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EN
The article refers to the class of situations in which abandoning the principle of legalism occurred in connection with the threat to the basic interests of a society and a state. The political history of the United States provides numerous examples of this kind of events. During international armed conflicts involving the US, civil wars or revolutions, the political leaders of this modern constitutional state have often decided to breach the law in order to overcome the danger threatening „the life of the nation”. One of the explanations for this state of affairs was the fact that the constitution of 1787, as distinguished from many other contemporary national constitutions, did not contain detailed solutions for the times of crisis. The activity of American presidents in the area of national security was grounded on expanding interpretations of their competences defined in the Basic Law. One of the theoretical grounds for president’s emergency power doctrine was the theory of prerogative elaborated by John Locke in the late 17th century. The article seeks to provide answer to the following paradox. Why did Locke, despite his involvement in developing the idea of the rule of law, also accept exercising extralegal prerogative powers in cases of emergency? The English philosopher defined the prerogative as „the power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it”. The idea of extralegal powers has become a recurring motif in the history of the United States’ liberal political culture. Proponents of this vision were convicted that uncertainty, contingency and an unforeseen cases are an inherent features of social and political life, which in many cases elude legal regulation. Recently, the renaissance of Locke’s theory of prerogative has taken place in connection with the war on terrorism, in form of an extralegal measures doctrine.
EN
The article deals with the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 23 April 1935 as compared with constitutions of the authoritarian states of interwar Europe, which were republics. The scope of the analysis extends to the constitutions of: Albania — of 7 March 1925, Lithuania — of 15 May 1928 and 12 May1938, Portugal — of 19 March 1933, Austria — of 30 April 1934 and Estonia — of 28 July 1937. The comparison covers constitutional provisions concerning the head of state, government and parliament and the relationship between the executive and the legislative powers. Detailed insight into the texts of those constitutions allows us to identify their common elements typical of an authoritarian state, primarily the position of the head of state, the hierarchy of President’s authorities and protection primacy of the executive in its relations with the legislative. At the same time, it makes it possible to identify particular differences in each of these constitutions, which are sometimes unique in its content, e.g. a strong position of the head of government in relation to the head of state (in Portugal and Austria), or implementing to a signifi cant extent the institution of direct democracy (in Estonia)
EN
The article deals with the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 23 April 1935 as compared with constitutions of the authoritarian states of interwar Europe, which were republics. The scope of the analysis extends to the constitutions of: Albania — of 7 March 1925, Lithuania — of 15 May 1928 and 12 May 1938, Austria — of 30 April 1934, Portugal — of 19 March 1933, and Estonia — of 28 July 1937. The comparison covers constitutional provisions concerning the head of state, government and parliament and the relationship between the executive and the legislative powers. The comparison of the provisions of Poland’s constitution and respective provisions of the abovementioned constitution allows us to identify its place in this context and show specifi c traits of Polish constitution, especially those absent in other authoritarian constitutions of interwar Europe.
EN
The article assesses the impact of the legal acts of the President of the Republic of Poland on individual legal standing. Anyone may in virtue of the President’s actions, satisfy their legal interest and acquire rights. Potential admissibility of administrative court’s review of the President’s executive competences is also discussed. A majority of the scholarly opinions and of jurisdiction is that neither common nor administrative courts have the competence to assess is actions of the highest state authority in this matter. No jurisdiction in this scope prevents administering justice and thus is an obstacle in exercising fundamental rights by an individual. The article presents arguments for and against recognition of the administrative court’s competence and potential effects of legal review.
EN
The article deals with the prerogatives of the President of Republic to appoint judges on the motion of the National Council of the Judiciary. Its aim is to give arguments in favor of the thesis that neither Article 179 nor Article 144, para. 3, subpara. 17 of the Constitution cannot provide a basis for the President’s decision refusing to appoint the judge. In a democratic state ruled by law and implementing the principle of legality in the exercise of powers of public authorities, one cannot unquestioningly accept the thesis that the prerogative is a personal privilege of the President, which may be enjoyed irrespective of the constitutional regulation of rights and without a specifi c legal procedure. Article 179 in conjunction with Article 144 para. 3, subpara. 17 of the Constitution provides a basis for the reconstruction of two norms: a competence norm and a norm requiring President to make use of the powers granted to the him. This provision cannot provide a basis for the president’s decision refusing to appoint the judge. The National Council of the Judiciary, due to its constitutional authority to safeguard the independence of courts and judges, is competent to carry out a detailed and substantive evaluation of the candidate for the position of judge. However, in view of the limitations of Article 10 in conjunction with Article 173 of the Constitution, the President may apply to the National Council of the Judiciary to reconsider the case.
PL
W artykule autor skupia się na konstytucyjnej prerogatywie Prezydenta Rzeczypo-spolitej Polskiej jaką jest nadawanie statutu Kancelarii Prezydenta RP, która jest or-ganem pomocniczym prezydenta. Pierwsza części artykuł, odnosi się do podstawach prawnych nadawania statutu przez Prezydenta RP, natomiast w drugiej części autor, przedstawia poszczególne dokumenty z lat 1989–2017. W zakończeniu autor zwra-ca uwagę na podobieństwa oraz różnice w nadawanych przez Prezydentów RP sta-tutach, w których określali Oni zasady funkcjonowania Kancelarii Prezydenta RP, która umożliwia prezydentom realizację założeń swojej prezydentury.
EN
In this article, the author focuses on the constitutional prerogative of the President of the Republic of Poland, which is the granting of the statute of the President’s Chancellery. The aim of the article will be to analyze the individual statutes of the auxiliary body of the president, taking into account changes that have been made to the Law Office based on the documents issued. In the first part, the article refers to the legal basis for issuing statutes by the president, but the author in the subsequent parts focuses mainly on the analysis of documents issued by individual Presidents of the Republic of Poland.
EN
The article shows how the law of pardon was regulated and how it was applied in two quasi-states, the Duchy of Warsaw (1807–1813) and the Congress Poland (1815–1831) during the constitutional period. These two entities were dependent on France and Russia respectively, which was not irrelevant to the regulations on pardon, since those powers were closely related to monarchs. Both the Polish king (prince of Warsaw) and the Russian emperor (tsar) in the context of the prerogative of the law of pardon have had a profound influence on the course and outcome of individual judicial proceedings so issues of abolition, amnesty and abolition of a punishment are also raised in the article. At the end, the elements of pardons operating in the territories of the three states that made partitions of the Republic of Poland are mentioned.
PL
Artykuł przedstawia sposób uregulowania prawa łaski i praktykę jego stosowania w dwóch tworach quasi-państwowych: Księstwie Warszawskim (1807–1813) oraz w okresie konstytucyjnym Królestwa Kongresowego (1815–1831). Oba te podmioty były zależne odpowiednio od Francji i Rosji, co nie pozostawało bez znaczenia dla uregulowań dotyczących ułaskawienia, gdyż kompetencje te były ściśle związane z osobami monarchów. Zarówno król polski (książę warszawski), jak i cesarz (car) rosyjski w ramach prerogatywy prawa łaski uzyskali ogromny wpływ na przebieg i wynik indywidualnych procesów sądowych, artykuł podejmuje więc również kwestie abolicji, amnestii oraz zatarcia skazania. Na końcu wspomniane zostają elementy ułaskawienia funkcjonujące na obszarach trzech państw zaborczych.
EN
The legislator confirms the existence from God’s establishment of right of the faithful to the sacraments. This is due to their very nature. There is also the right of the faithful to freely choose their state of life. However, these laws do not prejudge the sacrament of Holy Orders. Because the Church must be free to choose candidates for ordination. Therefore, both the Code of Canon Law and the non-code documents before and after its promulgation confirm that there is no right to ordination. However, can. 1030 of the Code of Canon Law confirms that in a special legal situation there are transitional deacons who cannot be forbidden to ordain the presbyterate without a canonical reason. This legal status can be described as the “prerogative” of the transitional deacons. The reason for this special legal position is that justice is ensured in the Church and that there is no arbitrariness in decisions to admit to the presbyterate of transitional deacons who have been recognized as worthy of the diaconate, and no reasons have been found that would prevent them from receiving ordination to the presbyterate degree. The consequence of such a prerogative is the possibility of seeking justice through recourse prescribed by law.
EN
The essay describes the concept and evolution of a countersignature and prerogatives of the President of the Republic of Poland. The countersignature is a special signature (a consent) of a member of the Council of Ministers which is necessary to validate the President’s legal (official) act. Prerogatives are enumerated in a constitutional act as presidential competences, which do not require a signature of a member of the Government (a countersignature). The author claims that the institution of independent presidential competences was invented by Polish lawyers and used for the first time ever in the Polish Constitution of 1935. Further, the author describes the evolution of the institution of a countersignature and prerogatives in the Polish political system. It is said that nowadays the number of independent competences does not have such significant importance as it is claimed in constitutional law and in reality prerogatives do not strengthen the political position of the President significantly. His/her power depends on whole relations between the authorities described in constitutional provisions.
PL
Autor w opracowaniu przedstawia istotę i rozwój instytucji kontrasygnaty oraz samodzielnych uprawnień Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej. Kontrasygnata jest szczególnego rodzaju mechanizmem (podpisem właściwej osoby, z zasady członka rządu), który jest niezbędny do legalizacji aktu urzędowego głowy państwa. Członek rady ministrów poprzez akt podpisania aktu prezydenta przejmuje za niego odpowiedzialność polityczną. Równocześnie akt urzędowy głowy państwa jest nieważny do czasu opatrzenia go kontrasygnatą. Prerogatywy są to natomiast enumeratywnie wyliczone kompetencje prezydenta, które dla swojej ważności nie potrzebują współpodpisu członka rządu. W publikacji autor podnosi tezę, że prerogatywy są owocem polskiego konstytucjonalizmu i zostały po raz pierwszy w historii wprowadzone do ustroju w Konstytucji kwietniowej z 1935 r. Ponadto w opracowaniu została przedstawiona ewolucja instytucji kontrasygnaty i powiązanych z nią prerogatyw w polskim systemie prawnym. Autor wskazuje, że współcześnie prerogatywy nie mają tak doniosłego znaczenia jak im się to przypisuje w nauce prawa ustrojowego i że w praktyce samodzielne uprawnienia głowy państwa wcale tak istotnie nie wzmacniają pozycji i funkcji prezydenta. Jego władza i status zależą od całokształtu postanowień ustawy zasadniczej, które definiują relacje pomiędzy organami państwa.
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