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Peirce o „substancji" i „fundamentach"

100%
EN
In this article, the author presents the view that C. S. Peirce’s thought contains ideas that can help clarify and resolve many of the philosophical problems raised by contemporary thinkers. In the author’s opinion, these thinkers are more predisposed towards understanding Peirce’s thoughts than those who lived in his own time. This article discusses two such problems: (1) the substantiality of beings (including the conception of the self) and (2) the foundations of human knowledge.
EN
The present article discusses the emergence of the term “substance” (ousia). It is shown that while the word obviously has its roots in Greek language and tradition, it presupposes a much broader context. Thus, to comprehend the full meaning of the term one must take into account the whole philosophical tradition in which it occurs and the whole of reality to which it refers. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that from the very beginning ousia (substantia) was linked to that which exists actually and constitutes the internal principle (essence) of being. This causal nature of the substance is frequently overlooked and the sense of the word is very often reduced to an eternal and immutable substrate (i.e., something static and unchanging).
3
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Aristotelova zmena paradigmy v ontológii

86%
EN
Aristotle‘s intellectual contribution to ontology has been interpreted in history as the culmination of the preceding evolution of philosophy. To a large extent he himself contributed to such a Hegelian notion of his place in the history of metaphysics, or more precisely ontology. In this paper, we will argue that Aristotle brought about a 180-degree change in ontological thinking, a conceptual revolution that can be described in terms of Kuhn’s “paradigm shift.” This means that what was previously described by philosophers as a false or illusory reality is, according to Aristotle, a true reality. Paradigmatic examples of such true reality are not elements or roots (of all the different things), atoms, or ideas, but ordinary medium-sized material objects, especially plants, animals, humans and their essences.
SK
Aristotelov myšlienkový prínos v ontológii sa v dejinách interpretuje ako určité zavŕšenie predchádzajúceho vývoja filozofie. On sám veľkou mierou prispel k takémuto heglovskému ponímaniu svojho miesta v dejinách metafyziky, resp. ontológie. V tomto príspevku budeme argumentovať v prospech tézy, že Aristoteles uskutočnil v ontológii myšlienkový obrat o 180°, konceptuálnu revolúciu, ktorú je možné označiť kuhnovským termínom – zmena paradigmy. To znamená, že to, čo bolo dovtedy filozofmi označované ako nepravá až iluzórna skutočnosť, je podľa Aristotela pravá skutočnosť. Paradigmatickými príkladmi takejto pravej reality nie sú prvky či korene (všetkých vecí), atómy, idey, ale bežné materiálne objekty strednej veľkosti, predovšetkým rastliny, zvieratá, ľudia a ich esencie.
EN
There are many ontologies of the world or of specific phenomena such as time, matter, space, and quantum mechanics1. However, ontologies of information are rather rare. One of the reasons behind this is that information is most frequently associated with communication and computing, and not with ‘the furniture of the world’. But what would be the nature of an ontology of information? For it to be of significant import it should be amenable to formalization in a logico-grammatical formalism. A candidate ontology satisfying such a requirement can be found in some of the ideas of K. Turek, presented in this paper. Turek outlines the ontology of information conceived of as a part of nature, and provides the ‘missing link’ to the Z axiomatic set theory, offering a proposal for developing a formal ontology of information both in its philosophical and logicogrammatical representations.
EN
The article attempts to confront Roman Berger’s concepts of music theory, in particular the theory of musical analysis, using one of his works: Sonata No. 3 „da camera” for piano (1971). In its most general aspect, the confrontation focuses on the overriding idea in Berger’s theory, which defines a piece of music as a specific integral combination of shape (form) and movement of substance (musical material), aimed at achieving a desired expressive message. In terms of SHAPE, the sonata builds an image of an integrated, almost concentric musical piece generated from a single structural idea. Its individual levels and stages demonstrate features analogous to the sonata model, both in the composition of the 4-movement cycle, and the generic solutions applied in individual segments. This frame, which accounts for the outermost quality of the work’s structure, is filled with SUBSTANCE, or the musical content, the “movement” of which builds the genre-specific and microformal levels of the development process. The structural idea, or motif, which is the essential element of the substance, is subject to the structural programme, which — pursuant to Berger’s concept of movement of substance — takes various forms, ranging from associative to almost dissociative. Adopting the criterion of the degree of association, three basic form classes are arrived at (A, B, and C). The combinations of the classes, correlated with the agogical norm, determine the formal structure of the sonata. This is how Berger’s concept of inteThe article attempts to confront Roman Berger’s concepts of music theory, in particular the theory of musical analysis, using one of his works: Sonata No. 3 „da camera” for piano (1971). In its most general aspect, the confrontation focuses on the overriding idea in Berger’s theory, which defi nes a piece of music as a specifi c integral combination of shape (form) and movement of substance (musical material), aimed at achieving a desired expressive message. In terms of SHAPE, the sonata builds an image of an integrated, almost concentric musical piece generated from a single structural idea. Its individual levels and stages demonstrate features analogous to the sonata model, both in the composition of the 4-movement cycle, and the generic solutions applied in individual segments. This frame, which accounts for the outermost quality of the work’s structure, is fi lled with SUBSTANCE, or the musical content, the “movement” of which builds the genre-specifi c and microformal levels of the development process. The structural idea, or motif, which is the essential element of the substance, is subject to the structural programme, which — pursuant to Berger’s concept of movement of substance — takes various forms, ranging from associative to almost dissociative. Adopting the criterion of the degree of association, three basic form classes are arrived at (A, B, and C). The combinations of the classes, correlated with the agogical norm, determine the formal structure of the sonata. This is how Berger’s concept of integrity and building the shape through substance is generally carried through. The purpose of the piece, which is its expressive message, is basically determined in the sonata dedication: in memoriam Frico Kafenda (the composer’s teacher and friend). The dedication governs the moods of the music, as well as the distribution and intensity of tensions, coordinated with the genre-essence of the form. On this level, naturally for a musical piece in a sense, the intertextual, symbolic contexts are embedded.grity and building the shape through substance is generally carried through. The purpose of the piece, which is its expressive message, is basically determined in the sonata dedication: in memoriam Frico Kafenda (the composer’s teacher and friend). The dedication governs the moods of the music, as well as the distribution and intensity of tensions, coordinated with the genre-essence of the form. On this level, naturally for a musical piece in a sense, the intertextual, symbolic contexts are embedded.
EN
Maximus the Confessor is one of the first authors who use the term perichoresis. What is more important, facing monophysitism and monotheletism he defines the fundamental terms, such as substance, hypostasis and nature. On the base of these formulas he develops his doctrine of two natures in one hypostasis, underlining that we cannot use the terms: fu¢sij su¢nqetoj, mi¢a a¥plw¤j fu¢sij or mi¢a su¢nqetoj fu¢sij in relation to Christ. The only proper term is u¥po¢stasij su¢nqetoj - Son of God consubstantial with Father and with all human beings
EN
The subject of this paper is the issue of human speech in Aristotle, especially in his work Categories. Its primary goal is to elaborate an interpretation of Aristotle’s statements about human speech as a quantity (Cat. 4b20–b39, 5a15–b2) that would allow them to fit reasonably into the whole of Aristotle’s theory of language. The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first part a certain approach to the question of the reconstruction of Aristotle’s theory of language is proposed. The second part, by means of the introduction of the criteria of separability and ontological priority of the first substance, creates a framework for the subsequent analysis of the two basic classifications, which constitute the main theme of Categories. The third part supplies its own interpretation of the ontological status of human speech in the context of the classification schemes in Categories, and this, in the fourth part, is inserted into the greater whole of Aristotle’s theory of language.
SK
Predmetom analýzy v tejto stati je problematika ľudskej reči u Aristotela, špeciálne v jeho diele Kategórie. Hlavným cieľom práce je vypracovanie takého výkladu Aristotelových vyjadrení o ľudskej reči ako o kvantite (Kategórie 4b20–b39, 5a15–b2), ktorý by zmysluplne zapadal do celku Aristotelovej teórie jazyka. Štruktúra práce je nasledovná. V prvej časti je navrhnutý určitý prístup k otázke rekonštrukcie Aristotelovej teórie jazyka. Druhá časť si pomocou predstavenia kritérií separability a ontologickej priority prvej substancie vytvára rámec pre následnú analýzu dvoch základných klasifikácií, ktoré sú nosnou témou diela Kategórie. Tretia časť poskytuje vlastný výklad ontologického statusu ľudskej reči v kontexte klasifikačných schém diela Kategórie, a tento výklad je v záverečnej, štvrtej časti state zasadený do celku Aristotelovej teórie jazyka.
Logos i Ethos
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2015
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issue 2(39)
97–115
EN
The article undertakes the issue of metaphysical subjectivity in the philosophy of the human person developed by Karol Wojtyła. He drew extensively upon the notion of suppositum but there is no systematic exposition of the concept in his work. The article undertakes the task of investigating the issue. First, Wojtyła’s approach to metaphysics is presented. Second, the paper sets out the philosopher’s understanding of suppositum. Finally, some further clarifications are developed, including those helping to better understand the association of the metaphysical subjectivity with the personal. Wojtyła’s concept of suppositum requires a stronger reference to a pro-personalistic notion of substance. The latter seems to be offered by an original project of Thomistic metaphysics presented by W. Norris Clarke. The last part of the paper is an attempt at demonstration of the complementarity of metaphysical ideas of these two philosophers.
EN
The article is aimed at analysis of 9–24 stanzas of XXI chapter of philosophical poem Laghu-tattva-sphoṭa, i.e. A Light Bursting of the Reality, authored by Amṛtachandra-sūri (10th c. A.D.), the Jain thinker. Chapter XXI is dedicated to the problem of universals and particulars, meaningful and influential subject of Indian, as well as Western philosophy.
EN
This paper is based on the assumption that there is a system to conceptual metaphor and to its conceptualized linguistic expression. Conceptual metaphor is not a matter of arbitrary fixity. Individual basic metaphors and even generic-level metaphors are not isolated. There is a higher unity to metaphor that governs not only all basic and generic-level metaphors, but novel metaphors as well. When we understand a scene, including those described in literary texts, we naturally structure it in terms of conceptual mega-metaphors which may structurally unite the patterns of meaning throughout the whole of the text and find expression in various minor novel metaphors. As the subject matter of this analysis I have chosen the series of novels "Children of Violence" by the famous British writer Doris Lessing (1919-2013), the Nobel Prize winner for literature in 2007.
EN
One of the main difficulties that Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle face is the different treatment that the Categories and the Metaphysics offer to the question of the substance. After describing briefly the status quaestionis ousiae in Aristotle, and after tracing the main Neoplatonic interpretations of this doctrine (from Plotinus’ negative one to Porphyry’s positive and “conciliatory” one), this article attempts to demonstrate that the Neoplatonists of Athens and Alexandria, Syrianus and Ammonius, inaugurate a new interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine. With regard to the category of substance in general and to the question of substantiality of “immanent form” in particular, this new interpretation goes beyond the positions of Plotinus and Porphyry and returns the ontological value to the Aristotelian substances. Unlike Plotinus, who recognized as ousia only that one intelligible, that is five genres of the Platonic Sophist, and unlike Porphyry, who defused the anti–Platonic fuse of the Categories, giving to this treaty a mainly semantic skopos, these philosophers, through their original study of the theory of the three states of katholou, already shed in the Porphyrian Eisagôgê, fit the immanent forms of Aristotle, recognized as substances and as a reflection of the transcendental universal, into the late antique Neoplatonic metaphysical triadic structure.
EN
Reference to persons with personal pronouns raises the issue of the primary referent and its nature. “I” does not refer to a property or cluster of properties. This contrasts with our identifying grasp of persons. A person is a radical singularity and thus stands in contrast to a kind or sortal term. The individuation of persons is not adequately grasped by “definite descriptions” or “eidetic singularities.” In spite of the seeming possibility of persons being wholly identical in terms of properties, in other words, “doubles,” the core referent of reference to persons is not to what is individuated merely by mere numerical differences or spatial-temporal, and essential-eidetic determinations. Rather we have to do with a “non-sortal unique essence.” What “I” refers to is a self-individuating substance. This raises questions for the proper referent of “love.” What is it that love intends or loves if persons are basically radical singularities. What does one love and why does one love if whom one loves is most essentially non-sortal? The question of the ontological status of persons requires integrating the status of being transcendental I’s, and thus being non-temporal, non-spatial, non-sortal, simple (non-composite) substances and thus not homogenous with the experienced world.
EN
The teaching on the Eucharist from The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas aptly illustrates that philosophy is an indispensable tool for rationalizing revealed truths in practicing theology. The author applies terminology developed on the basis of Aristotelian metaphysics to properly conceive the mystery which the liturgy refers to with the words: “This is the great Mystery of Faith”. Using the metaphysical concepts of “matter” and “form” as well as “substance” and “accidents,” Aquinas describes the essence of the Eucharistic mystery in which, through the words constituting the form of the sacrament, uttered by the priest on behalf of Christ and at His command, the substance is transformed from bread and wine (transubstantiatio) into the substance of the Body and Blood of the Lord. As a result, the accidents of bread and wine, still perceived by the senses, exist by the power of God’s creative action without their proper subject. Thomas draws attention to the uniqueness of the sacrament of the Eucharist among other sacraments, in which matter, such as water or oil, does not undergo a substantial transformation, but becomes only an instrument, the use of which is accompanied, through its consecration, by a specific power to produce spiritual effects.
PL
Szczególnym przykładem przemawiającym za prawdziwością stwierdzenia, w myśl którego filozofia stanowi niezbędne narzędzie, służące racjonalizacji prawd objawionych, pozostaje nauka o Eucharystii zawarta w Sumie Teologicznej św. Tomasza z Akwinu. Autor ten sięga po terminologię wypracowaną na gruncie arystotelesowskiej metafizyki celem wyjaśnienia istoty Misterium, do którego liturgia odnosi słowa: „Oto wielka Tajemnica Wiary”. Posługując się metafizycznymi pojęciami „materii” i „formy” oraz „substancji” i „przypadłości”, Akwinata podejmuje swego rodzaju próbę wyrażenia niewyrażalnego, opisując istotę Eucharystycznego Misterium, w którym - pod wpływem stanowiących formę sakramentu słów, wypowiadanych przez kapłana w imieniu samego Chrystusa oraz na Jego wyraźne polecenie - następuje zamiana substancji chleba i wina (transsubstantiatio) w substancję Ciała i Krwi Pańskiej. W wyniku tej przemiany spostrzegane nadal ludzkimi zmysłami przypadłości chleba i wina istnieją bez właściwego sobie podmiotu, mocą stwórczego działania Boga. Tomasz zwraca uwagę na wyjątkowość sakramentu Eucharystii wśród innych sakramentów, w których ich materia, jak woda czy olej, nie ulegają substancjalnej przemianie, ale pozostając nadal sobą spełniają jedynie rolę narzędzia, którego użyciu towarzyszy, dzięki ich konsekracji, określona moc sprawiania duchowych skutków.
EN
Marcin Śmiglecki (1564-1618) was one of the most famous Polish representatives of the second scholastics. His work Logica, originally published in Ingolstadt (1618), was followed by three times published at Oxford (1634, 1638 and 1658).This work includes a series of logical and metaphysical problems, issue of subsistence among them the. This issue belongs to the metaphysical problematics of the substance and is associated with the concept of being. An outline of the issues of subsistence, which we find in The Logic (1618), is very important, because in the earlier lectures in Vilnius (1586/1587), our thinker barely mentioned it. The problem was discussed in the Christian tradition. On the manner its consideration influenced mainly views of Boethius (c. 480-525), who understood the subsistence as a substance take on the aspect of independent existence. This idea developed St. Thomas Aquinas (1225- 1275) in accordance with its metaphysics of existence. The concept of subsistence meant for him independence in existence understood as the act of being. Generally, the second scholasticism, which was founded on the tradition of “pure” Aristotelianism, marginalized this question. We find this expressed in the views of Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), who claimed that “to subsist” means only one of many properties of the substance and that does not matter for the theory of being. However, for Śmiglecki, the concept of subsistence was essentially important. In the field of contingent beings it enabled him to positive statement the substance as being able to exist by itself. It was a generally valid definition of subsistence, especially referring to substances created. In this meaning “the subsistence” marked the independent existence, not inherent in the substrate. In the second and the crucial meaning, the subsistence is characterized by independence from any cause. This is the case of God’s Substance, Existence itself by itself. It seems that the great advantage of the concept of subsistence in Śmiglecki’s theory was that it allowed to accurately distinguish between substance created and the uncreated. The solution of this difficult problem was made possible by drawing attention to the existential aspect of being. Aquinas’ theory of being suggested this solution, but in the period of second scholasticism Aristotelian metaphysics was favorited. Thomistic accents were probable the cause that Śmiglecki’s Logic was initially negatively censured in Roma (1615). This is the fact, in his fundamental work our author walked away from some interpretations introduced by F. Suárez and masters of Jesuits school, but finally that gave great effects.
16
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Pantheism

72%
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2016
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vol. 64
|
issue 4
67-91
EN
In this paper I have had two aims. One was to describe a number of pantheist or near pantheist religious attitudes, including the influence of many worlds theories. The other was to indicate some of the ways we might arrive at Pantheism. One final remark: when assessing religious positions the intellectual grounds for accepting or rejecting them should, I suggest, be whether they make sense of things, that is, enable us to under­stand. The ways to Pantheism, or to near Pantheism, should therefore be interpreted as part of a com­parison between ways of understanding.
PL
Powyższy artykuł jest eksplikacją pojęcia panteizm, zawierając przy tym dwie osobliwości. Po pierwsze, zamiast ujmować panteizm jako tezę czysto metafizyczną, traktuję go jako teorię zarówno metafizyczną, jak i wartościującą, głoszącą, że Wszechświat godny jest religijnej czci. Takie określenie panteizmu ma swoje konsekwencje dla odróżnienia tej doktryny od zbliżonych stanowisk, jak na przykład panenteizm. Po drugie, w moim artykule rozważam, jakie znaczenie posiada popularna obecnie (i słusznie) Teoria Wielu Światów dla argumentacji na rzecz panteizmu. W wąskim lub ścisłym sensie panteizm jest tezą głoszącą, że wszechświat jest Bogiem, przy czym przez Boga, pisanego z dużej litery, rozumiem istotę w najwyższym stopniu godną religijnej czci. To odróżnia panteizm od panenteizmu, czyli tezy głoszącej, że wszechświat jest częścią Boga, a nie całym Bogiem. W szerszym sensie panteizm jest tezą głoszącą, że wszechświat jest godny religijnej czci, chociaż nie w najwyższym stopniu.
EN
The present text deals with two layers of philosophic psychology/anthropology in the works of Thomas Aquinas and strives to examine the mutual relationships and interrelated meanings between these layers while paying particular attention to the biblical image of a human being as imago Dei. With respect to this aim, the paper contains a justification of the distinction between philosophic psychology, which understands soul as a substantial form of the human being, and dualistic philosophic psychology, which views soul as the subject of activities, or as incomplete substance. This distinction is then confirmed as confronted with the way Thomas Aquinas delimits the human being as imago Dei in his Summa Theologiae, by which means the way we understand this expression becomes more exact, and the importance of Thomas's dualistic terminology, which we encounter in his works, is emphasised at the same time.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2017
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vol. 6
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issue 3
451-483
EN
The article aims at proposing a way of solution to the problem why mathematics is efficient in physics. Its strategy consists in, first, identifying servere reductionisms performed on physical processes in order to have them correspond to mathematics. As this makes it impossible to understand the real relationship between matter and mathematics, a necessary step on the way to an understanding is to abandon the reductionisms from the very outset. Consequently, one is faced with the need of searching for mathematical elements in nature, as if there never had been any successful mathematics in physics. And for this search, one has to rely on experience alone. To this end, the article takes its inspiration from two pillars of Aristotelian philosophy of nature, the notions of ‘substance’ and ‘dynamics’, together with a careful examination of the treasure of accumulated experience in physics. Upon this basis, the hylomorphic structure of elementary particles, which are considered to be at the basis of all material substances, is the source for the most common features of the dynamical order of material things in general. This dynamical order, in turn, is quite likely to be reflected in mathematical terms. This is a novel approach because, at present, the most common framework for dealing with the question of mathematics in physics is Scientific Realism. It addresses the question why the existent physico-mathematical theories are successful. In order to find an answer, it starts from these theories and some methodological considerations, but does not address the question of where these theories stem from. In particular, it does not consider the possibility that these theories might, at least in part, stem from the material things they are referring to. The latter approach is what is suggested here. It is that of Natural Realism, of which Aristotle is an eminent representative.
Forum Philosophicum
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2014
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vol. 19
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issue 2
241–249
EN
Saint Maximus the Confessor’s voluminous corpus constitutes a coherent and lucid philosophical and theological system, notwithstanding the existence of obscure, difficult, and at times even contradictory passages. A question stemming from Maximus’ work is whether the “intelligible creation” (noēte ktisis) is imperishable or corruptible, which would have important implications for a number of other issues like the created / uncreated distinction, Maximus’ relationship to Neoplatonism, et al. However, Maximus provides us with contradictory passages concerning this subject, characterizing the noēte ktisis as both corruptible and imperishable. While in certain passages of the Ambigua ad Ioannem he states that created intelligible beings move “according to corruption,” excluding the possibility of natural incorruptibility for them, in other passages he states that the noēte ktisis possesses imperishability by nature, and not merely by grace. In this paper I will attempt to examine this apparent inconsistency on the basis of these two examples and to discuss which of both positions should be considered as Maximus’ “primary” position.
EN
In one of the last chapters of his book Truth and Method, Gadamer writes a “coining of the concept of language throughout the history of Western thought,” and when reaching the study of the Middle Ages, he surprises his readers by considering the theological issue of the “incarnation of the Verb” to explain the relationship between thought and language. However, this resource allows him to develop an argument in support of his ontological-hermeneutical theory of language. The analogy between theological theme and mode of being of language was already thought by Saint Augustine and recorded in his book On the Trinity. There he elaborates on the substantial nature of the inside or internal verb, and the particular way in which it undergoes the process that leads to its incarnation into vox, neither getting lost nor becoming a mere conventional sign. By ways of the connection between the interior verb with notitias, with the ideas in the Verb, and with the essence of physical things in this world, an interesting and coherent ontologization of language it achieved, which would later inspire Gadamer.
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