Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Refine search results

Journals help

  1. 2 Studia Gilsoniana

Years help

  1. 1 2021

  2. 1 2020

Authors help

  1. 2 Polis D. F.

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  species problem
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

The Compatibility of Evolution and Classical Metaphysics

100%
Polis D. F.
Studia Gilsoniana
|
2020
|
vol. 9
|
issue 4
549-585
EN
The compatibility of evolution with Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics is defended in response to Fr. Michal Chaberek’s thesis of incompatibility. The motivation and structure of Darwin’s theory are reviewed, including the roles of secondary causality, randomness and necessity. “Randomness” is an analogous term whose evolutionary use, while challenging, is fully compatible with theism. Evolution’s necessity derives from the laws of nature, which are intentional realities, the vehicle of divine providence. Methodological analysis shows that metaphysics lacks the evidentiary basis to judge biological theories. Species are entia rationis whose immutability does not conflict with the evolutionary succession of biological populations. While Darwin’s theory was unknown to Aquinas, he endorses the possibility of new species immanent in the initial state of the universe, nor does his understanding of exemplar ideas offer ground for objection. Finally, five arguments given by Fr. Chaberek are answered.
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Metaphysics and Evolution: Response to Critics

88%
Polis D. F.
Studia Gilsoniana
|
2021
|
vol. 10
|
issue 4
847-891
EN
I respond to Michał Chaberek’s and Robert A. Delfino’s criticisms of my argument that evolution is compatible with Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. Biological species, as secondary substances, are beings of reason founded in the natures of their instances. They are traceable to God’s creative intent, but not to universal exemplars. Aquinas teaches that concepts are derived from sensible accidents. Thus, evolution’s directed variation of such accidents will eventually require new species concepts. This accords with projective realism, which allows diverse, well-founded concepts based on the multiple perspectives and conceptual spaces of knowing subjects. Charges that this is nominalism, not moderate realism, are rebutted; however, it is relativism because knowledge is a subject-object relation. Other metaphysical issues are considered. Chaberek’s thesis that species cannot evolve naturally fails because he: (1) reifies the species concept, (2) misrepresents the motivation, structure and conclusions of evolution, (3) confuses Aristotle’s four causes and (4) limits God’s creative omnipotence. Finally, Chaberek is out of step with contemporary theology.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.