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EN
This article aims to present the philosophical conception of the New Realism movement which formed at the beginning of the twentieth century in the United States in reaction to the thinking of the idealist consensus, whose foremost representative was Josiah Royce. It also aims to reconstruct the basic procedure of argumentation of the programme of reform of philosophy proposed by the New Realism, and to subject to critical scrutiny the epistemological conception of direct realism. The New Realists were significantly influenced in their opinions by the work of Bertrand Russell, something which explains certain visible parallels with the programme of the Vienna Circle and with thinking that anticipates the philosophy of science. Last but not least, we aim to argue in favour of the view that New Realism is not a comprehensive philosophical conception, but rather the sum of the approaches found in the different New Realist thinkers. Despite this, however, some views of the New Realists are shown to be a still relevant and inspiring source for further philosophical investigation.
DE
Ziel des vorliegenden Beitrags ist es, das philosophische Konzept der Bewegung des Neuen Realismus vorzustellen, die sich Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts in den USA als Reaktion auf die Gedanken des idealistischen Konsens mit seinem führenden Vertreter Josiah Royce formte. In diesem Beitrag soll auch die grundlegende Argumentationsweise der vom Neuen Realismus angeregten Philosophiereform rekonstruiert werden. Des Weiteren wird das epistemologische Konzept des direkten Realismus einer kritischen Analyse unterzogen. Die neuen Realisten gehen in ihren Ansichten insbesondere vom Werk Bertrand Russells aus, wodurch wir gewisse Parallelen zum Programm des Wiener Kreises sehen, bzw. zu den Gedanken, die die Wissenschaftsphilosophie antizipieren. Nicht zuletzt ist es unser Ziel, jene Interpretation argumentativ zu unterstützen, der gemäß der Neue Realismus kein abgeschlossenes Philosophiekonzept darstellt, sondern die Summe der Ansätze einzelner neorealistischer Denker. Dennoch erweisen sich einige Ansichten der Neorealisten als nach wie vor aktuelle und inspirative Quelle der weiteren philosophischen Untersuchung.
EN
The inspiration of this text is the belief of the Pythagoreans that the roots and source of complete knowledge is the quadruple expressed in the “arch-four”, also called as tetractys. Hence the hypothesis considered in this paper is: the basis of the philosophy of social sciences is entangled in these four valours, manifested in what is “general and necessary” (scientific) in social life, the first and universal as to the “principles and causes” of this life (theoretically philosophical) and “which can be different in it” (practically philosophical) and “intuitive”. The quadruple appears with different clarity in the history of human thought, which seeks clarification and understanding of the things being cognised, including such a thing as society. It is exposed in the oath of the Pythagoreans, the writings of Plato and Aristotle, who applied these four valours, among other things, in distinguishing the four types of knowledge and learning about the first four causes and principles. This fourfold division seems to be experiencing a renaissance in contemporary theological-cognitive holism and can be treated as an expressive, a “hard core”, and the basis of research not only of social but mainly of global society as a social system. This entanglement of the foundations of the philosophy of the social sciences leads to the suggestion of defining this philosophy as the knowledge of social being composed of “what is general and necessary” (scientific), genetically first, universal (theoretically philosophical) and “being able to be different” (philosophically practical) and intuitive.
EN
Since phenomenology isn’t just a method of philosophical research but also a genuine philosophical stance, Husserl discusses in his famous article Philosophy as a Strict Science from 1910/11 at least three notions of philosophy to demonstrate, what should be considered solely as a scientifi c philosophy. Th is may only be his phenomenological philosophy, which Husserl contrasts against both in his time most popular philosophical positions, i.e. the naturalism, and the philosophy of world view. But there is also another “brand” of philosophy that’s being mentioned in his article: the so called ‘Tiefsinn’. Is it a fourth notion of philosophy, or just the extreme derivation from the “world view”? Not only shall our article answer that question, but also demonstrate Husserl’s conception of a phenomenological philosophy being a strict scientifi c philosophy in contrast to naturalism as well as the world view.
CS
Fenomenologie není pouze specifi cká metoda filosofi ckého zkoumání, ale též svébytná fi losofi cká pozice. Husserl je znám a diskutován spíše jako autor právě zmíněné metody, ovšem ta přeci měla sloužit jakožto organon pro vytvoření samostatné fi losofi cké nauky. Proto se bude v příspěvku věnovat pozornost Husserlovu chápání toho, co je to filosofi e, a to v kontrastu proti dobově populárním fi losofi ckým pozicím, jimiž byly naturalismus a fi losofi e světového názoru s jeho nejodpudivější podobou nazývanou Husserlem pejorativně „Tiefsinn“: důvtipná duchaplnost. Husserl zamýšlí odstranit oba zmíněné typy fi losofi e skutečně přísně vědeckou fi losofi í, jež bude fi losofi í fenomenologickou.
EN
The reflection on philosophical foundations of pedagogy is characteristic feature of the analytical tradition in philosophy. The creative work of Kazimierz Twardowski, famous polish philosopher, is an integral part of this tradition. His papers together form the analytical project, which lay the ground for the formation of a particular style of philosiphizing in pedagogical dimension. These features are most clearly manifested in problematizing the relation between philosophy and pedagogy, in the analysis of pedagogical concepts, in the critic of irrationalism in pedagogy, in the coordination with scientific criticism in pedagogy.
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PL
Autor formułuje tezę, zgodnie z którą filozofia Ch.S. Peirce’a jest próbą pojęciowego opisu wszechświata przy pomocy metod naukowych. W konstruowaniu filozofii i metafizyki odwołuje się do logiki i metodologii naukowej. W formułowaniu rozstrzygnięć filozoficznych przywiązuje uwagę do rozumowań abdukcyjnych i w nich widzi przyszłość filozofii naukowej. Wyjaśnienie aktywności człowieka postrzega w powiązaniu myśli z praktyką (pragmatyzm). Autor tekstu swoje roz-ważania o filozofii Peirce’a sytuuje w kontekście klasycznych (I. Kant) i współczesnych (M. Heidegger) koncepcji filozoficznych oraz tezy o końcu filozofii.
EN
The author formulates the thesis according to which philosophy of Ch.S. Peirce is an attempt to conceptual description of the universe using scientific methods. In constructing philosophy and metaphysics this philosopher appeals to logic and scientific methodology. In resolving a philosophical problems Peirce attaches significance to abductive reasoning and in it he sees the future of scientific philosophy. The explanation of human activity Peirce perceives in conjunction thoughts with practice (pragmatism). The author of the article own deliberations on the philosophy of Peirce situates in the context of classical (I. Kant) and contemporary (M. Heidegger) philosophical concepts and thesis of the end of philosophy.
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