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1
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Disclosure of Evidence in Central and Eastern European Countries in Light of the Implementation of the Damages Directive

100%
Druviete I., Jerņeva J., Ulaganathan Ravindran A.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2017
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vol. 10(15)
197-222
EN
The article looks primarily at the material comprised in the volume edited by A. Piszcz, Implementation of the EU Damages Directive in Central and Eastern European Countries published in 2017 and based on that compares aspects of the disclosure of evidence issue in Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The purpose of this article is to look into how the process for the disclosure of evidence has evolved in eleven countries of the European Union in light of Directive 2014/104/EU. The article looks at six key issues with regard to disclosure of evidence in light of Directive 2014/104/EU: general procedural issues; procedure for the submission of evidence; criteria for the disclosure of evidence; restrictions on the disclosure of evidence; disclosure of evidence by parties other than the defendant; and consequences of the failure to comply with a request to submit evidence. The article relies on primary data from eleven EU countries from Central and Eastern Europe.
2
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The Scope of the Implementation of the Damages Directive in CEE States

100%
Petr M.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2017
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vol. 10(15)
13-30
EN
The Damages Directive has a rather limited scope, focusing only on damages claims stemming from anticompetitive agreements or abuse of a dominant position, provided such conduct was able to affect trade between EU Member States. However, Member States are not limited by this scope and so they may decide, when implementing the Directive, to enhance not only claims for damages, but the overall private enforcement of competition law. In this article, we shall explore the scope of the implementing legislation of selected Central and Eastern European Countries, namely in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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Consensual Dispute Resolution in the Damage Directive. Implementation in CEE Countries

100%
Modzelewska de Raad M.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2017
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vol. 10(15)
49-68
EN
This paper discusses the use of consensual dispute resolution for the purpose of antitrust damage claims as introduced by the Directive. It presents these type of claims in a broader context of arbitration (or ADR), in comparison with traditional claim settling before a state court. Particular focus is on selected CEE countries and their implementation of the Directive, serving as an example of the transposition of the Directive’s rules (Article 18 and 19) into national systems in the area of consensual dispute resolution. Specific institutions intended to encourage consensual resolution included in the Directive (and transposed into national systems) are being commented on as well. Lastly, the paper briefs on the advantages of ADR in general, and concludes that even post-Directive, ADR remains attractive as a complimentary instrument to public enforcement and state judiciary enforcement.
4
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Private Antitrust Enforcement Without Punitive Damages: A Half-Baked Reform?

88%
Massa C.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2018
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vol. 11(17)
93-111
EN
Directive 2014/104/EU on private antitrust enforcement opted for the exclusion of punitive damages from the category of recoverable damages following a violation of antitrust law. This article will outline the concept of punitive damages and analyse the relevant case-law of the courts of the Member States, of the ECtHR and of the ECJ. Then, it will examine the regime laid down in the Directive and consider the possible reasons why the European legislator opted for this exclusion. Thus, the opportunity to introduce such a provision into the European legal system will be evaluated, taking into consideration the problem of overdeterrence, the problem of the division of functions between public and private enforcement, and making a comparison with the relevant provisions of Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights. Finally, a possible modification of Article 3(3) of the Directive will be suggested, in the framework of the review that the Commission is required to undertake by December 27, 2020
FR
La Directive 2014/104/UE sur l’application privée du droit de la concurrence a opté pour l’exclusion des dommages-intérêts punitifs de la catégorie des dommages recouvrables suite à la violation du droit de la concurrence. Cet article décrira la notion de dommages-intérêts punitifs et analysera la jurisprudence pertinente des tribunaux des États membres, de la CEDH et de la CJUE. Ensuite, il examinera le régime prévu par la Directive et examinera les raisons possibles pour lesquelles le législateur européen a opté pour cette exclusion. Donc, l’opportunité d’introduire une telle disposition dans le système juridique européen sera d’évaluée en prenant en considération le problème de la dissuasion excessive, celui de la répartition des fonctions entre l’application publique et privée du droit de la concurrence et en faisant une comparaison avec les dispositions pertinentes de la Directive 2004/48/ EC relative au respect des droits de propriété intellectuelle. Enfin, une éventuelle modification de l’article 3, paragraphe 3, de la Directive sera d’envisagée, dans le cadre d’une révision de la Directive que la Commission doit faire au plus tard le 27 décembre 2020
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The Type of Liability in Private Enforcement in Selected CEE Countries Relating to the Implementation of the Damages Directive

88%
Wolski D.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2017
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vol. 10(15)
69-84
EN
The article is devoted to the type of liability in selected CEE countries, namely those covered by the national reports drafted for the 2nd International Conference on Harmonization of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Central and Eastern European Perspective. The paper starts with preliminary remarks concerning the role of the type of liability in private enforcement of competition law and the Damages Directive. In the following sections of the article, the author discusses the manner of adopting the aforementioned element as a result of the implementation process in CEE Member States. The article is mainly based on the content of the relevant national reports, with a few references to issues beyond their scope. In the summary, the author formulates brief conclusions with respect to the implementation manner of the type of liability as well as provides general remarks concerning the role of the type of liability in competition-based private enforcement cases.
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Antitrust Damages Actions in Ukraine: Current Situation and Perspectives

75%
Gerasymenko A., Mazaraki N.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2015
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vol. 8(12)
195-214
EN
The article gives an overview of Ukrainian legislation and experiences concerning antitrust damages actions. The analysis has led to a number of conclusions: private claims are rare in Ukraine due to difficulties in obtaining evidence, high legal costs, and lacking confidence in the Ukrainian court system. The paper gives examples of Ukrainian private antitrust enforcement practice and provides a statistical analysis of the dynamics of ‘compensated’ damages caused by antitrust infringements in Ukraine. The value of ‘compensated’ damages is compared to the value of the economic effect of stopping antitrust infringements, as well as to the value of the overall welfare loss deriving from market power in the national economy. Finally, some new sources of damages caused by market power are discussed considering the development perspectives of this branch of antitrust activity.
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Quantification of Harm and the Damages Directive: Implementation in CEE Countries

63%
Mikelėnas V., Zaščiurinskaitė R.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2017
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vol. 10(15)
111-132
EN
Quantification of harm is regarded as one of the most significant obstacles for the full compensation of harm and development of private enforcement within the European Union, including CEE Member States. Consequently, the Damages Directive establishes general rules and requirements for the quantification of harm, such as a rebuttable presumption of harm in case of cartels, the power of national courts to estimate harm as well as others, which closely interact with the principle of full compensation emphasized by the case-law of the European Union and directly established in the Damages Directive. The main focus of this paper is the effectiveness of the rules on the quantification of harm in general, and how these rules will contribute to the development of private antitrust enforcement in CEE Member States. Therefore, one of the issues to be discussed in the paper is the analysis of how, and to what extent specific rules and requirements for the quantification of harm have been transposed into the national legislation of CEE Member States. As certain CEE national jurisdictions have had certain rules for the quantification of harm already before the implementation of the Damages Directive, the paper analyses how effective these rules have been, and how much they have contributed to the development of private antitrust enforcement of those CEE national jurisdictions. Previous experience of those CEE Member States in applying specific rules for the quantification of harm is important, in order to assess the possible impact of the newly introduced rules on the quantification of harm and on private antitrust enforcement in general in other CEE Member States. The rules for the quantification of harm will not enhance private antitrust enforcement on their own, however, their effective application by national courts together with other rules under the Damages Directive should contribute to a quicker development of private enforcement in CEE Members States.
8
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The Principle of Liability in Private Antitrust Enforcement in Selected European States In Light of the Implementation of the Damages Directive into the Polish Legal System

63%
Wolski D.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2016
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vol. 9(14)
69-96
EN
In the vast majority of European countries, private antitrust enforcement falls under general rules of civil law. One of the issues to be discussed in relation to this type of litigation is the principle of liability, which exists in the given legal system, and its presumed impact on private enforcement. This problem has been debated in the course of the implementation works on the Damages Directive into the Polish legal system. A discussion on the principle of liability has taken place at least twice in this context. First, the issue was considered by the Civil Law Codification Commission and expressed in its Assumptions behind the Draft Act on complaints for damages caused by the breach of competition law. Subsequently, the principle of liability was assessed again at the reconciliation conference held at the Ministry of Justice. This is but a part of a broader discussion about the relationship between the rule of liability existing in national laws being applied to private enforcement cases and EU law as well as limitations arising from the latter. After outlining this interplay, the paper will briefly introduce solutions adopted with respect to the principle of liability in the context of private enforcement in selected European countries. The selection is not random, despite the fact that a limited number of countries has been analysed – eight including Poland. These include the most advanced EU Member States when it comes to private antitrust enforcement (such as the UK, Germany or the Netherlands), along with less developed examples (such as Italy or France), and even underdeveloped countries when it comes to the number and popularity of private antitrust litigations (such as Lithuania and Poland). This sort of analysis paints a relatively comprehensive picture of the adopted solutions in relation to the principles of liability governing private enforcement cases in Europe. The same is true for the issue of the burden of proof and presumptions/binding power in civil proceedings of decisions issued by competition authorities. Furthermore, what seemed to be crucial for the drafters of the Damages Directive, this sort of analysis makes it possible to formulate certain conclusions with respect to the relationship between the effectiveness of private enforcement in a given State and the adopted principle of liability. The final conclusions understandably focus on the Polish example, that is, the implementation of the Damages Directive into the Polish legal system.
FR
Dans la grande majorité des pays européens l'application privée du droit de la concurrence relève des règles générales du droit civil. Un de problème qui exige l’analyse dans ce type de litige est le principe de la responsabilité qui existe dans le système juridique particulier, ainsi que son effet sur l'exécution privée du droit de la concurrence. Ce problème était discuté pendant les travaux concernant la transposition de la directive relative aux certaines règles régissant les actions en dommages (« Damages Directive ») dans le système juridique polonais. La discussion sur le principe de la responsabilité a eu lieu au moins deux fois dans ce contexte. Tout d’abord, la question a été examinée par la Commission de codification du droit civil et exprimée dans ses hypothèses concernant le projet de loi sur les actions en dommages pour les infractions aux dispositions du droit de la concurrence. Ensuite, le principe de la responsabilité a été évalué de nouveau lors de la conférence de réconciliation qui a eu lieu au Ministère de la Justice. C’est juste une partie de discussion plus large concernant la relation entre le principe de la responsabilité existant dans les législations nationales appliquées dans des affaires d’application privée du droit de la concurrence et le droit de l'Union européenne, ainsi que les limitations qui en découlent. Après la présentation cette interaction, le document parlera brièvement des solutions adoptées dans certains pays européens afin de répondre au problème du principe de la responsabilité dans le contexte de l'application privée du droit de la concurrence. La sélection n'est pas aléatoire, malgré le fait qu'un nombre limité de pays a été analysé – huit pays dont la Pologne. Elle inclus les Etats Membres de l’Union européenne les plus avances en ce qui concerne l’application privée du droit de la concurrence (comme le Royaume-Uni, l'Allemagne ou les Pays-Bas), ainsi que des exemples de juridictions moins développés (comme l'Italie ou la France) et même des pays sous-développés en ce qui concerne le nombre et la popularité des actions en dommages dans le domaine du droit de la concurrence (comme la Lituanie et la Pologne). Ce type d'analyse donne une vision relativement complète des solutions concernant les principes de responsabilité dans le domaine d’application privée du droit de la concurrence adoptées en Europe. C’est la même chose en ce qui concerne la question de la charge de la preuve et des présomptions / le pouvoir contraignant des décisions rendues par les autorités de la concurrence dans les procédures civiles. En outre, ce qui semblait crucial pour les rédacteurs de « Damages Directive », ce type d'analyse permet de formuler certaines conclusions concernant la relation entre l’application privée du droit de la concurrence dans un État Membre particulier et le principe de responsabilité adopté dans cet État. Les conclusions finales se focalisent sur l'exemple polonais, c'est-à-dire sur la transposition de « Damages Directive » dans le système juridique polonais.
9
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Effect of National Decisions on Actions for Competition Damages in the CEE Countries

51%
Pärn-Lee E.
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
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2017
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vol. 10(15)
177-198
EN
One of the main objectives of the so-called Damages Directive (2014/104/EU) was to make antitrust enforcement more effective. Although in most EU countries private antitrust enforcement has been possible subject to general rules of civil law; the number of private antitrust litigations has remained relatively low. It is presumed that the complementary roles of public and private enforcement, as well as the synergy between them, will take effect if formal decisions taken during public enforcement will have binding effect with regard to follow-on private litigations. According to the Damages Directive, final national decisions on competition infringements shall have binding effect in follow-on litigations. What is to be understood under ‘binding effect’, and the potential effects thereof, has been subject to a lively debate among academics and practitioners. It has been questioned if decisions of an executive body can bind the judiciary, and if so, to what extent. What is the evidentiary value of a formal decision of a NCA regarding national courts, but also on the court of another Member State. The article deals with the main issues and arguments presented in the general debate on the binding effect of national competition law decisions, and provides a closer look on this topic with regard to specific CEE countries.
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