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EN
The main question of the presented experiments has been whether the probability weighting function (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979) and configural weighting incorporated in the CPT model (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) can account for the overweighting of positive outcomes and underweigthing of negative outcomes, the phenomena first observed in the 50−ties (Irwin, 1953; Marks, 1951; – Marks-Irwin effect) and called unrealistic optimism in the current literature. In Experiment 1, carried out with 133 students, the relations between expectations of success, weights attributed to positive and 0 outcomes and the objective frequency of such outcomes were investigated in a skill situation, i. e. a competition for the best student paper. It was found that: (1) expectations of success depended strongly on the objective frequency of prizes, (2) the best outcomes were weighted in agreement with predictions of the CPT model, but (3) the same was not true for the worst outcome, i. e. 0. The results, however, could not be easily generalised because the situation was constructed such that no negative outcomes were present and 0 outcome was always the most probable. To extend studies to lotteries with negative outcomes and wider range of probabilities an additional experiment was carried out. In Experiment 2 284 students made choices between 10 pairs of 5-outcome mixed lotteries. These lotteries were constructed such the absolute utilities (calculated from CPT) of positive and negative outcomes were equal, and positive and negative outcomes had the same probabilities of occurrence. According to CPT, such lotteries should be always rejected. because negative outcomes are weighted more heavily, yielding negative overall CPT values of the lotteries. The results, however, did not support such predictions – the acceptance rate was close to 1/ . In general, the binominal distribution of acceptance of gambles with negative CPT values might suggest that some people assign optimistic weights to outcomes, i. e. overweight probabilities of positive outcomes and underweight probabilities of negative outcomes. In particular, individual differences in dispositional optimism (measured with the LOT scale) can reinforce such tendency.
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EN
When making decisions, people tend tooverweight small probabilities and underweight moderate and high probabilities. This bias is stronger for affect-rich outcomes. In the current research, we investigated the influence of object-irrelevant affect on distortions of probabilities. Subjects participated in two independent tasks. In the first one, participants had tofollow sets of stimuli displayed serially on ascreen. Depending on the experimental condition, neutral envelopes were presented with aset of other neutral or negative stimuli. In the second task, subjects declared certainty equivalents for nine lotteries by giving the maximum amount of money that they would pay in order toinsure negatively or neutrally conditioned envelopes from previous task. We estimated the probability weighting function described by two parameters – attractiveness of the lottery outcome and probability discriminability – for both experimental conditions, separately. Participants showed alower mean value of attractiveness for negatively conditioned envelopes. However, the discriminability parameter did not differ between conditions. Additionally, we found that less numerate individuals use object-irrelevant affect tomake decisions under risk, which is expressed in more pronounced distortions in probability weighting.
PL
Podejmując decyzje, ludzie zniekształcają obiektywne wartości prawdopodobieństw: niskie wartości prawdopodobieństw są przeważane, natomiast średnie iwysokie – niedoważane. Efekt ten nasila się wprzypadku loterii, których rezultaty wzbudzają silne emocje. Wartykule zamierzano zweryfikować, czy za efekty zniekształcenia prawdopodobieństw mogą być odpowiedzialne emocje niezwiązane bezpośrednio zprzedmiotem loterii. Badani brali udział wdwóch niezależnych zadaniach. Pierwsze zadanie polegało na śledzeniu serii zmieniających się bodźców. Zależnie od manipulacji, bodziec warunkowy – kopertę zawierającą określoną kwotę – eksponowano wraz zbodźcami neutralnymi lub bodźcami negatywnymi. Wdrugim zadaniu badani podawali ekwiwalenty pewne dla dziewięciu loterii pieniężnych deklarując maksymalną kwotę, którą byliby wstanie przeznaczyć na ubezpieczenie kopert uwarunkowanych neutralnie lub negatywnie wpoprzedniej części badania. Wobu warunkach eksperymentalnych przeprowadzono estymację funkcji wag decyzyjnych opisanej dwoma parametrami – atrakcyjności wyniku loterii oraz różnicowania wartości prawdopodobieństw. Uzyskane wyniki potwierdziły, że negatywny afekt wpływa na obniżenie parametru atrakcyjności loterii. Nie zaobserwowano istotnych różnic wparametrze różnicowania prawdopodobieństw. Dodatkowo wykazano, że osoby oniskich zdolnościach numerycznych zniekształcają prawdopodobieństwa wwagach decyzyjnych wwiększym stopniu niż osoby owysokich zdolnościach numerycznych, ponieważ swoje decyzje opierają na afekcie, który jest nieadekwatnie przypisany do przedmiotu oceny.
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