Jakubczak-Chodźko Magdalena, Sytuacja dydaktyczna z perspektywy kompetencji komunikacyjnych nauczycieli akademickich [The didactic situation from the perspective of academic teacher communication skills]. Kultura – Społeczeństwo – Edukacja nr 2(14) 2018, Poznań 2018, pp. 111–117, Adam Mickiewicz University Press. ISSN 2300-0422. DOI 10.14746/kse.2018.14.9. This article shows a mode of perception of the relevant didactic situation from the perspective of teacher-held communicatio skills. Using the analysis of rationality, presented are new areas of perception of teacher competence. In addition, with the aid of the approach presented by Jürgen Habermas, it was possible to analyse the significance of communication skills as key in the teaching profession.
What makes a certain consideration an aesthetic reason rather than a reason of some other kind? Is it a solely a matter of the kind of attitude or activity that the reason supports? How fundamental or structural are such reasons? Do they contrast in a natural way with epistemic or practical reasons? Is skilled aesthetic achievement, whether interpretative or creative, a matter of recognizing the aesthetic reasons we have for a given response, and correctly according with such reasons? In this paper, I offer a preliminary discussion of these topics. I argue that our account of aesthetic reasons should respect the fact that they play an important regulative role, over and above directly supporting aesthetic response. Such a role allows aesthetic reasons to moderate a wide range of practical and epistemic activities, but not by adding or substituting distinctively aesthetic ends or purposes for such activities. I then go on to argue against the view that skilled aesthetic achievement consists in correct recognition of and accord with aesthetic reasons, adapting a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s.
The paper deals with the issue of wicked problems — the important concept to understand relationship between public administration and it’s environment and decision making structure in resolving such type of problems. The paper provides some background on the wicked problems literature. Particularly important here, is identification apotential barriers to tackling wicked policy problems.
Despite globalization and the rapid development of information technology, cross-cultural dialogue did not become any easier. The physical and non-physical confrontations are intensified by the differences in basic values and interest of cultures, which can be seen by the increasing number of wars, extreme localism, and mistrust between people. Rationality, which has long been regarded as the best and the only common language among different cultures, fails to facilitate communication and collaboration. Rationality’s limitation was revealed among others in Alasdair MacIntyre’sWhose Justice? Which Rationality? Unlike what ancient Greek philosophers suggested, thereis not a single type of supreme rationality that everyone will and should follow. The only consensus perhaps is about the instrumental rationality suggested by Max Weber, which is futile in promoting cross-cultural dialogues as it addresses the various means rather than the ends of different cultures. In this paper, I argue that emotion is a better language for universal dialogue than rationality in two senses. First, the psychologists and anthropologists provide solid evidence to prove that certain emotions are basic and universal among all human beings. For instance, based on his study of facial expression of the Fore people in Papua New Guinea, Ekman (2003) proposed that anger, fear, surprise, disgust, sadness, and happiness are six basic emotions that are universally shared. Other evidence includes studies conducted by Tomkins (1962), Arnold (1960), and Frijda (1986). These basic emotions might serve as the foundation of cross-cultural dialogue because we are evolved to understand the causes and expressions of these emotions in others despite the cultural and social differences. Second, unlike instrumental rationality that focuses solely on how to achieve one’s end, certain emotions are non-egocentric by nature. For instance, compassion is “another-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of another person” (Batson 1991). Chinese philosophy expresses a similar idea with the aid of the concept of Ren, which is the essence of human being, according to Confucianism. Love is another non-egocentric emotion that is constituted by care and concern of the well-being of one’s beloved for his or her own sake. That is, I love you not because loving you makes me happy, instead, it is because loving you makes you happy. Such non-egocentric emotions (other examples include sympathy, empathy, trust, etc.) might encourage and motivate cross-cultural dialogue despite the conflict of interest between cultures. While facing multi-faceted contemporary problems and crisis, we do not lack rational and intelligent solutions. We lack mutual understanding, reciprocal tolerance, and sustainable collaboration. The role of emotion in establishing a platform of cross-cultural dialogue should not be overlooked.
Amartya K. Sen is criticised for a modification of mainstream rational choice theory by an introduction of the commitment concept. This kind of modification sometimes is treated as a mistake. This article attempts to interpret the Amartya Sen’s concept of rationality. The means to this end will be an analysis of the ways of explanation of socalled Sen’s mistake. Three critical approaches to Sen’s concept of rationality made by Philip Pettit, Daniel Hausman and Geoffrey Brenan will be examined. In conclusion Sen’s concept of rationality, which includes the concept of commitment, should be interpreted as an approach which provides a subject with an autonomous expression of oneself, agency, responsibility and skills of critical thinking.
The gap between game-theoretic predictions and actual choices people make in, for instance, gaming experiments has been over-interpreted as evidence against rationality of players. I consider a version of the ultimatum game and examine its equilibria under different assumptions about players’ preferences. Using standard notions of rationality I show that the discrepancy between the “normative” and the “descriptive” cannot be established by a simple comparison of what is predicted by the equilibrium choices and the actual choices people make.
The aim of the article is to present and analyze selected organizational solutions based on the same principles thanks to which their creators wanted to create the perfect social order. I will try to demonstrate the rationality of these solutions using the example of the state of T. More, New Harmony of R. Owen and kibbutzes in Israel. Certain regularities can be observed in that the emergence of fundamental assumptions of these communities coincides with the moments of crisis in particular societies, which led to changes in the way people think about the world around them. The object of the research is an understanding of the organization of these communities and the effectiveness of their functioning based on the same rules.
The system approach to the miracle is based on the conviction that the complex issues, requiring the interdisciplinary approach, should be captured in a system way. Thus, the problem of miracle, because of its interdisciplinary character, should be captured in a systemic way, because such approach enables the more adequate and comprehensive presentation of these issues. The system approach towards the epistemology of miracle is the attempt of the more adequate presentation of the relationship between the scientific-natural research and theological stage of recognizing the miracle. Because of using systemic categories, it is possible to present the common foundations (environment) of the system of scientific-natural knowledge and the system of theological interpretation, which can be described as the rationality of knowledge. The result of adopting the systemic epistemology of miracle is noticing the relations between the scientific-natural research and theological interpretation in their system complexity. Determining these relations leads to the more general conclusion that the natural sciences and theology as separate and autonomous systems of gaining the knowledge of reality do not have to be treated as the competing but rather as the complementary ones, with their methodological diversity and limitations in mind.
The interdependence between humour and the Cooperative Principle (CP) (Grice 1975/1989b, 1978/1989b, 1989a) appears to be a bone of contention in pragmatic studies on verbal humour. The wellentrenched approach advocated by Raskin and Attardo is that jokes (and also other forms of intentionally produced humour) constitute the non-bona-fide mode of communication standing vis-à-vis the Gricean model and governed by a humour-CP (Raskin 1985, 1987, 1998; Raskin and Attardo 1994; Attardo 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996, 2006), and that they violate, not merely flout, the maxims and even the CP (Attardo 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996, 2006). The aim of the article is to shed new light on the interdependence between humour and the CP with a view to substantiating that the authors who regard humour as an independent communicative mode and as an intrinsic violation of maxims and the CP appear to labour under a serious misapprehension. It will be argued that the Gricean model of cooperative rationality does allow for humorous verbalisations, which normally rely on maxim flouts.
Two experiments (N1= 117 andN2= 245) on reasoning with knowledge-rich conditionals showed a main effect of logical validity, which was due to the negative effect of counter-examples being smaller for valid than for invalid arguments. These findings support the thesis that some people tend to inhibit background inconsistent with the hypothetical truth of the premises, while others tend to abandon the implicit truth-assumption when they have factual evidence to the contrary. Findings show that adhering to the truth-assumption in the face of conflicting evidence to the contrary requires an investment of time and effort which people with a higher general aptitude are more likely to do.
The concept of economic effectiveness has often been interpreted in an ambiguous manner. There is no clear definition of it in the literature. Individual authors place stress on different elements of this concept. There are also different measures of effectiveness. This article aims to make the concept of economic effectiveness more precise
The article addresses the issue of the relationship between cognitive and affective processes, in particular mood and thinking. The aim of the study was to examine the relationship between mood and rational reasoning as well as the role of the systems of direct and indirect regulation of behaviour in this process. Two study groups (N = 51 and N = 53), a control group (N = 51) and a group of so-called “listening persons” (N = 104) took part in the study. The following measures were used: Mood Scale, Tasks Set, Questionnaire for Listening Person (the author’s techniques) and A. Kolańczyk’s AR Scale. The results show that those in whom negative mood was induced, solved tasks better and were more aware of their sensual experiences than those in whom positive mood was induced (which increased the awareness of reflections). However, the hypothesis that greater rationality of reasoning results from the interactive influence of both mood and systems of regulation of behaviour activity was not supported.
A context of my paper is the debate on reason, tradition and traditional communities, in which this moral and epistemological issues were discussed as a part of general socio-philosophical theory of modernity. In particular I intend to locate my considerations in the context of formal-pragmatic theory of modern communicative rationality developed by Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom. I will provide a competitive model of the rationality of tradition by applying a conceptual toolkit of pragmatically oriented analysis to explain practices connected with vocabulary of tradition. I argue that tradition as a communication system has a fully rational structure. My main claim is that communicative structure of tradition has a rational structure of language game. This structure includes defined principles of communication for members of closed tradition-grounded community and rule of inclusion for potential new members. Firstly I consider closely internal principles of communication within the framework of tradition contrasting them shortly with normative-deontic rules of the postenlightenment idea of pragmatic communication discussed by Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom. After that I examine the rule of inclusion — the rule, which mediates between closed system of tradition-based community and his environment.
The central goal of the presented article is to show that the type of rationality proper to the method of the contemporary sciences yields a unique conceptual environment in which the spirit of rationality instilled to the theological thought by its encounter with the Greek philosophy finds its natural expansion. At the outset, the origins of the Greek rationality in the Ionian school of philosophy are briefly discussed in order to illuminate their adequacy for the exposition and defense of doctrine in the times of the early Church Fathers. Next, the specificity of the scholastic method of St. Thomas Aquinas briefly surveyed to indicate the nature of the unique harmony between faith and reason achieved by the Angelic Doctor. In the following step, the role of rationality in theology is gleaned through negative examples of its elimination as evident in nominalism and the subsequent Lutheran intervention. This is followed by a short discourse into of the origins and the specificity of the contemporary scientific method with particular emphasis on the method’s unique potential to expand and deepen the Greek rationality. Finally, a case study of the evolutionary theology is offered in which the implementation of the dynamic (evolutionary) picture of the Universe as the conceptual foundation opens up new and profound ways of understanding the Universe’s meaning and the meaning of man in particular. Thus the spirit of the hellenistic rationality in theology is not only preserved but also significantly enhanced.
This introduction clarifies the ideas behind the Logic, Reasoning and Rationality congress from which the papers in this issue are selected. These ideas are situated in the history of 20th century philosophy (Vienna Circle, Kuhn, . . . ). We also give an overview of the papers in this issue.
Th is article is an att empt to show a possible way to fi nd out, what kind of rationality characterizes history. It bases on philosophical assumption that idea of rationality is always directly connected with idea of truth. Th is connection was presented in the article as an argument for treating the notion of historical truth as the right basis for analyze rationality of history. In light of modern theory of history, historical truth can be see from angle of the notion of truth proposed by Hilary Putnam and Willard Van Orman Quine. It means that it can be understand as the internal truth: truth dependent on its context. In accordance with main assumption, this fact allows history to try to think about its own rationality in similar way: to defi ne it as internal (contextual) rationality, which accurately mirrors the individual character of historical cognition. Th e article points out theoretical problems potentially connected with above conception of rationality. Question, whether history has ability to analyze the rationality by its own instruments, was underlined as one of the most important.
Starting with his own modification of Plato’s allegory of the cave the author explains the notion of creation, which does not mean a single initiating event but the grounding of the entire process of the world in a creative will that lies outside of this process. Faith in God is faith in a reason for the world, which is not itself groundless, as the scientific worldview holds. When we think the concept „God”, we think the unity of two predicates that are only occasionally and never necessarily bound together in our earthly experience of the world: the unity of absolute power and absolute goodness, i.e. the unity of being and meaning. After Nietzsche we can no longer rest the proofs for the existence of God on the human capacity for truth, for its foundation is sure only if we presuppose the existence of God. However, there is a grammar based proof that is Nietzscheresistant. The rationale of the futurum exactum, the future perfect tense, shows that the reality of the present entails the reality of the past. The question is: What sort of reality does the past have? The sole answer can be: We have to think of a consciousness in which everything that happens is taken up, an absolute consciousness.
In this article the author presents the problem of subjectivity in terms of neoliberal culture from a critical perspective. The author explores relation between neoliberalism and production of certain types of subjectivity. A useful tool undertaken in this analysis is Robert Kwaśnica’s concept of two rationalities: instrumental and emancipatory. Production of certain rationalities is reflected in the varying attitudes to themselves, other people and also in relation to the educational prospects. The author concludes that education often serves for improving situation on the labor market and competing with other units. This way of thinking is located in the perspective of instrumental rationality. It turns out that one of the key features of the neoliberal discourse is therefore building a specific identity of the individual, which reveals its educational value.
The article is discusses possible limitations of the rationalistic concept of human action within cultural theory. Here, rationality of human action is construed in terms of decision theory. Two kinds of limitations are considered: (1) resulting from non-rationalistic conceptions of human action; (2) implied by anti individualistic approaches to socio-cultural phenomena, especially structuralist and functionalist ones. Proposed conclusions aim for a reconciliation of rationalistic theory of action and principal premises of cultural materialism.
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