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EN
There was a specific consensus existing between enterprise-level cells of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the workers’ councils, with the latter respecting political views of the party organs and the former, on the other hand, accepting professional competencies of the councils. The best example on which the hybrid practice could be followed was a new phenomenon of public auditions for managerial positions. The author shows how the initially economic project of the enterprise councils was increasingly transforming itself into a movement with political ambitions since the August 1968 occupation. The informal centre of these activities was Škoda Plzeň, which organized a nationwide congress of self-governing bodies in January 1969. After the fall of the reform-oriented leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in April 1969, the workers’ councils were becoming increasingly dependent on the leeway vis-á-vis superiors, which company-level party organizations created for them. The latter were effectively resisting political purges for a few months; in this respect, they were making use, in particulars, of worries of the central apparatus of mass protests before the anniversary of the occupation in August 1969. However, after the forced resignation of company-level reformists in the autumn of 1969, the self-governing bodies lost all political support and dissolved themselves.
CS
Naprostá většina zvolených se rekrutovala z řad technické inteligence mužského pohlaví a středního věku. Tato nová socialistická inteligence se postavila de facto do čela dělnického hnutí. Mezi radami pracujících a podnikovými organizacemi Komunistické strany Československa fungoval specifický konsenzus, ve kterém rady respektovaly politická stanoviska stranických orgánů a ty naopak přijímaly odborné kompetence rad. Nejlépe bylo možno tuto hybridní praxi sledovat na novém fenoménu veřejných konkurzů do manažerských funkcí. Autor ukazuje, jak se po okupaci v srpnu 1968 původně ekonomický projekt podnikových rad stále více transformoval do podoby hnutí s politickými reformními ambicemi. Neformálním centrem těchto aktivit se stal podnik Škoda Plzeň, který v lednu 1969 uspořádal celostátní sjezd samospráv. Rady pracujících se po pádu reformního vedení KSČ v dubnu 1969 stávaly stále více závislé na prostoru, který jim vůči nadřízeným instancím vytvářely stranické organizace podnikové úrovně. Ty se samy několik měsíců účinně bránily před politickými čistkami, přičemž využívaly zejména obav centrálního aparátu z masových protestů před výročím okupace v srpnu 1969. Po nuceném odchodu reformních funkcionářů na podnikové úrovni na podzim 1969 však již samosprávy ztratily veškeré politické zázemí a samy se rozpustily.
EN
The author examines the attitude of Slovenians to the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia since the late 1960s until the declaration of the independent Republic of Slovenia in 1991. He asks himself a question whether socialist Yugoslavia was indeed a state which Slovenians perceived as theirs, just like they had done in the case of the pre-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and he observes how their identification with that state was changing over time, the reasons of the changes, and whether the loss of their loyalty caused the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation. He is looking for answers in public opinion polls which had been continually taking place in Slovenia since 1968 and conducted in a relatively fair manner, without political interventions, which is indeed a rarity in the context of socialist countries. Using their results, the author concludes that Slovenians viewed themselves as a natural part of the Yugoslav community until the late 1980s. This opinion was shared by a majority of Slovenia’s population, although many of them were not satisfied with Slovenia’s position in Yugoslavia, or their living standard at times of economic crises. It was only in 1989 that the opinion that Yugoslavia as a “country of many advantages” had run out of its potential and no longer offered good prospects for future prevailed among Slovenians. However, their attitudes reacting to accelerating changes both at home and abroad did not cause the disintegration of the common state. After 1991, Slovenians completely (and sometimes uncritically) identified themselves with independent Slovenia, and mostly (although rather declaratively) also with values of parliamentary democracy. The author’s exposition is preceded by an analysis of published sources on the disintegration of Yugoslavia and based on an extensive set of empirical data from public opinion polls in the form of tables.
EN
The study analyses the ideological orientations of the Slovenian communist establishment in the 1980s, their mutual intersections and their significance in political practice. The author identifies five simultaneously present orientations: Sloveneism (Slovenian nationalism); Yugoslavism (Yugoslav federalism); self-managed socialism as a specifically Yugoslav variant of Marxism-Leninism; political liberalization; and later affinity to the market economy. Slovenian nationalism had the strongest position in the actions of the communist elite (League of Communists of Slovenia, Zveza komunistov Slovenije - ZKS). It was particularly concerned with maintaining Slovenia's political autonomy according to the 1974 constitution but steadily gained strength, especially under the influence of public opinion. At the same time, the Slovenian communist leaders wanted to avoid a confrontation with the radicalized public and always ended up in harmony with it on a nationalist wave. In contrast to the "Sloveneists", the "Yugoslavists" did not rely on identification with a united political demos but saw the meaning of Slovenia's involvement in the common state mainly in the joint building of self-managed socialism and in the defence against external dangers. Although the appeal of self-managed socialism was weakened by the chronic economic crisis in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, leading Slovenian communists remained committed to its ideology. They also advocated supplementing self-management with market mechanisms and a limited liberalization of conditions, which, however, was not to imply the formation of other political parties. However, the communists in Ljubljana subordinated all their other ideological orientations to Slovenian nationalism in both rhetoric and practice. This was reflected in their smooth transition to the new political-economic system on the wave of national euphoria, which culminated in the declaration of Slovenian independence in the summer of 1991.
CS
Studie analyzuje ideologické orientace slovinského komunistického establishmentu v osmdesátých letech minulého století, jejich vzájemné souvislosti a význam v politické praxi. Autor identifikuje pětici současně přítomných orientací: slovinství (slovinský nacionalismus), jugoslávství (jugoslávský federalismus), samosprávný socialismus jako specificky jugoslávskou variantu marxismu-leninismu, politickou liberalizaci a sympatie pro tržní ekonomiku. Nejsilněji se v politice Svazu komunistů Slovinska (Zveza komunistov Slovenije – ZKS) uplatňoval slovinský nacionalismus, který dbal zejména na udržení politické autonomie Slovinska podle ústavy z roku 1974 a který, zejména pod vlivem veřejného mínění, ale setrvale narůstal. Slovinské komunistické špičky se přitom nechtěly konfrontovat s radikalizující se veřejností a na nacionální vlně s ní vždy nakonec souzněly. Jugoslávství slovinských komunistů se na rozdíl od slovinství neopíralo o identifikaci s jednotným jugoslávským politickým demosem a smysl zapojení Slovinska do společného státu spatřovalo zejména ve společném budování samosprávného socialismu a v obraně před vnějšími nebezpečími. Ačkoli přitažlivost samosprávného socialismu v osmdesátých letech oslabovala chronická hospodářská krize v Jugoslávii, přední slovinští komunisté zůstávali jeho ideologii věrni. Zasazovali se zároveň za doplnění samosprávy tržními mechanismy a za omezenou liberalizaci poměrů, která však neměla implikovat vznik jiných politických stran. Slovinskému nacionalismu však komunisté v Lublani všechny své ostatní ideové orientace podřizovali jak v rétorice, tak i v praxi. To se projevilo jejich hladkým přechodem do nového politicko-ekonomického systému na vlně národní euforie po roce 1990, která vyvrcholila vyhlášením nezávislosti Slovinska v létě 1991.
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