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EN
The principle of prohibition of reformatio in peius is established in Article 134 § 2 of the Law on Proceedings Before Administrative Courts. According to this provision the administrative court is not allowed to issue a decision to the detriment of the complainant. A judgment adverse to the complainant can be exceptionally issued but only if the court fi nds a violation of the law resulting in the annulment of the challenged act or action. This principle is a procedural institution which ensures that the complainant’s situation will not deteriorate due to the decision of the administrative court. There are many interpretative doubts concerning the prohibition of reformatio in peius in the doctrine and the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. This is because administrative courts very rarely issue a decision on the merits. Decisions of administrative courts are basically of cassation nature. When the administrative court allows a complaint, the contested act is generally eliminated from the system of law and the case is returned for re-examination by the public administrative authority. It is therefore very diffi cult to determine the content of the prohibition of reformatio in peius in administrative court proceedings and in practice the prohibition of a change for the worse is not a real guarantee of the protection of the interests of the complainant. In the author’s opinion, the way of approaching the mechanism of application of the prohibition of reformatio in peius by the administrative courts needs to be changed. And yet, a signifi cant improvement in the eff ectiveness of the protection against the worsening of the complainant’s legal situation will only be possible through the introduction of a new legal regulation restricting the jurisdiction of public administrative authority, which will reconsider the case after the cassation judgment issued by the administrative court.
Ius Novum
|
2023
|
vol. 17
|
issue 3 ENG
79-94
PL
The aim of the paper is to analyse how the term ‘appellate measure’ is interpreted in the Polish doctrine of criminal procedure law and, in particular, to assess the accuracy of the assumption that the possibility of recognising a particular means of indictment of a decision as an appellate measure is determined by its normative features. Based on the analysis of the characteristic features of each means of indictment of a decision, an attempt is made to demonstrate that this assumption may be regarded as incorrect. It is suggested that the previous definition of an appellate measure be revised, and recognise that this concept is purely of a conventional (traditional) nature, which means that the possibility of classifying a particular means of indictment of a decision as an appellate measure should not depend on its nature or similarity to other legal measures considered as means of indictment of a decision.
EN
For over 30 years there has been a discussion in criminal proceedings doctrine about the scope of the prohibition on reformatio in peius in proceedings pending as a result of bringing an objection to an injunction verdict. It boils down not only to the interpretation of regulations expressing the attitude of the legislator on this issue, but also affects the assessment of the compliance of individual regulations with constitutional and convention norms, or whether it refers to the purposefulness of regulating this issue in one way or another, entailing the expression by individual authors of various applications de lege ferenda. In this work, the author deals with the current state of science and jurisprudence in relation to this problem, and also presents his own position in this regard.
PL
W doktrynie prawa karnego procesowego od przeszło 30 lat toczy się dyskusja na temat zakresu obowiązywania zakazu reformationis in peius w postępowaniu zainicjowanym wniesieniem sprzeciwu od wyroku nakazowego. Sprowadza się ona nie tylko do kwestii interpretacji przepisów wyrażających stosunek ustawodawcy do tego zagadnienia, ale dotyka również oceny zgodności poszczególnych uregulowań ustawowych z normami wyższego rzędu. Dyskusja ta odnosi się także do obszaru celowości uregulowania tej problematyki w taki czy inny sposób, wiążąc się z wyrażaniem przez poszczególnych przedstawicieli piśmiennictwa przeróżnych wniosków de lege ferenda. W niniejszej pracy zajęto się obecnym stanem nauki i orzecznictwa w odniesieniu do omawianego zagadnienia, a także zaprezentowano w tym względzie własne stanowisko.
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