Search results - CEJSH

1

Symbolická reprezentace jako způsob porozumění současné politice

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Kňapová K.

Politologická revue (Czech Political Science Review)

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2019

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issue 1

55-73

EN

The aim of this article is to introduce the concept of symbolic representation into a discussion about contemporary politics. Politics these days is transforming and departing from what we were used to in past decades. These changes naturally influence the way how we understand representation these days. The bond between those who represent and those who are represented is becoming vaguer and based more on the current articulation of this bond than pre-existing political identities. Use of the concept of symbolic representation and the more important concept of the representative claim introduced by Michael Saward will be illustrated on the discourse of Tomio Okamura and his Freedom and Direct Democracy Party.

2

Pomiędzy ludem a ludnością. Analiza kategorii populizmu w ujęciu Ernesta Laclaua

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Kozak P.

Nowa Krytyka

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2012

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issue 28

139-155

EN

This paper discusses the signifi cance of a notion of “populism” for social philosophy based on the work of Ernesto Laclau. The fi rst part of the essay presents the background of Laclau’s theory, i.e. the studies of Le Bon, Gabriel Tarde, William McDougall and Sigmund Freud – their relations to the social practice and their theoretical consequences. The second part deals with the theory of populism of Ernesto Laclau. In accordance with the conception of Laclau, populism is described as a logic of the political. The last part takes into consideration the context of Laclau’s conception and asks if and how we can use “populism” as a descriptive category and not as the normative one. The thesis of the paper is that Laclau’s theory is useful for describing the politics and social movements in Poland in last fi ve years.

3

Some thoughts about the interplay between welfare attitudes and populism

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Saxonberg S., Sirovátka T.

Problemy Polityki Społecznej. Studia i Dyskusje

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2020

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vol. 48

27-40

EN

This article argues for setting a research agenda to investigate more concretely the interplay between welfare attitudes and support for populist parties. It notes that although much has been written about populism, much less has been written about the interplay between populism and welfare attitudes. In addition, populism has tended to concentrate on rightwing populism while devoting less attention to leftwing populism. Meanwhile, centrist populist parties have been has been even more neglected than leftwing populism. We need to develop a more nuanced view and conduct comparative analyses of the differences in welfare attitudes among leftwing, centrist and rightwing populist voters. Our article also notes that the current databases that have both voting and welfare attitudes often do not include the countries with the most important leftwing populist parties. Another problem is the need to take into account the country context. For example, Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece and Smer in Slovakia are all three normally considered to be leftwing populist parties, but only Smer has promoted an anti-immigrant and anti-Roma agenda.

4

Elites vs the people: populism in the political thought of Law and Justice

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Lewandowski A., Polakowski M.

Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio K – Politologia

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2018

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vol. 25

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issue 2

EN

The purpose of this paper was to specify what is the share of narrowly understood micro-ideology in the political thought of Law and Justice. Embarking on the analysis of the above-stated problem, we first and foremost fixed particular methodological assumption. As a point of departure for our analysis we adopted the conception of the ideological morphology by Michael Freeden. In line with it, we assumed that ideologies are not fully distinct entities but they interact with one another. They are also partly overlapping and thus they share some contiguous points. In accordance with the concept of populism, as worked out within our framework, we focused our attention on the problematics of elites and the people. As conceived of by Law and Justice, elites did not discharge their duties, alienating themselves from the society and caring mainly about their own socio-economic interest. Furthermore, the critique of elites was mainly related to their non-democratic genesis and artificially created putative “super-expertise”.Eventually, we proved that populism may be regarded as one of the phenomena characterizing the political thought of Law and Justice.

5

Populism and its perils: language and politics

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Skidmore M. J.

Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio K – Politologia

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2015

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vol. 22

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issue 1

EN

Populism appeals to the masses, and against elites. To the extent that any successful democracy must respond to popular desires, democracies must incorporate some elements of populism. Nevertheless, for continued success a democratic polity also must ensure widespread education, including a concern for language and the ability to analyze and resist “mind manipulators”.

6

A world threatened by populism. Remarks on security in modern times

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Czura T.

Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Finansów i Prawa w Bielsku-Białej

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2020

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issue 1

31-34

EN

The article is an attempt to answer the question about the importance of populism in contemporary reflection on security in its broadest sense. The author of these analyses tries to find the reasons for the growing populist trend, which occurs not only in the political dimension, but permeates almost all social life. In the context of such a goal, the connection between populism and ideology and nihilism is shown. As a consequence of the methodological principles adopted, two types of populism were distinguished: ideological and nihilistic. Ideological populism is characterized by a high degree of indeterminacy and makes far-reaching simplifications and generalisations. In this perspective, the enemies of the people are both newcomers, strangers, immigrants, as well as sexual, ethnic and other minorities.Nihilist populism is more depressing. It is based on the recognition of fragmentation as a basic indicator of values. The individual, detached from the wider background, is in a way the programme of populism understood in this way. A simple consequence of nihilistic populism is the uprooting of the individual, which results in consumerist attitudes. In this sense, one can say that nihilistic populism is aimed at justifying consumptionism, i.e. it provides an ideological foundation for the carefree use of material goods.

7

Populizm Ruchu Palikota

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Wasiuta M.

Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne

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2015

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vol. 45

157-175

EN

This article deals with the Ruch Palikota political party, which has gained enough support in 2011 elections in Poland to be represented in Polish chamber of deputies – Sejm. One of the main opinions in media and within politicians is that Ruch Palikota (RP) is a populist party. This article attempts to examine the argument that the RP is not a populist party. A basic conception of populism is a description made by Roman Tokarczyk and Maria Marczewska-Rytko.

8

The Symbolism of Populism

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Taranu A.

Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne

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2015

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vol. 48

64-75

PL

Ogromna większość artykułów dotyczących populizmu opisuje to polityczne zjawisko jako trudne do wyjaśnienia i analizy ze względu na jego dyskursywną różnorodność i behawioralny „kameleonizm”. Co więcej, twierdzę, że termin „populizm” opisuje większą liczbę politycznych i społecznych faktów, niż pojedynczy termin jest w stanie pomieścić w swej objętości semantycznej. Skupiam się głównie na psychologicznych źródłach populizmu, które mogą być obserwowane w symbolicznej sferze polityki. W tej perspektywie postrzegam polityczny symbolizm, będący częścią teorii behawiorystycznej, jako lepsze narzędzie służące ujawnianiu dyskursu populistycznego niż zwykłe techniki analizy politycznej.

EN

The vast majority of the papers on populism describe this political phenomenon as one which is very difficult to explain and to analyze due to its discursive versatility and behavioural chameleonism. Furthermore, I would argue that the term populism covers more political and social realities than one single term would normally concentrate from a semantic point of view. I focus more over the psychological roots of populism which can be observed in the political symbolic field. In that manner, I consider that political symbolic, as part of the behavioural theory, can be a better tool for unveiling the populist discourse than the usual techniques of political analysis.

9

European Identity and Populism

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Szatlach M. E.

Polish Political Science Yearbook

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2007

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vol. 36

69-90

EN

Identity as a theoretical concept in social sciences has evolved from a status of derivative importance into an essential and autonomous notion performing at present an important role that explains some processes of the contemporary world. According to Renata Dopierała, generally identity can be defined as a reflective attitude of an individual to himself, created by the necessity of self-characteristic building a system of ideas, opinions, convictions, etc., that corresponds with the given social context. However, the answer to the question: What is identity?, is not so obvious as some can expect. The relationship between identity, interests, preferences, and loyalty is also not so clear. Shortly speaking, identity can be also perceived as a self-conception rooted in the society, our attitude and relation to others. Its integral parts are two main components: individual and social.

10

Populism and National Identity

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Ociepka B.

Polish Political Science Yearbook

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2006

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vol. 35

97-107

EN

Populism became a signi! cant factor of political debates in Eastern and Western countries of the EU and a new force in European party systems in the nineties. The frame for the discussion on populism is made by the representative form of democracy and responding to it dual system of media of communication. The popularity of populist parties and movements nowadays reflects the crisis of representative democracy. It is accompanied by the growing role of media in politics, which might be seen as the result of citizens’ dissatisfaction with the existing models of intermediation. The media also play a crucial role in the process of identity creation, at the same moment they illustrate the dificulty of defining identity anew.

11

The Unpredicted Rise of Populism: The Case of Poland

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Tomczak D. A.

Central European Economic Journal

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2023

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vol. 10

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issue 57

304-322

EN

This article investigates the rise of populism in Poland, applying an interdisciplinary method, with political, social, and economic factors as the compound reason for the turn from liberalism towards populism. The methodology of the study is the exploratory analysis of research, historical materials on Poland`s transition to capitalism, and calculation of the selected empirical data of household incomes, linked to election results, in the regional cross-section. The household economic condition was validated by a report on deprivation and the presented growth of households’disposable income, exposing regional differences between the selected voivodeships. The populist party Law and Justice (PiS) won the two last elections, with the majority of votes in low-income regions, which proved the hypothesis that economic inequality, amplified by globalisation and transition disparities were the main reasons for populism’s prevalence. The democratic backsliding has not changed party-political scenery for very long, which revealed that for the majority of Polish voters, economic upgrading counted more, despite the violation of democracy. Therefore, the advance of knowledge about measures to reduce the in-country socioeconomic disparities between regions has become more important.

12

Cultural Factors of Aggression in the Public Field

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Młodzik L.

Political Preferences

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2019

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issue 24

57-72

EN

The analysis of literature on the subject indicates the occurrence of cultural stereotypes that hinder the adaptation to the conditions of the era of an information civilization. They are of a particular importance in the public sphere. Their main feature (disadvantage) is the stimulation of aggression in social relations, the manifestations of which deform the functioning of liberal democracy. Aggression as a cultural trait comes from the fear of losing identity and from the uncertainty. The dissemination of the patterns of liberal culture and thus the displacement of the restrictive culture are the ways of counteracting the negative phenomena associated with it. The development of this problem is the subject of this text.

13

Social security as an instrument for creating populist attitudes

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Plecka D., Rutkowska P.

Political Preferences

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2016

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issue 13

115-123

EN

Societal security is undoubtedly an instrument for creating populist attitudes. This is related primarily to the quality of different democratic mechanisms and their representations affecting the political system. However, in the largest extent the merge of societal security and populism are triggered by the political elite, and the recipients of their communication - the citizens. It is related to the belief, which is increasingly affecting the public that ‘the elite should do what people order them to’ (Markowski 2004: 14). Undoubtedly, this situation creates series of consequences related primarily to the lack of political and economic civic competences. On the other hand, it may contribute to the growth of citizens’ dissatisfaction with the government actions that results in the loss of the legitimacy.

14

The Right-Wing Perspective: Populist Frames and Agenda on Facebook in Central and Eastern Europe

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Almodt R.

Central European Journal of Communication

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2022

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vol. 15

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issue 3(32)

434-463

EN

Political and public debates unfolding online provide various spaces for interaction between political actors, citizens and media outlets. This environment can be employed for diverse agendas, frames and biases, especially within populist narratives. This work examines the discourse of Central and Eastern European right-wing populists from Austria, Germany, Hungary and Poland (2015-2021). To identify discursive patterns within public Facebook posts (n=192,057) by 31 party, movement and partisan news media pages, created by API interrogation, right-wing discourse is analyzed through semi-automated quantitative content analysis based on text mining, in conjunction with qualitative content analysis of messages that generated the highest engagement-rates (n=80). Key findings indicate both national and international narrative patterns with a focus on political, social and ethnic opponents, by incorporating Engesser et al.’s (2017) core elements of right-wing populist discourse within Master Populist Frame building (Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2017), thus marking the contemporary agenda of European right-wing discourse.

15

A different kind of massive attack: How the Bulgarian Ultranationalist Party Ataka engineered its political success using electronic media

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Ibroscheva E.

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2013

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vol. 6

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issue 1(10)

51-66

EN

Th is study explores the role of media in securing the electorate success of Ataka, Bul- garia’s ultra-right-wing party, as well as their contribution to the rise of nationalistic tendencies among the Bulgarian electorate. To accomplish this, the study sets two goals: fi rst, to explore the political and socio-cultural environment which has allowed for the growth of ultra-nationalist rhetoric in Bulgaria, and second, to examine how Ataka’s media publicity machine, with a specifi c focus on their new media tactics, have contributed to securing popular support for the virtually unfettered expression of ultra-nationalistic ideas. By conducting a critical analysis of Ataka’s use of electronic media, includ- ing websites, online forums, and other social networking tools, the study analyzes the importance of electronic media to a right wing party such as Ataka, that catapulted it from complete obscurity into a political force of national importance.

16

Some remarks on the comparative experiment as a method in assessing populist political communication in Europe

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Kasprowicz D., Hess A.

Central European Journal of Communication

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2019

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vol. 12

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issue 2(23)

243-255

EN

In this paper fundamental information concerning the designing and conducting of comparative experiments, as methods which are able to be employed in the field of media studies, will be successively delineated. On the basis of the large-scale online experiment conducted in 15 countries in 2017, the assessment of the populist message impact as well as methodological challenges to such a project will be presented. We discuss challenges and lessons learnt from this type of research design.

17

Neo-nationalism as a reaction to globalisation and superstate

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Skalník P.

Studia Ethnologica Pragensia

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2023

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issue 2

27-38

EN

According to Gellner the raison d’être of nationalism is the (nation) state. This has been gradually achieved in Europe, the Americas, Asia, Africa and Oceania through the disintegration of colonial and multi-national empires. The nation-building process was accompanied and enabled by national languages. Many colonial languages remained (the Americas, most of Africa, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa before and after apartheid, and post-independence English imposed on Namibia). Ironically, English is now the main language of the EU while UK is no more a member. Iran reacted to speedy westernisation by Islamic revolution. Arab „revolutions“ are reactions to secular regimes of capitalist or socialist kinds. Basically the nation state, though many declare its demise, is a very successful invention. The present neo-nationalism is the reaction to supranational integration imposed by economic globalisation or late imperial ideological interests. The Soviet Union fell apart for various reasons but neo-nationalist states such as Ukraine, Georgia, the Baltic states or even the autonomous Tatarstan are now thriving2 . China still keeps its empire together but may eventually face nationalist explosions on its margins. The European Union is under threat of late because various neo-nationalist elites find unbearable the super-state trends and economic neoliberalism of bureaucratic cosmopolites. Nationalism is a populist doctrine by definition that was framed by democratic polities. Neo-nationalism, however, uses populism as a substitute for liberal democracy3 . The result could be closed national societies that (once again) become prone to military solutions of their differences.

18

Edukacja polonistyczna w czasach populistycznej zarazy

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Koc K.

Paidia i Literatura

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2020

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issue 2

13-34

EN

The article encourages reflection on the role of Polish language education in the face of contemporary challenges. One of them is the expansion of populism (e.g. in politics, in the media, in the way of thinking about education) and the accompanying disinformation campaigns, propaganda or replacing information analysis with emotional opinions. We are also in Poland witnessing this disturbing process, which threatens the foundations of democracy. That is why teaching a critical attitude towards theses expressed in public discourse is so important. The article shows how access to reliable information can contribute to forming such an attitude. The author also suggests that the interpretation of modern children’s literature may be used to expose populist lies, harmful simplifications, and manipulation of facts; it can also successfully support the development of mature civic awareness even among very young students. The point of reference in this case is the problem of attitude towards refugees.

19

Populist Political Movement Sme rodina – Boris Kollár (We Are a Family – Boris Kollár)

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Školkay A., Žúborová V.

Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne

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2019

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issue 4

5-26

PL

Artykuł opisuje badanie wyjaśniające dotyczące populistycznego ruchu politycznego Sme rodina – Borisa Kollára (Jesteśmy Rodziną – Boris Kollár, od listopada 2019 wyłącznie Sme rodina). W pierwszej kolejności artykuł umieszcza ruch w generalnej koncepcji sui generis rodziny partii politycznych (partia niszowa), w przeciwieństwie do niektórych klasyfikacji określających ruch jako przede wszystkim populistyczną partię protestu, koncentrującą się na niektórych kwestiach niszowych, a dopiero w drugiej kolejności jako partię przedsiębiorców. Artykuł odpowiada na pytanie dlaczego partia uważana jest za populistyczną przez licznych politycznych i niepolitycznych aktorów i analityków. Artykuł również sugeruje, że w rzeczywistości nie ma zakładanego bezpośredniego związku pomiędzy poparciem dla tej partii a pogorszeniem się poziomu życia, jak czasem jest to przedstawiane w dyskursie publicznym. Wręcz przeciwnie, artykuł sugeruje, że mogą występować silniejsze powiązania pomiędzy względnym ubóstwem, poczuciem opuszczenia przez polityczne elity/partie a niskim poziomem wykształcenia. Ponadto, istotną rolę odgrywa znajomość lidera partii (o statusie celebryty), który często pojawiał się i był opisywany przez media bulwarowe (tabloidy). Z tego powodu, wiele młodych kobiet oddało głos na tę partię. Partia zaczęła również podnosić kwestie postrzegane jako problematyczne, którymi poprzednie rządy i inne partie polityczne nie zajmowały się w ogóle lub w niewystarczającym stopniu (kwestie niszowe lub szczególnie istotne).

EN

This is an exploratory study of populist political movement Sme rodina – Boris Kollár (We Are a Family – Boris Kollár, since November 2019 only Sme rodina). The paper first locates this movement into a lose concept/sui generis family of political parties (the niche party), arguing in contrast to some typologies that this is primarily protest populist party presenting some niche issues, and only secondarily, an entrepreneurial party. The paper also answers the question why this party is considered as being populist by many political and non-political actors and analysts. The paper also suggests that there is actually non-existent, but assumed direct correlation between the support for this party and the decline in the standard of living, as sometimes presented in public discourse. In contrast, it is suggested here that there may be stronger links between relative poverty, feeling of being abandoned by political elites/parties, and low educational levels. Moreover, there played an important role previous knowledge (celebrity status) of the party leader who was often presented and discussed in tabloid media. For this reason, many young females voted for this party. The party also managed to raise a widely perceived problematic issue that was seen as not tackled sufficiently or at all by the previous governments and other competing political parties (the niche or salient issue).

20

Populizm w Polsce – między demagogią i demofilią

89%

Kasprowicz D., Hess A.

Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne

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2017

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issue 2

201-214

EN

The goal of this paper is to present the evolution of populism in Poland using the examples of two political parties: the “Samoobrona” (“Self-Defense”) political party of Andrzej Lepper (a populist party which garnered most support in the first decade of the 21st century) and the “Kukiz ‘15” movement – the dark horse of the last Polish parliamentary elections. Both of these groups superbly illustrate the demagogy characteristic of populism, linked with an affirmation of the people (nation) which in turn would not be possible without the anti-establishment stance of the political leaders and the electorate. A comparison of these two examples allows us to monitor the transformations occurring in populist groups over the last few years, especially in the age where the Internet is employed as a vital means of communication. The paper presents the alternative conceptualizations of the idea of populism, and moves on to employ the N. Baar scheme (2009) and secondary and primary data (data obtained from the “Barometr Wyborczy” voting advisory application), and press releases to draft various types of correspondence between these two cases, which makes it possible to identify new, interesting characteristics of populism.

PL

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie ewolucji populizmu w Polsce przy użyciu dwóch przykładów partii politycznych: „Samoobrony” Andrzeja Leppera (była to partia populistyczna, która uzyskała największe poparcie w pierwszej dekadzie XXI wieku) oraz ruchu „Kukiz’15” – czarnego konia ostatnich wyborów parlamentarnych. Oba te ugrupowania znakomicie ilustrują demagogię charakterystyczną dla populizmu, związaną z afirmacją narodu, która z kolei nie byłaby możliwa bez anty establishmentowej postawy przywódców politycznych i elektoratu. Porównanie tych dwóch przykładów umożliwiło nam monitorowanie przemian zachodzących w ugrupowaniach populistycznych w ciągu ostatnich kilku lat, zwłaszcza w czasach gdy Internet służy jako podstawowy środek komunikacji. W artykule zaprezentowano kolejno alternatywne konceptualizacje idei populizmu, a później – korzystając ze schematu N. Baara (2009) i danych drugorzędnych i podstawowych (dane uzyskane w internetowym poradniku wyborczym „Barometr Wyborczy”), oraz publikacji prasowych – zarysowano różnorodne powiązania występujące między obydwoma ugrupowaniami, co pozwoliło w rezultacie określić nowe, ciekawe cechy populizmu.

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