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EN
The main aim of this article is to show the role of Ukrainian police and special services in religious conflicts. According to the author the religious conflictis the situation in which at least one party to a dispute is defined through the prism of its relationship to religion. Ukraineis one of those post-Soviet countries, where–due to nothing unhampered freedom of religion–religious conflicts are the most. In view of the size of the paper we present only the most important of them. The author notes that the Ukrainian police and the Security Service of Ukraine are not contracting safeguard security and public order, but antagonizes parties to the dispute, andevenactors are considered conflicts. Many hope related to improving the image associated with the reform of the authorities responsible for internal security of Ukraine.
EN
One of the most basic functions of the state is to ensure the security to it and its citizens. Significant elements are: perseverance, political independence, territorial integrity and maintenance proper level of life quality. Today’s intelligence, which is part of the structures of security organs, belongs to the elite part of the special forces performing strategic goals. Therefore, acquiring the information by OSINT is important not only for the institution itself but also for citizens. OSINT is one of the means by which security is provided to the internal and external states. Open source information is one of the agents of economic, political, military, etc. Books, periodicals, statistical yearbooks, social networking sites and daily newspapers belong to the basic, verified sources. In globalized world, OSINT has particular importance because, due to the obtained information, the state can take defensive action. In this article, the author pointed out the use of OSINT in the military diagnosis.
EN
The existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact was the start of intensified competition for spheres of influence. Beneficiaries who were leading those political-military organizations, the United States and the Soviet Union, in the process of implementing their strategic objectives used a wide range of forces and assets owned. Their secret services, whose activities were of total character, took an active part in this rivalry. It is difficult to say what those services were not interested in. They were active participants in the information war, which supported primarily foreign policy and military operations. Their satellite states, which were of interest to intelligence services because of their military potential, were also involved in the ongoing political and ideological confrontation. One such example was Poland, which was recognized not only by the intelligence of the NATO countries (U.S., Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, West Germany), but also by intelligence of its allies (the Soviet Union and East Germany).
EN
In this article considered was issue of special services, which became particularly interesting after the Second World War. Made was an attempt of characterizing methods used by special services, and of formulating general definitions of terms associated to them, such as: intelligence services, spy, diversion and sabotage. Considered was also an unevident relation of special services to terrorist activity, especially the so called cyberterrorism, which in the article was characterized through indication of most common methods of such actions. Relevant for the article is also issue of security and information protection, particularly legal ways of fighting terrorism and activities of foreign special services.
EN
The purpose of this article is to present the origins and assumptions of the Russian concept of coercive migration engineering and its practical application with particular emphasis on the role of special services in such activities. The engineering of coercive migration has become an unprecedented form of leverage through which the Russian Federation pursues its geopolitical interests. The country’s use of this tool is a fact and not a conspiracy theory devoid of empirical evidence, as some analysts associated with European Union institutions believe. A comparison of the course of the exodus of Cubans from Mariel to Miami in 1980 and the Finnish-Russian migration crisis in 2015-2016 proves that at least since the Cold War, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and then the Russian Federation - on the basis of innovative approaches to security problems and conflict theory in military science - have developed effective means and methods of engineering coercive migration, making it a tool for destabilizing states and forcing political concessions favorable to themselves.
EN
The aim of the article is to analyze the determinants and other conditions of the religious policy of the Polish state towards the Methodist Church in the Stalinist period. The author took into account conceptual, programmatic, executive and operational activities undertaken by a complex subject of power, formed by three structures: party, administrative and special services. In his opinion, the liquidation direction of religious policy towards the Methodist Church was determined primarily by two factors: 1) the activity of Methodists in Masuria, which was assessed as “harmful activities” because they were competitive to the activity of the Evangelical-Augsburg Church (in which the authorities placed great hopes for effective repolonization of the native population), 2) strong links between the Methodist Church in Poland and the Methodist Church in the West (United States of America, Canada, Great Britain, Sweden). The liquidationa ctivities have been depicted primarily on the basis of solutions included in the action of special services under the codename “Moda”. The author also explains the reasons for the final resignation from the liquidation policy towards Polish Methodism and the inclusion of the Methodist Church in the direction of the rationing policy.
EN
The material scope of the research problem presented in the text encompasses the issues concerned with the possibilities for and limitations of recruiting secret collaborators by the Polish civilian intelligence service. The analysis of the problematics of secret collaboration focuses mainly on institutional and legal aspects, which can be seen in its inclusion in the systemic legal perspective, encompassing such dimensions as administrative and legal, criminal and legal, civil and legal, and ethical one. Next to the normative aspects, the text addresses sociological and psychological aspects of recruiting secret collaborators by special services, thereby depicting the main recruitment methods. The methodology adopted is chiefly based on the institutional and legal approach, in which use is made of, inter alia, textual, functional and systemic interpretations. The problem of possible abuse concerned with the recruitment of secret collaborators by special services is illustrated with an abstract case study and a relevant legal interpretation. Besides, to extend the analysis of psychological and sociological aspects of recruiting secret collaborators, the study uses limited open interviews with former officers of the civilian special services operating in Poland before 1990.
EN
The author discussed the matter of managing Polish special services, including the liquidation of the security service created in the period of the Polish People’s Republic and the establishment of the State Protection Office (SPO). The attention was paid inter alia to changes in the organization and in the scope of supervision over the SPO, which took place in 1996, as well as to the establishment in 1995 of the Sejm’s Special Services Committee. In 2002, the Internal Security Agency and the Foreign Intelligence Agency were established in the place of the SPO. Four years later, the Central Anticorruption Bureau was formed. The author came to the conclusion that changes in the scope of supervision and control over civil special services in the Polish state between 1990 and 2016 were connected, above all, to ongoing political events in Poland.
EN
The end of the communist dictatorship in Poland in 1989 was tantamount to the necessity of changing the manner of the functioning of the existent special services. The book presents the model of change of the civil special services between 1989 and 1990, when the communist Security Service was liquidated, and the Of ce for State Protection was appointed with the act of 6 April 1990. The author describes the process and demonstrates that in Poland both the “option zero” and “continuation” models were rejected and a “hybrid” model was adopted instead.
XX
The main objective of this article is to systematize the knowledge of the place occupied, and the role played, in the structure of government administration by the head of the Internal Security Agency. The author examines legal solutions allowing to characterize the legal status of the head of the Internal Security Agency as a body performing tasks arising from the functions of the State and as the entity in charge of a part of government administration capable to perform these tasks. According to the author, this objective requires presentation of the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the position of Head of the Internal Security Agency and characterization of powers which he/she may use in order to implement his/her tasks. The article provides a survey of the constitutional solutions that determine the status of the Head of the Internal Security Agency as central government administration body. In this context, the author shows the relations between the Head of the Internal Security Agency and the Prime Minister, to whom he/she is subordinate and who oversees the activities of the Internal Security Agency. He also provides an analysis of the principles of organization and management of the substantive work of the Agency. From this analysis it clearly follows that the Head of the Agency has to play at least some of the key roles in the “governmental” system of the State security. On the one hand, it accounts for an important aspect of national security, which is the “internal security” and “protection of the constitutional order”. On the other hand, the head of the Internal Security Agency has the authority to initiate certain specifi c activities of the Agency in fulfi llment of its tasks. His/her scope of competences include also assessment of performance of the Agency’s functionaries in the context of their offi cial operations. Moreover, he/she is responsible for implementation of important duties in rendering information to constitutional organs of the executive and to parliament.
EN
The article addresses the issue of Africa's position in Soviet/Russian foreign policy viewed from historical and contemporary standpoint. The analysis indicates the fact that until early 1950's the USSR paid scant attention to African countries. Thereafter until mid 1980's the USSR attempted to influence processes of modernization and decolonization in African continent. The 1990's are characterized by withdrawing from the presence in Africa. In recent 20 years Russia again has become increasingly involved in defusing armed conflicts in that continent.
EN
The author presents the de-classified preliminary findings of the European Commission funded FP7 research project PRIME, dealing with extremism, radicalization and lone-actor terrorism (also known as “lone wolf terrorism”). The article provides partial results of the research consisting of a context analysis of the lone actor threat, that is a description of a range of identified contextual elements which may affect the relevance, adoption, implementation or exploitation of the PRIME Project’s final deliverables (counter- and communication measures requirements portfolios), including differences in culture and legislation across Europe, as well as operational (law-enforcement-related and stakeholder-identified) constraints. The article presents a host of definitional issues related to “lone wolf terrorism”, provides results of the surveys/questionnaires performed in Poland and India and ends with a summary of the problems, constraints and obstacles to the successful and efficient use of operational procedures available for the law-enforcement and security agencies and institutions, based on data gathered through engagement activities with security practitioners.
EN
The author presents the de-classified preliminary findings of the European Commission funded FP7 research project PRIME, dealing with extremism, radicalization and lone-actor terrorism (also known as “lone wolf terrorism”). The article provides partial results of the research consisting of a context analysis of the lone actor threat, that is a description of a range of identified contextual elements which may affect the relevance, adoption, implementation or exploitation of the PRIME Project’s final deliverables (counter- and communication measures requirements portfolios), including differences in culture and legislation across Europe, as well as operational (law-enforcement-related and stakeholder-identified) constraints. The article presents a host of definitional issues related to “lone wolf terrorism”, provides results of the surveys/questionnaires performed in Poland and India and ends with a summary of the problems, constraints and obstacles to the successful and efficient use of operational procedures available for the law-enforcement and security agencies and institutions, based on data gathered through engagement activities with security practitioners.
EN
The 21st century has brought communities a number of challenges related to local armed conflicts (eg. In Syria and Ukraine). That resulted in the migration of people to the scale, which last time took place during the World War II. Then, this dilemma also affected Polish military special services but the problem was much more complex, because during the WWII, the Polish military intelligence was massacred. That gap in the military staff was filled by commanders of the tormentors. The purpose of this article is illustrate the nature and complexity of demographic, Polish military special forces after 1945 and set out the key issues related to the security of the Polish society in that period.
PL
Dwudziesty pierwszy wiek przyniósł społecznościom szereg wyzwań związanych z lokalnymi konfliktami zbrojnymi (np. w Syrii czy na Ukrainie), co pociągnęło za sobą migrację ludności na skalę, jaka ostatnio wystąpiła podczas II wojny światowej. Ten dylemat bardzo boleśnie dotknął również polskie wojskowe służby specjalne. Problem był o tyle bardziej złożony, że podczas II wojny światowej wojskową inteligencję polską w dosłownym znaczeniu wymordowano. A zatem powstałą lukę kadrową wypełniono dowódcami (oficerami) oprawców, którzy wcześniej czy później zostali rozliczeni przez „chichot” historii.
EN
This article presents information on corruption in Poland and attempts to assess the effectiveness of the Government Programme for Combating Corruption for 2014– 2019. The paper will be presented adescription of the phenomenon of corruption, scope and purpose of the program implemented anti-corruption, the authorities responsible for preventing and combating corruption. The rest of this article will be presented legislation on criminal offenses of corruption, together with a brief description. In order to realize the approximate analysis of the risk of corruption in the article will be presented statistics on the number of committed offenses of corruption in Poland in selected years. At the end will be conclusions about the effectiveness of the program. The article was developed largely on the basis of the assessed Programme, legislation and da-of statistics published in the Map of Corruption for 2014 compiled by the Central Anticorruption Bureau on the basis of data obtained from all departments and bodies involved-smokers in the fight against corruption.
PL
Artykuł przedstawia informacje na temat korupcji w Polsce oraz podejmuje próbę oceny skuteczności Rządowego Programu Przeciwdziałania Korupcji na lata 2014– 2019. W artykule został przedstawiony opis zjawiska korupcji, zakres i cel wdrożonego programu przeciwdziałania korupcji, a także organy odpowiedzialne za zapobieganie i zwalczanie korupcji. W dalszej części artykułu omówiono przepisy prawne dotyczące przestępstw korupcyjnych wraz z krótkim opisem. Aby można było zrealizować przybliżoną analizę stanu zagrożenia korupcją, w artykule przedstawiono dane statystyczne dotyczące ilości popełnionych przestępstw korupcyjnych w Polsce w wybranych latach. Na koniec sformułowano wnioski dotyczące skuteczności Programu. Artykuł został opracowany w głównej mierze na podstawie ocenianego Programu, przepisów prawnych oraz danych statystycznych publikowanych w Mapie Korupcji za 2014 r. opracowanej przez Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne na podstawie danych uzyskanych od wszystkich służb i organów zajmujących się zwalczaniem korupcji.
PL
Artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie zmian charakteru funkcji ministra koordynatora do spraw służb specjalnych w Polsce w latach 1997–2020 ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem elementów cywilnej kontroli nad działalnością służb specjalnych ze strony władzy wykonawczej oraz elementów wskazujących na możliwość ingerencji o charakterze politycznym w merytoryczną sferę ich działalności. Funkcjonowanie takiego organu, który powinien koordynować działalność tych newralgicznych instytucji w systemie bezpieczeństwa państwa w celu harmonizacji ich współdziałania dla osiągnięcia jak najlepszych efektów dla bezpieczeństwa państwa, jest zasadne. Analiza aktów prawnych regulujących działalność tego organu oraz określania jego kompetencji w omawianym okresie wskazuje raczej na próby politycznej ingerencji i wpływu rządzących na służby specjalne niż merytorycznej działalności w celu usprawnienia systemu bezpieczeństwa państwa w tym przedmiocie lub zapewnienia demokratycznej kontroli cywilnej.
EN
The aim of the article is to present the tranformation of the function of the minister – coordinator of special services in Poland between 1997 and 2020. In particular, the elements of civil democratic control and the examples of political influence towards special services are taken into consideration. It is very important to establish the institution that can provide suitable coordination in the specific area of the state security that can lead to the special services effectiveness. The analysis of the regulations connected with the minister-coordinator creation and activity shows rather the political involvment and influence towards special services activity than the positive aspects of impoving their coordination and cooperation for the state security and civil democratic control.
18
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Poszukiwany Józef Dolina

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EN
The presented text describes the backstage of the great operation of the communist service aimed at one of the graduates and employees of the Catholic University of Lublin. This pre-war graduate of the Faculty of Law and Socio-Economic Sciences of the Catholic University of Lublin, assistant at the Commercial Law Department and at the same time an assessor at the Lublin court, Józef Dolina, became one of the most sought after fugitives in the “political enemies of the state” category during the PRL. The collection of the Lublin Institute of National Remembrance contains files illustrating the extensive activities of the communist secret police, whose aim was to determine the whereabouts and surveillance of an escaped employee of the Catholic University of Lublin. To carry it out, forces and means were used to testify to the scale of the threat that the security service officers felt towards Józef Dolina.
PL
Prezentowany tekst opisuje kulisy wielkiej operacji komunistycznych służb wymierzonej w jednego z absolwentów i pracowników KUL. Ten przedwojenny absolwent Wydziału Prawa i Nauk Społeczno-Ekonomicznych KUL, asystent w Katedrze Prawa Handlowego i jednocześnie asesor sądowy w lubelskim sądzie, Józef Dolina, stał się w okresie PRL jednym z najpilniej poszukiwanych zbiegów zaliczanych do kategorii „wrogów politycznych państwa”. W zbiorach lubelskiego IPN znajdują się akta obrazujące szeroko zakrojone działania komunistycznej bezpieki, których celem było ustalenie miejsca pobytu i inwigilacja zbiegłego pracownika KUL. Do jej przeprowadzenia używano sił i środków świadczących o skali zagrożenia, jakie funkcjonariusze służb bezpieczeństwa odczuwali wobec Józefa Doliny.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono współpracę służb specjalnych z jednostkami specjalnymi. W pierwszej części materiału scharakteryzowano instytucje związane z działalnością jednostek specjalnych w Polsce. Opisano zmiany dokonane przez MON, którym ulegało Dowództwo Wojsk Specjalnych od końca 2013 r. do połowy 2015 r. Wspomniano elementy dotyczące planowania rozwoju sił specjalnych zarówno w Polsce, jak i w USA. Zaprezentowano spektrum operacji specjalnych z dość szczegółowym ich opisem. W drugiej części materiału opisano służby specjalne, których zadania sprowadzają się do zapewniania bezpieczeństwa kraju. Trzecia – ostatnia – część dotyczy współpracy służb specjalnych z formacjami specjalnymi, którą można podzielić na kilka elementów. Pierwszy z nich to współpraca związana z tworzeniem i wzajemnym wspieraniem się nowych jednostek specjalnych i jednostek antyterrorystycznych wchodzących w skład służb specjalnych. Kolejny element to współpraca, która przejawia się we wzajemnych skoordynowanych ćwiczeniach (szkoleniach), ostatni zaś – to wymiana informacji wywiadowczych i realizacja misji specjalnych oraz operacji specjalnych o zasięgu międzynarodowym. Zaprezentowana współpraca dotyczy polskich i zagranicznych jednostek oraz służb specjalnych.
EN
The article presents the work of the special services of special units. The first part of the material describes the characteristics of the institutions associated with the activities of special units in Poland and the changes made by the Ministry of National Defence during the period of the end of 2013 and mid 2015 relating to the Special Forces Command. The author has mentioned the elements involved in planning the development of the special forces, both in Poland and in the USA. The spectrum of special operations, with a fairly detailed description of special operations has also been presented. In the second part of the material special forces are described, whose tasks boil down to ensure the safety of the country. And the third – the last part of the article deals with cooperation between special services and special units. Special collaboration between the above mentioned departments and units can be divided into several components. The first one is related to the establishing of co-operation, mutual support that new special units get from antiterrorist units of special services. Another element is associated with mutual coordinated exercises. The next element of cooperation is the exchange of information, intelligence and implementation of special missions and special operations with international scope. Presented cooperation concerns Polish and foreign units and special services.
PL
W artykule autor podjął się analizy problemu, czy w procesie stanowienia prawa, na którego podstawie działają polskie służby specjalne, są respektowane prawa obywateli wyrażone w Konstytucji RP. Odniósł się także do uprawnień operacyjnych służb specjalnych zawartych w ustawach kompetencyjnych, które umożliwiają ingerencję państwa w wolności i prawa jednostki ze względu na ochronę interesu ogólnospołecznego i ogólnopaństwowego. W przepisach dotyczących wolności i praw obywatela – zawartych w art. 31 ust. 3 Konstytucji RP z 2 kwietnia 1997 r. – określono obszar, w który organy władzy publicznej i inne podmioty mogą wkraczać (wyłącznie na podstawie upoważnienia ustawowego) w celu zapewnienia obywatelowi bezpieczeństwa, ochrony porządku publicznego albo ochrony środowiska, zdrowia, moralności publicznej oraz wolności i praw innych osób. Autor opisał m.in. charakter uprawnień operacyjnych służb specjalnych na gruncie obowiązującego prawa, w tym znaczenie tych uprawnień dla skutecznej realizacji ustawowych zadań nałożonych na służby, oraz granice konstytucyjne i pozaustawowe ingerowania służb w wolność jednostki.
EN
The author in his article analyses the problem whether in the law making process, on the basis of which operate Polish special services, constitutional rights of citizens are respected. He addressed operational powers of special services as well from the respective competence acts which enable stat’s interference into freedoms and rights of citizens due to general social and state interest. In constitutional provisions regarding freedoms and rights of citizens (Article 31.3 of the constitution of 2 April 1997) there has been indicated the area in which public authority organs and other entities can interfere (solely on the basis of legal authorization) in order to ensure security for citizens, public order or environment protection, health, public morality, and freedoms and rights of other people. The author described, inter alia, the nature of operational powers of special services on the basis of the law in force, including the meaning of these powers for an effective implementation of actions designed for the services, as well as the constitutional and non-statutory frames for possible interference into rights of citizens.
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