This paper discusses the epistemic status of bodily sensations-especially the sensations of pain, hunger and thirst-in the second part of Descartes’ Sixth Meditation. It is argued that this part is an integral component of Descartes overall purely epistemological project in the Meditations. Surprisingly perhaps, in contrast with his standardly taken infallible, internalist and foundationalist position, Descartes adopts a fallibilist, externalist and reliabilist position as regards the knowledge and beliefs based on bodily sensations. The argument for this conclusion is justified by an analysis of both the criterion of nature’s teachings and the concept of true errors of nature in terms of Wilfrid Sellars’ distinction between the logical space of reasons and the empirical space of causes.
PL
Osobliwość takich doznań, jak ból, głód i pragnienie. Reliabilizm w drugiej części szóstej Medytacji Kartezjusza Artykuł omawia epistemiczny status cielesnych doznań takich, jak ból, głód i pragnienia, o których mowa w drugiej części szóstej Medytacji Kartezjusza. Argumentuję, że ów fragment stanowi integralny komponent epistemologicznego programu, który można znaleźć w Medytacjach. Na ogół widzi się Kartezjusza jako zwolennika infallibilizmu, internalizmu oraz fundacjonalizmu. Tymczasem w odniesieniu do wiedzy i przekonań opartych na doznaniach cielesnych przyjmuje on fallibilizm, eksternalizm i reliabilizm. Na rzecz tego wniosku przemawia z jednej strony, analiza tego, czego naucza nas – według Kartezjusza – natura przez wrażenia bólu, głodu i pragnienia, z drugiej strony jego analiza błędów, którym podlega nasza natura, przeprowadzona przeze mnie z wykorzystaniem zaproponowanego przez Wilfrida Sellarsa podziału na logiczną przestrzeń rozumu oraz empiryczną przestrzeń przyczyn.
The paper analyzes the strategy of refuting skepticism by virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa. Responses to skeptical challenge are overviewed. The philosophical and meta-philosophical strategies are outlined. The solution based on distinguishing between reflective knowledge and animal knowledge is considered. The internalist assumptions of skepticism are critically exposed. The notion of web of belief is further used to support an anti-skeptical position. Shane Ryan’s notion of epistemic grace is put forward in defense of the virtue epistemology approach.
In this paper, I aim to characterize the pragmatist and anti-deflationist notions of truth. I take Habermas’s rather recent discussion (1999) and present the interpretation that his notion of truth relies on the reliabilist conception of knowledge rather than the internalist conception that defines knowledge as a justified true belief. Then, I show that my interpretation is consistent with Habermas’s project of weak naturalism. Finally, I draw some more general implications about the pragmatist notion of truth.
The paper discusses how evidentiality and conjunct/disjunct marking in grammar are related to reliabilism, a contemporary theory of epistemic justification developed within the Anglo-American analytic tradition. It is assumed that many problems and ideas concerned with theories of knowledge, and with justification of beliefs in particular, which are widely discussed in contemporary philosophical debates, are worth reconsidering in the light of what grammars of natural languages impose on the epistemic agent. Section two explains how the notions of knowledge, belief and justification are understood in the paper. The section also outlines the major problems concerning the internalist justification of beliefs. Section three presents an externalist view on the problem of justification: process reliabilism. The reliabilist theory of justification is set in the context of two grammatical categories: evidentiality and conjunct/disjunct marking (egophoricity). Since the two categories are still little known, section four offers a brief presentation of evidentiality and egophoricity in grammar, illustrated with data from two languages. Finally, section five addresses the problem whether the premises of reliabilism are reconcilable with ‘natural epistemology’ encoded in grammar. The final conclusion says that the externalist premises of reliabilism are certainly not congruent with grammatical evidentiality and evidentialityrelated categories, but they are not logically inconsistent therewith. Furthermore, since the reliabilist program declares interest in ‘folk epistemic practices’, the approach might greatly benefit from what ‘natural epistemology’ tells us about epistemic folk concepts and epistemic practices employed by speakers of diverse world languages.
In the paper, I present one of the most important contemporary attempts of defeating fundamental problems concerning justification in the context of doxastic assumption. Goldman rejects thesis that we cannot take account of anything except insofar we have believes about it, assumption accepted by foundations and coherence theories. Instead of faulty (above mentioned) views, Goldman indicates reliable cognitive processes as perception, memory, and reasoning. In my paper, I present the whole gamut of arguments against Goldman’s theory but as decisive I consider faults on the ground of reliability concerning perception.
PL
W artykule prezentuję jedną z najważniejszych współczesnych prób pokonania zasadniczych problemów związanych z kwestią uzasadniania w kontekście tzw. założenia doksastycznego (doxastic). Goldman, odrzucając tezę, iż w uzasadnieniu nie możemy brać pod uwagę niczego innego niż przekonania, tezę przyjmowaną przez prezentowane w artykule stanowiska fundacjonistyczne i koherencjonistyczne, przyjmuje pogląd eksternalistyczny. Zamiast wadliwych (wyżej wspomnianych) stanowisk Goldman wskazuje na reliabilne procesy poznawcze w postaci przede wszystkim ujęć percepcyjnych, ale i danych pamięciowych oraz rozumowań. W artykule przedstawiam wachlarz argumentów krytycznych wobec koncepcji Goldmana, ale za zasadniczy uznaję brak podstaw w jego teorii dla akceptacji wiarygodności procesów percepcyjnych.
Based on analysis of the issue of how we learn from experience (if not by using induction), the study presents a problem of induction as formulated by Hume, thus showing its roots in unjustifiability of the principle of uniformity of nature. Popper's solution to the problem, consisting of the complete rejection of inductive reasoning, is exposed. Popper's solution is then subjected to comparison with David Papineau's reliabilism - a notion that knowledge is a true belief generated by a reliable method. The main objective of this study is to reopen a debate over the topic of invalidity of induction. A secondary objective is to illustrate the possible intersection between critical rationalism with its emphasis on delegitimisation of knowledge and reliabilist criteria of certainty.
CS
Na základě analýzy otázky, jak se učíme ze zkušenosti (pokud ne za použití indukce) představuje studie problém indukce nejprve tak, jak byl formulován Humem skrze jeho příčinu v nezdůvodnitelnosti principu uniformity přírody. Následně ukazuje Popperovo řešení problému spočívající v naprostém odmítnutí induktivního usuzování. Popperův přístup je podroben srovnání s reliabilistickou pozicí Davida Papineau - stanoviskem, že poznání je pravdivým přesvědčením generovaným spolehlivou metodou. Hlavním cílem textu je znovuotevření diskuze nad tématem neplatnosti indukce a možná redukce námitek vůči její logické neplatnosti na základě nahlédnutí reliabilistického stanoviska. Vedlejším záměrem je pak ilustrovat možné styčné body mezi kritickým racionalismem s jeho důrazem na delegitimizaci vědění a reliabilistickým kritériem spolehlivosti.
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