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A Theory of Propositions

100%
Smith N. J. J.
Logic and Logical Philosophy
|
2016
|
vol. 25
|
issue 1
83-125
EN
In this paper I present a new theory of propositions, according to which propositions are abstract mathematical objects: well-formed formulas together with models. I distinguish the theory from a number of existing views and explain some of its advantages - chief amongst which are the following. On this view, propositions are unified and intrinsically truth-bearing. They are mind- and language-independent and they are governed by logic. The theory of propositions is ontologically innocent. It makes room for an appropriate interface with formal semantics and it does not enforce an overly fine or overly coarse level of granularity.
2
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Truth-Bearers in Frege and the Tractatus

75%
Bronzo S.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2019
|
vol. 47
31-53
EN
This paper argues that the Tractatus breaks deeply with Frege’s account of truth-bearers as mind-independent entities, and is closer to the act-theoretic approach recently defended, for example, by Scott Soames and Peter Hanks. For the Tractatus, the primary truth-bearers are facts-in-use, which essentially involve acts, as well as facts functioning as instruments of representation. The Tractarian account, it is further argued, can vindicate three platitudes that constitute the main motivation of Frege’s approach.
3
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Above Reason Propositions and Contradiction in the Religious Thought of Robert Boyle

63%
Marko J. S.
Forum Philosophicum
|
2014
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vol. 19
|
issue 2
227–239
EN
In this essay, I argue that Robert Boyle does not hold that true religion requires us to believe doctrines that are in violation of the law of noncontradiction or that it yields logical contradictions. Rather, due to the epistemological limitations of human reason, we are sometimes called to believe doctrines or propositions that are at first blush contradictory but, upon further inspection, not definitively so. This holds for doctrines considered singly or together and is an important qualifier to the traditional line of scholarship’s flat claim that Boyle’s limits of belief are logical contradictions. My conclusions here are at odds with Jan W. Wojcik’s claim, in her important, revisionist work on the famous natural philosopher, that he teaches that sometimes we are required to believe religious doctrines that violate the law of noncontradiction.
4
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Past, Present, or Future: What’s The Difference?

45%
MANN W. E.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
|
2018
|
vol. 66
|
issue 4
135-148
EN
This essay examines Marcin Tkaczyk’s “The antinomy of future contingent events,” with an eye towards clarifying the roles played by philosophical notions of propositions, events, the pre-sent, the relativity of time, and Tkaczyk’s notion of a “sphere of culture.” The essay concludes by examining what support might be offered for Tkaczyk’s claim that people can to some degree change the past.
PL
Artykuł analizuje tekst „Antynomia przyszłych zdarzeń przygodnych” Marcina Tkaczyka, sku¬¬piając się na wyjaśnianiu ról odgrywanych przez filozoficzne pojęcia zdań, zdarzeń, teraźniej¬szo¬ści, względności czasu i użytego przez Tkaczyka pojęcia „sfery kultury”. Tekst kończy się analizą kwestii, w jaki sposób można udzielić wsparcia tezie Tkaczyka, że ludzie mogą do pewnego stopnia zmienić przeszłość.
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