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Propozice, obrazy a fikční světy

100%
EN
The author focuses on the role of propositions and images in the constitution of the fictional world of a narrative literary work. He critically examines Martínez-Bonati's idea of the "alienation" of sentence-meanings in images, based on Husserl's notion of fulfillment (Erfüllung). In particular: 1. He points out that not only expressed propositions, but also other (emotional and style-determining) parameters of sentence-meanings and even failures or disturbances in expressing propositions can participate in generating acts of imagination with mimetic functions. 2. He argues that the notion of fulfillment (as applied to sentence meanings) should be extended so as to include all experiences with mimetic function: visual images should be approached as one of the variety of kinds of (literarily-productive) imaginative fulfillment. 3. He rejects the interpretation of fulfillment as alienation (or dissolution) of meanings in images: among other things, he argues that this would eliminate the communicative scheme within which the interpretation of a text of narrative fiction takes place.
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2013
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vol. 11
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issue 2
103-130
EN
This work argues that the Basque reportative particle omen contributes to the propositional contents of the utterance, and it is not an illocutionary force indicator, contrary to what seems to be suggested by the standard view on omen. The results of the application of the assent/dissent test for the case of omen show that subjects not only accept a rejection of the reported content (p), but also a rejection of the evidential content (pomen) itself. The results are similar to those of the verb esan ‘to say’. It is, then, proposed that the difference between these two elements can be explained by distinguishing between the contents of the utterances (with Korta & Perry 2007, 2011), regarding the (non-)articulation of the original speaker.
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2013
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vol. 11
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issue 2
103-130
EN
This work argues that the Basque reportative particle omen contributes to the propositional contents of the utterance, and it is not an illocutionary force indicator, contrary to what seems to be suggested by the standard view on omen. The results of the application of the assent/dissent test for the case of omen show that subjects not only accept a rejection of the reported content (p), but also a rejection of the evidential content (pomen) itself. The results are similar to those of the verb esan ‘to say’. It is, then, proposed that the difference between these two elements can be explained by distinguishing between the contents of the utterances (with Korta & Perry 2007, 2011), regarding the (non-)articulation of the original speaker.  
EN
Starting with the assumption that the proposition (i.e. predicate > argument(s) structure) is the basic unit of the semantic structure of the text, the author argues that the relation > predicate > argument in its turn is the basic link in the process of the construction of the text. She distinguishes three types of predicates: (a) those which inform about the relations between the parts of the world around us and about the characteristics of these parts (cf. ‘stand’, ‘sleep’, ‘build’, ‘destroy’, ‘white’, ‘old’, ‘tall’, ‘man’, ‘animal’, ‘river’, sea’) and which accept arguments whose referents are parts of that world; (b) those which inform about our mental, emotional, volitional reactions to that world (cf. ‘think’, ‘know’, ‘like’, ‘wish’, ‘want’, ‘ask’, ‘command’) and which accept also arguments whose referents are events, states of affairs, processes, i.e. propositional arguments; (c) those which inform about the ways of our thinking and concluding about the events, states, processes happening around us (cf. ‘coexist’, ‘exclude’, ‘succeed’, ‘precede’, ‘overlap’, ‘cause’, ‘let’, ‘stipulate’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘before’, after’, because’, ‘if’) and which only accept propositional arguments. She concludes that however complex and/or context dependent a sentence is, it should be understood and interpreted as a hierarchically organized proposition.
5
Content available remote

PREDYKAT vs ARGUMENT (semantyka i forma)

88%
Rocznik Slawistyczny
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2017
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vol. 66
109-116
EN
In the frame of the grammatical description “from meaning to form” the author promotes the thesis that arguments implied by verbal predicates stand in the syntactic position primarily designed for noun phrases.
EN
The paper raises the topic of what the functional and logical notion of subject is. It examines the syntax-semantic nature of Icelandic and Polish quirky subject constructions (subjectless clauses in which the initial DP bears oblique Case) with psych-verbs. Of main interest is the full vs. default agreement on V which nominative DPs and quirky subjects always trigger, respectively. We attempt to define the primitive notion of subject from two standpoints – its LF representation and how it is mirrored syntactically by the predication relation of the subject with respect to vP/VP and the proposition of the sentence in TP between the subject and T′. We discuss the semantic and configurational dependencies between quirky subjects and nominative DPs and vP and TP/CP. The paper investigates also the landing site for non-nominative initial DPs and argues for the Topic Phrase in the Left Periphery (Rizzi 1997) as a most natural candidate to host quirky subjects. Hopefully, the conclusions reached here may offer some way of bringing the notion of subject towards its more satisfactory understanding and description within the generative approach.
EN
Built in argument positions and the propositions intensional completenessThe paper discusses issues concerning the potential influence of built in argument positions on the propositions intensional completeness. According to the chosen scientific approach the distribution of determiners is a reflex of the propositions completeness, there seem to exist however such structures in which one of the argument positions is blocked due to being built into the predicate. The intensional value of such positions may vary and theoretically reflect the propositions definiteness / indefiniteness (intensional completeness). Predicates such as: търся implicate a locative argument position, which is inherently indefinite, but does not seem to reflect the distribution of determiners.
XX
The article presents arguments for theological and logical fatalism and analyzes the view that the theological fatalism can be reduced to or transformed into the logical one. Next, there follows a critique of Linda Zagzebski’s thesis that theological fatal- ism is not reducible to logical fatalism. The article begins with a brief presentation of the controversy between the proponents and opponents of the theological fatalism.
EN
This paper questions the logic behind the presence and the working of the EPP-feature in Polish dual copula clauses (henceforth, DCCs) with the pronominal copula to, the verbal copula być ‘to be’, and two nominative 3rd person DPs, as represented in Bondaruk (2019). The criticism follows from: (i) – Chomsky’s (2000, 2001) downward Agree operation; (ii) – the view that the predicator encodes the predication relation between the pre-copular subject and the post-copular predicate; (iii) – selective multiple Agree, whereby the satisfaction of the EPP- and uφ-features is divorced. Adopting (i)–(iii), Bondaruk’s scrutiny allows either the pre- or the post-copular DP to occupy SpecTP, thereby accounting for DCCs’ agreement and configurational patterns, but, simultaneously, suffering from theoretical shortcomings it creates. We argue for a simpler satisfaction of the subject requirement which does not rely on the troublesome EPP-feature, but is motivated formally by the relation between T and the higher DP. We derive this requirement by following Zeiljstra’s (2012) upward Agree which only takes place once interpretable features c-command uninterpretable features, and Rothstein’s (2004) approach which is based on a neo-Davidsonian event semantics and which argues that be and its complement form a complex predicate, separated from the pre-copular DP both semantically and syntactically.
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2020
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vol. 30
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issue 2
59-76
EN
The paper presents the results of the second stage of research on business models of language schools. It was assumed that there is a significant difference in the value propositions of schools and the expectations of their clients. An examination procedure was planned with the use of a questionnaire and statistical analysis such as factor analysis, on its basis. Respondents consisted of a group of school managers (representing the majority of enterprises in Lower Silesia) on the one hand and, on the other hand, a large group of former and current clients. The results of the research confirm the existence of a gap in the perception of the values of both groups. The analysis has been conducted in the convention of the business model canvas template. The distinctness of the offer’s perception is presented in the form of activity packages, responsible for creating value for the clients (the right side of the model canvas). The structure of the packages, as a picture of the gap, is discussed. The results of the first stage of the research, diagnosing the influence of the surrounding elements on the business models of lan-guage schools, are also referred to. Directional changes in the business models that result from both stages of the research are suggested. The strategic dimension of the gap results from the strategy-busi-ness model relation. In light of the literature review, it may be supposed that the research is unique due to the segment of subjects and research methodology
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2018
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vol. 7
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issue 1
81-99
EN
In MS 620 (1909), C. S. Peirce crafts his ultimate statement regarding habit-formation. Here he defines and illustrates the influence of specific vivid virtual habits with the objective of changing future beliefs/actions. The specificity of the protoplans as determinations invites immediate implementation of action interventions, or recommendations to change action approaches. In this way, virtual habits transcend mere possibility for implementation of the action strategy; their vividity and specificity uniquely qualify them as soon to be actualized episodes.
EN
Internalism (Frege; Searle) and externalism (Putnam 1975; Burge 1979) are related doctrines in the philosophy of language and mind, mostly centered on the role of reference in the individuation of propositions. This debate has recently been extended in speech act theory from content to force. But here the landscape becomes more complicated. It has been recently argued that speech act theory got off the track after Austin by internalizing Austin's "felicity" conditions. In reply it is noted that the issue of internalism and externalism is more nuanced-there are internal and external elements in many theories, and a preliminary categorization is attempted here. Furthermore, internalism also has its virtues, which are largely overlooked, and we attempt to redress that imbalance.
EN
The relationship between Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language (hereafter LSL) ([1934] 1937) and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) ([1921] 1922) has been interpreted in several ways during past decades. One of the interpretations has gained keen advocates among Carnap scholars. It was originally provoked by what Caranp said in LSL, and it consists of two parts. First, it indicates that in TLP the possibility of speaking about the logical form of a language within the same language (which happens to be the only language that there is) had been foresworn by Wittgenstein, but Carnap proved him wrong by producing a book (LSL) written exactly in the manner which had been proscribed by Wittgenstein. This is the debate about the possibility of speaking about logical form. Second, Wittgenstein’s dogmatism with regard to the existence of a unique correct grammar at the foundation of the language has been contrasted with Carnap’s open-mindedness in conceiving a boundless ocean of possibilities for constructing logical systems. Interestingly enough, Wittgenstein rambled with rage in reaction to Carnap’s view about the LSL-TLP relationship. But unlike Carnap’s view, which led to a dominant interpretation of the relationship, Wittgenstein’s testimony about the case has been strangely ignored in the history of analytic philosophy. In this paper, I try to make an inquiry about the grounds for Wittgenstein’s dissatisfaction with the Carnapian reading of the LSL-TLP relationship. I will show that Wittgenstein was not totally unfair in his judgment, and that some salient aspects of LSL (recognized as the anti-Tractarian aspects of the work) could be best understood in the light, or rather the gloom, of TLP, and bear a significant resemblance to it. This, however, does not need to diminish the logical and historical significance of LSL.
PL
The article in question deals with the linguistic contrastive analysis of the semanticosyntactic structure of Ukrainian and English proverbs. The attention has been focused on the sentence structure including stylistic, functional and semantic overtones. Paroemias are considered as a complicated semantic category which may refl ect the specifi city of perception of the objective reality by the representatives of diff erent ethnos in general and each fragment in particular. In a wide sense a paroemia is an archetype unit that represents ancient culture, traditions and mentality of each nation. The common and diff erent features have been identifi ed according to structure, lexical background and meaning. The most widespread similarities and diff erences have been determined in both languages with the help of structural models.
EN
Heidegger claimed that traditional understanding of the truth as correspondence of the proposition with the entity is grounded in more primordial phenomena. He called them “the more fundamental truth”. Heidegger pointed out that the latter also comprise of such phenomena as Entdeckend-sein der Aussage and Erschlossenheit of the human Dasein. However, Heidegger’s attempt to call these phenomena as “the fundamental truths” can be justified only when they possessed so key character as the traditional concept of the truth. The latter understands its content as a basic regulative idea which is binding for all our thinking and talking about anything real. That is why the truth is considered as a necessary condition of possibility of any authentic bond among people. This key character of the truth does not exist in the mentioned-above phenomena. Hence, the attempt to call them “the truth” seems to be unjustified and mistaken.
EN
In this article I attempt to show that grammatical categories such as the adverbs dabei (with it/them) and doch (but, still) in German can be explained as prosodic, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic continuum based on their core meaning. Some classifications described and maintained in the traditional grammar of German, especially represented by the „valency grammar“, i.e. classifications as „sentential adverbs“ or „discourse markers“, therefore should be neutralized and newly considered. The grammatical categories in charge should be understood as crossing over the unit of sentence, and in this respect they are not „Satzglieder“ (sentence constituents), but „Äußerungsglieder“ (utterance constituents) as Darski (2010) claims. In the „adverbial“ area prosodic features and syntactic positions closely correspond to each other and on the other hand semantic contents and pragmatic effects do correspond too. The continuous scale of the elements dabei and doch can be seen as an ample example for demonstrating the „iconic“ relation between prosody/syntax and semantics/pragmatics, i.e. between forms and functions.
EN
Transcendental Phenomenology of language wrestles with the relationship of language to mind’s manifestation of being. Of special interest is the sense in which language is, like one’s embodiment, a medium of manifestation. Not only does it permit sharing the world because words as worldly things embody meanings that can be the same for everyone; not only does speaking manifest to others the common world from the speaker’s perspective; but also speaking, as a meaning to say, may achieve the manifestation of the world also for the speaker herself. This requires finding the right words to form true propositions in a well-formed sentences. The manifest telos of proposition-rendering sentences is adumbrated and founded in the infant’s elemental formation of simple phonemic identity syntheses and syntax. This instinctual dynamism is founded in what Husserl names “the idea of truth” which supports the thesis of a universal language instinct.
EN
According to Kaplan’s bidimensional theory of demonstratives, the descriptive content of any indexical term (and the sentences they appear in) is only employed to determine its reference in any possible world rigidly but cannot be expressed by the sentence’s truth conditions. Kaplan then argues that an indexical sentence’s informativeness depends on what he calls its character, a property of the context that relates a particular context to a concrete content, but it cannot be a part of the proposition the sentence entertains (its content), primarily given the logical inconsistencies the opposite would show in the theory of conditionals and counterfactuals. I agree with Kaplan that indexicals should not be considered disguised descriptions. Nevertheless, I believe that their content is informative and, therefore, part of the proposition these sentences express, even though that implies accepting the existence of content shifting operators within the same context --what Kaplan dubbed monsters. This paper, therefore, presents an alternative account to indexical terms and sentences employing the Interactive Theory introduced in Colomina-Alminana (2022). This approach considers that the meaning of any sentence, the proposition it expresses, depends upon three interrelated factors: the speaker’s intentions when uttering, the audience’s potential uptakes of such statement, and the conventions established by the speech community both speaker and audience belong, or the linguistic interaction takes place. The critical element is the so-called speaker's point of view, an objective perspectival networking background that allows lexical and syntactic mechanisms to trigger and update potential conceptual presuppositional content shared by both speaker and audience and whose existence is prior to any context and circumstances.
19
63%
PL
W teorii dowodzenia sądowego w procesie karnym dostrzec można rozbieżność, dotyczącą przedmiotu dowodu. Wyróżnia się dwa główne stanowiska. Pierwsze głosi, że przedmiotem dowodu jest fakt, drugie natomiast, że jest nim twierdzenie, wyrażane zdaniem. Artykuł przedstawia możliwe rozwiązanie tej kontrowersji. Punktem wyjścia jest spostrzeżenie, iż nośnikami prawdy są twierdzenia/zdania, nie zaś fakty. Skoro zatem prawda jest jedną z podstawowych wartości w procesie karnym, to wynika z tego, że przedmiotem dowodu jest twierdzenie. Po drugie, w toku postępowania dowodowego prowadzone są rozumowania w postaci operacji myślowych – te zaś mogą być prowadzone tylko z użyciem zdań. Artykuł kończy się konkluzją, iż przedmiotem dowodu jest twierdzenie; udowodnienie faktu jest epistemologicznie niemożliwe. Rozwiązanie takie wydaje się korzystne dla teorii dowodzenia, gdyż może wpłynąć na poprawę jakości rozumowań dowodowych, w tym także na jakość uzasadnień wyroków.
EN
In the theory of evidential reasoning in a criminal trial, there is a discrepancy in the subject matter of proof. There are two main positions. The first one states that the object of proof is fact, while the second one is a statement expressed in a sentence. The article presents a possible solution to this controversy. The starting point is the observation that the bearers of truth are statements/sentences. Therefore, since truth is one of the basic values in criminal proceedings, it results that the object of proof is a claim. Secondly, in the course of evidential reasoning is carried out in the form of thought operations - these can only be carried out with the use of sentences. The article ends with an conclusion that the object of evidence is a proposition; proving the fact is epistemologically impossible. Such a solution seems to be beneficial for the theory of proof, as it may improve the quality of evidential reasoning, including the quality of justifications of verdicts.
20
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Four Basic Argument Forms

63%
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2019
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vol. 17
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issue 1
57-69
EN
This paper provides a theoretical rationale for distinguishing four basic argument forms. On the basis of a survey of classical and contemporary definitions of argument, a set of assumptions is formulated regarding the linguistic and pragmatic aspects of arguments. It is demonstrated how these assumptions yield four different argument forms: (1) first-order predicate arguments, (2) first-order subject arguments, (3) second-order subject arguments, and (4) second-order predicate arguments. These argument forms are then further described and illustrated by means of concrete examples, and it is explained how they are visually represented in the Periodic Table of Arguments.
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