejmującym jedynie kilka państw. Te zaś, które się na to zdecydowały, różnią zastosowane w tym celu metody i rozwiązania.
EN
The purpose of this article is to determine the political conditions of the amendments introduced to the Constitution of Ukraine regarding the modification of the form of rule: 1) to establish the motives of political subjects that aimed at introducing amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution; 2) to grasp the specific political situation in which the modification of the form of rule in Ukraine took place. The following thesis has been examined: 1) that it were the presidents Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005) and Viktor Yanukovych (2010-2014) who had particular aspirations to modify the semi-presidential form of rule introduced in 1996 in Ukraine; 2) that introducing amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine regarding the modification of the form of rule was the result of a political compromise made between the government and the opposition during the socio-political protest in 2004 (the so-called Orange Revolution) and the mass anti-government protest in 2014 (Euromaidan).
PL
Celem artykułu jest określenie uwarunkowań politycznych dokonywania zmian Konstytucji Ukrainy w zakresie modyfikacji formy rządów: 1) ustalenie motywów podmiotów politycznych dążących do wprowadzenia zmian do Konstytucji Ukrainy; 2) ujęcie specyfiki sytuacji politycznej, w której modyfikowano formę sprawowania rządów na Ukrainie. Sformułowane zostały następujące założenia: 1) szczególne aspiracje w zakresie modyfikacji półprezydenckiej formy rządów wprowadzonej na Ukrainie w 1996 r. wykazywali prezydenci Leonid Kuczma (1994-2005) oraz Wiktor Janukowycz (2010-2014); 2) wprowadzenie zmian do Konstytucji Ukrainy w zakresie modyfikacji formy rządów było efektem kompromisu politycznego zawartego pomiędzy władzą a opozycją podczas protestów społeczno-politycznych w 2004 r. (tzw. pomarańczowa rewolucja) oraz w trakcie masowych antyrządowych protestów w 2014 r. (Euromajdan).
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