Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 4

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  privation
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The aim of this paper is to highlight the decisive contribution of Simplicius and Philoponus to the resolution of the problem of evil in Neoplatonism. A correct and faithful interpretation of the problem, which also had to agree with Plato’s texts, became particularly needed after Plotinus had identified evil with matter, threatening, thus, the dualistic position, which was absent in Plato. The first rectification was made by Proclus with the notion of parhypostasis, i.e., “parasitic” or “collateral” existence, which de-hypostasized evil, while at the same time challenging the Plotinian theory that turned evil into a principle that was ontologically opposed to good. In light of this, the last Neoplatonic exegetes, Simplicius and Philoponus, definitely clarified the “privative” role of kakon, finally relieving matter from the negative meaning given to it by Plotinus and restoring metaphysical monism. 
IT
The aim of this paper is to highlight the decisive contribution of Simplicius and Philoponus to the resolution of the problem of evil in Neoplatonism. A correct and faithful interpretation of the problem, which also had to agree with Plato’s texts, became particularly needed after Plotinus had identified evil with matter, threatening, thus, the dualistic position, which was absent in Plato. The first rectification was made by Proclus with the notion of parhypostasis, i.e., “parasitic” or “collateral” existence, which de-hypostasized evil, while at the same time challenging the Plotinian theory that turned evil into a principle that was ontologically opposed to good. In light of this, the last Neoplatonic exegetes, Simplicius and Philoponus, definitely clarified the “privative” role of kakon, finally relieving matter from the negative meaning given to it by Plotinus and restoring metaphysical monism.
EN
The aim of the present study was to determine how the social and material status of the family of origin and the degree of satisfaction of material needs during childhood (excessive vs. insufficient) engender materialism in young adults. The participants in the study were 346 individuals aged 20 to 35. To measure materialism, the following scales were used: the Material Values Scale by Richins; the Priorities in Life Scale; and the Motives for Making Money Scale by Srivastav, Locke, and Bartol. Socioeconomic variables were measured with the author’s own tool. The results indicate that the low socioeconomic status of the family of origin and the experience of privation in early life increase the attractiveness of material goods and money, and thus contribute to the formation of the materialistic orientation. The experience of overabundance during childhood, by contrast, is negatively correlated with materialism. This, however, does not mean that being spoiled has no negative consequences. It appears that people who were showered with material goods in childhood lose the ability to appreciate their abundance. They feel they do not have enough material goods, even if they have more than others.
Studia Gilsoniana
|
2019
|
vol. 8
|
issue 3
681-716
EN
The chief aim of this article is to show that St. Thomas Aquinas’s Fourth Way of demonstrating God’s existence can only be made precisely intelligible by comprehending it as a real, generic whole in light of its specific organizational principles. Considered as a real, generic whole, this argument is one from effect to cause (from a real order of more or less perfectly existing generic, specific, and individual beings [habens esse] more or less perfectly possessing generic, specific, and individual ways of being within qualitatively different, hierarchical, orders of existence to a first cause of this order of perfections). In addition, this article maintains that, to comprehend this complicated argument, readers mush be familiar with philosophical principles that St. Thomas repeatedly uses throughout his major works, but with which most of his contemporary students tend to be unfamiliar. Consequently, a secondary aim of this paper is to introduce readers unfamiliar with them to some of these principle so that they may be able better to comprehend what St. Thomas is saying in this demonstration and in other teachings of his as well.
PL
W naszym artykule skupiamy się na analizie struktury podwójnej negacji w poemacie Parmenidesa, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem B 2. Punktem wyjścia analizy jest stoicka klasyfikacja negacji, którą przedstawia Diogenes Laertios (VII.69-70). Obejmuje ona: negację, przeczenie, prywację oraz podwójną negację. Przykład podany przez Diogenesa Laertiosa zapisujemy następująco: „Nie (nie jest dzień)” ↔ „jest dzień”. W warstwie poetyckiej, podwójna negacja spełnia funkcję wzmocnienia ekspresji wypowiedzi bogini. Z kolei w kontekście ontologii Parmenidesa, prawo podwójnej negacji służy afirmacji „jest”. Naszym celem jest szczegółowa analiza konstrukcji podwójnej negacji. W kolejnym kroku wprowadzamy dowody nie wprost z Elementów Euklidesa. Pokazujemy, że wszystkie cztery formy negacji, które wymienia Diogenes Laertios, występują w Elementach i że zawierają one bogatszy zestaw form językowych służący wyrażeniu negacji, w tym podwójnej negacji. Pokazujemy wreszcie, że Parmenides świadomie stosuje prawo podwójnej negacji, a poemat jest pierwszym w historii tekstem filozoficznym poświadczającym użycie tego prawa. Podwójna negacja może być wyrażona krótko jako: u stoików (Diogenes Laertios VII.69-70): „nie (nie jest dzień) ↔ jest dzień”; u Euklidesa: „Nie (jest nie-równe) ↔ Jest równe” (Elementy, I.6); „Nie jest tak, że (…. nie jest wokół…) ↔ Jest wokół” (Elementy, VI.26) u Parmenidesa „jest ↔ nie jest” (B 2, w. 3).
EN
In our article we focus on an analysis of the structure of double negation in the poem of Parmenides, paying attention to the fragment B 2. The starting point for the analysis is the classification of varieties of negation contained in Diogenes Laertius (VII 69–70): negation, denial, privation and double negation. We provide an example of double negation as given by Diogenes: “Not (is not a day) ↔ it is a day”. In terms of the poetic expression the law of double negation serves to strengthen the goddess’ speech. However, in the context of Parmenides’ ontolog y, the law of double negation serves as an affirmation of ‘is’. Our goal is to give a detailed analysis of the structure of double negation. In the next step we introduce Euclid’s proofs by comparison. We show that all four forms of negation indicated by Diogenes occur in the Elements and there is a richer set of the linguistic forms used as an expression of nega- tion, including that of double negation. Finally, we show that Parmenides applies consciously the law of double negation, and the poem is the first philosophical text confirming the use of this law. In short, double negation can be summarized as follows: for the Stoics, in Diogenes Laertius (VII 69–70): “not (is not a day) ↔ is a day”; for Euclid: “not (is not-equal) ↔ is equal” (Elements I 6). “is not like that (... is not around ...) ↔ is around” (Elements VI 26); and in Parmenides: “is ↔ not (is not to be)” (B 2, v. 3).
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.