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In this essay which comprises one of chapters in Frank Cioffi Freud and the Question of a Pseudoscience (Open Court, Chicago 1998, pp. 115-142) its author, the most harsh and provocative contemporary critic of psychoanalysis, has assembled reasons for concluding that psychoanalysis  is a pseudoscience. What makes this text unique among current offerings is the contrary view about a pseudoscience according to which it is constituted by methodologically defective procedures (in a sense of wilful which encompasses refined self-deception) rather than merely by formally defective theses.
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Paper concerns problem of different kinds of misuse of political knowledge assuming that these misuses should be understood as multiform, complex und often unclear. Obviously the brightest examples of misuse of political knowledge come from pseudoscience, but many of them exist on the border of acceptable and rejected knowledge – these kinds of misuse are neither false nor true. Out of many form of misuses of political knowledge six types are discussed in details: instrumental and autonomic, intentional and nonintentional, useful and not useful.
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The article is an account of a hoax by the author, which led to publishing a paper introducing a new, non-existent therapy in a popular science monthly, Charaktery. The hoax, partly based on a similar provocation by Alan Sokal in 1996, was designed to examine the possibility of introducing a scientifically untested conception into popular science. Another goal was to provoke a public discussion about the phenomenon of pseudoscience penetrating science. The article recounts the history of the publication and briefly presents the content of the paper; it also shows the basic differences between Sokal’s hoax and the author’s sham. The paper ends with conclusions and questions raised by the experiment.
EN
The aim of this paper is to identify the mechanisms and techniques of counterfeiting science. Archaeological non-rational hypothesis seem to be very attractive for the public in spite of the fact that genuine information is widely available. I aim to verify how and why these pseudoscientific theories diffused in Polish reality, to what extent the reality influenced them and how the attitude towards such topics was changing in the second part of the 20th century. Materials for my analysis were articles about archaeology, published in Polish popular science journals in the years 1945-1999. Two different tendencies can be observed. Some authors –mostly renowned scientists- explain to the readers, why these theories are impossible to prove scientifically. On the other side, running parallel, there are many articles written by proponents of pseudo-archaeology. The most common mechanisms of counterfeiting facts are: presenting artifacts without archaeological context, distorting their scale, distorting the facts, leaving a reader in a state of uncertainty, rejection of rational argument, lack of skepticism, care and logic. Sometimes other alternatives are not checked, and the concepts of greater probability, but less attractive for the public, are not even considered, only in order to attach a reader’s attention.
PL
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie, jakie są techniki i mechanizmy fałszowania faktów naukowych. Archeologiczne pseudonaukowe hipotezy wydają się bardzo atrakcyjne dla społeczeństwa, mimo faktu, że z naukowego punkty widzenia są one niemożliwe. Istotne zatem wydaje się zbadanie, dlaczego i w jakim stopniu te pseudonaukowe teorie istniały i rozwijały się w polskim społeczeństwie, do jakiego stopnia rzeczywistość pozanaukowa wpływała na ich tworzenie i jak zmieniał się stosunek do pseudonaukowych teorii w drugiej połowie XX wieku. Materiałem badawczym były artykuły dotyczące archeologii, opublikowane w polskich czasopismach popularnonaukowych w latach 1945-1999. Można zaobserwować dwie przeciwstawne tendencje, często występujące w tym samym czasie. Część autorów- najczęściej naukowców i specjalistów w określonej dziedzinie- tłumaczy czytelnikom, dlaczego pseudonaukowe fakty, zjawiska i teorie nie są możliwe z naukowego punktu widzenia. Z drugiej strony jednak ukazało się wiele tekstów pisanych przez zwolenników pseudonaukowych teorii. Wśród najczęściej stosowanych technik fałszowania naukowych faktów i zjawisk wymienić należy: przedstawianie artefaktów bez archeologicznego kontekstu, zmiana ich skali, pomijanie określonych faktów lub fałszowanie ich, odrzucanie racjonalnych argumentów, brak logiki w rozumowaniu. Zdarza się, że przedstawiana jest tylko jedna możliwość zaistnienia określonego zjawiska. Często fakty i zjawiska bardziej prawdopodobne, lecz mniej atrakcyjne medianie, a zatem mniej przyciągające ewentualnego czytelnika, nie są brane pod uwagę.
EN
Traditionally, alchemy is regarded as an example of pseudoscience. In this paper I dispute this view and demonstrate that the practice of alchemy, in many aspects, can be interpreted as an experiment in protoscience. In the first part of the article, I introduce William R. Newman’s and Lawrence Principe’s analyses about the etymological origin of alchemy, its historiography and the origin of the separation between alchemy and chemistry. In the second part of the article I discuss different aspects on the practice of alchemy in light of the issues encountered with the inter-subjective repeatability of the experiments and the methods used to publicize the findings. In addition to the examination of the subjects researched, I also review the systematic elements found in the theoretical considerations presented by the alchemists.
PL
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate a different perspective on the problem of demarcation. It presents the results achieved by J. Hintikka and the Finnish school of the philosophy of science. However, the origins of this approach can be traced to the work of R. Carnap and Y. Bar-Hillel. The controversy over confirmationism and falsificationism is based on false assumptions. We need both probability and informative content. Our theories must have a connection with reality (high probability) and reflect its deep structure (information). Expected informational content allows us to define a “negative” demarcation criterion between science and pseudoscience.
PL
May you live in interesting times, the famous maxim quotes. Undoubtedly, at least in the historical context, periods of political, social, scientific, or economic riots – or at least commotion, ferment, crisis – have certainly earned such a title. So have the epochs which were subject to radical transformations distorting traditional relationships and institutions, existing patterns and rules. The abovementioned “interestingness” is thus a function of a radical change, challenge and variability, somewhat a derivative of erosion, and of all that we associate it with the notion of revolution or turn, be it political, social, economic, environmental, or scientific. The paper’s core aim is to examine the nowadays constantly revised, questioned, thus, shaking demarcation between science and pseudoscience in the light of new trends such as misinformation, denialism, internetisation and memoisation of scientific discourses.
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