Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 5

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  sexual freedom
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
In the article the statements about deceitful rape presented in Polish literature and judiciary were reviewed. It was stated that on the basis of the Article 197 § 1 CC the word “deceit” encodes both the objective and subjective element. For the existence of deceit, it is relevant that a perpetrator intentionally misleads or exploits the victim`s mistake. In addition, it was proposed in the article that certain groups of cases, which have not yet been treated as deceitful rapes, should be assessed as fulfilling the features of a prohibited act under the Article 197 § 1 CC. Finally, a de lege ferenda postulate was submitted, that the features described in the Article 198 CC should be transferred to the Article 197 § 1 CC.
PL
W artykule dokonano rewizji prezentowanych w polskiej literaturze i orzecznictwie twierdzeń dotyczących podstępnego zgwałcenia. Uznano, że na gruncie art. 197 § 1 Kodeksu karnego słowo „podstęp” koduje zarówno element przedmiotowy, jak i podmiotowy. Aby bowiem zaistniał podstęp, sprawca musi celowo wprowadzać ofiarę w błąd lub taki błąd wyzyskiwać. Ponadto w artykule zgłoszono propozycję, by pewne grupy przypadków, które dotychczas nie były traktowane jako podstępne zgwałcenia, oceniać jako realizujące znamiona czynu z art. 197 § 1 k.k. Wreszcie wysunięto postulat de lege ferenda, by znamiona opisane w art. 198 k.k. przenieść do art. 197 § 1 k.k.
EN
The sexual revolution of the 20th century was based on a redefinition of the body, which led to a new postmodern sexual ideal in which the body and sexuality were freed from the limitations of biology. This phenomenon was inserted within the logic of capitalism, which proposes itself as a “theory of everything,” that is to say, comprehensive of all human reality. Sexuality thus became an object of consumption, bowing to the logic of the capitalist system in which everything can be bought and sold. This new sexual market is based on sexual freedom, giving rise to a fierce competition between users that reaffirms narcissistic, individualistic patterns. In this sense, through the theory of sexual capital, the monogamous structure that existed prior to the sexual revolution and the new polyamorous structure of postmodernity are compared, with the conclusion that the sexual revolution has generated new forms of unforeseen sexual violence.
PL
Ustawodawca polski zdecydował się wprowadzić do systemu prawnego instytucję organu kolegialnego skupionego na badaniu przypadków czynów skierowanych przeciwko wolności seksualnej i obyczajności popełnionych przed laty na szkodę małoletnich i obecnie już przedawnionych. Badanie prowadzone przez rzeczoną Komisję miałoby prowadzić do wpisania do Rejestru Sprawców Przestępstw na Tle Seksualnym także osób, wobec których sąd powszechny nie wydał orzeczenia, poprzedzonego procesem zmierzającym do wieloaspektowej oceny ich czynów. Regulacja taka jest sprzeczna z podstawowymi zasadami porządku prawnego, w tym z tymi o charakterze międzynarodowym, i stanowi nieadekwatną reakcję aparatu państwowego, szczególnie wobec istnienia alternatywnych dróg, którymi mógł podążyć ustawodawca.
EN
Polish legislative body has decided to introduce into the legal system the institution of a collective body entitled to conduct the inquiries into cases of acts committed against sexual freedom of minors many years ago which are currently nonpunishable due to the matter of time. The inquiry would lead to the registration in the Register of Sexual Offenders of persons against whom the court has not issued a judgment after a fair trial. Such a regulation is in a contrary to the fundamental principles of the legal system, including international legal norms and is an example of inadequate reaction of the State, especially.
EN
The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combatting violence againstwomen and domestic violence (further: CETS210, Istanbul Convention, Anti-violenceConvention) became part of the Polish legal system on 1 August 2015. The IstanbulConvention incorporates a specific legal provision on rape, namely Art. 36 CETS210.It states that the Parties should take the necessary legislative or other measures toensure that the intentional conduct described in Art. 36 CETS210 is criminalised.Article 36.1a CETS210 states that rape takes place when engaging in non-consensualvaginal, anal or oral penetration of a sexual nature of the body of another person withany bodily part or object.Rape is respectively regulated in Art. 19 7 of the Polish Criminal Code 1997 (further,k.k.). However, the context of Art. 197 k.k. significantly differs from the wordingof Art. 36 CETS. Whereas Art. 36 CETS protects freedom, autonomy and sexualautonomy of the person, Art. 197 k.k. protects merely sexual freedom combined withprotecting the social customs. In order to establish the presence of rape, one needs toprove the presence of violence, psychological aggression and/or deception. Protectingsocial customs implies an additional burden because it allows evaluating the behaviourof the victim rather than the one of the perpetrator. The Istanbul Convention is orientedon eager elimination of violence against women and domestic violence. Therefore, itestablishes that the Parties should take the necessary measures to promote changesin the social and cultural patterns and behaviour of women and men with a view toeradicating prejudice, customs, traditions and all other practices which are based onthe idea of the inferiority of women or stereotyped roles for women and men (Art.12.1 CETS210). It is within this line that rape regulation should follow.The question that is tackled in this article is as follows: to what extent doesthe difference in the legal description of the act of “rape”, and the difference in protectedvalues by legal provision in Art. 36 CETS210 and in Art. 197 k.k. make an ontologicaland normative difference? Are they not possible to be reconciled? Or, is the meredifference in the words describing what “rape” not an obstacle to achieving the goalsexpected by Art. 36 CETS210?The problem is not an artificial one especially in view of the fact that the Polishlegislators did not amend the text of Art. 197 k.k. upon the ratification of CETS210. It would suggest that the Polish legislator was of the opinion that there is no definitedifference between Art. 36 CETS210 and Art. 197 k.k. The text examines what happen eswhen an old term acquires new meaning.Is Art. 197 k.k. despite the lack of amendments filling the value required by Art.36 CETS210? Or, is the sameness expected by the Polish legislator false? By demonstratingvital differences in the protected values and the action required establish ingthe presence of the rape, I call for amendments to fulfill the state legal obligations toobserve the Istanbul Convention.The article deals with the ontological difference in the legal concept behind the textof Art. 36 CETS210 and Art. 197 k.k. While Art. 197 k.k. is built on the concept of sexualfreedom, Art. 36 CETS is developed on the concept of sexual autonomy. I elaborateon that.The changes in the protected values incorporated in Art. 36 CETS210 lead toabandoning the concept of sexual freedom established in Art. 197 k.k. and adoptingthe concept of sexual autonomy. While the former concept of sexual freedom, asin Art. 197 k.k., uses violence, psychological aggression and/or deception to establishthe presence of rape, for sexual autonomy as defined in Art. 36 CETS210 the line iscrossed where the consent was not present. While sexual freedom limits freedom to torefusal, sexual autonomy demands the presence of consent. Not violence, aggressionor deception, but the lack of consents matters.The term and concept of sexual autonomy was first explored by the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights in the landmark European Court of Human Right (furtherECHR) judgment M.C. v. Bulgaria (No. 39272/98). The case is thoroughly analysedto further illuminate the difference between the two concepts behind the differentapproaches to defining “rape”.The article, however, starts with an in-depth introduction to the goal of the IstanbulConvention, which is to place the issue of rape in a proper perspective. Apart froma criminological analysis of the concept of rape, the article discusses the values protectedby, respectively, Art. 36 CETS210 and Art. 197 k.k. and compares the similarities andactual differences. A similar examination is related to the description of “rape” in Art.36 CETS and Art. 197 k.k. Last but not least, the subject is evaluated, taking the Polishcriminal dogmas into consideration.The conclusion of the examination leaves no room for assuming that Art. 197 k.k.fulfills the requirement stipulated by Art. 36 CETS210. It is, therefore necessary, toamend Art. 197 k.k.
EN
This paper analyses some specific problems under article 200 § 1 of the Penal Code. The basic aim of my research was to give a relatively clear answer to the question about penalising an offender when he/she is just several years older than his/her victim or when the victim initiates sexual activities. Taking into consideration the decrease of age in which youths begin sexual initiation, it is important to know what the consequences of it in their emotional sphere are. By referring such observations to the problem of child sexual abuse, there is a dissonance between child’s acceptance of incursion in his/her intimacy and legal regulations. Therefore, child sexual abuse is not only a legal problem, but it also has influence on sexuality and the society, morality etc.
PL
Opracowanie dotyczy przedmiotu ochrony z art. 200 § 1 kodeksu karnego, jakim jest wolność seksualna osób poniżej 15. roku życia. Podstawowym jego celem jest udzielenie względnie jednoznacznej odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy w sytuacji, kiedy sprawca jest zaledwie kilka lat starszy od pokrzywdzonego oraz w momencie, gdy ofiara sama inicjuje czynności seksualne dorosły młodociany powinien być karany zgodnie z sankcją z ww. przepisu. Mając na uwadze stale obniżający się wiek inicjacji seksualnej młodzieży, gdy osoba, która nie ukończyła 15. roku życia, dobrowolnie poddała się czynności seksualnej z osobą nieznacznie starszą (powyżej 17. roku życia, ponieważ taką granicę wieku wprowadza kodeks karny, by móc sprawcy przypisać popełnienie czynu zabronionego), powstaje dysonans prawny, moralny i obyczajowy. Z jednej bowiem strony są przepisy penalizujące takie zachowanie, z drugiej to nieletni sam przekroczył granicę ingerencji w swoją sferę intymną. W sytuacji, gdy ofiara zgadza się na kontakty seksualne albo sama zachęca czy inicjuje obcowanie płciowe lub inną czynność seksualną, neguje to cel, który przyświecał ustawodawcy kryminalizującemu takie zachowania. Tym niemniej przepisy obowiązują, w związku z czym warto przybliżyć tę tematykę w odniesieniu nie tylko do zachowania nagannego w kontekście prawnym, ale także z punktu widzenia socjologii czy obyczajności.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.