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FR
L’article examine la littérature sur les théories du préjudice dans les marches numériques ainsi que les difficultés spécifiques liées à la quantification du dommage dans le cadre d’une action en dommage concurrentiel. Ensuite, le développement timide d’une jurisprudence des actions privées sur les marches numériques dans l’Union Européenne est étudié en comparaison avec la pratique antitrust américaine, en faisant la distinction entre les plaintes introduites par des entreprises ou des consommateurs. Enfin, le document soulève les problématiques spécifiques à l’introduction d’actions en dommages et intérêts concurrentiels sur les marchés numériques, et explore les propositions suivantes : étendre la présomption du dommage aux abus de positions dominantes sur les marchés numériques, inciter les parties privées à requérir des injonctions et encourager la mise en oeuvre de remèdes dans le cadre d’actions privées.
EN
The paper reviews literature on theories of harm in digital markets, and the specific difficulties in quantifying the damage in private enforcement of competition law. The development of a tentative case-law on private enforcement in digital markets in the European Union is studied next, in comparison to the US antitrust practice, differentiating between businesses or consumers filing damages claims. Finally, the paper raises the specific issues posed by the digital economy for competition law claims for damages, and explores the idea of extending the presumption of harm also to abuse of dominance in digital markets, as well as making private parties aware of cease and desist injunctions or filing for private enforcement remedies.
EN
Quantification of harm is regarded as one of the most significant obstacles for the full compensation of harm and development of private enforcement within the European Union, including CEE Member States. Consequently, the Damages Directive establishes general rules and requirements for the quantification of harm, such as a rebuttable presumption of harm in case of cartels, the power of national courts to estimate harm as well as others, which closely interact with the principle of full compensation emphasized by the case-law of the European Union and directly established in the Damages Directive. The main focus of this paper is the effectiveness of the rules on the quantification of harm in general, and how these rules will contribute to the development of private antitrust enforcement in CEE Member States. Therefore, one of the issues to be discussed in the paper is the analysis of how, and to what extent specific rules and requirements for the quantification of harm have been transposed into the national legislation of CEE Member States. As certain CEE national jurisdictions have had certain rules for the quantification of harm already before the implementation of the Damages Directive, the paper analyses how effective these rules have been, and how much they have contributed to the development of private antitrust enforcement of those CEE national jurisdictions. Previous experience of those CEE Member States in applying specific rules for the quantification of harm is important, in order to assess the possible impact of the newly introduced rules on the quantification of harm and on private antitrust enforcement in general in other CEE Member States. The rules for the quantification of harm will not enhance private antitrust enforcement on their own, however, their effective application by national courts together with other rules under the Damages Directive should contribute to a quicker development of private enforcement in CEE Members States.
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