Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  probabilism
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
PL
In modern science, the theory of probability is one of the basic tools. Scientists using probability often refer to its objective interpretation. They emphasize that their probabilistic hypotheses concern objective facts, not degrees of belief. Accordingly, the following questions arise: What is the meaning of this type of probabilistic hypothesis? Is the assumption of objectivity necessary? The paper addresses these questions by analyzing objective probability in the context of the scientific debate on determinism. Two types of arguments will be presented. On the one hand, there is the assertion that objective probability can exist only in an indeterministic world. Then, on the other hand - I analyze the assertions of those who believe in the co‑existence of objective probability and determinism. As a result I show that the acceptance of deterministic and indeterministic fields as possible areas where objective probability can occur is extremely problematic. Depending on the chosen area we encounter different types of problems. Therefore, I show that a significant number of these problems are associated with the acceptance of incorrect metaphysical assumptions. And finally, I postulate that the objectivity of probability (and assumptions pertaining to it) can be reduced (without any losses) to the epistemic variant.
EN
The Polish version of the article was published in “Roczniki Humanistyczne,” vol. 59 (2011), issue 1. Modern theoretical-literary treatises, defined as normative poetics, are usually connected with the dominance of the convention and normativism, with obligatory rules, canonical concepts and restrictive directives hampering originality. The present text tries to revise the conviction that convention is a dominant tendency in the development of the old theoretical thought; it tends to show the avant-garde aspects of modern poetics and to present the relations between what is conventional and what is innovative in the most original theoretical texts of late Renaissance and Baroque. Examples of two avant-garde modern poetics—Francesco Patrizi’s theory of wonder formed at the end of the 16th century and the 17th century Emanuele Tesauro’s conceptistic theory—show that tradition and convention are necessary elements of inventive theories. The avant-garde of poetics of the past, contrary to the avant-garde of the 20th century, is not born from the defiance of the earlier theories but is formed by way of modernizing and transforming them. Old inventive theories—despite all the departures from tradition—are still part of the classical paradigm. Hence, the avant-garde character of late-Renaissance and Baroque theoretical reflection consists in a peculiar synergy of convention and novelty.
PL
Celem artykułu jest obrona tak zwanych „pragmatycznych” uzasadnień probabilizmu, tj. tezy mówiącej, iż stopnie przekonania racjonalnego podmiotu powinny być zgodne z aksjomatami teorii prawdopodobieństwa. Analizowane uzasadnienia to: Argument z Zakładu Holenderskiego (AZH) oraz Argument z Twierdzenia o Reprezentacji (ATR). Oba te argumenty natrafiają na szereg problemów istotnie podważających ich wartość, a tym samym probabilizm (operacjonizm, wymuszony zakład, itd.). W niniejszym artykule wykazane zostało, iż odpowiednia reinterpretacja tych argumentów prowadzi do wyeliminowania najistotniejszych problemów.
EN
The aim of this article is to defend the so-called “pragmatic” arguments for probabilism, i.e., a thesis which holds that a rational agent’s degrees of belief should be modeled by the theory of probability. Two such arguments are analyzed: Dutch-Book Argument (DBA) and Representation Theorem Argument (RTA). Both of these arguments encounter a number of problems that seriously undermine their value, and thus probabilism (operationalism, a forced bet, etc.) The article shows that amongst the various interpretations of DBA and RTA we can find those that are able to resolve the main difficulties that beset those arguments.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.