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EN
The presumption of innocence and the right to be present and related issuesin the criminal procedure in Slovak Republic
EN
The article concerns the relationship between presumption of innocence and elements of the dogmatic structure of crime, particularly guilt. It appears that the presumption of innocence has nothing to do with guilt conceived as personalized blame, and it is doubtful to what extent — if at all — it extends to other elements of criminal act. The presumption of innocence seems to be domain of facts, not necessarily law.
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EN
The aim of the presented paper is to analyze the problem of resolving preliminary issues in criminal proceeding namely by comparison of their legal regulations in Slovak and Czech criminal proceeding. The paper is specifically focusing on and dealing with question whether it is possible to assess the committing of criminal offense as a preliminary issue in relation to criminal offense which is not the subject of pending criminal proceeding. This problem is analyzed by comparing the practice of the courts in the Slovak Republic and Czech Republic. At the same time, it is analysed the relation between the term of criminal offense commitment and the term guilty, in the context of a question whether a criminal offense committing is supposed to be solved as a preliminary issue and as such is violation of presumption of innocence. Based on the analysis and comparison of court practice, as well as on comparison of terms criminal offense committing and guilty, we have drawn the inference that it is possible to state the committing of another criminal offense as solved preliminary issue and such statement is not violation of a presumption of innocence.
EN
The present study examines Arabic legal phraseology formation from the standpoint of positive law and jurisprudence. It claims that phraseological constructions in Arabic legislative and statutory texts are largely influenced by the translation process of Roman law texts. However, scholarly literature still relies to some extent on formulae used in the Islamic jurisprudence. To illustrate this, three examples of legal principles anchored in Islamic jurisprundence, known as legal maxims, are discussed along with their corresponding expressions in positive law in modern-day Arabic. Ultimately, the purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, to demonstrate that the phraseology present in many Arabic positive laws stems from a historical translation process that started in the beginning of the 20th century; secondly to emphasize the significance of textual genre awareness in legal translation. Concretely, the introductory section provides an overview of recent studies that have addressed legal phraseologisms. It is followed by a section on the historical role of translation in the construction of certain phraseologisms. The general legal principles of (a) burden of proof, (b) presumption of innocence, and (c) the pacta sunt servanda principle are then examined in order to shed light on the influence of both the Civilist tradition and Islamic jurisprudence on the use of legal Arabic today, as well as to demonstrate how the translation of phraseologisms is dependent on the parameters of genre. The analysis leads to the conclusion that proper use of phraseologisms, whether in drafting or translation, is closely linked to knowledge of phraseology formation and the historical influence of translation.
EN
The article elaborates on ‘presumption of guilt.’ The term ‘guilt’ has different meanings in substantive criminal law and procedural criminal law. However, the presumption of guilt in substantive criminal law ought not lead to a violation of the procedural presumption of innocence. Therefore, it shall be understood as a presumption of fact which must meet all the requirements referred to in Article 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or, in other words, be regarded as indirect evidence. For this reason, there is no legal basis to contend that the presumption of guilt rule has been established under substantive criminal law. Negative conceptualisation of guilt in the Penal Code is an expression of legislator’s conviction that human beings are generally able to control their conducts. So we can only talk about a presumption, a premise adopted by legislature, which explains the construction of the provision analysed.
PL
Przedmiotem opracowania jest „domniemanie winy” w prawie karnym. Termin „wina” w prawie karnym materialnym ma odmienne znaczenie niż w prawie procesowym. Jednakże domniemanie prawnokarnej winy nie może prowadzić do naruszenia zasady domniemania niewinności ‒ musi ono być konstruowane jako domniemanie faktyczne spełniające wymogi określone w art. 7 k.p.k., czyli jako dowód pośredni. Dlatego także brak podstaw do twierdzenia, że w prawie karnym ustanowiono zasadę domniemania winy. Negatywne ujęcie przesłanki zawinienia odzwierciedla przekonanie ustawodawcy o generalnej zdolności człowieka do autodetermiancji swojego zachowania. Stąd można więc mówić jedynie o domniemaniu, założeniu, przyjętym przez ustawodawcę, które wyjaśnia sposób skonstruowania przepisu.
EN
The fundamental problem of the article can be expressed in two sequentially asked questions, namely — firstly — whether the subject of substantive presumption may be not only facts, but also assessments formulated on their basis, and — secondly — whether in the case of limiting the essence of presumptions exclusively to facts, it would be possible to include (into the presumptions) these elements of the dogmatic structure of crime, the occurrence of which requires, first and foremost, a series of normative assessments based on normative criteria. It is diffi cult to imagine a situation in which a subject reconstructing reality would make the subject of presumption, and therefore only “guess” that he values its elements. It would have to mean that the court must use a presumption to assess whether the realization of the signs of a prohibited act was socially harmful, unlawful and culpable. A constitutional principle of the presumption of innocence, according to which the accused should be regarded as innocent until his guilt is proved and confi rmed by a valid sentence, does not authorize to conclude that the evidence emerging from successively collected evidence indicates innocence, but it only means that before the fi nal termination of the proceedings, there is no factual and legal basis for verifying the fault and bringing to criminal responsibility.
EN
According to the well-established Supreme Court’s case law, the civil court is entitled todetermine independently whether a tort constitutes a criminal offence even in the absenceof a final judgement of conviction. This opinion was expressed by the Supreme Court forthe purpose of applying the extended limitation period under Article 4421 § 2 of the CivilCode for claims for a tort that is a crime. The Supreme Court’s statement raises doubts on thegrounds of the presumption of innocence. The purpose of this article is firstly to present thestandard concerning the scope of the presumption of innocence in civil proceedings, createdby the European Court of Human Rights on the basis of Article 6 § 2 of the ECHR, accordingto which everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until provedguilty according to law. Then it is the assessment of the compatibility of the Supreme Court’sopinion through the perspective of the Convention standard.
PL
Zgodnie z ugruntowanym orzecznictwem Sądu Najwyższego, sąd cywilny jest uprawniony dosamodzielnego ustalenia, czy czyn niedozwolony stanowi przestępstwo, nawet w przypadkubraku prawomocnego wyroku skazującego. Pogląd ten został wyrażony przez Sąd Najwyższyna potrzeby stosowania na podstawie art. 4421 § 2 k.c. wydłużonego terminu przedawnieniaroszczeń z tytułu czynów niedozwolonych stanowiących przestępstwo. Stanowisko SąduNajwyższego budzi wątpliwości na gruncie zasady domniemania niewinności. Celem niniejszegoartykułu jest w pierwszej kolejności przedstawienie standardu dotyczącego zakresuobowiązywania domniemania niewinności w postępowaniu cywilnym, wykreowanego przezEuropejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka na gruncie art. 6 ust. 2 EKPC, zgodnie z którym każdego oskarżonego o popełnienie czynu zagrożonego karą uważa się za niewinnego do czasuudowodnienia mu winy zgodnie z ustawą. Następnie jest nim ocena zgodności przyjętegoprzez Sąd Najwyższy poglądu dotyczącego możliwości zastosowania art. 4421 § 2 k.c. równieżw sytuacji braku prawomocnego wyroku sądu karnego, stwierdzającego winę konkretnejosoby, przez pryzmat standardu konwencyjnego.
EN
The author analyses presumption of innocence in the media’s reporting of the judicial procedures. The principle of presumption of innocence says that the accused will be considered not guilty, unless his guilt will be proved in the final judgment of the court. This principle is written down in art. 42.2 of the Polish Constitution and art. 5 § 2 of the criminal procedure code. The above principle concerns all people, i.e. authorities of criminal process, police, administration agencies and even simple citizens. The Polish press law prohibits publication of personal data of the accused without the consent of public prosecutor or court as well as data of the injured person and witnesses without their consent. The press law also prohibits to prejudge the guilt of the accused before his conviction by the court of first instance. Alas, there are numerous cases of violation of such rules. Today one observes the increasing process of infotainment of mass media becoming more and more tabloid. They have a negative influence on realization of principle of presumption of innocence in everyday practice.
EN
There is a view prevalent in both German judicature and German legal literature that, under certain circumstances, the court can convict a person without having determined the type of crime they have committed. Examples include a conviction on the grounds of ‘theft or receiving stolen goods’ in cases when stolen goods have been found in possession of the accused but how they had been obtained was not determined. This practice is not regulated by the statutes and has been considered unconstitutional by some scholars for breaching the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, the principle of the presumption of innocence, and the principle of legal certainty. Furthermore, one of the panels of the Federal Court of Justice voiced criticism of heterogeneous alternative convictions in 2014. This article systematizes the practice of alternative conviction in the German criminal procedure, further focusing on the type of the practice that causes most controversy. This is followed by a historical account showing how the legal institution of heterogeneous alternative conviction has developed, as well as covering the conditions for applications and all the doubts of a constitutional nature. The author shares the view of the Grand Panel for Criminal Matters at the Federal Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court, which recognized that the current practice is in no breach of the Basic Law. However, a call is also expressed that alternative convictions be regulated by law.
PL
W niemieckim orzecznictwie i w doktrynie dominuje pogląd, że pod pewnymi warunkami możliwe jest skazanie oskarżonego, nawet jeśli sąd nie ustalił, jakiego typu przestępstwa się on dopuścił. Przykładem jest skazanie za „kradzież albo paserstwo”, jeśli u oskarżonego znaleziono skradzione rzeczy, ale nie wykazano, w jaki sposób je uzyskał. Tej nieuregulowanej przez ustawę praktyce zarzucano niekonstytucyjność ze względu na naruszenie gwarancji nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, zasady domniemania niewinności i zasady określoności. Do krytyków różnorodzajowego ustalenia alternatywnego (echte Wahlfeststellung) dołączył w 2014 r. jeden z senatów Trybunału Federalnego. Niniejszy artykuł systematyzuje rodzaje ustaleń alternatywnych w niemieckim procesie karnym, a następnie skupia się na ich najbardziej kontrowersyjnej odmianie. Przedstawiono historię kształtowania instytucji prawnej różnorodzajowego ustalenia alternatywnego oraz przesłanki jej stosowania. Omówiono też wszystkie wątpliwości natury konstytucyjnej. Autor zgodził się z Wielkim Senatem do Spraw Karnych Trybunału Federalnego i z Federalnym Sądem Konstytucyjnym, że obecna praktyka nie stanowi naruszenia Ustawy zasadniczej. Niemniej wyrażono postulat uregulowania ustaleń alternatywnych w ustawie.
Ius Novum
|
2020
|
vol. 14
|
issue 3
107-119
EN
This paper addresses the issue of jurisdictional independence of a disciplinary court in terms of the possibility of assessing an act under investigation in the context of the grounds of criminality of an act. The issue is of particular importance in view of the rules on limitation periods for disciplinary offences, which require the adoption of limitation periods for criminal offences where the act constitutes a criminal offence. Such a solution may lead to a conflict between the principle of jurisdictional independence of the disciplinary court and the principle of the presumption of innocence, since this presumption can only be rebutted by a final and non-appealable judgment of a criminal court. In turn, the stay of disciplinary proceedings and waiting for a final and non-appealable judgment of the criminal court may have a negative impact on the decision concerning the issue of disciplinary liability. This study proposes a compromise solution which, according to the author, would respect both principles.
PL
Niniejsze opracowanie porusza problematykę samodzielności jurysdykcyjnej sądu dyscyplinarnego w zakresie możliwości dokonywania oceny czynu będącego przedmiotem postępowania przed tym sądem w kontekście warunków przestępności czynu. Doniosłość tego zagadnienia jest szczególna z uwagi na unormowania dotyczące terminów przedawnienia dyscyplinarnego, które nakazują przyjąć terminy właściwe dla przedawnienia przestępstw, jeżeli czyn stanowi przestępstwo. Takie rozwiązanie prowadzić może do kolizji zasady samodzielności jurysdykcyjnej sądu dyscyplinarnego z zasadą domniemania niewinności, albowiem domniemanie to może być obalone jedynie prawomocnym wyrokiem sądu karnego. Z kolei zawieszenie postępowania dyscyplinarnego i oczekiwanie na prawomocny wyrok sądu karnego może przynieść negatywne skutki dla rozstrzygnięcia o kwestii odpowiedzialności dyscyplinarnej. W przedmiotowym opracowaniu zaproponowano kompromisowe rozwiązanie, które – w przekonaniu autora – respektowałoby obie wskazane zasady.
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