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PL
Przedmiotem rozważań artykułu jest fragment polityki karnej państwa obejmujący działalność sądów w celu przeciwdziałania i ograniczania przestępczości w drodze stosowania przepisów prawa karnego wobec cudzoziemców przebywających w Polsce. W szczególności poruszane jest zagadnienie polityki wymierzania kar i środków karnych cudzoziemcom, którzy dopuścili się czynów zabronionych przez polskie prawo karne i trafili do systemu formalnej kontroli społecznej. Celem analizy jest ustalenie, w jaki sposób na przestrzeni lat 2004 – 2012 kształtowała się polityka sądowego wymiaru kary cudzoziemcom, jakie kary i środki karne były wobec nich najczęściej stosowane w odpowiedzi na popełnienie poszczególnych rodzajów przestępstw oraz sprawdzenie czy, a jeśli tak, to w jakim kierunku i zakresie, polityka ta odbiega od polityki karnej stosowanej wobec polskich obywateli.
EN
The article discusses criminal policy, understood as court procedures intended to counteract and limit crime by applying provisions of criminal law. The chapter begins with an analysis of diverse definitions of criminal and penal policy. Then, mechanism of action of such policies in the aspect of administering punishments to perpetrators of criminal deeds is discussed. An analysis of statistical data concerning administering particular types of punishments allows to draw certain conclusions concerning penal policy employed in Poland in the difficult period of social change. The most often administered punishment in the first decade of the 21st century is deprivation of liberty (imprisonment) with conditional suspension (probation), imprisonment and fines are slightly less frequent, the least frequently courts sentence unconditional imprisonment. The picture of the data allows only to make a draft of contemporary visions of solving social problems related with crime – or rather lack of such visions. The reasons of incoherence and – in many cases – irrationality of our criminal policy can be seen in many factors which are impossible to discuss or even list in one article. However it is worth to notice that undoubtedly the progressing expansion and politicization of criminal law should be limited and it should be acknowledged that criminal law is not the best remedy for social problems, which include crime.
EN
The object of the analysis are the institution known in the criminal law as active repentance and other similar normative institutions, which are sometimes referred to by scientists as active repentance in its broad sense or as quasi-active repentance. I was interested in the behavior of the perpetrator after commitment of an offence as a factor affecting the extent of perpetrator’s criminal liability in the context of criminal and penal policy (legally permissible modification of criminal responsibility in individual cases). Even a brief review of the institutions of active repentance in the Polish criminal law (regulated in the general and specific chapters of the Penal Code) allows to state that there is no uniformity, consistency, and rationality in shaping of this substantial instrument of criminal and penal policy. Sometimes one may have an impression that the issue of active repentance was regulated quite accidentally, not as a part of the comprehensive, rational criminal policy pursued by the entire criminal justice system. Since the key question is whether the established and accepted objectives and functions of punishment and / or criminal law can be achieved without a punishment, therefore the first part of the article is devoted to theories and functions of the penalty in conjunction with the reasons and functions attributed to active repentance. The different functions of an active repentance – to increase the efficiency – require some specific element in the design of this institution to be taken into consideration. These variables may be: if the benefits gained by the repentant are facultative or mandatory, the extent of the benefits, additional requirements imposed on the offender related to his conduct, an indication of a shorter or longer time limit to meet the statutory requirements and / or conditions related to repentant’s motivation, directory of the deeds in which the perpetrator can use the benefits arising from his active repentance, and indirectly also the place and method of regulation. Whether these variables should include consent of the victim, with all its consequences, probably also needs to be taken into consideration. Referring to the presented features of active repentance, by operating with the indicated variables, one can attempt to construct a variety of models of active repentance appropriate for performance of specific functions. Assuming its preventive function, active repentance should be provided for the widest range of crimes possible. Preferably, active repentance should be described clearly and precisely in the general part of the Criminal Code. Benefits provided for the accused person should be as wide as possible and always obligatory. Effective preventive function enforces the need to spread this instrument, especially the profits associated with it.
EN
The article presents results of file research invovling an analysis of the manner in which court and prosecution applied law in resolving atypical cases of bribery. The subject of the said research were atypical cases of bribery involving crimes under Article 228 and Article 229 of the Penal Code perpetrated by persons performing public functions. The cases discussed followed a number of varied scenarios which, in general, consisted in accepting or granting material or personal benefit or a promise of such in connection with the perpetrator's official capicity. Hence the conduct of the perpetrator did formally fulfil the definition of the crime defined in Articles 228 and 229 Penal Code. However, since some specific circumstances took place, such as a statutory body's decision or penal jurisprudence, the perpetrated act should not render the perpetrator liable to prosecution. It was found that, when classifying atypical acts of corruption, judicial authorities made some effort to employ lenient penal-legal assessment of the perpetrator's conduct, but they often did so with insufficient diligence and by implementing inappropriate provisions of the penal law. The atypical bribery cases included circumstances in which physicians misled their patients by suggesting they should purchase a highend endoprothesis or medicine produced abroad, on an allegedly free market outside the National Health Fund (NFZ) refunding system. The patients they did so, in spite of the fact that such recommendations have no substantiation in the public functions of a medical doctor. Physicians would then claim that they assumed the role of an intermediary between a patient and a foreign dealer or manufacturer. In practice, they used prothesis or medicines refunded by the National Health Fund (NFZ). Unaware of that fact, patients acted in error as to the circumstances, fulfilling the definition of an unlawful act (error facti), and in particular, the patients were not aware that the money they handed over was in fact a bribe granted in connection with official capacity of the physician. In consequence, the criminal procedure in such cases should either be closed by means of discontinuation or refusal to instigate under Article 17 § 1.2 Criminal Procedure Code subject to Article 28 § 1 Penal Code. Prosecution bodies, however, avoided such classification and in cases like that opted for exempting the informer - briber from the penalty (Article 229 § 6 Penal Code), which did not fully reflect the actual legal and formal circumstances of a misinformed patient's conduct. Especially disagreeable was the fact that the solution adopted by prosecution assumed such patients were guilty. It was established that the notion of customary gifts, widely accepted in penal law publications as lawful excuse, is in practice defunct. This does not mean that similar facts were never subject to criminal procedure.
PL
Kara pozbawienia wolności i związany z nią proces resocjalizacji, któremu poddawani są skazani jest od dawna przedmiotem zainteresowania akademickiego. Problematyka penalizacji zachowań przestępczych, więziennictwa oraz realizacji celów i zadań systemu resocjalizacyjnego jest poruszana nie tylko przez prawników i kryminologów, ale również ekonomistów, psychologów, pedagogów, socjologów czy nawet przedstawicieli nauk medycznych. Każda z wymienionych dziedzin wskazuje zarówno na pozytywne, jak i negatywne efekty kary pozbawienia wolności. Odmienność prezentowanych stanowisk jest przy tym niezwykle szeroka. Wśród zwolenników jej stosowania pojawiają się stanowiska traktujące ją jako jedyny skuteczny sposób resocjalizacji przestępców, podczas gdy jej krytycy zwracają uwagę, że przystosowanie do życia w społeczeństwie nie jest możliwe do realizacji w warunkach izolacji penitencjarnej. Polska już od ponad dekady należy do ścisłej czołówki krajów Wspólnoty Europejskiej o najwyższych wskaźnikach penalizacji sprawców przestępstw. Stąd też problematyka więziennictwa i funkcjonowania systemu resocjalizacyjnego jest ważna i budzi żywe zainteresowanie świata akademickiego. Celem artykułu jest wskazanie najważniejszych punktów sporu o karę pozbawienia wolności w specyficznym kontekście polskiej polityki penalnej oraz praktyki resocjalizacyjnej.
EN
Imprisonment and resocialization process which is undertaken in order to ‘rehabilitate’ offenders has been the subject of academic discussion for years. The issue of penalizing criminal offences, prison institutions, as well as completing the goals of resocialization system is undertaken by not only criminologists or lawyers but also economists, psychologists, pedagogists, sociologists and even medics. Each of the mentioned disciplines indicates both, positive and negative effects of imprisonment and the span of presented ideas is firmly broad. Some specialists tend to see imprisonment as the only effective and possible social reaction to crime, others indicate that social integration is impossible by means of social isolation. Since over decade Poland has now been among the European Union countries with the highest imprisonment indexes. This is why the case of imprisonment and functioning of resocialization system is important and is often commented by academics. The aim of this article is to indicate the most important arguments concerning the issue of imprisonment in the specific climate of Polish penal policy and resocialization practice.
EN
The paper is a continuation of the previous analyses of penal policy pursued by Polish courts. The directions and shape of penal policy are the resultant of many different elements. Analysed in the present paper is the impact on that policy of changes in: penal law; detected crime; and some characteristics of the population of convicted persons. The 1980s abounded in far-reaching changes of penal legislation. In the years 1980-1981, the tremendous “Solidarity” movement failed to bring about a penal law reform despite the fact that its representatives started intensive work toward that aim, preparing and stimulating others to prepare drafts of such reform. The imposition of martial law secured continued power to the communists; its social costs, however, were extremely high. An item on the bill society were forced to pay was the inclusion into penal law of many elements typical of the law of war which aggravated criminal responsibility. Thus (1) the competence of military courts was extended to various categories of civilians; (2) the application of special modes of procedure was introduced or extended, including the single-instance summary proceedings; (3) many statutory penalties were aggravated; (4) many different categories of acts were penalized which had not been punishable before, including in particular pursuit of trade union activities and organization of strikes and protests; (5) internment was introduced as an administrative form of preventive deprivation of liberty. The abrogation of martial law resulted in removal of most but not all of the above aggravations. A new tide of severe provisions came with the acts of May 1985 which in fact created a new “martial law” in penal law. It consisted in: (1) extension of applicability of the existing and introduction of new “simplified” modes of procedure which involved limitation of the defendant’s right to defence; (2) aggravation of the statutory penalties for many acts; (3) vast extension of the application of additional penalties; (4) limitation of the applicability of suspended sentences; (5) exclusion of conditional release of multiple recidivists; (6) extension of the conditions of withdrawal of parole. Therefore, penal policy was shifted twice towards aggravation in the 1980s, the first such shift was made in 1982 and continued with reduced force throughout 1983, and the second one taking place in the years 1985‒1988. Departure from the over-punitive penal law of People’s Republic of Poland started in 1989 with the emergence of the new political order which created the initial conditions for the building of the Third Republic. In 1989, just the first steps were made, followed by few farther in the years 1990‒1991, towards changing the contens of penal law and reforming the most glaring effects of its abuse. Such steps met with immense difficulties. The attachment to former penal law proved strong: to penal law with indefinite statutory features of situences, with severe penalties which could be accumulated and imposed in the conditions of far-reaching limitation of the right to defence or even by default. According to an opinion often expressed in official statements, penal policy was to be determined first and foremost by the state of crime. The extent and trends of crime in general and of the separate offences were to “force” the authorities accordingly to shape penal policy. The incessantly growing threat to public order and citizens’ safety, and to social property in particular, was to justify the need for aggravated and accumulated penalties. Also penal lawyers who noticed the direct relationship between crime and punishment tended ‒ and still tend today for that matter ‒ to suppose that an identical relationship can be found between crime as a mass phenomenon and  punishment as a proces of distribution of condemnations through the imposition of penalties by courts. Yet whatever the relations between punishment ‒ its severity in particular ‒ and crime, they are in fact very weak indeed. This is shown by facts: crime comparable as to extent and gravity meets with most different punishment in different countries. A growth in crime sometimes leaves penal policy unchanged, and at other times results in its aggravation or mitigation; similar are the effects of a decrease in crime. Poland is a good example here: in the 1970s, detected crime was on the decrease but penal policy gained in strictness; in the 1980s, crime went up and the aggravation of penal policy continued. In the first of those decades, the decrease in crime was said to have resulted from the particular  shape of penal policy pursued then; in the next one, the need forstrict penal policy was argued to follow from the growth in crime. Never mentioned, instead, was a trend of crime which would actually justify a mitigation of penal policy. As we know, the extent and also largely the structure of detected crime, that is of crime recorded by the police, is the resultant of many different organizational, legal, and often also political factors. The real extent and structure of crime can hardly be seen through that screen, and its picture is often distorted. In the former “socialist” states, the extent of crime was a political issue: generally speaking, it shaped the way the authorities expected it to shape.             During the 1970s and even in 1980, the number of detected offences ‒ those confirmed in preparatory proceedings ‒ was 320‒350 thousand a year. Starting from 1981, it went up rapidly to 540 thousand in 1984. For the next few years, it was falsely kept at a similar or even somewhat lower level which was to manifest the effectiveness of the drastic statutes of May 1985. Early in the 1990s, the situation was changed radically: the extent of detected crime  was no longer perceived as a political issue regulated as the authorities requested. In the years 1990‒1992, the number of detected offences became stabilized at 860‒880 thousand a year. It is believed to have actually gone up, and it no doubt did go up in the economy-related spheres: the real number of offences against foreign currency and customs regulations, tax offences, frauds, embezzlements etc. was indeed greater. III. The above-mentioned growth in the number of detected offences was hardly reflected in the numer of persons found guilty in criminal proceedings. There were about 200 thousand such persons a year, and the numer only went down in years when amnesty laws were passed. Penal legislation provides for different penalties for the separate offences. Therefore, in order to appraise the enhanced or reduced severity of penal policy,  it is important to investigate any possible changes in the proportions of those offences throughout the 1980s. In the years 1980‒1991, convictions for crimes (where the statutory penalty is deprivation of liberty for at least 3 years) regularly amounted to 3‒4%, and those for the more serious offences (statutory pelalty of at least 1 or 2 years imprisonment) – to 19‒31%. In the early half of the 1980s, there was a shift towalds a greater proportion of convictions for the less serious offences. The opposite trend could be noticed in the latter half of the decade. Generally speaking, the bulk of convicted persons were guilty of less and less serious offences during the discussed decade, the proportion of convictions for serious crimes remaining rather stable in that period. This trend could be noticed under the statutes of May 1985 which shows how unrelated they were to the real situation in the sphere of crime, and how much they depended on other factors such as e.g. the ruling elites’ desire to have their revenge on society for the events of 1980-1981. The situation changed in the years 1989‒1991 when the proportion of persons convicted for the more serious offences started to go up rapidly. This sole element considered – that is, the structure of crime – were penal policy stable throughout the years l980‒1988, there should have been more and more  sentences to penalties not involving deprivation of liberty, and the length of inprisonment should have been reduced. In the years 1989‒1991, instead, a greater number of longer immediate prison sentences could be expected. The most severe, of all penalties provided for by Polish law is capitol puishment. In the years 1981‒1982, there were 3‒4 valid sentences to that pe- nalty a year, the number going up to a dozen or so in the years 1984‒1986. The common courts imposed death penalty for homicide only. Since 1988, not a single valid sentence to death has been imposed by those courts (though it was imposed by invalid sentences in isolated cases). This de facts abolition can be hoped to persist, especially as the new draft penal code does not provide for capital punishment. The death penalty has first of all a symbolic sense; it is difficult to say why the authorities insisted on rejecting all the postulates for its abolition. Instead, the basic instrument that determines the punitiveness of the Polish penal system is  unconditional deprivation of liberty. Penal policy of the 1970s had few good points; one of them was a limitation of the use of that penalty, noticeable at the end of the decade. This trend was further intensified in 1981 when 19% of those found guilty were sentenced to immediate imprisonment. Under martial law and in the period of its suspension, there was a slight shift away from that policy (2l‒22%). It was finally abandoned in the years 1984‒1986: in 1986, 30% of those found guilty were sentenced to immediate inprisonment. In 1988, the policy-makers came back to their senses, and re-orientation of penal policy was started:  sentenced to immediate imprisonment were 21% of those found guilty. This proportion went further down to 18% in 1989, but then proceeded to rise again in the years 1990‒1991 (19‒20%). The above-mentioned change in the structure of crime in those years considered, this fact cannot possibly be seen as evidencing the aggravation of penal policy. The imposition of unconditional deprivation of liberty evolved in a way that is worth mentioning here. In the latter half of the 1970s, the number of sentences to that penalty became stabilized at 190-200 per 100 thousand of adults, a great improvement compared to the early half of that decade (228‒273 per 100 thousand of adults). In the 1980s, the number of unconditional prison sentences went further down to about 150 per 100 thousand of adults, barring the period of validity of the acts of May 1985 when it again exceeded 200. Thus on the whole, the range of imposition of immediate impressonment was further reduced – a most satisfactory development. As regards the length of that penalty, that is the term to be spent in prison, there has been little improvement. Prison terms of under 1 year, considered short in Poland, still constitute a mere 8‒13% of all sentences to unconditional deprivation of liberty. Thus nearly 180 persons per 100 thousand of adults in the years of validity of the statuts of May 1985, and about 130-140 in the other years were sentenced to prison terms of at least one year, the number only going down to somewhat less than 100 in the years when amnesty laws were passed. Instead, the incidence of sentences to long prison terms of at least 3 years remained relatively stable: sentenced to that penalty were 30‒40 persons per 100 thousand of adults. The length of sentences can also be considered from a different angle, i.e. that of the average length of the discussed penalty. In the years 1980‒1991 the average length of unconditional prison term was practically unchanged and amounted to 24‒25 months (barring the year 1985 when it nearly reached 27 months). Therefore, the following trend emerped: the imposition of immediate imprisonment is gradually limited but its average length remains at a practically unchanged level. It is an extremely high level at that, the fact considered that the bulk of offences for which the Polish offenders were convicted involved the lower statutory penalty of 6 months deprivation of liberty at most. Of the greatest importance among the reactions to an offence which do not involve deprivation of liberty in Poland is the penalty of conditional deprivation of liberty. Its incidence went up rapidly under martial law (from 29% in 1980 to 37% in 1982) and remained at a high level for the next few years. It is only recently that the proportion of such sentences has been reduced to its original level. There is a great variety of shapes this particular penalty can assume: it can be combined with fine, supervision, and various duties imposed on the person sentenced to that penalty, and also with additional penalties and payment to the injured person or for a public purpose. In the years 1980‒1984, it was very often combined with fine (7l‒78% of cases). This proportion went down in the next years (to 55‒60%) which was however accompanied by an unusual growth in the imposition of additional penalties, such as in particular confiscation of property and forfeiture of things, and also of payment to the injured personor for a public purpose. In the years 1989‒1991, that is after abrogation of the states of May 1985, the proportion of cases where fine was imposed together with conditional deprivation of liberty again went up to two thirds of all cases of imposition of that penalty. (The amount of fines will be discussed further on). The penalty of limitation of liberty, introduced by tle 1969 penal code, had some problems fighting its way into the practice of criminal justice. In the latter half of the 1970s, though, its proportion among the bulk of penal measures became stabilized at 12‒14%. The same trend could be noticed in the years 1980‒1981. The aggravation of criminal responsibility under martial law resulted in reduction of sentences to that penalty (to as low a level as 7% in 1984). Instead, the next aggravation introduced by the statutes of May 1985 led to a growth in both the number and proportion of sentences to limitation of liberty. Surprising as it may seem at first sight this development can be explained by the fact that by force of the provisions adopted in 1985, that penalty could be imposed in proceedings by penal order, i.e. in the absence of the defendant. His objection to the decision admittedly rendered the order invalid, but he was not protected by the ban on reformatio in peius. In the years 1989–1991 the proportion of limitation of liberty in the bulk of penal measures imposed went down to the extent of rendering that penalty unimportant. In 1989, it was imposed on 7.4% of those found guilty; in 1990 – on 3.5%; and in l991 – on a mere 2.7%. In the 1990s, the relative incidence of imposition of the separate forms of that penalty started to change rapidly.  Deduction from the remmeration for work was imposed on 53% of persons sentenced to limitation of liberty in 1989, on 38% in 1990, and on 21% in 1991. Unpaid supervised work came to the foreground (34, 56, and 78% respectively) while referral of the convicted person to work practically disappeared (l3, 6 and, 1% respectively).  Fine as a self-standing penalty has never been extensively imposed in Poland as opposed to the situation in many other penal systems, the West European ones in particular. Late in ten 1970s, the proportion of fines became stabilized at 11–13% and remained unchanged throughout the early half of the 1980s. It then proceeded to go up a little in the years  1986–1988 (15–16%), and stopped at 13–15% in the years 1989–1991.  The proportion of fines can be expected to grow in the future, mainly at the sacrifice of conditional deprivation of liberty combined with fine. As important as the length of a prison term is the amount of a fine imposed. The repressiveness of fines can be appraised through reference to the average monthly wages in socialized economy. Compared to them, the average fines under the 1969 code evolved significantly. The use of fines was intensified in two parallel ways. First, their imposition together with deprivation of liberty grew more and more frequent (up to 69% of all persons sentenced to a prison  term in 1980). Second, the amount of fine was raised (to 2.5 times the monthly wages in 1980). Important changes in this respect took place in the 1980s. In the early half of the decade, the accumulation of fines with deprivation of liberty was further extended (to 75% of prison terms in 1984). On the other hand, the relative amount of fines went down (to about 1,5 times the monthly wages in socialized economy). This situation changed radically with the introduction of the statues of May 1985 which involved a drastic raise in the amount of fines  (in the years 1986–1987, to about 4 times the average monthly wages in the case of fines as additional penalties combined with deprivation of liberty, and to 2.5 times – in the case of self-standing fines). A next far-reaching change took place in the years 1989–1991. The relative amount of fine went down to about 0.5 time the monthly wages – a considerable reduction of repressiveness, even the general impoverishment of society considered. One of the penal measures introduced by the 1969 penal code is conditional discontinuance of criminal proceedings. It can be applied to first offenders guilty of the less serious acts whose guilt is self-evident. The measure was appllied by the public prosecutor in nearly 90% of cases, and by the court  in about l0% of cases only. Like unconditional deprivation of liberty, conditional discontinuance of proceedings can be seen as a specific gauge of aggravation or mitigation of penal policy. With growing severity of that policy, the proportion of  persons sentenced to unconditional prison terms goes up, and that of conditionally discontinued proceedings goes down. Is penal policy mitigated, the above proportions are reversed. In the years 1981, 1988, and 1989–1991, proceedings were conditionally discontinued in 24–30% of cases where the suspect was found guilty. Under the special martial law legislation, the proportion was 19–20%, and under the acts  of May 1985 – 16–19%. The remaining penal measures, that is additional penalty imposed as the main one, application of educational or corrective measures to persons aged 17 and guilty of misdemeanours, and renouncement of carrying out of the sentence, were used extremely seldom in spite of the considerable possibility of their application (the first two in particular). In the days when those in charge of criminal justice aimed at aggravation of responsibility, there was little room for its mitigation with the use of such measures. The years l980–1988 were characterized first and foremost by a tendency to aggravate penalties. After a short break in 1981, that tendency continued until 1989 when the first changes coul be noticed. In both cases, the period of reorientation of penal policy was too short to yield any farther-reaching changes. In the structure of penal measures,  the aggravation of responsibility was expressed mainly in the growing proportion of sentendes to immediate imprisonment and the limited use of conditional discontinuance of proceedings and limitation of liberty when no special procedural provisions incited the use of those measures. The penal policy pursued in the years 1989-1991 was deeply rooted in the practices of people’s Republic of Poland; to be more exact,  the trends of that  period still today if in a mitigated form. The 1989–1991 mitigation took place on different planes: the legal one, through removal of the specially punitive and glaringly unjust provisions, on the plane of application of law through many small mitigations of penalties which add to a significant whole, and also through a radical reform of prison policy. But the actual  mitigation does not go beyond the achievements of “Solidarity” of 1981. As a result, too many and too long sentences of immediate imprisonment are still imposed, and penal measures (imprisonment and fine in particular) are too often accumulated. Briefly speaking, Poland still has the style of punishming shaped after the penal code in force and its interpretation made in the 1970s. A radical abolition of this style and mitigatin of penalties still remains to be done, although the first steps have already been made by now (the virtual abolition of the death penalty and reduction of the amount of fines).
EN
The paper characterizes the evolution of penal policy with respect to per peetrators of transgressions, pursued in Poland by elected agencies attacbed to the state administration and called “transgression boards”. In the years 1972–1989, their decisions were supervised by the Minister of Internal Affairs. Most of the discussion, based on statistical materials, concerns changes in the structure and dynamics of penal measures applied by the boards. The measures have been defined as all legal reactions applicable upon the finding the perpetrator’s guilt. The present paper does not deal with all of those measures, though: for lack of statistical data, tukets imposed by the penal prosecution agencies and the possible reactions on part of those agencies if they renounce moving the case to the board for punishment according to the principle of  expediency of prosecution could not be discussed. Penal policy has been characterized against the background of amendments introduced in the period under analysis and of instructions issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs that shape the boards’ decisions. After 1982, such instructions usually aimed at aggravating repression. The statutory catalogue of penal measures contained in the transgressions code is relatively extensive. The most severe measure is detention which amounts to deprivation of liberty for up to 3 months. As stated in the code, it should be applied in exceptional cases only. In the first decade of validity of the code, detention was imposed in l–l.5 % of all decisions which meant the deprivation of liberty of 9,00–10,000 persons. It is therefore doubtful whether detention was indeed treated as an exceptional measure by practicians. In the next years, it was imposed much less often. The penalty of suspended detention played any role in the practice of transgression boards. As shown by studies, those who applied law  treated suspended detention as a separate penal measure to replace other measures not involving deprivation of liberty rather than a way of limiting the use of immediaste detention. Also disappointed were the  expectations related to another new measure, formally more severe than fine, that is limitation of liberty which was to “educate through work”. According to the legislators’ assumptions, that penalty was to  be the main alternative to detention; in practice, it was imposed rather often  (about 5% of all measures applied) but served mainly as a substitute for fine. The basic measure applied to perpetrators of transgressions was fine, imposed on 90% of cases of those punished by the boards. According to provisions of the Transgressions Code, though, a substitute penalty of detention can be imposed in the case of justified doubts as to the possibility of execution of fine. For this reason, it was found advisable in the present analysis to treat this form of fine as a measure different in quality from fine imposed without a substitute penalty which could in no case lead to imprisonment. Also research findings encouraged the treatment of these two kinds of fine as separate penal measures: the substitute penalty was treated in practice as a specific method of aggravating repression, and imposed in defiance with provisions of the Code. Owing to this approach it could be evidenced that the proportion of fines combined with the threat of deprivation of liberty (another measures designed as exceptional) went up rapidly in mid-1910s to become stabilized at about 20% of all decisions of the  transgression boards. The abuse of that measure, also designed as exceptional, was accompanied mainly by less frequent fines without a substitute penalty. At the same time, the proportion of the two most lenient measures, that is admonition and renouncement of inflicting punishment, went down regularly and amounted to a mere 2% of decisions despite the broad applications of those measures contained in the Code. This reflects the practicians’ tendency to use the aggravating legal solutions much more often than those which mitigate penalty; this led to increased repressiveness of penal policy. Beside the above-mentioned reactions, the Transgressions Code provides for a number of measures called additional penalties which are to accompany the principal ones. They can also be applied as self-standing measures in specific situations. Yet the agencies that apply law never availed themselves of this latter possibility. Instead, additional penalties were lavishly imposed (particularly the witholrawal it driving licence and the penalty of making the sentence publicly known) which led to accumulation of repressions suffered by the punished person. This is why the serious growth in the number of additional penalties, after the legal changes introduced in mid-l980s and instructions issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs in particular, was still another proof of the aggravation of penal policy with respect to perpertrators of transgressions. Characteristically, the Polish Transgressions Code combines the application of some of the non-custodical measures with the threat of deprivation of liberty in the case of failure in the execution of those measures. This concerns the above-mentioned fine but also, in definite conditions, the limitation of liberty and suspended detention. In practice, the threat of imprisonment was used very often, the total proportion of the three above measures becoming stabilized, after an initial growth, at about 20–25% of decisions which mainly resulted from excessive imposition of fines with a substitute penalty of detention. Most importantly, though, that threat was realized with respect to every fifth or sixth person in that group. As a result, the average of 20–25 thousand persons a year were imprisoned despite the fact that a measure not involving deprivation of liberty had originally been applied to them. A paradoxical situation arose where persons sentenced to the principal penalty of detention constituted a small percentage of those imprisoned by force of decisions of the transgression boards, while most served a substitute penalty due to a failure in the execution of the previously applied non-custodial measure. Still another expression of the growing repressiveness of penal policy was the greater and greater involved in the most frequently imposed penalty of fines in both of its forms: due to amendments of the Transgressions Code, the amound of fine went up a quicker pace than the average wages in socialized economy during most of the 1980s. A statutory solution concerning transgression that was most vehemently critized by the doctrine was the most limited judicial supervision over  decisions of the transgression boards. The appel instance were boards of  the second instance; only decisions imposing detention and limitation of liberty could be appealed against to the court. Thus judicial supervision concerned neither the substitute penalties which involved deprivation of liberty nor the most acute ban on driving motor vehicles. Meanwhile as shown by experimental findings, 6–15% of persons punished by the boards were acquitted by the court to which they complained, and a non-isolation measure was  substituted for deprivation of  liberty in over one-third of the cases. This shows that courts saw decisions of the boards not only as essentially defective but also as excessively repressive. This latter conclusion is rather symptomatic the fact considered that penal policy pursued by courts with respect to offenders was sewere, too. What has also to be stressed when characterizing the decisions in cases of transgressions is the frequent use of the statutory possibility of deciding in expedited proceedings and proceedings  by writ of payment. From the viewpoint of rational penal policy, that tendency deserves to be criticized as protection of the defendant’s basic processual guaranties suffers statutory limitation in those modes of procedure, and the speed and simplification of proceedings affect the individualization of punishment. Also of importance was the fact that the frequent decisions in expedited proceedings served as a specific form of aggravation of represion since – as shown by research findings – the penalties imposed in that mode were more severe than in the ordinary proceedings. Analysis of the evolution of decisions of the transgression boards has led to the conclusion that throughout the period under analysis, penal policy was regularly aggravated which was largely influenced by punitive instructions of the Minister of Internal Affairs. The only periods of mitigation of penalties were  the years 1981 and 1989: this resulted mainly from social conflicts and public opinion pressure on reduction of repressiveness of the penal system. For this reason, the 1989 amendment of the Transgression Code, forced by systemic changes, which deprived the Minister of Internal Affairs of his original control over decisions of the transgression boards and submitted all of those decisions to judical review brings the hope for liberalization and rationalization of penal policy in cases of transgressions.
EN
The article is a result of file examination and attempts to characterise acts related to trading in influence and their criminal evaluation formulated by the courts of law in their final sentences. The empirical basis of the research are 123 criminal proceedings which resulted in valid sentences concerning passive and active trading in influence (articles 230 , and article 231 of Polish Criminal Code ). Analysed proceedings were from across the country and were decided between 1 January 2004 and 1 November 2006. The research investigated not only the court files but also public prosecution files. No files on cases discontinued or dismissed under articles providing for the indemnity of the perpetrator who informs of the crime (article 17 of Criminal Proceeding Code under article 230a of the CC) were included. The file material contained predominantly cases of passive trading in influence (article 230 of CC) consisting in, to put it simply, an obligation to take care of a matter in a public institution in return for a bribe or a promise to do so. 92 such cases were reported, 109 persons trading in influence were accused. As a result of court decisions, 78 persons were found guilty, 5 acquitted, one found partially guilty (cleared of one charge but guilty of another), and 8 cases were dismissed on conditions. Cases of active trading in influence (article 230a of CC), that is the practice of paying for someone’s influence, were much less frequent. The files included only 31 such cases, with 57 accused for paying for trading in influence. 28 cases resulted in convictions and three were dismissed on conditions. Acquittals did not occur in this group of cases. Two basic areas of study were assumed. First, a case analysis of a corruption deed of trading in influence allowed to obtain the information necessary for drafting a profile of typical perpetrators, to identify their approach (pleading guilty/not guilty) and for drafting a profile of the act of corruption itself. The latter included investigation of the means of corruption, the initiator of the corruption proposal, a catalogue of matters (contract, document, permission etc.) to be paid for, and institutions whose operation was to be interfered by trading in influence. Corruption act profile included also an attempt to investigate the promised influence (own, third parties’, actual, fictitious) and its source (family, friends, acquaintances, co-workers, other) which the passive perpetrators referred to and which the active perpetrators sought. Second, the study analysed application of provisions defining the features of the crime (articles 230 and 230a of CC). The analysis included the practice of applying the said provisions by the prosecution and the courts, as they were obliged to interpret a deed for the purpose of proceedings in legal terms and to qualify it according to provisions of law. Legitimacy of deed qualification was evaluated, particularly by the courts in their valid final verdicts.
PL
Przedmiotem rozważań artykułu jest fragment polityki karnej państwa obejmujący działalność sądów w celu przeciwdziałania i ograniczania przestępczości w drodze stosowania przepisów prawa karnego wobec cudzoziemców przebywających w Polsce. W szczególności poruszane jest zagadnienie polityki wymierzania kar i środków karnych cudzoziemcom, którzy dopuścili się czynów zabronionych przez polskie prawo karne i trafili do systemu formalnej kontroli społecznej. Celem analizy jest ustalenie, w jaki sposób na przestrzeni lat 2004-2012 kształtowała się polityka sądowego wymiaru kary cudzoziemcom, jakie kary i środki karne były wobec nich najczęściej stosowane w odpowiedzi na popełnienie poszczególnych rodzajów przestępstw oraz sprawdzenie czy, a jeśli tak, to w jakim kierunku i zakresie, polityka ta odbiega od polityki karnej stosowanej wobec polskich obywateli.
PL
W niniejszym opracowaniu przedstawiono wpływ procesu motywacyjnego sprawców zabójstw na ich odpowiedzialność karną. Na podstawie badanych spraw można stwierdzić, iż zabójstwa homoseksualne dokonywane są przede wszystkim na skutek określonej sytuacji faktycznej, w której niepoślednią rolę odgrywa ofi ara, dążąc do zaspokojenia popędu seksualnego wbrew woli sprawcy lub posiada dobra materialne pożądane przez sprawcę. Z reguły są to zabójstwa nieplanowane popełnione pod wpływem nagle powstałego zamiaru, w wyniku pewnej zaskakującej sytuacji kryzysowej, wyzwalającej gwałtowane reakcje emocjonalne. Najczęściej swoje wyjaśnienia zmieniali sprawcy zabójstw na tle ekonomicznym. Natomiast większość sprawców zabójstw z motywów emocjonalnych podtrzymywała swoje wyjaśnienia do końca. W wielu wypadkach pojawiło się u nich głębokie poczucie winy i żal z powodu zaistniałej zbrodni, co niewątpliwie mogło ułatwić i ukierunkować proces przyszłych oddziaływań resocjalizacyjnych. Niejednokrotnie podawane w wyjaśnieniach elementy procesu motywacyjnego były brane pod uwagę jako okoliczności łagodzące przy wymiarze kary. Przykładowo: ustalenie faktu znęcania się nad przyszłym sprawcą (partnerem homoseksualnym), szantażu lub jego zgwałcenia przez ofi arę, z reguły wpływało na złagodzenie wymiaru kary. Dowodem tego może być różnica średniej wysokości wymiaru kary pozbawienia wolności dla sprawców zabójstw z motywów emocjonalnych (10,3 lata) w stosunku do sprawców zabójstw z motywów racjonalnych, w większości ekonomicznych (17,1 lat). Na podstawie prowadzonych badań można uznać, iż polimotywacyjność jest w zasadzie cechą dystynktywną zabójstw homoseksualnych. Oprócz motywów wiodących (pierwotnych i wtórnych), które spowodowały u sprawcy powstanie i realizację zamiaru dokonania zabójstwa, można było wyróżnić również motywy uboczne, tj. zachowania następcze związane integralnie z motywem wiodącym bądź mające charakter dodatkowego bodźca, któremu sprawca uległ w chwili popełnienia lub bezpośrednio po popełnieniu czynu, np. sprawca korzystając z okazji dokonuje kradzieży mienia. Sprawcy zabójstw popełnionych z motywów emocjonalnych tłumaczyli swoje zachowanie przede wszystkim zawinioną postawą ofi ary i związanym z tym własnym zdenerwowaniem, szokiem, wściekłością, furią, wzburzeniem, które wywołały agresję o podłożu fizjologicznym. Następowało więc znane wiktymologii typowe „odrzucenie ofi ary”, gdyż, mimo że przyznali się do popełnienia czynu, a nawet żałowali swego postępku, to jednak przeważało zapatrywanie, iż ofiara zasłużyła sobie na takie potraktowanie, z uwagi na swoje karygodne zachowanie. Było to typowe usprawiedliwianie swego czynu opierające się na deprecjacji i dewaloryzacji ofi ary oraz poczuciu krzywdy jako aktu sprawiedliwości pozwalającego uniknąć winy w aspekcie moralnym. W literaturze zagranicznej podkreśla się, iż w obronie sprawców zabójstw homoseksualnych wykorzystuje się argumenty tzw. paniki homoseksualnej. Jest to forma obrony opierająca się na przesłance obrony koniecznej, polegająca na przerzuceniu winy na ofi arę. Jeżeli się powiedzie, wówczas ogranicza odpowiedzialność karną oskarżonego do zarzutu nieumyślnego spowodowania śmierci. Wydaje się, że nie ma powodów, aby przyjmować, iż w Polskim systemie prawnym w nadmierny sposób jest wykorzystywana obrona oparta na tzw. panice homoseksualnej, a jej uwzględnienie jest związane z homofobią występującą w wymiarze sprawiedliwości. Dowodem tego mogą być zabójstwa, gdzie sąd nie uznał wyjaśnień oskarżonego i przyjął ekonomiczny motyw popełnienia czynu, względnie uznał polimotywacyjność, przyjmując motywy racjonalne za wiodące lub równorzędne. Orzeczone w tych sprawach wysokie kary pozbawienia wolności dowodzą, iż sąd nie wziął pod uwagę powoływania się sprawcy na motywy emocjonalne oraz m.in. na tzw. panikę homoseksualną.
EN
The negative effects of hate crimes and the threats resulting from these acts justify the need to take effective actions to counter them and eliminate all their manifestations from society. The source literature notes the necessity to intensify efforts leading to more efficient detection, prosecution and penalisation of these crimes. In her article, Patrycja Kozłowska concentrates on the examination of the criminal policy in cases of hate crimes committed in Poland in 2008–2020. Selected court statistical data illustrating the number of convictions for hate crimes, the types of criminal penalties imposed on their perpetrators as well as the length of sentenced penalties of absolute deprivation of liberty have been analysed. Kozłowska also makes an attempt to capture differences in judicial practice becoming evident in the period under scrutiny.
PL
Negatywne skutki przestępstw z nienawiści oraz wynikające z nich zagrożenia uzasadniają potrzebę podjęcia skutecznych działań w celu przeciwdziałania im i eliminowania wszelkich ich przejawów z życia społecznego. W literaturze przedmiotu zwraca się uwagę na konieczność zintensyfikowania wysiłków, zmierzających do lepszego wykrywania, ścigania i karania sprawców tych przestępstw. Niniejszy artykuł został więc poświęcony zbadaniu, jak w latach 2008–2020 wyglądała realizacja polityki karnej w sprawach o przestępstwa z nienawiści w Polsce. Analizie poddano wybrane statystyki sądowe obrazujące liczbę skazań za przestępstwa z nienawiści, a także rodzaje kar kryminalnych orzekanych w odpowiedzi na ich popełnienie i wymiary bezwzględnej kary pozbawienia wolności. W tekście podjęto próbę uchwycenia różnic występujących w praktyce orzeczniczej sądów w analizowanym okresie.
EN
Rapid increases in imprisonment rates and the adoption of severe penal policies in some countries have, in recent years, prompted a burgeoning scholarly literature on the determinants of penal policy. However, much of this literature may be asking the wrong question. The authors typically focussed on the causes of harsher penal policies and offered explanations. However, it seems more reasonable to ask what recent changes in penal policy tell us about the country itself. The paper shows that crossnational differences in penal policy tell us important things about differences in penal culture, and that decisive changes in penal culture may both indicate and portend major, and sometimes regrettable, changes in larger political cultures. The paper has been divided into three sections, each addressing a separate question. The first considers the reasons for penal policies in Britain, Australia, the U.S., and elsewhere becoming harsher over the final three decades of the twentieth century. The short answer is that the question is based on a false premise. Only in some places did penal policies become harsher and in importantly different ways. The assumption that penal policies everywhere tightened over that period is wrong. The second addresses the questions of why penal policies in particular countries did and did not become more severe. A wide range of explanations are available. They range from national differences in constitutional arrangements, the organisation of criminal justice systems, the nature of the mass media, and the nature of national politics to fortuities of personality and event. The key points, however, are that, at day's end, policies are chosen and choices have consequences. The third question is why policy choices matter. One answer, of course, is that they matter because they affect what happens to individual human beings. Another important reason why they matter is that policies adopted and implemented sometimes change the world and sometimes change the ways people think. Repressive policies, rationalised and justified, and in due course followed, desensitise us to the reasons why at the outset they appeared to be repressive and make it easier, when new controversial issues about crime control policies arise, to adopt even more repressive policies. America, over the past 30 years, England for the past 15 years, and other countries for different periods, have through their changes in penal policies changed their penal cultures in ways that portend ill for the future.
EN
  The paper describes and appraises the policy of prosecution and punishment in cases of transgressions in the years 1990‒1994, i.e. after the systemic transformations in Poland. It is a continuation of a study of penal policy carried out while the former Code of Transgressions was still in force; the aim now is to draw a comparison between the old and new tendencies in the practice of prosecution and punishment. The comparison, however, encounters specific difficulties. The first reason for this is that a full judicial control over decisions of transgression boards was introduced and the boards were submitted to the Ministry of Justice supervision. The second reason is that the statistical data gathered now by that department are much scantier as compared to those formerly gathered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs while the transgression boards were still subordinated to it. In the seventies, a systematic aggravation of the penal policy took place. Admittedly, that policy was then temporarily mitigated with the birth of Solidarity; yet after the imposition of martial law in 1982, followed by the passing of the 1985 act, penal policy once again grew repressive, this time much more so. Then, at the close of the past decade, as a result of social pressure, penal policy was quite distinctly liberalized. To show the transformations of that policy in the nineties, it has usually been compared to the tendencies found in both a “repressive” year of 1987 and a “liberal” one of 1988. As follows from analysis of the prosecution policy measured by the number of motions for punishment submitted to transgression boards, the number of such motions was greatly reduced in the years 1990-1994 as compared to preceding decades. The fact considered that recorded crime went up distinctly in that period, as probably did also the number of petty infringements of the law – that is, transgressions – this reduction can be interpreted as a limitation of the scope of prosecution with respect to such acts. On the one hand, this resulted from a lowered activity of the police, on the other hand – from the force’s aim towards improving their image in society. A similar trend could be found in the case of police orders the number of which was also reduced. Characteristically, the average fine imposed by police order amounted to not even a half of the statutory upper limit. This notwithstanding, a draft amendment of the code of transgressions was published in the Spring of 1994 which suggested that the limit be raised tenfold; the draft also provided for an identical raise in the upper limit of fine as a main penalty, This solution was sharply criticized by the present author as its actual implanentation would result in a general aggravation of economic repression. The structure of transgressions for which the boards imposed punishment in the nineties underwent a rather significant change: the number of persons brought before the boards for traffic transgressions went up considerably (to about 70%) while that of persons guilty of disturbance of public order went down. This latter trend should be seen as advantageous since the formerly mass-scale prosecution of perpetrators of such acts, most of them alcohol dependent, was generally considered futile. Also liberalized was the structure of penal measures imposed on all perpetrators of transgressions. Admittedly, fine remained the prevalent response (about 95% of decisions); yet the proportion of the strictest measures (arrest and limitation of liberty) went down distinctly, and that of the most lenient ones (reprimand and renouncement of inflicting punishment) went up. The fact considered that the penalty of arrest was limited to the minimum and imposed chiefly on persons guilty of the acts that are to be classified as offenses under the draft of the Penal Code, the proposed preservation of that penalty in the future Code of Transgressions cannot be praised. This same conclusion is also true for conditional suspention the execution of arrest which is nearly a dead institution in practice. As clearly follows from statistical data used in the present analysis, changes in the structure of penal measures imposed reflected a mitigation of penal policy. Instead, no data are gathered as to the severity load of those measures. This situation is bound to provoke criticism, chiefly because of the lack of data on the amounts of fines. Fines being the most frequently imposed measures, their amounts constitute the basic index of punitiveness of the boards’ decisions. The fact considered that the statutory amount of fine was last raised in 1992 while nominal wages showed a regular upwards trend, the conclusion is justified that we in fact dealt with what was perhaps an unintended mitigation of the actual severity of economic repression. As follows from the principles of rational penal policy, the provions legal in force have to be to be amended. Due, however, to pauperization of society, the raise in the maximum statutory fine cannot be as drastic as suggested in the above-mentioned draft amendment of 1994. This might well lead to revival of the once pursued practice of using fines as an instrument of adding to the budget. The statistical data under analysis also provide no information on the imposition of additional penal measures, the sole exception being prohibition of operating motor driven vehicles. All that can be observed is a very serious growth in the proportion of this latter penalty which was due to a mass prosecution of perpetrators of petty traffic offenses. Characteristically, though, the incidence of imposition of this measure on such persons (those additionally guilty of drunken driving included) has been on a regular decrease. Also astonishing is the fact that despite the introduction of judicial review of the boards’ decisions (which had been postulated for many decades by the scientific circles), no statistical data are gathered showing the extent to which penal policy pursued by those boards is actually corrected by courts. Admittedly, it follows from the findings of the solo relevant research project conducted in the nineties that today as in the past, courts usually tend to reduce the penalties imposed by transgression boards (the penalty of prohibition of operating motor driven vehicles in particular). What remains unknown, though, is both the general number of persons who demand that their cases be examined by courts and the actual decisions of those courts. Although penal policy in cases of transgressions grew slightly more severe in 1990‒1994, its present liberalization as compared to the two preceding decades is generally seen as favorable. What probably accounts for this liberalization is the exclusion of transgression boards from under the supervision of Ministry of Internal Affairs and the resulting deprivation of the head of that particular Ministry of the right to issue instructions as to the sentencing policy which invariably increased its punitiveness. Thus an instrument of pressure was abolished which limited the discretion of members of transgression boards. This shows that respect for the independence of those appointed to apply tbe law may result in a reduction of repressiveness even with no legislative changes in the system of penal measures. This is not to say, though, that – still  based on rigorous provisions as it is – the system does not require a possibly prompt amendment.
EN
This report devoted to presenting the probation system in Poland together with the duties performed by probation officers is made up of two chapters. In the first chapter all primary legal acts regulating the institutions of the probation officers were discussed, also with the functions they perform in the system of criminal justice. In the second chapter, results of research conducted in all court districts in Poland in 2002 were presented. Both, the analysis of legal regulations, as well as the research, have been conducted after the implementation of the basic reform in Poland, yet there is still a lot to be done organisation wise, i.e. enlarging the number of probation officers, improving their essential preparation as well as implementing modem and effective forms of activity.       In the first chapter, where the legal bases of probation officers are discussed, the most important legal acts were mentioned first. Their number is quite substantial, since in the nine laws there are regulations concerning the socio-legal status and duties of probation officers. In order to indicate the most significant of them the following cannot be omitted:       The Penal Code of 1997 which regulated matters concerned with probation officers performing a number of supervisory forms (including probation);       The Executive Penal Code of 1997 by means of which piobation officers were given a rank of one of the important organs responsible for executing punishments and means of punishment. These tasks have been extended in order to grant the probation officers: executing the punishment of restriction of liberty and substitutive penalty ‒ community service, and also certain duties have been precised concerned with executing the punishment of deprivation of liberty and providing the post penitentiary help.        The law on the organisation of law courts (dated from 2001) in which only few articles are devoted to probation. They are, however, immensely important because they helped to precise this system, constituting that probation officers are an autonomous organ operating within the judiciary system, meaning by that regional and district courts, towards which presidents of the law courts and judges occupy supervisory and controlling positions. Simultaneously, the professional and social character of the probation officer has been confirmed in that law.       Another very important legal act is the law of 1982 on the procedures in juvenile cases (with later changes, especially with a very thorough amendment of 2000) which regulates the use of probation (family courts) in cases of defining the supervisory methods or reformative for the juveniles.       Amongst the discussed laws one, from 2001, about the probation officers is of a special significance. This law has almost a pioneer character. It has been created by the Polish Parliament from the initiative of probation officers and with their considerable participation. While enacted from the beginning of 2002, it has normalised in a complex way the socio-professional status of probation officers and precisely settled the location, organisation and the duties ofthe probation service in the judiciary system.         In this report laws and obligations of probation officers have been discussed, together with their calling and prospects for promotion, as well as competence connected with performing duties foreseen in the law of probation officers, and other laws, especially in the Penal Code, the Executive Penal Code, Code of Penal Procedure and in the Civil Code.        The bills conceming the probation service and the persons of probation officers, are an additional documentation to the executive acts, to the regulations and orders of the court. In example we can mention one of the most significant regulations, created by the Minister of Justice in 2003, in matter of a detailed executing of the authorities and obligations of probation officers.        In the second chapter the activity of probation officers in 2002 has been presented, in the light of the research results. They were conducted by sending a questionnaire to all 40 court regions (all together 150 questionnaires, part of which has been filled in in groups). It needs to be stressed at this point that amongst the questions none of the issues which could be called stressful were taken up. The research included 50 different issues, amongst which the following should be discussed: - kinds and number of performed interviews by the probation officers during the time of criminal proceedings and later of executing, - executing of measures to examine a convicted offender in case of conditional discontinuance of legal penal proceedings, a conditional suspension of penalty execution, a conditional release from serving the full sentence, - the content of adjudged and executed guardianship, in other words what is the character of probation officers’ contacts and work with persons under their ward, - ęxecuting of penalty of imprisonment and community service, - activity in the area of executing the penalty of imprisonment, - the difficulties in the work of probation officers, - opinions of probation officers concerned with cooperation with social workers as well as in reference to the significance of specific purposes of penalty.        It is difficurt to summarise the research results. Therefore, only for the purpose of a small illustration, the following conclusions can be  mentioned: - probation officers' opinion about their insufficient number (there is about 2000 professional probation officers for adults) in order to be effective in the assigned roles, - the legal system seems to have achieved a desired state, - supervisions performed by probation officers do not comply with all the obligatory (i.e.- caring - job finding); however, the controlling functions over the sentenced under supervision seem to be accepted as satisfactory.
EN
The paper focuses on penal policy, or to be more accurate, on its part related to “the operation of the courts of law with a view to preventing and reducing the crime rate through the application of criminal law,”1 though with regard to a selected group only, i.e. foreign nationals who reside in Poland. In very simple terms, it addresses the policy of punishments and punitive measures pursued with respect to foreign nationals who have committed offences expressly prohibited by Polish criminal law, and were subsequently embraced by a formal system of social supervision. The studies at issue were conducted on the basis of statistical data collected by the Ministry of Justice. They comprise information on the kinds of punishment and punitive measures applied to foreign nationals for committing respective types of criminal offences, as revealed and discovered by Polish justice system throughout the country, in the period spanning 2004–2012. It appears that an 8-year period of scrutiny regarding the application of penal policy to foreign nationals allows for the identification of all attendant key trends, as well as any portents of forthcoming changes. An appraisal of the structure of criminal offences committed by foreign nationals reveals that they fall most frequently (87% in total) within 5 key categories, i.e. 21% of convictions against the credibility of documents, 20% against public order, 18% against the safety of transportation, 15% fraud, 13% against property. Criminal offences falling within the scope of other legislative constraints that serve as the conviction basis against foreign nationals are encountered much less frequently and comprise primarily offences against: human life and health, the justice system, family and family care, sexual freedom, public security, environment, commercial endeavours, and against the Republic of Poland. There are also criminal offences whose characteristics fall within the scope of other legal classifications than those comprised in Polish Criminal Code, usually the following ones: the Polish Fiscal Penal Code of September 10, 1999 (Journal of Laws of 1999, No. 83, Item. 930), the Promotion of Sobriety and Prevention of Alcohol Abuse Act of October 26, 1982 (Journal of Laws of 1982, No. 35, Item. 230), the Health Protection Against the Consequences of Consumption of Tobacco and Tobacco Products Act of November 9, 1995 (Journal of Laws of 1996, No 10, Item 55), and finally, the Industrial Property Act of June 30, 2000 (Journal of Laws of 2001, No. 49, Item 508). The current policy of criminal convictions against foreign nationals does not substantially differ from the general trends in Polish penal policy. By far, most frequently the courts of law opt for a term of imprisonment with conditional suspension of its execution as a penal measure. The next option in line comprises a fine, and then comes an immediate custodial sentence, occasionally a restriction of personal liberty.2 It is clear that the key category of criminal offences for which foreign nationals ended up in Polish prisons were offences against property. In this particular category, most offenders had been convicted in pursuance of the provisions of Article 278 § 1, Polish Penal Code (theft), Article 279 §1, Polish Penal Code (burglary with forced entry), and Article 280 §1, Polish Penal Code (aggravated theft). The legislation in place provides for an opportunity to apply a diversity of punitive measures apart from the penalty itself, also as probation measures, or as preventive measures. The legislators clearly aimed for generally increasing the role and overall significance of punitive measures within the penal policy, although an overall body of convictions meted out against foreign nationals over the years 2004–2012 in Poland demonstrates that the courts of law were not particularly forthcoming in this respect, rather seldom ordering punitive measures against the perpetrators, and if so, they would usually reach out for the option of ordering fines and a driving ban, or a forfeiture of property. Statistical data taking into account the lawfully convicted foreign nationals, stratified by a specific type of criminal offence, gender, and punishment meted out for the principal offence, reveal that in 2005 there was a significant reduction in the number of punitive measures ordered by the courts. In fact, compared with 2004, their number decreased fivefold, and remained approximately at the same level throughout the following four years, whereas in 2010, a penal measure was ordered only once, none in 2011, and in 2012 – twice. The sentencing and penal measures policy pursued by the Polish courts, as addressed in the present study, was assessed not only at the level of statistical data made available by the Ministry of Justice, but also through meticulous research conducted on the court’s case files pertaining to foreign nationals whose cases had lawfully been closed, randomly sampled. Both the sampling methodology applied and the number of the records brought under study makes the results of this research project fully representative. Examination of the court’s case files yielded the results fully consistent with the results obtained on the basis of the statistical data obtained from the ministerial records, including in terms of the actual application of the penal policy against foreign nationals committing criminal offences in Poland, although certain exceptions were encountered with regard to the policies applied to the perpetrators of specific types of criminal offences. On the other hand, though, those seem to have much more in common with a particular type and nature of the offence itself, rather than the fact that it was committed by a foreign national. The conclusions drawn from the statistical data under study, as supplemented by a detailed appraisal of the court records, give sufficient grounds to believe that in its essence, the penal policy applied to foreign nationals residing in Poland does not differ from that applied in Poland at large.
PL
Theft is one of the oldest and clearly condemned crime in history. It takes a significant part in the crime structure in Poland. Nevertheless, it seems to be a forgotten and uninteresting subject among modern criminological research. In public opinion, theft invariably causes indignation, and the way of punishing thieves is a field of interest for both public opinion and politicians. In  Poland,  theft  is  an  offence  that  can  either  be  prosecuted  as  a  misdemeanor  or  a  crime - it depends on the value of the property stolen. Therefore, legal penalties for crime related to theft may vary considerably. It is precisely this line between misdemeanor and crime that is cur- rently being discussed in Poland. To talk about changes concerning the punishment of thieves, one should first check what is the current state of the criminal policy in this regard. Therefore, I want to present the results of the research, which I carried out at the Institute of Justice in 2017. I examined randomly selected court files of two above mention categories of theft, which ended validly and in which the enforcement proceedings ended in 2016. The research was conducted on 420 cases (including 233 misdemeanor and 187 crime cases). On the basis of the collected material emerges the image of the criminal policy against thieves who stood before the court, which gives the opportunity to consider whether and what changes in the law can be predicted against the perpetrators of the simple theft. Kradzież jest jednym z najstarszych przestępstw znanych w historii. Przy ogólnej tendencji spadku ilości popełnianych przestępstw, kradzieże wciąż stanowią znaczący udział w strukturze polskiej przestępczości. W Polsce kradzież jest czynem, który może być ścigany jako wykroczenie lub jako przestępstwo – zależy to od wartości skradzionej własności. W związku z tym, kary za kradzież mogą się znacznie różnić. Sposób i wysokość tzw. „przepołowienia” kradzieży, czyli granicy od której będzie traktowana jako przestępstwo (i co za tym idzie surowiej karana), jest obecnie przedmiotem dyskusji w Polsce. Aby sprawdzić jak w rzeczywistości wygląda struktura orzekanych kar i za jakie wartości skradzionego mienia sprawcy byli pociągani do odpowiedzialności, przestawiam wyniki badania, które przeprowadziłam w Instytucie Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości w 2017 roku. Przedmiotem analizy były losowo wybrane akta sądowe 420 spraw (w tym 233 spraw wykroczeń i 187 spraw przestępstw), które zakończyły się prawomocnie i w których postępowanie wykonawcze zakończyło się w 2016 r. Na podstawie zebranego materiału wyłania się obraz polityki karnej przeciwko sprawcom kradzieży, którzy stanęli przed polskimi sądami. Artykuł jest rozszerzoną i zmodyfkowaną wersją referatu wygłoszonego na XVIII Konferencji Europejskiego Towarzystwa Kryminologicznego w Sarajewie, która odbyła się w dniach 29 sierpnia 2018 r. - 1 września 2018 r.
EN
Theft is one of the oldest and clearly condemned crime in history. It takes a significant part in the crime structure in Poland. Nevertheless, it seems to be a forgotten and uninteresting subject among modern criminological research. In public opinion, theft invariably causes indignation, and the way of punishing thieves is a field of interest for both public opinion and politicians. In  Poland,  theft  is  an  offence  that  can  either  be  prosecuted  as  a  misdemeanor  or  a  crime - it depends on the value of the property stolen. Therefore, legal penalties for crime related to theft may vary considerably. It is precisely this line between misdemeanor and crime that is cur- rently being discussed in Poland. To talk about changes concerning the punishment of thieves, one should first check what is the current state of the criminal policy in this regard. Therefore, I want to present the results of the research, which I carried out at the Institute of Justice in 2017. I examined randomly selected court files of two above mention categories of theft, which ended validly and in which the enforcement proceedings ended in 2016. The research was conducted on 420 cases (including 233 misdemeanor and 187 crime cases). On the basis of the collected material emerges the image of the criminal policy against thieves who stood before the court, which gives the opportunity to consider whether and what changes in the law can be predicted against the perpetrators of the simple theft.
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