In this paper we ask about the role of macroprudential policies to affect the link between lending and capital ratio in countries differing in economic development and capital account openness. To resolve this problem we apply the GMM 2-step Blundell and Bond approach to a sample covering over 60 countries. Our results show that the effect of macroprudential policies on the association between lending and the capital ratio in non-crisis periods is stronger in advanced countries than in emerging countries. Differentiating by the level of capital account openness, we find that macroprudential policies are more effective in increasing the resilience of banks and thus weakening the association between loan supply and capital ratio for relatively closed economies but less effective for relatively open economies. Generally, with our study we are able to support the view that macroprudential policy has the potential to curb the procyclical impact of bank capital on lending.
In this paper we aim to find out whether bank specialization and bank capitalization affect the relationship between loans growth and capital ratio, both in expansions and in contractions. We hypothesize that the impact of bank capital on lending is relatively strong in cooperative banks and savings banks. We also expect that this effect is nonlinear, and is stronger in “low” capital banks than in “high” capital banks. In order to test our hypotheses, we apply the two-step GMM robust estimator for data spanning the years 1996–2011 on individual banks available in the Bankscope database. Our analysis shows that lending of poorly capitalized banks is more affected by capital ratio than lending of well-capitalized banks. Loans growth of cooperative and savings banks is more capital constrained that lending of commercial banks. Capital matters for the lending activity in contractions only in the case of savings and “low” capital banks.
In this paper we ask about the capacity of macroprudential policies to reduce the positive association between loans growth and the capital ratio. We focus on aggregated macroprudential policy measures and on individual instruments and test whether their effect on the association between lending and capital depends on bank size, the economic development of a country as well as on the extent of capital account openness. Applying the GMM 2-step Blundell and Bond approach to a sample covering over 60 countries, we find that macroprudential policy instruments reduce the impact of capital on bank lending during both crisis and non-crisis times. This result is stronger in large banks than in other banks. Of individual macroprudential instruments, only borrower-targeted LTV caps and DTI ratio weaken the association between lending and capital. Our results also show that the effect of macroprudential policies on the association between lending and the capital ratio in non-crisis periods is stronger in advanced countries than in emerging countries. Additionally, differentiating by the level of capital account openness, we find that macroprudential policies are more effective in increasing the resilience of banks and thus weakening the association between loan supply and capital ratio for relatively closed economies but less effective for relatively open economies. Generally, with our study we are able to support the view that macroprudential policy has the potential to curb the procyclical impact of bank capital on lending and therefore, the introduction of more restrictive international capital standards included in Basel III and of macroprudential policies are fully justified.
This paper extends the literature on the link between lending and capital by examining the role of equity ownership structure for this link in banks operating in the European Union. As theory predicts, publiclytraded banks are more prone to heightened agency problems (moral hazard and adverse selection) due to dispersed ownership and therefore have stronger incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking especially in economic expansions. This may bring about procyclical lending effect in economic downturns. Theory also predicts that these banks are also more affected by capital market frictions in economic downturns. Applying Blundell and Bond (1998) two step robust GMM estimator we predict and find that the link between lending and capital in economic downturns is stronger in publicly-traded banks than in privately- held banks, which may be a result of greater conditional accounting conservatism of publicly-traded banks. Additionally, the link between lending and capital during expansions is stronger in the case of privately- held banks reporting unconsolidated data, but not for banks reporting consolidated financial reports, consistent with the view that limited access to capital markets increases the cost of external finance of private banks. Finally, we find empirical support for the view that lending of privately- held banks is not constrained by capital ratio in economic downturns. Our results stress the importance of conditional conservatism for the effectiveness macroprudential policy, in particular countercyclical capital buffers.
We analyze the effectiveness of various macroprudential policy instruments in reducing the procyclicality of loan-loss provisions (LLPs) using individual bank information from over 65 countries and applying the two-step GMM Blundell-Bond (1998) approach with robust standard errors. Our research identifies several new facts. Firstly, borrower restrictions are definitely more effective in reducing the procyclicality of loan-loss provisions than other macroprudential policy instruments. This effect is supported in both unconsolidated and consolidated data and is robust to several robustness checks. Secondly, dynamic provisions, large exposure concentration limits and taxes on specific assets are effective in reducing the procyclicality of loan-loss provisions. And finally, we find that both loan-to-value caps and debt-to-income ratios, are especially effective in reducing the procyclicality of LLP of large banks. Off-balance-sheet restrictions, concentration limits and taxes are also effective in reducing the procyclicality of LLP of large banks. Dynamic provisions reduce the procyclicality of LLP independently of bank size.
Procyclicality in banking may result in financial instability and therefore be destructive to economic growth. The sensitivity of different banking balance sheet and income statement variables to the business cycle is diversified and may be prone to increasing integration of financial markets. In this paper we address the problem of the influence of financial integration on the transmission of economic shocks from one country to another and consequently on the sensitivity of loan loss provisions to the business cycle. We also aim to find out whether earnings management hypotheses are supported throughout the whole business cycle. Application of the SURE approach to 13 OECD countries in 1995-2009 shows that the procyclicality of LLP is statistically significant almost in thewhole sample of countries. Independent of the econometric specification, the earnings management hypotheses are hardly supported.
This article brings up the issue of procyclicality of banking activity stemming, among other things, from Basel II banking regulations and banks’ management practices. It also tries to examine the applicability of tools aimed to limit excessive credit granting (limits on LtV, DtI) as potential macroprudential solutions. It explores dominant trends in empirical studies on the issue of Basel banking regulation procyclicality and some of their shortcomings, including data used. To remedy these drawbacks and lack of some information, which seem crucial from the author’s point of view, the research survey is proposed. This article describes construction of the survey and comments on some results obtained from the survey conducted among banks from the European Union. The author attempted to verify, among other things, whether advanced methods used in calculation of capital requirements or in credit granting process, increase probability of decreasing credit supply. It was also investigated whether banks had their own limits on credit granting that were stricter than regulatory ones and thereby anticyclical use of such limits may be limited. However, the results obtained by the author do not allow to verify them in statistically significant manner and should not be used in formulating more general proposals. Further research using the proposed methodology should be conducted under auspices of respected international organisation like World Bank, national supervisory bodies or national central banks.
This paper aims to identify the effect of macroprudential policies and microprudential regulations and their interactions on the sensitivity of leverage and liquidity funding risk to the business cycle. Analysing the sample of 782 banks we find that both macroprudential and microprudential instruments have insignificant impact on the procyclicality of leverage in the non-crisis period. Macroprudential instruments decrease the procyclicality of liquidity risk during the non-crisis period and increase the procyclicality of leverage during the crisis. Restrictions on the range of activities conducted by banks reduce the procyclicality of liquidity risk during the non-crisis period. Interaction between the macroprudential instruments targeted at risk-taking by borrowers and restrictions on the range of activities taken by banks has been found to be effective in reducing the procyclicality of leverage during the crisis period.
In this paper we explore several new factors which may affect the procyclicality of loan-loss provisions. In particular, we test whether there are visible differences in sensitivity of loan-loss provisions to the business cycle between commercial and cooperative banks as well as between large, medium and small banks. We also aim to find out whether the level of bank capital ratio and the application of discretionary income-smoothing affect procyclicality of loan-loss provisions. Our results show that loan-loss provisions of banks are procyclical. This procyclicality is particularly visible and stronger in the sample of commercial banks. We also find that loan-loss provisions of large banks are more negatively affected by the business cycle than those of medium or small banks. We show that banks with low capital ratios exhibit increased procyclicality of loan-loss provisions. And finally, we also find empirical evidence that banks with a greater degree of discretionary income-smoothing have loan-loss provisions more negatively affected by the business cycle, and thus more procyclical.
This paper extends the literature on the capital crunch effect by examining the role of public policy for the link between lending and capital in a sample of large banks operating in the European Union. Applying Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step robust GMM estimator we show that restrictions on bank activities and more stringent capital standards weaken the capital crunch effect, consistent with reduced risk taking and boosted bank charter values. Official supervision also reduces the impact of capital ratio on lending in downturns. Private oversight seems to be related to thin capital buffers in expansions, and therefore the capital crunch effect is enhanced in countries with increased market discipline. We thus provide evidence that neither regulations nor supervision at the microprudential level is neutral from a financial stability perspective. Weak regulations and supervision seem to increase the pro-cyclical effect of capital on bank lending.
This paper attempts to find out whether better quality of investor protection matters for the effect of capital ratio on loan growth of large EU banks in 1996-2011. We focus on several measures of the quality of investor protection with a proven track record in the banking literature, i.e.: anti-self-dealing index, ex-antecontrol and ex-post-control of anti-self-dealing indices, and creditor protection rights index. Our results show that better investor protection increases the procyclical impact of capital on lending in the sample of banks reporting unconsolidated data. This is consistent with the view that better shareholders rights protection induces bank borrowers to take more loans and to engage in more risk-taking, in particular during economic booms, which results in greater sensitivity of bank lending to capital ratios in economic downturns. The opposite effect is found in the sample of banks reporting consolidated data. This effect is consistent with the view that better minority shareholders protection may reduce risk-taking incentives of large banks and result in better risk management of credit portfolio (and other investments of such banks).
This article presents explanations of the procyclicality phenonomenon with the application of the theory of market failures and behavioral finance. This analysis shows that the most important failures include: externalities of strategic complementarities (the classical herding phenomenon), fire sale externalities (i.e. asset prices spirals); network externalities (i.e. contagion risk). The theory of market failures does not say the whole story about the procyclicality phenomenon. To get a fuller picture of procyclicality one has to resort to behavioral finance, i.e. availability heuristics and threshold heuristics. The analysis also focuses on macroprudential instruments in their potential to affect financial cycle and soundness of financial sector. The article aims also to identify basic limitation of macroprudential policy instruments.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono wyjaśnienia zjawiska procykliczności działalności depozytowo-kredytowej na gruncie teorii zawodności mechanizmu rynkowego oraz na gruncie finansów behawioralnych. Wskazano, że wśród takich głównych zakłóceń znajdują się: efekty zewnętrzne związane ze strategicznymi komplementarnościami, z masową sprzedażą aktywów oraz z powiązaniami (i prowadzące do zjawiska zarażania). Zakłócenia mechanizmu rynkowego zakorzenione w teorii ekonomii klasycznej nie dają pełnego obrazu procykliczności działalności depozytowo-kredytowej. Aby ją lepiej zrozumieć, należy odwołać się do osiągnięć finansów behawioralnych. Analizie poddano również podstawowe antycykliczne instrumenty polityki makroostrożnościowej oraz mechanizm transmisji tych instrumentów w obszarze oddziaływania na cykl kredytowy i odporność sektora finansowego oraz określono również czynniki, które mogą ograniczać skuteczność i efektywność tych instrumentów.
Using the two step system GMM Blundell and Bond estimator this paper documents a large cross-bank and cross-country variation in the relationship between loan loss provisions (LLP) and the business cycle and explores bank management specific, bank-activity specific and country specific (institutional and regulatory) features that explain this diversity in the European Union. Our results indicate that LLP in large, publicly traded and commercial banks, as well as in banks reporting consolidated statements, are more procyclical. Better investor protection and more restrictive bank capital regulations reduce the procyclicality of LLP. We do not find support for the view that better quality of market monitoring mitigates the sensitivity of LLP to business cycle. Our findings clearly indicate the empirical importance of income smoothing, capital management and credit risk management for decreased procyclicality of LLP.
This article aims to analyse the implications of time dimension of systemic risk (procyclicality) on the conduct of macroprudential policy. A multitude of procyclicality factors imply the need for multiple anticyclical tools addressing particular factors. The analysis shows that macroprudential authority should take a proactive stance and analyse financial stability within a longer time horizon, so as not to experience the paradox of financial instability or be subject to inaction bias. Macroprudential supervision should act both during boom (limiting the build-up of systemic risk) and recession (mitigating its materialisation) and, regardless of the financial cycle phase, seek to strengthen resilience of the financial system to shocks. The key to its effectiveness is development of an operational framework and ways to effectively implement its tools, taking intoaccount different attitudes towards procyclicality of the institutions responsible for conducting macroprudential policy.
PL
Celem artykułu jest analiza wpływu czasowego wymiaru ryzyka systemowego – procykliczności na sposób sprawowania nadzoru makroostrożnościowego. Mnogość czynników procyklicznych implikuje konieczność opracowania wielu narzędzi antycyklicznych ograniczających poszczególne czynniki. Z analizy wynika, że działania nadzoru makroostrożnościowego powinny przyjąć postawę proaktywną oraz należy przyjąć dłuższy horyzont analizy uwzględniający przyszłą niestabilność bez ulegania paradoksowi niestabilności i bezczynności. Nadzór makroostrożnościowy powinien działać zarówno w okresie ożywienia (ograniczanie narastania ryzyka systemowego), jak i dekoniunktury (łagodzenie przejawów jego materializacji), a niezależnie od fazy cyklu dążyć do wzmacniania odporności systemu finansowego na szoki. Kluczowe dla jego skuteczności jest opracowanie ram działania i sposobu implementacji jego narzędzi i uwzględnienie różnego nastawienia wobec procykliczności instytucji wchodzących w skład organu nadzoru makroostrożnościowego.
The paper discusses and evaluates proposals from various economists and politicians on how to reduce procyclicality-or behaviors positively correlated with the overall state of the economy-in the banking sector. The author juxtaposes these proposals with specific reform measures, both those that have already been implemented and those planned in the future. Małecki defines procyclicality as “such operations of banking sector entities that contribute to more intense fluctuations in the business cycle.” The author reviews arguments that either support or counter the proposition that the banking sector is procyclical. He then looks at these arguments in the context of reforms that have already been implemented or are expected to take effect in the future. The key conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is that there is no single miracle remedy for the problems arising from the procyclicality of the banking sector, Małecki says. An optimal measure that could help significantly reduce the procyclicality effect is a combination of various measures involving structural reforms as well as changes in banking regulation and in how stabilization policy is pursued, the author adds. Structural and regulatory reforms carried out in the banking sector in recent years have generally followed the path recommended by many economists, according to Małecki. The same goes for changes in how countercyclical macroeconomic policy has been pursued, the author says. However, these changes have not been radical enough and leave a lot to be desired in terms of an optimal mix of reforms designed to prevent procyclicality in the banking sector, the author concludes. Thus, it is hardly possible to expect that procyclicality will be substantially limited any time in the foreseeable future, Małecki says.
PL
Celem artykułu jest omówienie i ocena zgłaszanych przez ekonomistów i polityków gospodarczych propozycji przeciwdziałania procykliczności sektora bankowego, a następnie konfrontacja z tymi propozycjami reform już realizowanych oraz zapowiadanych. Procykliczność jest tutaj rozumiana, jako takie funkcjonowanie sektora bankowego, które przyczynia się do wzmacniania wahań koniunktury gospodarczej. Dla zrealizowania tego zamierzenia najpierw pokrótce przytaczane są argumenty przemawiające za tezą o procykliczności sektora bankowego. Następnie przedstawiane są różne propozycje przeciwdziałania tej procykliczności. Wreszcie, z omawianymi propozycjami konfrontowane są reformy, zarówno już realizowane jak i zapowiadane. Podstawowym wnioskiem z przeprowadzonej analizy jest, iż nie ma jednego, cudownego remedium na problem procykliczności sektora bankowego. Optymalnym rozwiązaniem, które mogłoby pozwolić na istotne ograniczenie tej procykliczności, wydaje się połączenie różnych działań obejmujących zarówno reformy strukturalne, zmiany regulacji, jak i zmiany w sposobie prowadzenia polityki stabilizacyjnej. Podjęte w ostatnich latach reformy strukturalne i regulacyjne sektora bankowego, a także zmiany w sposobie prowadzenia antycyklicznej polityki makroekonomicznej zmierzają we właściwym, postulowanym przez wielu ekonomistów kierunku. Jednocześnie są one zdecydowanie nie dość daleko idące i pozostają odległe od przedstawionej w niniejszym artykule kombinacji tych reform, uznanej za optymalną z punktu widzenia przeciwdziałania procykliczności sektora bankowego. Tym samym trudno oczekiwać w dającej się przewidzieć przyszłości istotniejszego ograniczenia tej procykliczności.
This article examines the impact of bank capital ratios on cooperative banks’ lending by comparing differences in loan growth to differences in capital ratios at sets of banks that are clustered based on capital ratio size. Applying a fixed-effects estimator to a sample of cooperative banks operating in Poland and using a unique quarterly dataset covering the period of 2000:1-2012:4, we find that loans’ growth is particularly capitalconstrained in poorly-capitalized banks, but only in non-recessionary ones. Lending of poorly capitalized banks is strongly affected by the interest rate margin, which is also important in determining the loans’ growth of medium and large cooperative banks. Generally the results add support to the view that small banks, such as cooperative banks, are not capital-constrained in recessionary periods, thus their customers do not suffer from the capital crunch in unfavourable macroeconomic conditions. However, their lending activity is procyclical, because increases in the unemployment rate result in decreases in the loans’ growth of cooperative banks in Poland.
PL
Artykuł analizuje wpływ współczynnika kapitałowego na aktywność kredytową banków spółdzielczych, biorąc pod uwagę stopień dokapitalizowania tych banków. W badaniu zastosowano estymator z ustalonymi efektami stałymi na próbie danych kwartalnych dotyczących banków spółdzielczych w Polsce w okresie 2000:1-2012:4 i zidentyfikowano, że stopa wzrostu kredytów jest szczególnie wrażliwa na współczynnik kapitałowy w przypadku słabo dokapitalizowanych banków, przede wszystkim w okresie ożywienia. Aktywność kredytowa banków słabo dokapitalizowanych jest również bardzo wrażliwa na wskaźnik marży odsetkowej netto. Efekt ten utrzymuje się również w przypadku pozostałych banków. Ogólnie wyniki badania dają podstawę do stwierdzenia, że aktywność kredytowa małych lokalnych banków, którymi zazwyczaj są banki spółdzielcze, nie jest ograniczona przez współczynniki adekwatności kapitałowej w okresie recesji. Zatem ich klienci nie odczuwają skutków kryzysu kapitałowego w niesprzyjających uwarunkowaniach makroekonomicznych. Jednakże aktywność kredytowa tych banków jest procykliczna, ponieważ przy wzroście stopy bezrobocia następuje spadek stopy wzrostu kredytów banków spółdzielczych w Polsce.
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