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EN
Does the presence of institutional hybridization invariably lead to lower rates of economic growth? The absence of tight complementarities between the different spheres of the economy makes it harder for companies to secure market-based or strategic- inspired modes of coordination. I investigate this issue with the case of France - an institutionally hybrid economy whose relative economic performance has declined in the last decade. I highlight that the prominence of state intervention in the first four postwar decades lessened the weaknesses of institutional hybridization. Nonetheless, state dirigisme did not eliminate the shortcomings associated with a hybrid model. If anything, state intervention in France significantly contributed to stifle the development of institutional capacities of actors, most notably labour organisations, which are crucial in coordinated market economies.
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Koszty bankructwa państwa

100%
PL
Celem opracowania jest przedstawienie najważniejszych teorii oraz wybranych wyników badań empirycznych dotyczących kosztów bankructwa państwa. Oszacowanie potencjalnych kosztów bankructwa państwa stanowi niezbędną wiedzę dla rządów w celu podjęcia decyzji, w jak dużym stopniu w warunkach kryzysu zadłużenia opłacalne jest unikanie niewypłacalności w porównaniu z kosztami i korzyściami wywiązywania się ze zobowiązań. Z przeprowadzonej w opracowaniu analizy wynika, że w zależności od przyjętej metody ekonometrycznej oraz badanej próby krajów nadal występują olbrzymie rozbieżności odnośnie do wpływu bankructwa państwa na tempo wzrostu gospodarczego. Przykładowo koszty w krótkim okresie mogą wynosić od 0 do 10,5%, z kolei w średnim okresie od 0 do 10%. Podobnie znaczne rozbieżności dotyczą wpływu bankructwa na dostęp do międzynarodowych rynków kapitałowych i rozmiary handlu międzynarodowego. Najważniejszym potencjalnym kosztem ekonomicznym bankructwa państwa skłaniającym rządy do spłacania swoich zobowiązań jest negatywny wpływ bankructwa na sytuację krajowych firm, w tym głównie banków, co pośrednio wpływa na stan całej gospodarki kraju. Pogorszenie warunków funkcjonowania przedsiębiorstw prowadzi do ograniczenia prywatnych inwestycji, w tym szczególnie ważnych dla rozwoju współczesnych gospodarek inwestycji w kapitał ludzki, co zwrotnie obniża efektywność gospodarki, tempo wzrostu PKB i poprzez działanie automatycznych stabilizatorów pogłębia problemy fiskalne (głębokość i czas trwania kryzysu zadłużenia). Kolejnym ważnym kosztem motywującym rządy do unikania niewypłacalności są koszty polityczne, które są zazwyczaj długotrwałe i znaczne. Reasumując, należy podkreślić, że wyniki badań empirycznych wykazują skrajne rozbieżności, co utrudnia wykorzystanie ich przez rządy do podejmowaniu decyzji w warunkach kryzysów zadłużenia.
EN
The aim of this paper is to present the most important theories and selected empirical evidence on the costs of sovereign default. The evaluation of these costs is essential for countries facing a debt crisis for deciding how far they should go to avoid default compared with the costs and benefits resulting from the repayment of their debts. The analysis shows that depending on the selection of econometric model and sample of countries, there are still extreme differences regarding the impact of the sovereign default on economic growth. For example, the costs of not repaying debts can range from zero to 10.5% in the short run while in the medium term it can range from zero to 10%. Similarly, significant differences relate to the impact of sovereign default on the access to the international capital markets and on the size of international trade. The most important potential economic cost of sovereign default inducing governments to repay their debts is its negative impact on the domestic economy through the financial system, mainly banks, which indirectly affects the state of the whole economy. The deterioration of the business environment leads to a reduction in private investments, particularly the investments in human capital, which are very important for the development of modern economies. It leads to the reduction of the efficiency of the economy and GDP growth, and through the operation of automatic stabilizers- -exacerbates fiscal problems (the depth and the duration of the debt crisis). Another important incentive for governments to repay their debts are political costs, which are usually significant and long-lasting. In summary, the results of empirical studies show extreme differences, making it difficult for governments facing a debt crisis to use them to make optimal decisions.
EN
This article focuses on two of the three pillars of the ‘EU through the Eyes of Asia’ perceptions project, and analyzes the Japanese print media and elite interviews. We focus on two issues: the first of these is exasperation at the slow progress towards an EU-Japan Free Trade Agreement/Economic Partnership Agreement (FTA/EPA). This exasperation is clearest in the Japanese elite interviews, but the trade negotiations also feature significantly in discussions in the Japanese print media. The second issue is the consistent perception of the EU as a significant normative and diplomatic power, and a leader on human rights promotion, with this perception strongly evident in both the Japanese print media and elite interviews. Overall, the EU was perceived positively as a political actor, and, in a boost for post-Lisbon perceptions of the EU, High Representative Catherine Ashton had a generally high and somewhat positive profile in Japan. This came across more strongly in the print media rather than the elite interviews. In a much-quoted speech given in Japan in 2006, Commission President José Manuel Barroso talked of the untapped trade potential within EU-Japan relations, and the normative power of the EU and Japan. A focus on perceptions helps to inform us about the global importance of the EU and how this is being interpreted outside of Europe. To understand the European Union itself we need to have an external reflection in order to interpret its meaning. Through our study, we hope to highlight and communicate the fact that the Barroso perspective is shared by many within Japan.
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Debt Reduction in the Eurozone

88%
EN
When the Greek crisis exploded in the spring of 2010 the eurozone countries collected funds to refinance Greece’s debt in order to stave off a banking crisis. Later Ireland and Portugal asked for similar eurozone assistance. Because refinancing (bailout) was not sufficient to enable these peripheral countries to solve their debt problems, they agreed to implement austerity programs so that they could use eurozone countries’ public funds. But these austerity measures, even if politically affordable, will not suffice. It is exceedingly possible that the peripheral countries will not outgrow their problems and will be unable to return to capital markets at their pre-crisis levels. Their debt-to-GDP as well as debt services-to-income ratios are likely to grow and additional debt reorganization programs including debt reduction (haircut) will be required. At the heart of the issue is the potential impact of a reduction of the peripheral economies’ debt on the monetary financial institutions of all European Union countries. As a result of the restructuring and partial debt reduction, banks may need to receive public support. To address these problems a new solution in the form of the European Stability Mechanism (EMS) has been proposed. It is expected to change the way in which the eurozone functions. However, the EMS idea is based on the same philosophy as the existing bailout instruments. It does not address the equal treatment and moral hazard issues, while the conditionality programs proposed so far have not softened the adverse impact of the growing debt burden on the economic performance of the debt-laden countries. The entire European Union financial system is at risk and remains vulnerable as long as the refinancing mechanisms are not supported by debt restructuring and reduction. Debt managers do not seem to know how to draw on past experience and so ad hoc measures prevail. To effectively manage that kind of debt reorganization, the European Union should create the necessary procedures to efficiently address the economic future of all heavily indebted economies. The EU should also be prepared politically to accept the costs of debt reduction or of a fundamental reorganization of the eurozone.
EN
The global financial and economic crisis has fully revealed the risks of over- -indebted countries, whose cause was, inter alia, the maintenance of structural deficits for many years. Economies of the Visegrad Group (V4 Group) conducted even less disciplined fiscal policy than the EU. Nevertheless, the V4 Group has weathered the crisis better than the EU, even though its initial fiscal position was worse. However, in the long term, the fiscal consolidation process will be hindered due to unfavorable demographic trends and the burden on public finances imposed by scarce social security systems. In this respect, the V4 Group is going to experience even greater challenges than the EU. The purpose of this article is to show the arithmetic course and consequences of the sovereign debt crisis on economies of V4 Group as well as the challenges related among others to ageing process its population is going to face in medium and long term.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono dynamikę negocjacji zadłużeniowych w strefie euro jako strategiczną grę między krajami centrum i krajami peryferyjnymi. W każdej grze strategicznej, negocjatorzy wyceniają, w sposób mniej lub bardziej formalny, wartość funkcji preferencji każdej ze stron. Pierwsze decyzje ratowania gospodarki Grecji podejmowano w sytuacji niepełnej informacji zarówno o wartości wypłat (mierzonych np. szacowaną wielkością zmian PKB), jak i o przedmiocie umowy związanej z realizacją wybranej strategii - refinansowania długów sektora publicznego Grecji. Rozpoczętą grę sekwencyjną, z niedoskonałą informacją, prezentowano na rynku jako skończone negocjacje. Tymczasem w negocjacjach pojawiały się nowe strategie (np. wyjścia ze strefy euro) i coraz większego znaczenia nabierała gra prowadzona między strefą euro a rynkiem kapitałowym. Istotnym problemem w rozpatrywanych negocjacjach zadłużeniowych jest ich koalicyjna postać. W strefie euro koalicje tworzą zarówno kraje centrum, jak i kraje peryferyjne. Ich stabilność zależy od podziału korzyści z przyjmowanego rozwiązania i ma istotne znaczenie dla sposobu rozwiązywania problemu zadłużenia w UGW i losów całej Unii Europejskiej. Autor zauważa, że wyniki interakcji uzyskiwane w negocjacjach z Grecją, Irlandią i Portugalią wpłynęły na kolejne strategie, a także na późniejsze postępowanie wobec problemów Hiszpanii i Włoch. Decyzje w sprawie powołanie Europejskiego Mechanizmu Stabilności, aktywnego włączenia Europejskiego Banku Centralnego w zarządzanie długiem na rynku kapitałowym, powołanie unii bankowej itp. są istotnym „uzupełnieniem" podjętych wcześniej decyzji restrukturyzacji długu Grecji, Portugalii i Irlandii.
EN
The paper looks at the dynamics of debt negotiations within the euro area as a strategic game between the central and peripheral countries. In each strategic game, players assess, in a more or less formal way, the pay-offs of each party. When the first decisions to rescue Greece were taken, the strategies were created in the game of incomplete information on both the value of pay-offs (for example the estimated size of the measured changes in GDP) and the subject of the contract related to the implementation of the selected strategies - refinancing of the public debt of Greece. The players began a sequential game with imperfect information, presented to the market as finished negotiations. Meanwhile, new strategies emerged (e.g. exit from the euro area) and the game between the euro area and the capital market became also more important. In the ongoing negotiations, the cooperative nature of the game gained an increasingly important role. The stability of the coalition depends on the distribution of the benefits of the adopted solutions and is essential for the process of solving the debt problem in the EMU and the fate of the European Union. It should also be noted that the results achieved in the negotiations with Greece, Ireland and Portugal contributed to the creation of new strategies. Decisions on establishment of the ESM, the ECB's active involvement in the management of debt in the capital market, the creation of a banking union, etc., constitute an important "complement" to the decisions taken earlier - to bailout strategies of Greece, Portugal and Ireland.
PL
W opracowaniu przeanalizowano alternatywne wyjaśnienie mechanizmów i przyczyn leżących u podstaw narastania kosztów obsługi długu publicznego w Grecji, Hiszpanii, Irlandii, Portugalii oraz we Włoszech. Podane zostały różne argumenty wspierające interpretację pojawienia się tego zjawiska jako kryzysu kursu walutowego w kontekście reżimu sztywnych kursów walutowych, związanego z występowaniem znaczącego zróżnicowania dynamik inflacyjnych, nierównowag handlowych oraz ograniczeń narzędzi polityki gospodarczej zarówno na poziomie narodowym, jak i europejskim. Zauważono przede wszystkim, że różne fazy narastania stóp procentowych w Grecji można wyjaśniać na podstawie dostępnych już modeli kryzysu walutowego. Zgod-nie z innymi źródłami podkreślono ponadto, że kraje peryferyjne kolejno dotknięte kryzysem łączył wyższy wzrost kosztu pracy w stosunku do krajów rdzenia, rejestrowany od momentu ich wejścia do wspólnej waluty aż do pojawienia się zwiększeń kosztów obsługi ich długu publicznego. Kraje peryferyjne odnotowały także znaczące deficyty rachunku bieżącego. Na podstawie przeprowadzonej przez autora analizy danych pokazano, że wyższe niż średnie w strefie euro tempo wzrostu cen rejestrowane w krajach peryferyjnych przyczyniło się do znaczącej i progresywnej aprecjacji realnego kursu walutowego we wszystkich tych krajach oraz mogło spowodować nadmierny wzrost kosztu pracy, utraty konkurencyjności i deficyty rachunku bieżącego. Zdaniem autora artykułu zróżnicowanie dynamik inflacyjnych mogło być więc główną przyczyną narastania kosztów obsługi długu publicznego w peryferyjnych państwach strefy euro.
EN
This work analyses an alternative explanation of mechanisms and likely causes, which could lead to the growth of public debt service costs in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Different arguments supporting interpretation of such a phenomenon as a currency crisis are given, underling that, in a fix exchange rate framework, significant inflation differential, trade imbalances and economic policy limitations at national as well as at European level could have been most likely causes of the crisis. First of all, it has been pointed out, that it is possible to explain different phases of yield rate growth in Greece on the basis of already existing currency crisis models. As already stressed in other sources, it has been, then, underlined, that from the very moment of their entrance in the euro area up to the European sovereign debt crisis breakthrough, all of the peripheral countries mostly interested by the crisis have registered higher labour cost growth in comparison with core countries. Moreover, peripheral countries have been running significant current account deficits, too. On the basis of author own empirical data analysis it has been, thus, pointed out that higher price growth rate registered in peripheral countries caused a relevant and progressive appreciation of the real exchange rate in each of those countries and it could then lead to higher labour cost growth rate, competiveness loses and current account deficits, as well. According to the author, inflation dynamics differences could, thus, have been the main cause of public debt service cost rises in peripheral euro area countries.
EN
Since the wide spreading of the European Union (EU) crisis begun, the research papers have been providing different definitions such as currency crisis, competitiveness crisis, banking crisis, balance of payment crisis, but the most frequent notion of EU crises is the sovereign debt crisis. In this paper, the researchers agree that the current European crisis can be identified as sovereign debt crises at its surface, but in order to search for solutions of EU problems, we must look deeper into the sources of this crisis. Through this paper, the multiplication of crisis is explained, whereby it is being concluded that one type of crisis led to another, while staying on the point that the Eurozone current crisis is basically a combination of two core crisis: balance of payment crisis and banking crisis. In order to support the hypothesis that sovereign debt crisis is deeply connected with balance of payment crisis, we have analysed the trade and capital flows of European countries. It was discovered that periphery countries mostly financed their current account deficit, trade deficits and public deficit through external borrowing from creditor countries. Further, the periphery countries have been cumulating not only trade deficit in trade activity with other European partners, but also in trade with the rest of the world. The key source of imbalances between the European countries seems to be a different level of competitiveness caused by different level of productivity. As the second face of EU crises, we recognised a banking crisis. We found that sovereign debt crisis and banking crisis are interconnected but banking crisis usually precedes the debt crisis. With the fast growth of international capital flows, financial integration was strongly regionally concentrated and became especially important within the EU. Through the analysis of the international investment position of creditor countries, it was concluded that these countries are more integrated within the euro area through financial flows than through real economic flows. Additionally, it was discovered that creditor countries’ banks were among the biggest investors in bonds of periphery countries such as Greece. In other periphery countries such as Ireland, banking crisis and subsequent measures for the rescuing of banking system led to the increase of public debt. In the other countries, banks were faced with solvency problems due to bad debt holdings. Having in mind that we found interconnection of the debt crisis with balance of payment crisis on the one side, and with the banking crisis on the other side, the conclusion is that sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone is a result of two-core crisis: balance of payment crisis and bank crisis. Reckoning on the European Union history where each crisis usually led to the stronger integration, maybe the current crisis is a step further towards better and deeper integration.
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